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In the summer of 2007, a few months before commencing with my bachelor studies, I read an 
article in a German weekly news magazine on a real estate crisis in the United States. The 
report was relatively short and mentioned problems of home buyers who are no longer able 
to repay their mortgages. It also explained that these problems could affect the banking sector 
via loan defaults, and that dangers in this regard are nowhere near being eliminated. However, 
I interpreted these remarks as concerns with a relatively limited scope, rather than a warning 
of serious global risks, especially because news coverage on this topic was generally limited, 
and stock indices around the globe still reached new all-time highs at that time, indicating a 
prosperous economy, at least from a superficial perspective. In short, I would not have ex-
pected to hear much more on this topic in the following months – not to mention years. 
I was, however, proven wrong. The difficulties in the U.S. housing sector were followed by 
problems in the banking sector. Given the highly internationally interlinked nature of the latter 
sector, all industrial countries, as well as many developing countries, were rapidly affected, 
and negative impacts on the real economy inevitably followed. In the next years, the Financial 
Crisis became omnipresent. With Greece’s government debt, youth unemployment in Spain, 
and nationalised banks in Germany, everything was connected to this Crisis, and keeping an 
overview of the specific sub-crisis to which one is referring could prove difficult.1 
When I completed my master studies in 2013, reports on the poor financial situation in Greece 
were still present in the news, more than every second adolescent was still unemployed in 
Spain, and the German government still held shares in former private banks. The problems 
that began with increased risk-taking, in combination with relatively low levels of regulation 
in the U.S. real estate market 10 years ago, and which developed to a global Financial Crisis,2 
are – as of autumn 2018, by the time that I am working on my doctoral dissertation – at least 
partially still present, even though most stock indices recovered and exceeded their pre-crisis 
level. In the case of the Greek government-debt crisis in particular, a long-term solution is still 
not discernible. Furthermore, the repayment of emergency loans provided to several southern 
European countries is planned as a process over several decades to come. In addition, central 
banks in industrial countries are still dealing with the consequences of the Financial Crisis. 
Apart from other unconventional monetary policies, the perceived need to stimulate the 
economy is illustrated by low – or even negative – base rates. The risks in line with current 
monetary policies might unintentionally already pave the way for the next financial and eco-
nomic crisis. 
While the financial problems of the eurozone continue to exist, another major crisis concerns 
European countries since summer 2015: As a result of to the poor economic situation and civil 
                                                     
1 In this study, the terms “Crisis”, “Financial Crisis”, “recent Financial Crisis”, and “Financial Crisis since 2007” 
refer to the general global financial and economic developments since August 9th, 2007. Other commonly used 
terms, such as “Credit Crisis”, “Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis”, and “Eurozone Crisis”, are sometimes chosen to 
describe more specific developments in certain sectors or regions (cf. Kickert et al., 2015, p. 565). 
2 The Financial Crisis’ 10th anniversary, however, did not receive much media attention, apart from some nota-




wars in the Middle East and Africa, more than 1 million migrants and refugees travelled to the 
European Union seeking asylum. A lack of housing possibilities, problems with integration, and 
heavy burdens on the welfare systems are part of the many-layered societal consequences. 
The increase in Islamic terrorist activities on European soil is also partially related to the mi-
grant crisis. Terrorist attacks and terrorist plots have developed into relatively frequent events 
in recent years, particularly in Western Europe. Corresponding countermeasures involve re-
sources of all levels of government. 
In terms of media coverage, the Eurozone Crisis was temporarily pushed into the background 
by the newly evolving migrant crisis – as a form of social crisis – since 2015, as well as Islamic 
terrorism, possibly also resulting in the misleading perception of many citizens that all the 
financial and government debt-related problems had been solved in the meantime. On the 
contrary, the current situation in some European countries can be described as a double or 
triple crisis scenario, certainly neither improving nor simplifying the overall situation. 
Both the Financial Crisis and the migrant crisis imposed and partly still impose a heavy burden 
on local government – the governmental level generally considered to be closest to the citi-
zens in line with its local presence. Although usually financially supported by other levels of 
government, the local level faces the consequences of most crises the most directly. Social 
benefits for those who lost their jobs in an economic downturn, housing for those who arrive 
in a country regardless of their legal status, and many more responsibilities are among the 
public services usually provided by the municipalities. Reflecting on the additional burdens of 
recent years, those are often unequally distributed across the world as well as within certain 
countries. Historical conditions and the own crisis management, as well as many other factors, 
determine the actual local scope of a crisis and its duration. 
Overall, the recent Financial Crisis has raised various questions ranging from the specific rea-
sons for its emergence to the most appropriate responses depending on the particular devel-
opments in a certain region or industry. Considering the scope and complexity of the Crisis, 
substantiated answers require insights from multiple academic disciplines. This doctoral dis-
sertation aims to evaluate the varying impact of and responses to the Financial Crisis at the 
local level in the Netherlands. 
The structure of this study consists of a subdivision into four parts. Part one serves as the 
introduction by providing an overview of the developments of the Financial Crisis since 2007 
and its global implications. In addition to remarks on previous research on the topic, the rele-
vance of this study, with its focus at the Dutch local level, is emphasised. The specification of 
the theoretical and methodological approach makes up the content of part two. In line with 
the research topic, political-administrative theory and economic theory are the main focus. 
The empirical part will primarily be comprised of quantitative analyses of changes to municipal 
balance sheets during the Financial Crisis. Then, part three addresses the recent Financial Cri-
sis and its implications for the Netherlands. After providing general insights into the country’s 
political-administrative system, including the role of the local level, and the developments of 
the Crisis separately, both subjects are brought together. Based on official documents and 
previous research, the developments of the Financial Crisis since 2007 and the political-ad-




implications for the national level, the situation at the local level, including changes in local 
government finance at an aggregated level, is subsequently analysed. While official statistics 
are the main source of data, own survey results, including qualitative components, serve as 
an addition. Part four focuses on the varying effects of and responses to the Financial Crisis 
across the Dutch municipal level by analysing each municipality’s situation separately. By in-
cluding additional factors, such as socio-economic indicators, organisational characteristics, 
and political majorities, the questions as to why the municipalities were affected differently 
by the Financial Crisis and why they decided on diverse responses are researched. This last 
part of the study closes with an overall discussion of the empirical findings in the context of 











Part 1: Introduction 
What developments caused the Financial Crisis since 2007, and how did it evolve? What were 
the implications for citizens, private companies, and nation states, and how did these change 
over time? Were some countries more affected than others, and what are potential explana-
tions? These and other questions are briefly addressed in the first part of this study. Overall, 
this part serves as an introduction and gives an overview of the recent Financial Crisis as well 
as the research intentions. 
Apart from general observations and the development in Western countries, the local level is 
introduced as the main object of research. Previous publications regarding the impact of and 
responses to the recent Financial Crisis are briefly mentioned, and the limited research at the 
local level is pointed out. This circumstance is also one of the aspects put forward to highlight 
the overall relevance of this study by providing quantitative insights into the implications of 
the Crisis at the local level in particular. The introductory chapter closes with a presentation 





1. The Financial Crisis since 2007 and its consequences 
“Risk comes from not knowing what you’re doing.” 
- Warren E. Buffet3 
 
The history of the Financial Crisis since 2007 began with the end of a previous crisis and a 
subsequent period of recovery,4 which can be considered to be a typical development in a 
global economy characterised by boom and bust cycles. Increased speculation, mainly regard-
ing securities linked to companies with Internet business-related activities, along with the at-
traction of many private traders hoping for large profits, led to a market environment of care-
less investing, an ensuing sudden plunge in prices, and the burst of the so-called Dot-com 
bubble5 in the late 1990s, which primarily affected the United States. However, similarly to 
most modern-day economic and financial crises, the impact was not limited to a single nation 
state, since almost all of today’ markets are highly globally interwoven. The U.S. Federal Re-
serve System reacted to the economic troubles with lower interest rates in the following years, 
and the U.S. government lowered regulatory standards to stimulate the economy. In this en-
vironment, speculators moved into the growing real estate market, where house prices in-
creased sharply, while building costs were generally declining since the early 1980s (Shiller, 
2008, p. 33). Especially the trading of sub-prime mortgages took place with few concerns 
about the underlying value of the securities within a generally increasingly liberal market en-
vironment. With the first doubts regarding the basis of the returning economic growth, inter-
bank interest rates, which can also collectively be considered as an indicator of trust by banks 
in one another’s business activities, began to rise in late 2007. 
Increasing interest rates led to refinancing problems and credit defaults, especially in the 
housing market, and next to private banks and financial services companies, the real economy 
was affected in a short time. Also, institutional weaknesses became evident in areas such as 
credit rating and equity requirements. More generally, it can be argued that international fi-
nancial institutions as well as national counterparts failed in their roles as supervisors of finan-
cial market developments (Bermeo & Pontusson, 2012b, p. 2 f.). Mainly originating in the 
United States, the Crisis spread across the globe, primarily hitting industrial countries. How-
ever, because of factors such as the size and international linkage of the national financial 
sector, as well as contractual terms and notice periods, the Crisis followed an increasingly un-
even development across different nation states and economic sectors. Ireland, for example, 
                                                     
3 As cited in Rasmussen (1994). 
4 Defining the exact beginning of a financial crisis is relatively difficult, since some relevant indicators, such as 
economic growth, change gradually over time, and a time delay might occur before events affect some coun-
tries. As a consequence, analyses might differ in their conclusions depending on the periods of time under in-
vestigation. This study dates the general beginning of the Financial Crisis on August 9th, 2007, when the first 
problems with sub-prime loans were recognised. Similar problems occur when defining the end of a financial 
crisis. 




was among the first countries affected, and Sweden was among the last (Bermeo & Pontus-
son, 2012b, p. 2 f.). While some companies went bankrupt, others – predominantly large pri-
vate banks – were bailed out by national governments for reasons of systemic risks. In the 
meantime, many people lost their jobs. As a further consequence of the economic downturn, 
government debt generally increased as a result of higher welfare spending and liabilities in 
the context of rescue packages. Private sector failure thus affected not only countless individ-
uals and their employment situation, but also the public sector and its financial situation 
(Hodges & Lapsley, 2016). Regarding economic growth, by early 2009, most industrial coun-
tries were in recession, which is generally defined as two consecutive quarters of economic 
contraction (Cameron, 2012, p. 91). 
Even though governments are accustomed to dealing with crises of different types, crises are 
often largely unpredictable and represent major administrative challenges for all actors in-
volved (Saliterer et al., 2017, p. 1 f.). When the recent Financial Crisis threatened the financial 
system, caused corporate revenues to decline, and resulted in citizens losing their jobs, vari-
ous governmental and non-governmental organisations, such as international financial insti-
tutions, national governments, and central banks, began to act. Unfortunately, at least in the 
early phases of the Crisis, “many governments did not even know what was [exactly] happen-
ing in their banking sectors or in the economy more generally” (Peters, et al. 2011, p. 14). Co-
ordinating the reactions at the international level – since global problems cannot be solved 
merely at the national level – was a complex and time-consuming task (The Guardian, 2012; 
The Telegraph, 2011; BBC, 2012; European Commission, 2009; van Ewijk & Teulings, 2009, pp. 
11-51). 
Apart from the frantic bailouts of private banks, political leaders took decisions on other types 
of largely national countermeasures based on negotiation processes away from usual rou-
tines. In practice, these measures often consisted of two consecutive steps, the first of which 
involved arrangements to moderate the impact of the Financial Crisis on citizens and to stim-
ulate the economy. While the former was mainly achieved in the area of social policies, addi-
tional investments in infrastructure are an example of the latter. Aiming to rebalance the pub-
lic budgets, austerity measures across various levels of government as well as policy areas 
usually followed at a later stage (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015; Kickert et al., 2015; Wagschal 
& Jäkel, 2010; Armingeon, 2012; Hörisch, 2013). 
However, there is clearly not one correct way in which to react, with the intention to solve a 
financial crisis, since each crisis is different. Historical experiences and economic theories pro-
vide a certain understanding of the underlying mechanisms; however, attempts to implement 
countermeasures to a financial crisis in a sustainable manner can be considered to be a pro-
cess of trial and error. In other words, all measures were taken under relatively high uncer-
tainty regarding their impact and success, which are typical characteristics of crisis manage-
ment in the context of a financial crisis in general. 
In line with the financial troubles in many countries, partly in combination with previous fi-
nancial imbalances, the solvency of several members of the eurozone, especially southern Eu-
ropean states and Ireland, deteriorated considerably in 2009. To counteract these develop-




Monetary Fund (IMF), with support from the European Central Bank (ECB). To institutionalise 
the euro rescue policies, the European Financial Stability Facility, which is a special purpose 
entity, was established in 2010. Then, in 2012, the function was taken over by the European 
Stability Mechanism, a likewise newly founded intergovernmental organisation. The pure ne-
cessity of these exceptional measures illustrates the severity of the Financial Crisis in Europe 
(European Stability Mechanism, 2018; International Monetary Fund, 2009a; Stiglitz, 2016, p. 
3 ff., 177 ff.; Teulings et al., 2011; Borger, 2018). 
Concerning the impact on the global financial and monetary system, the Financial Crisis since 
2007, including the Eurozone Crisis, partly came to an end in 2013, when the last rescue pack-
ages for eurozone members, with the exception of Greece, were arranged (The Guardian, 
2012; The Telegraph, 2011; BBC, 2012; European Stability Mechanism, 2018). Around that 
time, a return to positive economic growth rates could also be observed in a number of indus-
trial countries (World Bank, 2017a).6 
Regarding the question as to whether these developments are the consequence of measures 
taken to fight the Crisis or a relatively independent and natural process of economic recovery 
as a part of an economic boom and bust cycle, it can be argued that both aspects contributed 
to the improvement of the situation. As is natural for the state of the economic situation and 
its changes, a combination of multiple interactive factors of influence are responsible for the 
overall trend. However, the sustainability of the current trend is yet to be seen. 
Apart from positive economic developments in most industrial countries in more recent years, 
it should not be forgotten that some countries, especially Greece, are still facing ongoing so-
cio-economic and financial problems, implying systemic financial risks, at least for the euro-
zone (European Stability Mechanism, 2018). In addition, central banks around the globe still 
did not return to pre-crisis monetary policies. As another aspect of the Crisis, the repayment 
of debts in the context of bailout packages that some European countries received is sched-
uled to take several decades. The Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis in the United States, on the other 
hand, was chiefly limited to the period 2007 to 2009. Regulatory actions as well as stimulus 
packages were among the measures initiated by the United States government to address the 
Crisis. However, more recent financial difficulties of some private companies in different in-
dustrial countries, especially in the financial sector, are partially still a late consequence of the 
financial turmoil starting in 2007. 
Similarly to many other industrial countries, the Netherlands also experienced a period of re-
cession in 2008 and 2009 (Cameron, 2012, p. 96; Bartelsman, 2009, p. 39). During this time, 
the Dutch government rescued a number of private banks and insurance companies from 
bankruptcy. Overall, more than 300 billion euros of financial securities were provided to pre-
vent the country’s financial sector from collapsing (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 156; de Kam, 
2009a, p. 89 f.; Bijlsma et al., 2009, p. 58 f.; de Haan, 2009, p. 95 ff.; van Ewijk & Teulings, 
2009, pp. 169-189). 
                                                     




Next to the rescue measures for banks and insurance companies, the Dutch central govern-
ment aimed to stimulate and support the national economy, which faced the economic con-
sequences of the recent Financial Crisis, from 2009 onwards (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 
2009; Kickert, 2012d, p. 440 f.; Kickert, 2012e, p. 53; Kickert, 2015, p. 542; de Vries & Degen, 
2015, p. 158). This was followed by austerity and consolidation measures in order to rebalance 
the public budget. Starting in 2010, budget cuts were characterised by political consensuses, 
and they experienced various changes in terms of scope and focus areas in line with changing 
political majorities (Kickert, 2015, p. 541 f.).  
Taken together, the Financial Crisis since 2007 developed into “one of the most important and 
urgent challenges” (Kickert, 2012a, p. 300) for Western governments in comparison with other 
issues on the political agenda, such as terrorism (European Commission, 2018). The Crisis’ 
multi-faceted impact and in parts unconventional countermeasures were hardly thinkable just 
a few years earlier. From a public finance perspective, the rescue and stimulus packages en-
tailed the highest increase in debt in times of peace (Wagschal & Jäkel, 2010, p. 295). As a 
consequence, the crisis was a dominant topic in the last decade. In retrospect, the global fi-
nancial and monetary system was highly endangered during this period of time, and alterna-
tive decisions, such as denying external help for several European countries in enormous fi-
nancial difficulties, might have led to an even larger crisis. On the other hand, national bank-
ruptcies might have been educative to illustrate the necessity to lower risks by improving the 
financial management. However, these counterfactual scenarios are difficult to assess. 
More generally, it should be taken into account that events such as the recent Financial Crisis, 
or other occurrences of a similar dimension, can represent critical junctures for nation states. 
Previous paths, for example in relation to a country’s long-term economic development, might 
be left. Prevailing views on major questions such as the preferred economic system and other 
major consensuses in the area of societal cohabitation might consequently experience 
changes. Windows of opportunity might also emerge for policy reform and policy innovation 
(Bermeo & Pontusson, 2012b, pp. 1, 27). Furthermore, a crisis can also lead to changes in 
political majorities, in particular as a consequences of public satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the reactions to the Crisis. In other words, a crisis or a similar event can imply various societal, 
political, and economic changes – in both the short and long term – beyond direct impacts, 
such as job losses and declining stock market prices. These circumstances make crisis research 
even more important. 
Overall, the Financial Crisis since 2007 raised many questions for individuals and firms con-
cerned. Citizens asked themselves for new opportunities when losing their jobs, and private 
companies explored potential new markets or business ideas after sales figures declined. In 
addition, nation states, represented by politicians and civil servants, searched for suitable 
measures to address the Crisis and consequences thereof. In other words, extensive reflection 
and adaption processes emerged as a result of the fundamental changes to the global eco-
nomic situation. 
For scholars, many new or partially recurring research questions emerged as well. As a result 




in various academic disciplines. In the areas of public administration and political science, suit-
able reactions to the developments mark a central part of the discussions. In economics, the 
question of how a crisis of this extent could emerge with hardly any prediction, including 
doubts regarding existing theoretical assumptions, was part of the debate. While these exam-
ples already illustrate the importance of, as well as the challenge in, connecting the insights 
from different academic disciplines in order to understand the recent Financial Crisis and its 
accompanying developments as a whole, they also apply to many separate aspects of the Cri-
sis, such as the consequences for public finances. 
Taken together, the Financial Crisis since 2007 created much room – or even a necessity – to 
reconsider existing theories and generally accepted relationships by critically reconsidering 
previous assumptions as well as addressing emerging research questions based on new in-
sights. This study will focus on the aforementioned developments in the context of the Finan-
cial Crisis since 2007 at the local level of government in the Netherlands. This will be done by 
exploring the impact of the Crisis on local government, the municipalities’ reactions to the 
Crisis, and the factors explaining variation in both the impact and the responses. 
The further parts of this introduction are structured as follows. The first sub-chapter addresses 
the Financial Crisis and its consequences more closely, focusing on varying effects and local 
government, and it introduces the overall research question of this study (1.1). In the next 
sub-chapter, the relevance and the objectives of this research are discussed (1.2). The intro-
duction closes with an outline of the overall structure of the study in a final sub-chapter (1.3). 
 
1.1. Variation in the impact of the recent Financial Crisis and its conse-
quences at the local level of government 
When reflecting on the Financial Crisis since 2007, which can be considered to be the largest 
crisis since the Great Depression (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009, p. 248 ff.; Reinhart, 2010), the var-
ious direct and indirect consequences should not be forgotten. Not only were massive gov-
ernmental efforts necessary to prevent the financial system from failure, but millions of peo-
ple also lost their jobs within the financial industry and in many other sectors because of bank-
ruptcies and an economic downturn. In the United States, the unemployment rate reached its 
recent peak level of 10% in 2009 (United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016), and the EU 
recorded its recent high of 11% in 2013 (Eurostat, 2016). Similarly to many other economic 
developments in the last decade, the Financial Crisis had a negative impact on the employ-
ment rate, but it was certainly not the only factor of influence. Greece’s budgetary problems, 
for example, already existed long before the Crisis, which partially explains why Greece is still 
facing some difficulties, while other countries are not. The same applies to private companies: 
companies with poor business models are regularly forced to terminate their activities – this 
was always the case and will remain so. Therefore, a financial crisis is not necessary for such 
terminations; however, it can certainly speed up the process. The above-mentioned examples 
also illustrate the difficulty in assessing the impact of the Financial Crisis separately from other 




Furthermore, the recent Financial Crisis did not affect all countries to the same extent and at 
the same time (Saliterer et al., 2017, p. 8; Steccolini et al., 2017b, p. 231). It mainly hit indus-
trial countries; most developing countries were affected to a lesser extent, but they were par-
tially concerned with other economic problems independent of the Crisis during the same pe-
riod. Overall, the general impact of the Financial Crisis since 2007 is mostly explained by the 
size of the various economic sectors within a state. Economies mainly based on agriculture 
and local manufacturing are seldom directly involved in the turbulences of global financial 
markets. However, second-round effects, for example because of lower development aid, 
might occur. Within the group of industrial countries, temporal variation can be observed in 
the case of the recent Financial Crisis as well. While the United States was the country in which 
the initial financial problems originated in 2007, the Crisis – better known as the Sub-prime 
Mortgage Crisis in a U.S. context – largely came to an end in the US in 2009, at least partially 
as a result of the economic policies meant to address the Crisis. There was a time delay before 
Europe’s real economy and national budgets faced the Crisis, whereas worldwide financial 
institutions were hit in real-time as a result of the globally interlinked nature of the financial 
sector. The Financial Crisis since 2007 certainly affected all European countries; however, 
southern European countries were hit much harder, as the realisation of bailout packages il-
lustrates (The Guardian, 2012; The Telegraph, 2011; BBC, 2012; European Commission, 2009; 
European Stability Mechanism, 2018). Apart from all the negative impacts, one can argue that 
some economies, such as Germany, temporarily benefited from the Crisis on the basis of low 
interest rates on public debt (Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, 2015). As these 
remarks illustrate, the time frame is crucial when analysing the effects of the recent Financial 
Crisis or any other crisis. In this context, the appropriate period under investigation is not nec-
essarily the same for all countries under review. 
The varying impact and duration of the Financial Crisis since 2007 in different countries leads 
to the question of the reasons for these differing developments. Apart from reactions to ad-
dress the Crisis, structural economic problems and government debt levels that are incompat-
ible with the economic performance are the most common explanations, implying a certain 
path dependency. While both factors are determined within a country, they are sometimes 
influenced by supranational agreements, such as the Economic and Monetary Union of the 
EU. 
However, while geographical characteristics might limit the economic possibilities within a 
certain area, government debt depends on a country’s deliberate decisions. Therefore, differ-
ent approaches regarding the acceptability of debt and debt policies, also based on political 
motives, can be distinguished. While some countries are able to deal with relatively high levels 
of government debt, especially if they are in a strong economic position, others follow a more 
stable path by avoiding such high levels. Overall, critical debt levels are usually the result of 
excessive state spending regardless of public revenues over decades, sometimes combined 
with an inefficient administration. In the case of the eurozone, the single currency7 further 
enables some countries, particularly in southern Europe, to finance their debt less expensively 
                                                     
7 See Stiglitz (2016) for a comprehensive discussion of the structural problems of the euro as a single currency, 




than it would probably be possible with separate currencies (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011; Rein-
hart & Rogoff, 2013; Reinhart et al., 2015; Mauro, 2011). 
In general, the complexity of economic mechanisms implies a variety of factors contributing 
to the emergence and course of financial crises. Socio-economic factors, institutional arrange-
ments, and many other conditions can potentially moderate or intensify financial problems. 
The financial sector and corresponding employment, for instance, are more relevant in some 
countries compared to others. Furthermore, the interactions of factors are of importance; 
small differences can have major consequences. 
National legislation, for example in the banking sector, can be the major reason a country is 
more or less affected by a certain crisis. The case of Iceland – a country with a comparably 
large and internationally oriented banking sector – during the Financial Crisis since 2007 illus-
trates this argument: In the early 2000s, legal changes were implemented in the country to 
deregulate banks. These conditions led to higher debt levels of Icelandic private banks in com-
parison with those of other European countries (Carey, 2009). After the financial turmoil be-
gan in the United States, Iceland was clearly more affected in the early years of the Financial 
Crisis than other European countries and was forced to nationalise its largest banks. While 
Iceland is generally comparable with other industrial countries in terms of its stage of eco-
nomic development, the highly deregulated banking system is the generally accepted expla-
nation for the recent Financial Crisis’ relatively strong impact next to the substantial size of 
the banking sector itself. 
Not only is the impact of the Financial Crisis since 2007 subject to variation from a cross-coun-
try perspective, but the measures taken in response to the Crisis also differ. In particular, the 
extent of national arrangements, such as economic growth packages and governmental guar-
antees for private companies, largely depended on a country’s respective situation. While a 
link between the impact of and reactions to the Crisis is given in the case of effective counter-
measures, measures might also have been taken based on the mere anticipation of an impact. 
Pressure in this respect might also have arisen from various interest groups worrying about 
certain potential consequences. Overall, these circumstances enable an analysis and compar-
isons of factors with a fortifying or moderating effect on the types and scope of measures 
implemented to address the Crisis. Furthermore, crisis management from a procedural per-
spective might lead to different decisions on how to react. 
While any crisis of a certain scope affects all levels within a system of multi-level governance, 
the types and time of impacts and responses can vary extensively. The dependence on certain 
types of taxes, such as corporate and income taxes, and the mechanism of financial compen-
sation are two main explanations. The fragmentation of competences, including regulatory 
powers, as well as information between the different levels of government, makes efficient 
crisis reactions even more complicated (Peters, et al. 2011, p. 14 f.). In the context of the 
Financial Crisis since 2007, the situation at the nation state levels was widely reported both in 
the news and in the content of public and political debates, whereas regional and local levels 
of government received much less attention (Saliterer et al., 2017, p. 2 f.). While revenues at 
the local level usually predominantly consist of financial allocations from upper levels of gov-




administrative system. On the expenditure side, the distribution of tasks among the adminis-
trative levels within a country is also subject to broad variation. Local authorities in different 
countries might consequently be affected by the same financial crisis differently on both sides 
of their budgets. In this context, especially major responsibilities in the area of social affairs 
can lead to a noticeable deterioration of the financial situation. From a practical perspective, 
local officials were confronted with many questions in the context of the recent Crisis, as were 
the politicians and civil servants in charge at the national level: What can be done to alleviate 
the consequences for the local population and local businesses? Should the funding of certain 
initiatives be continued, or should expenditures be cut? Should the spending in a one policy 
area be reduced rather than in another one, or should costs be cut equally? Are there alter-
native ways in which to generate revenues? 
Depending on the local policy decisions made by the competent bodies, the course of a crisis 
can largely differ across the local level within a country, and the understanding and interpre-
tation of the developments from an economic perspective, as well as the overall perception 
of the crisis apart from financial facts, might thus cause further variation. Following the results 
of recent comparative studies focusing on national levels of government (Kickert & Randma-
Liiv, 2015; Wanna et al., 2015; Kickert, 2012a), the developments of the Financial Crisis since 
2007, including the responses to it, differed considerably. While some public authorities, for 
example, focused on austerity measures in certain policy areas, others aimed to stimulate the 
economy with support and rescue activities for the private sector and related labour market 
policies. 
In line with the observations at national levels of government, variation regarding the impact 
of and responses to the Financial Crisis since 2007 is also likely across regional and municipal 
levels of government. Certain industries affected by the Crisis, for example, are traditionally 
more relevant in one region than in another, thereby leading to higher tax losses as well as 
higher increases in unemployment. Based on the local impact of the Crisis, in combination 
with political preferences, policy decisions on how to address the Crisis are likely to vary as 
well. 
Overall, variation across territorial entities implies additional complexity for the general chal-
lenge in understanding the mechanisms behind the recent Financial Crisis. While some theo-
retical assumptions might still appear valid in the context of one country or a municipality 
within a country, this might not be the case for another country or municipality. Again, the 
approach to combine insights from multiple academic disciplines, including public administra-
tion, political science, and economics in particular, appears to be the most promising strategy 
to understand the partially dissimilar developments of the recent Crisis. In this context, from 
a methodological perspective, a comparison of entities at the same governmental level within 
a country is generally encouraged by identical or at least similar political-administrative frame-
work conditions, originating from uniform legal requirements, in contrast to country compar-
isons. 
As already mentioned, this study will focus on the Netherlands, and it analyses the situation 




to retrace the impact at the local level and responses by local government, as well as to un-
derstand why some municipalities were more affected than others and why they selected dif-
ferent countermeasures. As a decentralised unitary state subdivided into 12 provinces, with a 
relatively limited role in the political-administrative system, and 380 municipalities in 2018 
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2018a), with relatively extensive tasks, including the pro-
vision of most social services, the country is a particularly suitable research object for two 
reasons. First, the municipalities can be considered as relevant actors within the political-ad-
ministrative system of the Netherlands with a certain leeway regarding the organisation and 
performance of public tasks and services within their areas of responsibilities. Second, the 
number of municipalities enables a full census. 
In the context of a financial crisis, three additional reasons make the Netherlands a relevant 
case. First, the country is an open economy that largely depends on international trade, which 
implies a high likelihood of both positive and negative spillover effects linked to global devel-
opments. Second, the financial service and insurance sector is comparably large and interna-
tionally oriented. Third, a relatively liberal approach existed towards financial regulation in 
the years before the Crisis. These reasons suggest a relatively large impact of the recent Fi-
nancial Crisis in the case of the Netherlands as well as a great necessity of governmental 
measures to address the Crisis. 
While this study will be mainly comprised of quantitative analyses of the municipalities’ budg-
ets, qualitative analyses will also be conducted, especially when trying to understand why cer-
tain decisions in the area of public budgeting were taken. Based on official statistics and pri-
mary data from three consecutive surveys amongst mayors, as the political-administrative 
leaders at the local level, this study will be guided by the following research question: 
How did the Financial Crisis since 2007 have an impact on Dutch municipalities and their finan-
cial situation, how did local authorities respond to the Crisis, and what factors explain varia-
tion? 
 
1.2. Relevance and objectives of this study 
The local level possesses two characteristics, which illustrate its advantages as an object of 
research: propinquity and numerosity. Propinquity refers to the relatively small territories 
with limited numbers of relevant actors, which are able to interact frequently because of small 
distances between them. Considering the policy process, those who make decisions are also 
close to those who are responsible for the implementation. Therefore, a small number of in-
terviews can provide broad insights.8 The numerosity of research objects makes the use of 
certain methodological approaches possible at the local level; these are not always feasible at 
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other levels of government. The relatively large number of local entities with uniform frame-
work conditions enables quantitative research, for example with a focus on variation between 
the municipalities (John, 2009, p. 21 f.). 
Ten years after the beginning of the Financial Crisis, the literature on the topic is still growing. 
While a final assessment, especially regarding the partly still ongoing Eurozone Crisis, remains 
a task for future research, studies on the Financial Crisis and various aspects thereof were 
published in recent years. The complexity of events explains the attention from different aca-
demic disciplines, namely public administration, political science, economics, law, psychology, 
and sociology. 
While the causes, implications, and appropriate reactions, as well as regulative issues, in the 
context of the Financial Crisis are mainly questions to be addressed from an economic and 
partially also a jurisprudential perspective,9 the impact on public finance and reactions by gov-
ernmental entities, including their crisis managements, are aspects mainly in the fields of po-
litical science and public administration. The latter is also the focus of this study. 
In line with the generally low attention that local government, as the main provider of public 
services in many countries (Page, 1991, p. 1), receives in supra-regional media coverage be-
cause of a limited number of people affected, as well as in academic debates, the impact of 
the Financial Crisis since 2007 at this level of government and the reactions to it have not been 
widely discussed yet. This circumstance is presumably also caused by central government’s 
larger number and scope of potential policy reactions in the context of a financial crisis, espe-
cially in the areas of financial market regulation – as a policy domain typically within the com-
petences of the national level – as well as extensive fiscal stimuli. More generally, “key deci-
sions about powers and finances get taken at other levels [than the local one]” (John, 2009, p. 
19). However, since the Financial Crisis can be considered as one of the most important events 
in recent history, and given that early studies on the crisis suggest an impact particularly on 
municipal finances (United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 9), the intended analysis 
will investigate relevant questions. Furthermore, local decisions can still “illustrate issues of 
power and collective action problems” (John, 2009, p. 19).10 
Academic literature on the Financial Crisis since 2007, with a focus on implications at different 
levels of government from a political-administrative perspective, is also growing.11 Research 
on the impact of the Crisis has mainly focused on the national levels of government. In this 
context, some studies have had a comparative approach (European Commission 2009; Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 2009b; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
                                                     
9 Next to purely academic publications on the recent Financial Crisis, some economists wrote best-selling books 
on the topic also addressed to the general public. Those include Shiller (2008), Krugman (2008), Stiglitz (2010), 
and Blinder (2013). 
10 In general, it can also be argued that ”it does not matter what to study, but how to do it [from a methodolog-
ical perspective]“ (John, 2009, p. 20). In some cases, particularly in basic scientific research, studies can be ra-
ther explorative and a certain relevance might become apparent at a later stage. In this context chance might 
play an important role as well. 
11 See appendix 1 for an overview of publications on the recent Financial Crisis at the local level of government 




2011; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012; Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, 2015; Marer, 2010; van den Noord, 2011; Staehr, 
2010), while others have analysed the situation in a certain country in detail (Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission, 2011; Massey, 2011; Lane, 2011; Gavilan et al., 2011). Moreover, while 
some of the early publications have combined the investigation of crisis impact and crisis re-
action, more recent studies have often focused on the response side. Research on the latter 
aspect of the Crisis at the national level has been published both from a comparative perspec-
tive (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015; Kickert et al., 2015; European Commission, 2009; Kickert, 
2012a; Wagschal & Jäkel, 2010; Armingeon, 2012; Hörisch, 2013; Pontusson & Raess, 2012; 
Cameron, 2012; Ansell, 2012; Armingeon & Baccaro, 2012; Lindvall, 2012; Bideleux, 2011; Kat-
tel & Raudla, 2013; van den Noord, 2011; Peters, 2011) and as single-country studies or as 
two-country comparisons (Posner & Fantone, 2015; Good & Lindquist, 2015; Wanna, 2015; 
Horie, 2015; Jensen & Davidsen, 2015; Zapico-Goni, 2015; Pereira & Wemans, 2015; Arghyrou, 
2015; Boyle & Mulreany, 2015; Kickert, 2012b; Kickert, 2012c; Kickert, 2013a; Kickert, 2013b; 
Schelkle, 2012; McCarty, 2012; Barnes & Wren, 2012; Di Mascio et al., 2013; Di Mascio & Nata-
lini, 2014; Kickert & Ysa, 2014; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011; Lane, 2011). 
An edited volume regarding the Financial Crisis and the budget impacts at the national level 
in a number of industrial countries, including some of the aforementioned country studies, 
has been presented by Wanna et al. (2015). In addition, Bermeo and Pontusson (2012a) have 
published an edited volume on the responses by national levels of government, including var-
ious comparisons. Beblavy et al. (2011) have presented an edited volume focusing on the Crisis 
primarily from an economic perspective, and an edited volume by Kates (2011) also has an 
economic perspective and has further emphasised the general lessons of the Crisis. Another 
edited volume on the Financial Crisis, with a focus on the economic situation in various eastern 
European countries, was prepared by Jungmann and Sagemann (2011). 
As pointed out before, studies on the effects of the Financial Crisis and the reactions to it at 
regional and local levels of government are relatively limited, compared to the national level. 
Some researchers have analysed the impact on local government from a comparative per-
spective (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015; United Cities and 
Local Governments, 2009; Council of European Municipalities and Regions, 2009a; Council of 
European Municipalities and Regions, 2009b; Blöchliger et al., 2010; Bailey & Chapain, 2011b; 
Paulais, 2009; Dethier & Morrill, 2012; Canuto & Liu, 2010; Vammalle & Hulbert, 2013; Wol-
man, 2014; Wolman & Hincapie, 2014). The ways in which local government reacted to the 
Crisis have also been the focus of a number of comparative analyses in recent years (Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015; Nunes Silva & Bucek, 2014; Blöch-
liger et al., 2010; Bailey & Chapain, 2011b; Meneguzzo et al., 2013; Vammalle & Hulbert, 2013; 
Wolman, 2014; Wolman & Hincapie, 2014), and some of these studies have addressed both 
aspects. Studies on the situation in individual countries, mainly focusing on local responses, 
have been published as well (Barbera et al., 2016; Cepiku et al., 2016; Bolgherini, 2014; Ladner 
& Soguel, 2015; Chapain & Renney, 2011; Champagne, 2011; Beer, 2011). General suggestions 





Three edited volumes on the impact of and responses to the recent Financial Crisis at the local 
level are also worth mentioning. One by Bailey and Chapain (2011a) has mainly focused on 
the impact and the situation in the UK, and it has also included chapters on France, Canada, 
and Australia. A second one by Richardson (2010) has also explored the impact of the Crisis at 
the local level in the UK and the implications for public services. Lastly, an edited volume by 
Steccolini et al. (2017a) has focused on crisis responses and crisis resilience, which is concep-
tualised as the capacities and capabilities to absorb and react to financial shocks, as well as 
variation at the local level in various countries, including the Netherlands. 
Wagschal and Jäkel (2010), Armingeon (2012), and Hörisch (2013) have focused on the varia-
tion in fiscal response strategies at the national level. The question regarding economic, polit-
ical, and administrative factors determining variation in the financial situation of local govern-
ment has previously been analysed both from a cross-country comparative perspective (Gus-
cina, 2008) and within certain countries (Bogumil et al., 2014; Boettcher, 2013; Boettcher, 
2012; Holtkamp 2007). However, all these studies have largely attempted to explain variation 
in government debt without a specific focus on changes in municipal finance caused by the 
recent Financial Crisis. 
To date, compared to other European countries, the number of studies on the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 and the situation in the Netherlands is relatively limited, which can be explained 
by the larger impact in southern Europe in particular. However, a number of studies have ad-
dressed the developments at the Dutch national level (Kickert, 2015; Kickert, 2012d; Kickert, 
2012e; de Vries & Degen, 2015; Kickert, 2012a), predominantly focusing on the decisions by 
central government and the related decision-making processes. Studies of the situation at the 
local level (Overmans & Timm-Arnold, 2016; Overmans & Noordegraaf, 2014; Engelen & Mus-
terd, 2010; Overmans, 2017; Weske et al., 2014; Centraal Planbureau, 2016; Kattenberg et al., 
2016; Allers & Bolt, 2010; Allers & Hoeben, 2010; van der Lei, 2015) have often followed qual-
itative approaches, with either a small number of municipalities included in the examinations 
or work with preliminary financial data. Further insights into the impact of the Financial Crisis 
on municipal land development in the Netherlands have also been published by two consul-
tancies (Deloitte, 2010; Deloitte, 2011; Deloitte, 2012; Deloitte, 2013; Deloitte, 2014; Deloitte, 
2016; Deloitte, 2017; Ernst & Young, 2015). 
An extensive empirical understanding of financial developments at the Dutch local level is still 
missing from the research on the Financial Crisis since 2007. That understanding is the main 
aim of this study, and it is achieved by combining official statistics on municipal budgets and 
survey data. Most of the previous research on the topic has been based on interviews with 
municipal officials and document analyses, with a relatively small number of municipalities 
included as cases, which can therefore be considered as explorative approaches with limited 
potential for generalisations regarding the average consequences of the Financial Crisis at this 
level of government. In contrast, this study’s focus on quantitative methods allows for state-
ments on common or uncommon developments by generally assessing all municipalities, the 
empirical testing of hypotheses regarding factors determining variation, and a more holistic 




methods, this study will also include qualitative components, especially to explain relations 
between certain factors previously identified through empirical analyses. 
In addition to the overall research subject of the ways in which municipalities in the Nether-
lands were affected by the Financial Crisis and reacted to it, another objective of this study is 
to examine factors causing variation regarding the Crisis’ impact and countermeasures. In 
other words, the overall goal is to provide a better understanding of recent developments in 
the context of the Financial Crisis at the Dutch local level, which is the administrative level 
closest to the citizens. This goal can also be considered as a beneficial contribution to research 
on the resilience of local entities. In terms of the complexity of the Financial Crisis since 2007, 
as well as questions in the field of public finances in general and in the context of a crisis in 
particular, an interdisciplinary approach is applied for this study by including theoretical in-
sights primarily from the academic disciplines of public administration, political science, eco-
nomics, law, and psychology. 
While public administration and political science are particularly relevant to understand the 
overall transformation of the role and functioning of the state and local government inde-
pendent of the recent Financial Crisis as underlying framework conditions, the procedures 
within political bodies and the administration intended to adjust municipal revenues and ex-
penditures in times of crisis, as well as some of the factors potentially determining variation 
across municipalities in case of a crisis, economics – particularly macroeconomics – provides 
the necessary insights to retrace the mechanisms of financial crises as such. Assessing the 
current legal situation in the context of municipal finances in the Netherlands requires the 
inclusion of law. Lastly, additional insights from psychology are necessary in order to include 
the perceptions of individuals or groups of individuals regarding certain developments as po-
tentially irrational factors when deciding on crisis reactions. 
With the intention to contribute to a better comprehension of the mechanisms of financial 
crises and the implications, particularly for local government, this study also aims to help to 
reduce the negative effects of potential future crises and to support both crisis prevention and 
crisis management with policy recommendations based on scientific findings. In this regard, 
insights from the Netherlands, especially in relation to unintended as well as intended changes 
in public finances at the municipal level, can also be useful for political-administrative decision 
makers in other countries with similar economic conditions and similar political-administrative 
systems, since understanding the mechanisms behind a certain development is always the 
first step when aiming to influence future conditions in a desired way. 
 
1.3. The structure of this study 
Next to this first chapter, which introduces the research subject and represents the first part, 
this study consists of three additional components. The second part develops the theoretical 
framework and describes the methodology as the basis for the analyses at a later stage. Then 




Dutch local government, as well as the global time course of the Financial Crisis since 2007 
and related events. Second, the developments during the Crisis in the Netherlands are ana-
lysed based on official documents, previous research, and empirical data with a focus on the 
country’s local level of government. In other words, part three provides the necessary back-
ground knowledge on Dutch local government and the Financial Crisis since 2007, introduces 
the current state of research on the subject, and includes preparatory analytical steps. Part 
four, as the final component, addresses variation in the impact of and responses to the recent 
Financial Crisis across the Dutch local level with statistical analyses; the aim here is to explain 
why some municipalities were more concerned than others, and this part closes with the 
study’s overall discussion and conclusion. 
The second part begins with the development of the study’s theoretical framework within 
chapters 2, 3, and 4. Chapter two starts with the changing role and functioning of the state, 
particularly in line with the trends towards an enabling state and multi-level governance. Fol-
lowing these broad developments, the chapter continues with a focus on local government 
and local government finance. By assessing ongoing developments at the local level, such as 
decentralisation and management changes, a general understanding of the administrative and 
political conditions at the municipal level, as well as recent changes, is provided. In addition, 
theoretical insights into municipal finance are described, with a focus on cutback manage-
ment. Chapter 2 thus forms part of the theoretical basis for the question on the impact of the 
recent Financial Crisis at the local level, alongside other ongoing developments, and the po-
tential reactions within local officials’ usual room to manoeuvre, mainly from a financial per-
spective. 
Based on economic literature, the third chapter discusses the general mechanisms behind the 
emergence of and reactions to financial crises from a theoretical perspective and historical 
experiences. While the theories in line with different economic schools of thought, partially 
supplemented by political-administrative concepts and trends, primarily focus at national lev-
els of government, previous insights and recommendations for the local level are discussed as 
well. In other words, the chapter provides the necessary economic knowledge to understand 
the consequences of financial crises at the local of government. 
The theoretical framework concludes with chapter 4. Building upon the theoretical insights 
from chapters 2 and 3, the conceptual model is developed, before potential factors causing 
variation in crisis impact and crisis reaction at the local level are identified and discussed based 
on economic, political, and administrative theory, with an overall focus on public policy. This 
follows the logic that the recent Financial Crisis can be considered as an external effect on the 
local level, where it did not originate, and certain local conditions might enhance or moderate 
the impacts of the Crisis as well as the reactions to it. Based on the separate aspects, hypoth-
eses are formulated. In addition, the role of local officials’ crisis perception is discussed as an 
additional factor with a potential influence on policy decisions. 
As the last component of part two, chapter 5 explains the methodology of this study and its 
quantitative as well as qualitative elements, building upon the theoretical and conceptual 
work of the previous chapters. Next to the availability and sources as well as detailed types of 




part, the analytical approach and the operationalisations of dependent and independent var-
iables are introduced. In addition, a description is provided for the design and realisation of 
three own surveys, whose open questions will contribute to identifying problems and mecha-
nisms beyond official statistics.  
The sixth chapter – the first chapter of part three – addresses the Netherlands and its local 
level as the study’s object of research. After explaining the design of the political-administra-
tive system and the division of tasks between the different levels of government, recent de-
velopments towards an enabling state and multi-level governance are analysed in this coun-
try-specific context, building upon the theoretical considerations of the second chapter. 
Chapter 7 focuses on Dutch local government, including the municipal budgetary system. The 
historical development of the local level’s role and contemporarily tasks, obligations, and the 
legal situation are described to provide an understanding of the overall structural conditions. 
Particular attention is also paid to municipal revenues and expenditures, with the intention to 
assess local officials’ financial room to manoeuvre. To put the potential effects of the Financial 
Crisis since 2007 into perspective at a later stage, the recent trends and developments at the 
Dutch local level are analysed based on the theoretical insights of chapter 2. 
Chapter 8 analyses the events and developments of the Financial Crisis since 2007, including 
its temporal course, in detail. In other words, the necessary knowledge on the Crisis for the 
empirical analyses at a later stage is provided. Building upon chapter 3, the emergence and 
impacts of, as well as the reactions to, this specific Crisis are researched by examining relevant 
socio-economic key figures and discussions of the insights from both academic publications 
and official documents. Apart from the international and national levels, the situation at the 
local level is assessed, to the extent that information is available. 
Building upon the previous chapter, the impact of and responses to the recent Financial Crisis 
in the Netherlands are the topics of chapter 9. By analysing government documents and pre-
vious academic publications, the scope of the Crisis at the national level of government is dis-
cussed. Moreover, the effects for local government are assessed as well. All relevant studies 
on the Financial Crisis since 2007 at the Dutch local level, which are often limited to the situa-
tion in a limited number of municipalities from a qualitative perspective or single areas of 
municipal activities from a quantitative perspective – in other words, the current state of re-
search on the subject – is also presented and discussed in this chapter. 
In chapter 10, financial developments at the Dutch local level in the years since the beginning 
of the Crisis in 2007, as well as a few years before in order to provide benchmarks, are analysed 
based on official government statistics and own calculations. By examining the financial 
changes on both sides of the budgets for all Dutch municipalities combined, insights into par-
ticularly affected areas with municipal responsibilities and competences are gained; these in-
sights form the statistical basis for the more detailed analyses in part four. Special attention is 
paid to areas in which potential effects of the recent Financial Crisis have been identified in 
previous research. 
The results of three own surveys addressed to Dutch mayors are presented in chapter 11 to 




responses to financial changes within their municipalities, the Financial Crisis is assessed from 
a more subjective point of view, which provides further explanations for municipal decisions 
on countermeasures to address the Crisis. In addition, insights are provided from the surveys 
on topics such as cutback management and common strategies to reduce municipal expendi-
ture. 
Part four focuses on the variation in crisis impact and responses by Dutch municipalities. Build-
ing upon the empirical insights from chapter 10, chapter 12 continues the quantitative anal-
yses of this study by assessing the variation in financial changes in selected areas of activity 
between the municipalities. These calculations also constitute the dependent variables for the 
analyses in the next chapter. 
Chapter 13 subsequently assesses variation in the potential factors of influence on municipal 
finances in times of the recent Financial Crisis in the case of the Netherlands, identified based 
on the theoretical considerations in chapter 4. Thereafter, these factors are utilised as inde-
pendent variables in a series of linear regression models, aiming to determine their links to 
financial changes in the selected policy areas. After a presentation of the empirical results, the 
chapter closes with the testing of the hypotheses developed in chapter 4. 
As the final chapter, chapter 14 discusses the overall findings of this study by bringing the 
insights from the previous chapters together. After the focus on the variation across the local 
level in the Netherlands, the financial changes are assessed in relation to other ongoing trends 
and developments in local government and governance, as described in chapter 7. Then, the 
chapter reflects on the study’s limitations and provides an answer to the research question. 
Lastly, further attention is paid to crisis management and policy recommendations for the 
local level of government in the Netherlands, as along with more general lessons from the 












Part 2: Theory and methodology 
The second part provides the theoretical framework of this study and discusses the method-
ological approach. With regard to the general complexity of a financial crisis and its impact on 
public finances, as well as the potential political-administrative responses, this study follows 
a multidisciplinary approach. After introducing multi-level governance in the context of public 
administration as an analytical concept and reflecting on the rise of the enabling state, atten-
tion is given to the local level. Various developments in local government and local governance 
are discussed to assess the trends that originated before the Financial Crisis since 2007, but 
might have been strengthened or weakened as a result of the Crisis. Further attention is paid 
to local government finance. Starting with the general state of research in the field of budget-
ing and crisis budgeting, specific characteristics of the local level and its financial situation are 
subsequently discussed. 
The nature of the research topic also requires an understanding of economic theory, particu-
larly with a focus on market mechanisms, in addition to political-administrative theory. There-
fore, the understanding of financial crises is discussed in line with the main economic schools 
of thought and with a focus on the emergence, impact, and suggested responses as well as 
the underlying mechanisms. While economic theories mainly addresses the national level of 
government and international contexts, possible implications for the local level are also con-
sidered based on the corresponding literature. 
After introducing the conceptual model, potential factors explaining variation in the impact of 
and responses to a financial crisis across the municipal level are discussed. Based on political-
administrative and socio-economic theories, the aspects are clustered into three groups, 
namely structure-, institution-, and interest-based factors, and their corresponding hypothe-
ses are then derived. 
Part two closes with a description of the methodology of this study. The sources of the official 
data used for the ensuing analyses, as well as the analytical approach and the operationalisa-
tions of the dependent and independent variables, are presented. Concerning the own sur-





2. Local government and local government finance within a system of 
multi-level governance 
Urban or local politics “is about authoritative decision-making at a smaller scale than national 
units – the politics of the sub-national level” (John, 2009, p. 17). Accordingly, local government 
describes the necessary institutions as a requirement for political processes at the local level. 
From a citizens’ perspective, local government is usually the level of government that one is 
in contact with the most; this refers to political-administrative systems designed to be present 
all over a country, in line with considerations ranging from better insights into local conditions 
to capacities of exercising power. Municipal responsibilities often include social services as 
well as issues where public accessibility and short distances for personal interactions are ad-
vantages. Examples range from receiving unemployment benefits and applying for a new pass-
port to registering a business. 
The opinion that public affairs should be addressed as locally as possible is long-standing. Mill 
(1861, pp. 266-287) already extensively justified the advantages of local representation. From 
his perspective, a local administration, enabling local popular control, is required and should 
be responsible for purely local duties, since “the paving, lighting, and cleansing of the streets 
of a town […] are of little consequence to any but its inhabitants” (p. 278).12 However, he also 
acknowledges that some tasks might be performed at the national level for efficiency reasons, 
whereas others might be supervised and controlled at the state level.13 In addition to national 
or regional regulations to ensure a certain coherence in public services and service provision, 
the local level can be considered as relatively autonomous regarding its task provision in many 
countries these days. In the case of the 47 members states of the Council of Europe, for ex-
ample, the European Charter of Local Self-Government guarantees that “local self-govern-
ment denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to reg-
ulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in 
the interests of the local population” (Council of Europe, 1985, article 3, paragraph 1). How-
ever, the scope of this substantial share of public affairs certainly varies across countries and 
depends on the financial resources and their origin in particular. 
On the other hand, in more recent decades, the local level has increasingly been interlinked 
with other levels of government. The formation of formal and informal networks, sometimes 
involving non-governmental actors, can be observed in various policy areas. Apart from vari-
ation across countries and policy areas, further variation is possible within countries. 
From a worldwide perspective, sub-national levels of government account for 31% of total 
government spending, 22% of tax revenues, and 66% of public investments (Blöchliger et al., 
2010, p. 5). While national levels of government usually spend and earn a larger share of the 
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public budget, most investments are carried out locally. In addition to wide variation in the 
design of political-administrative systems, municipalities need to be considered as relevant 
actors in general. Overall, budgets need to be considered in relation to organisational capaci-
ties. Informal influence beyond official tasks and expenditure shares, for example, through 
local authority associations and political contacts, should also not be neglected in systems of 
multi-level governance. 
In other words, local government needs to be seen as part of a governmental system, where 
various levels interact and mutually influence one another. This implies that organisational 
changes and reform pressure emerge not only from the own organisation or level of govern-
ment, but potentially also from related levels of government. Therefore, research on local 
government – such as research on any other level of government – needs to carefully consider 
overall political and social developments. 
Local government is the research object of this study. However, in reference to the intercon-
nectedness of governmental levels, the first sub-chapter addresses changes in the role and 
functioning of the state as a whole (2.1). In a Western world context, the following are con-
sidered to be most relevant: the development from an active welfare state to a state that 
focuses on enabling others, such as private organisations and citizens, to take care of the pro-
duction and provision of public services, and the increasing formal and informal co-operation 
of governmental levels in policy networks. 
The second sub-chapter (2.2) provides a theoretical understanding of local government and 
local governance, focusing on ongoing trends and developments, such as decentralisation and 
management changes, partially relating to broader socio-economic transformation processes. 
Since all these ongoing developments originated long before the Financial Crisis since 2007, 
the understanding of these changes is crucial in order to identify the induced and not-induced 
effects of the Crisis in a later step of this study. This approach also implies a historical dimen-
sion of the analysis associated with further challenges, especially the difficulty in identifying 
clear cause-and-effect relationships over time. On the other hand, ongoing developments at 
the local level might have been intensified or moderated by the Financial Crisis, and this will 
be analysed in a later step as well. 
The theories of local government finance are addressed in the third sub-chapter (2.3). After 
providing a theoretical understanding of budgeting and the expenditure side of the balance 
sheet in general, austerity measures and cutback management will be discussed in the context 
of organisational decline. Thereafter, taxation and the revenue side are explored. Reflections 
on the relations between public income and expenditure will conclude elaborations on gov-
ernment finance. All of this is necessary to understand how public budgets are structured in 
general and how changes arise in line with accompanying decision-making processes. Specific 
characteristics of public finance at the local level, such as the common dependency on finan-
cial transfers from other levels of government, will also be assessed alongside the general 
theoretical understanding of government finance and possibilities to adjust the balance sheets 
to changing framework conditions. Overall, the objective is to provide an understanding of 




municipal level, including its financial situation, as well as the local leeway to react to these 
changing conditions at a later stage. 
 
2.1. The changing role and functioning of the state 
Levels of government are not completely autonomous in their decisions and actions, but part 
of wider governmental systems. The local level and local politics, for example, cannot be en-
tirely separated from regional, national, supranational, or international levels. Overall, politi-
cal-administrative processes can be considered as increasingly interwoven with interacting ef-
fects (John, 2009, p. 17). 
While the development of more interlinkages and dependencies between levels of govern-
ment describes a changing functioning of the state and its institutions, it can be generally con-
cluded that the local level has gained influence. However, previous research in this context 
has mainly focused on national and supranational levels (Bache & Flinders, 2004a, p. 3). 
Other developments address changes in the overall role of the state in society. In terms of 
different views in political theory, in combination with practical considerations, the state has 
been subject to continuous changes since its formalisation several centuries ago. While wide 
variation across countries certainly needs to be taken into account, answers to normative 
questions – such as what constitutes a state, what form of government is preferred, and what 
citizens’ rights and obligations are – are changing continuously. In combination with an em-
pirical perspective, many different types of states can be distinguished, and the classifications 
and definitions in academic literature vary widely. However, in the context of welfare states, 
the distinction between liberal, conservative, and social democratic regimes became relatively 
popular (Esping-Andersen, 1990). From a more practical perspective, common types and 
scopes of public services are associated with the different types of states or welfare states. 
While welfare states with relatively extensive public services were, for example, a common 
state model in Europe in the second half of the 20th century (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 26 ff.), 
more recent models are characterised by a wide range of individual responsibilities and a state 
that enables other organisations rather than producing and delivering public services itself. 
Needless to say, these developments did not leave local levels of government, as the main 
providers of public services over centuries (Page, 1991, p. 1), unaffected.  
Taken together, these framework conditions and developments make it necessary to assess 
the state and the changes in its role and functioning as a whole, before turning to local gov-
ernment. Therefore, the following sub-chapters discuss the developments towards an ena-





2.1.1. Towards an enabling state 
The role of the state, as the monopoly on the legitimate application of the physical violence 
of a human community within a certain territory (Weber, 1956, p. 829 f.), is subject to contin-
uous change. Originating from small territorial entities, which primarily focused on protecting 
their citizens from external aggressions and enforcing property laws in return for tax pay-
ments, and in line with classical liberalism – sometimes labelled a night-watchman state in 
medieval times – the development of the modern welfare state started in the Western world 
in the late 19th century. The enhancement of formal social securities in the following decades 
was sometimes also accompanied by the formation of federal state structures. However, a 
wide variation across Europe and the remaining Western world was and still is observed re-
garding this and other types of states (Raadschelders, 2003, pp. 141-184). 
Between the 1960s and 1990s, welfare states began to come under pressure, and the expan-
sion of social services generally slowed down. Aging societies14 and increasing costs for the 
provision of social services are the main reasons (Gilbert, 2005, p. 5). The accumulation of 
state debt can be considered as an additional factor contributing to this development. The 
preparation and execution of activities in the area of social welfare consequently started to 
change. Former public activities were often replaced by private activities financed by the state. 
While this approach did not always lead to cost reductions, it increased at least the state’s 
flexibility regarding its involvement in social services. Therefore, variation across different ar-
eas of social welfare is given next to the variation across countries (Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989, p. 
193; Raadschelders, 2003, p. 181 ff.). 
Later, in the 1980s or 1990s, the expansion of the welfare state stopped in most Western 
countries. This development was accompanied by tendencies towards a small government in 
general, stemming from major doubts regarding the state’s ability to deal with substantial 
societal and economic issues. Various public sector reform initiatives, generally aiming to in-
crease the public sector’s efficiency, can also be considered as part of this trend. Institutional 
reform strategies often focused on privatisation, deregulation, and decentralisation; privati-
sation in particular also implied a reduction in public sector employment (van der Meer, 2008, 
p. 181 f.; Raadschelders, 2003, p. 181 ff.). 
The successive vanishing of the welfare state in more recent years, combined with more indi-
vidual responsibility of the citizens, was also described as the hollowing out of the state 
(Rhodes, 1994; Milward & Provan, 2000), implying a major transformation of the relation be-
tween state and society rather than minor adjustments (Gilbert, 2002; Raadschelders et al., 
2015, p. 365). On closer inspection, the hollowing out of the state, or a hollow state, is mainly 
characterised by an increasing “separation between a government and the [public] services it 
funds” (Milward & Provan, 2000, p. 362). In this context, especially social services are increas-
ingly delivered by non-governmental organisations, which are often but not necessarily not 
profit-oriented, on behalf of the state. This implies further consequences, such as the need 
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for new types of accountability and control mechanisms (Milward & Provan, 2000; Bauman, 
2000, pp. 168-201; Jessop, 1993). 
However, the disappearance of an old state model made room for a new one. While various 
names were given to the changing role of the state and public service delivery in recent dec-
ades,15 the term enabling state, as “a model in which the state is not proactively governing 
society but is more concerned with defining objectives and mustering resources from a wide 
variety of sources to pursue those goals” (Peters & Pierre, 2001, p. 131), became widely 
used.16 In this type of state, “services and regulation are provided by a mix of different kinds 
of organisations with a range of supervisory and control regimes and mechanisms” (Page & 
Wright, 2007, p. 4). From a practical perspective, broad variation regarding the development 
towards an enabling state can be observed across and within countries as well as over time 
(Page & Wright, 2007, p. 12; van der Meer, 2008, p. 184).  
An enabling state thus “creates and supplies the necessary good conditions for operations of 
the market economy and civil society” (van der Meer, 2008, p. 174), in comparison with a 
welfare state as the provider of public services itself. While the conceptual understanding of 
an enabling state varies in academic literature, good governance and sufficient institutional 
capacities are often seen as part of the necessary conditions, created as a framework by an 
active government (van der Meer, 2008, p. 175, 180), that focuses on mediating, facilitating, 
and initiating various activities (Raadschelders et al., 2015, p. 369). In the context of public 
services, relatively bureaucratic methods of service provision were also replaced by more flex-
ible and customer-oriented approaches as part of the development towards an enabling state 
(van der Meer, 2008, p. 174). Privatisation and deregulation measures also further weakened 
the classical distinction between the public and the private sector (van der Meer, 2008, p. 
183). 
In addition, the development towards an enabling state generally strengthens the role of sub-
national levels of government (Raadschelders et al., 2015, p. 369). When looking at central 
government as the enabler of other organisations, local government can also be considered 
as one of these organisations in some cases (Page & Wright, 2007, p. 4). Privatisation, in com-
bination with the willingness to take regional or local conditions into account to a higher de-
gree, also relies on the knowledge of local institutions. 
Taken together, the role of the state in the Western world has transformed extensively since 
the 1980s, when the downsizing of many welfare states began. Compared to the situation in 
the early years after the Second World War, welfare states, with extensive social services that 
were mainly provided by the state itself, changed into states that are taking care of their citi-
zens indirectly (Page & Wright, 2007, p. 3 f.). By enabling others, such as non-governmental 
organisations, a more efficient service delivery is expected. Furthermore, these developments 
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also affected the state’s structure regarding its functioning. Policy networks gained in im-
portance in place of previously clear distinctions of responsibilities in hierarchical settings. 
Overall, more flexible organisational arrangements became widely accepted (Page & Wright, 
2007, p. 2). Therefore, an enabling state can be considered as an enhancer of changes in the 
functioning of the state towards multi-level governance; this is addressed in the next sub-
chapter. 
 
2.1.2. Multi-level governance 
Not only has the role of the state changed in recent decades, as the shift towards an enabling 
state illustrates, but the functioning of the state has also underwent a broad transformation 
in many countries, partially because of and closely related to the new role of the state. Distinct 
hierarchies regarding the involvement and tasks of actors in the policy process were, at least 
in some policy areas, replaced by a more flexible co-operation between various governmental 
and non-governmental stakeholders. 
While multi-level systems of government – traditionally including not only local, regional, and 
national levels, but also supranational and an overall international level in more recent dec-
ades – and informal arrangements and negations between the levels have been present to a 
certain degree in the political process for centuries (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 84), it is increas-
ingly argued that formal and informal exchanges are required in intergovernmental relations 
in order to govern efficiently (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 89). This is partially because new types 
of problems have emerged, with a scope widely beyond individual levels of government. Some 
topics, such as global warming and environmental pollution, are also not limited to a certain 
territory (Marks & Hooghe, 2004, p. 16). One main strategy to solve these issues, also in line 
with economic theory on the internalisation of external effects, implies negotiated settle-
ments with all the parties involved. As a consequence, the classical distention between do-
mestic and international politics is gradually disappearing (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p. 4; Bache 
& Flinders, 2004a, p. 1; Piattoni, 2010; van den Berg, 2011). In addition, it is also argued that 
a government consisting of multiple levels “makes it possible to satisfy citizens’ demands for 
public goods and services more precisely and cost-effectively” (Treisman, 2007, p. 11). 
Even though the involvement of non-governmental actors can also be considered as common 
practice for centuries, this approach has also gained additional influence in more recent dec-
ades, as the rise of an enabling state illustrates. Overall, the emergence of new concepts in 
relation to public decision-making, mainly in the area of public service development and pro-
vision, can be seen as an attempt to understand and react to the increasing complexity of 
governmental affairs. 
In his research on European integration, overlapping competencies in European politics, and 
institutional innovations of the European Community (EC)17, Gary Marks (1993) introduced 
                                                     




the term multi-level governance to describe the tendency of policymaking as “complex pat-
terns of mutual influence” (p. 406) in the early 1990s. In other words, a label was assigned to 
the European approach of sharing powers across multiple levels of government and inter-
meshing competences (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p. 24). The application of the concept to other 
settings and geographical regions followed (Ongaro, 2015, p. 2 f.), which led to its classification 
as a broader model of intergovernmental relationships (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 76). 
On closer inspection, Marks (1993, pp. 392, 401 f.) has emphasised two main ongoing devel-
opments in the EC’s structural policies: first, the decentralisation of responsibilities in some 
policy areas to sub-national levels of government, and second, the simultaneous centralisation 
of other responsibilities to the supranational level; the latter is also related to the develop-
ments of Europeanisation and internationalisation. In other words, the national level lost – 
and might still be losing – power in two directions (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 233; Marks & 
Hooghe, 2004, pp. 15, 19; Scharpf, 1997a, pp. 520, 533; Conzelmann, 2008, p. 13; Peters & 
Pierre, 2001, p. 132). This trend is further enhanced by the trans-nationalisation of policymak-
ing (van der Meer, 2008, p. 185). As a consequence of these developments, the regional and 
local levels can also be considered as potential allies in policymaking together with the Euro-
pean level (Marks, 1993, p. 402). 
The tendency towards an increasing co-operation between multiple levels of government was 
further supported by other developments. The first of these was the ongoing deterioration of 
the fiscal situation in many industrial countries, partially caused by smaller financial crises, 
whereby the national level was particularly weakened, while the impact at sub-national levels 
of government was often less extensive. Second, managerial reforms led to a greater legal 
independence between the different levels of government in various countries (Peters & 
Pierre, 2001, p. 132). 
Lastly, the often-cited shift from a government to a governance perspective, at least in West-
ern Europe (Peters & Pierre, 2001, p. 131), supported the increasing popularity of the multi-
level governance concept. In this context, government describes traditional hierarchical insti-
tutions with the “unilateral capacity to impose rules, duties and burdens to the members of a 
society and to assure the commitment to these rules, duties and burdens, if necessary by co-
ercion” (van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 102), while governance focuses on the pro-
cesses and authority to co-ordinate actions and resources (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 77 f.; van 
der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 102 f.; Bache & Flinders, 2004b, p. 198). In other words, 
within the governance concept, government is “one next to several or even many institutions 
and organisations that together steer, or guide, or make, or mediate in society” (van der Meer 
& Raadschelders, 2007, p. 102 f.). The shift from government to governance can also be con-
sidered as one of the characteristics of an enabling state (Page & Wright, 2007, p. 4). 
Multi-level governance can be understood as the continuation of these developments (Peters 




defined as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territo-
rial tiers – supranational, national, regional, and local” (p. 392).18 Therefore, multi-level refers 
to the interdependence of governmental operations across administrative levels, while gov-
ernance emphasises the interdependence between governmental and non-governmental ac-
tors (Bache & Flinders, 2004a, p. 3). In this context, it is also argued that multi-level govern-
ance needs to involve at least three levels of government in order to differentiate itself from 
classical intergovernmental relations (Piattoni, 2015, p. 325 f.). 
Overall, multi-level governance emerged through functional needs in the context of political-
administrative processes (Conzelmann, 2008, p. 26), and it is characterised by policy networks 
(Marks, 1993, p. 401 f.; Bache & Flinders, 2004a, p. 3), its ad hoc nature (Peters & Pierre, 2004, 
p. 83), and “the institutionalization of contested spheres of influence across several tiers of 
government” (Marks, 1993, p. 402). Within the policy networks, consisting of governmental 
and non-governmental actors, policy decisions are reached via deliberation and negotiation 
as well as through exchange and collaboration (Piattoni, 2015, p. 323; Peters & Pierre, 2004, 
p. 77 f.). Apart from such decisions, multi-level governance is also relevant for policy imple-
mentation (Papadopoulos, 2008, p. 31). 
It is also important to note that often, formal hierarchies between levels of government are 
at least partially disregarded in practice, and relations between actors are necessarily contex-
tually defined to some extent (Peters & Pierre, 2004, pp. 77, 79, 81). This implies that govern-
mental levels, as well as specific regulations, can be bypassed (Peters & Pierre, 2001, p. 132; 
Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 85; Piattoni, 2015, p. 332). As a result, from a practical perspective, 
the actual influence of individual actors in a system of multi-level governance depends largely 
on their capacities, such as budgets and staff members, as well as their political preferences 
(Kuhlmann, 2015, p. 210). In the case of political actors, their willingness to give away formal 
competences is also relevant in the development of policy networks (Piattoni, 2015, p. 331). 
While the emergence of multi-level governance needs to be understood as a gradual process, 
and traditional institutions still play a major role in policymaking (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 75 
f.), a wide variation in new policymaking arrangements can be observed. On the one hand, 
variation concerns different countries or regions within a country. One main reason consists 
of the previous distribution of powers across the governmental levels and the accompanying 
abilities to transfer powers to policy networks (Marks, 1993, p. 404; Scharpf, 1997a, p. 533). 
In this context, different arrangements can lead to different outcomes (Scharpf, 1997a, p. 
531). On the other hand, variation can be expected across different policy areas. Apart from 
the involvement of various governmental actors within their traditional areas of competence, 
                                                     
18 Other later definitions of multi-level governance, such as “negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between 
institutions at the transnational, national, regional, and local levels” (Peters & Pierre, 2001, p. 131), the “use of 
non-hierarchical forms of governing, the emergence of multi-level structures of policy implementation, and the 
enhanced role of non-state actors within them” (Conzelmann, 2008, p. 13), and “a type of policymaking ar-
rangements characterized by the simultaneous activation of governmental and non-governmental actors at 
different jurisdictional levels and such that the interrelationships thus created defy existing hierarchies and ra-




combined with certain problem-solving capacities, especially the number and resources of 
non-governmental actors can vary substantially (Scharpf, 1997a). 
Multi-level governance comprises various aspects that are generally considered to be positive, 
compared to policymaking within traditional hierarchies. New actors, particularly non-govern-
mental ones, are actively involved in the policy process, which implies additional views and 
opinions and an overall integrative approach (Piattoni, 2015, pp. 311, 324; Bache & Flinders, 
2004a, p. 1). A tendency towards consensus is generally enabled by these framework condi-
tions (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 85; Piattoni, 2015, p. 330). Furthermore, these circumstances 
allow for relatively spontaneous policy co-ordination as well as changes in the network com-
position, if necessary, and they encourage a collective learning process (Piattoni, 2015, pp. 
329 f., 332). 
The main critics of multi-level governance claim a lack of accountability, transparency, and 
democratic principles in general. It is particularly argued that accountability problems arise 
from the absence of clear chains of delegation and the higher complexity of the arrangements 
in general (Piattoni, 2015, pp. 324, 332, 335; Papadopoulos, 2008, p. 46). Furthermore, the 
relations between the actors are sometimes not transparent and cannot be scrutinised as part 
of the democratic process (Papadopoulos, 2008, p. 45). Depending on the details regarding 
the arrangements, policy networks can even exist completely separated from democratic pro-
cesses (Peters & Pierre, 2004, pp. 85, 88; Papadopoulos, 2008, p. 32). In this context, it must 
also be taken into account that the general public might hold political bodies accountable for 
policies, even if decisions were made largely beyond their sphere of influence (Piattoni, 2015, 
p. 337). In other words, a lack of political control is emphasised (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 88). 
Improvements and partial solutions to these problems might be possible by strengthening the 
competences of the juridical branch and ombudsmen (Papadopoulos, 2008, p. 46). In general, 
it needs to be remarked that tendencies towards technocratic decision-making can also be 
observed in traditional governmental hierarchies, and the weakening of democratic principles 
is not a problem solely associated with multi-level governance (Piattoni, 2015, p. 333). 
A second group of points of critique addresses the role of non-governmental actors within 
policy networks. The overall representativeness of the societal partners, as well as their selec-
tion and involvement, which might lead to co-ordination and capacity problems, is questioned 
(Piattoni, 2015, p. 335; Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 239). An unequal distribution of resources 
might lead to a bias regarding the involvement of actors and their influence within the policy 
networks (Conzelmann, 2008, p. 28; Piattoni, 2015, p. 311). The influence of lobby groups can 
also be seen as a critical aspect in general (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p. 15 f.). Furthermore, 
some authors have critically pointed out a higher dependency of the state on external actors 
(Peters & Pierre, 2001, p. 131), a blurring of the delineation between the public and the private 
sector (Piattoni, 2015, p. 332), and a fragmentation of power resources (Papadopoulos, 2008, 
p. 40). 
Further concerns involve the ways in which decisions are reached within the policy networks. 
Marks (1993, p. 407) has already noted that the shifting spheres of competence might result 
in conflicts. In addition, the informal nature of policy networks might lead to an inequality 




informal arrangements between some actors could be the result (Peters & Pierre, 2004, p. 
87).  
In summary, multi-level governance as a form of policymaking in networks, consisting of gov-
ernmental and non-governmental actors, has gained wide attention in public administration 
and political science in recent decades. While some see the concept as an alternative to tradi-
tional hierarchies, others consider policy networks to be nested within formal governmental 
institutions (Hooghe & Marks, 2003, p. 234). 
Changes in the direction of an enabling state and multi-level governance, as major transfor-
mations in the role and functioning of the state in recent decades, have both contributed to a 
general strengthening of local government. With regard to the detailed knowledge about local 
needs, local authorities can play a relevant role in policymaking and the delivery of public ser-
vices in relatively flexible arrangements beyond traditional hierarchies. Apart from these 
broader developments, other recent trends address local government and local governance 
in particular. These will be discussed in the next chapters. 
 
2.2. Local government and local governance: general trends and de-
velopments 
Apart from the Financial Crisis since 2007, states and their governmental levels, as parts of 
multi-level governance systems, face various challenges. Questions in relation to the future 
delivery of social services and the transformation from welfare states into enabling states may 
serve as examples. Furthermore, often far-reaching developments and changes in recent dec-
ades, ranging from necessary adaptations and new framework conditions to large-scale re-
form initiatives, affect the local level in particular. Compared to other levels of government, 
the local level can even be considered as the forerunner of public sector modernisation in 
many countries. In addition, civil servants at the local level are known for acting more flexibly 
and pragmatically concerning the implantation of reform instruments (Kuhlmann et al., 2015, 
p. 180). 
While some developments are specific to a single country or a group of countries, for example 
certain managerial approaches and the formation of particular territorial units, others can be 
interpreted as global trends. From a theoretical perspective, a vertical reform dimension, 
chiefly including changes in the division of responsibilities between the levels of government, 
and a horizontal reform dimension of changes across the local level can be distinguished 
(Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2011, pp. 479 f., 486 f.). While reforms along the vertical dimension 
potentially include shifts of power, such as in the case of decentralisation measures or multi-
level governance arrangements, municipal amalgamations are a typical example of horizontal 
reforms (Kuhlmann, 2015, p. 186 f.). In practice, some reform initiatives might also concern 





In general, all types of changes in local government and local governance potentially affect 
citizens as service takers, as well as civil servants as service providers. According to recent 
research (Schwab et al., 2017), the (1) reorganisation of local service delivery, (2) managerial 
reforms, (3) territorial and functional rescaling, and (4) democratic reforms are currently the 
four basic reform trajectories at the local level in Europe. The reorganisation of local service 
delivery refers to a changing relation between the state and the market. In line with the wider 
developments towards an enabling state and multi-level governance, public services are in-
creasingly developed and delivered in co-operation between governmental and non-govern-
mental actors. Closely related to broader public sector reform initiatives, such as New Public 
Management (NPM) and succeeding approaches, topics such as privatisation and agencifica-
tion also gained attention at the local level in recent decades. 
While in the case of some aspects of managerial changes in terms of service delivery, on the 
one hand, some developments are already seen as reversing (Schwab et al., 2017, p. 12 f.), 
the digitalisation of public services – as the reorganisation towards a more efficient public 
service delivery and provision of public information by integrating digital channels – can, on 
the other hand, especially be considered as enduring, since this development is enabled by 
general technological advances.19 
Next to the external dimension of managerial reforms in terms of public service delivery, the 
internal dimension is equally important. Focusing on administrative efficiency, the aim of 
many reform initiatives, and NPM in particular, was to transfer private sector methods to the 
public sector. As the major provider of public services, the local level was widely affected by 
these internal management changes. On closer inspection, especially the public sector work-
ing conditions were modified by approaches, such as customer orientation and performance 
management in recent decades (Schwab et al., 2017, p. 12 f.). 
In line with attempts to increase the overall efficiency of local government, territorial and 
functional rescaling in the search for an improved or optimal size in terms of territory and 
number of citizens, as well as an appropriate distribution of tasks, can be observed for a long 
time. From a horizontal perspective, municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation 
describe the trend of larger local units and increased working relationships between local en-
tities. Co-operation can thus also lead to municipal mergers in the long term. Regarding the 
                                                     
19 Partially related to the digitalisation of public services is the development of so-called smart cities since the 
late 1990s. While the understanding of smart cities varies in the literature, the term is generally used for terri-
torial entities, which collect various types of data in order to manage their public infrastructure and public ser-
vices more efficiently. A traffic management system, which collects traffic flow data via sensors and optimises 
traffic light settings, is a practical example. Apart from possible cost reductions through efficiency gains, citi-
zens can benefit from a higher quality of public infrastructure and public services. Considering the continuous 
technical advances, especially in the context of artificial intelligence and the Internet of things, which describes 
various types of devices newly connected to the Internet, further optimisations of public infrastructure and 
public services in relation to the understanding of smart cities can be expected in the future (Anthopoulos, 
2017; International Organization for Standardization, 2014). However, even though this development is cer-
tainly relevant for the local level of government, and despite local officials needing to decide on the implemen-
tation of new technologies in their municipality, smart cities are not further discussed in this study, because of 





distribution of responsibilities among the different levels of government, as the vertical re-
form dimension, the decentralisation of tasks to the local level is a common development 
(Schwab et al., 2017, p. 13). The latter is supplemented by the increasing importance of the 
EU in various policy areas and attempts by local government to influence European decision-
making, also known as Europeanisation. 
Democratic reforms are the last major reform trajectory. Based on considerations regarding 
the broader involvement of citizens at the local level, accompanied by potential advantages, 
such as broader societal consensuses in policymaking, various initiatives have been launched 
in recent decades. From a more practical perspective, these included public debates and con-
sultation formats. Therefore, initiatives for broader citizen participation beyond periodic elec-
tions can be considered as a recent development at the local level as well (Schwab et al., 2017, 
p. 13).20 
While all four reform trajectories are strongly interlinked and related (Schwab et al., 2017, p. 
13 f.), the following six trends and developments, as partial aspects of the overall reform tra-
jectories, will be analysed in more detail in the following sub-chapters to assess the situation 
in the Netherlands at a later stage: 
 Decentralisation of tasks (2.2.1) 
 Municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation (2.2.2) 
 Management changes (2.2.3) 
 Europeanisation (2.2.4) 
 Citizen participation (2.2.5) 
 Digitalisation of public services (2.2.6) 
Thereafter, a summary and discussion of the relations and interactions between the trends 
and developments will be provided in a concluding sub-chapter (2.2.7). 
 
2.2.1. Decentralisation of tasks 
Politically motivated decentralisation measures, partially in line with the development to-
wards multi-level governance and the rise of an enabling state, led to an increasing importance 
of local government in recent decades (Peters et al., 2011, p. 18). While different types of 
decentralisation can be distinguished and the understanding of the term varies broadly (Treis-
man, 2007, p. 21), Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) define decentralisation most generally as the 
“transfer of authority, responsibility, and resources – through deconcentration, delegation, or 
devolution – from the center to lower levels of administration” (p. 1). While other, more ex-
tensive descriptions of the general process (e.g. United Nations Development Programme, 
1997, p. 5) include intentions, such as an overall increase in quality and effectiveness of the 
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nology, and distinction from other developments, can be debated. See Denters and Rose (2005a, 2005b), Vet-
ter and Kersting (2003a, 2003b), Andrew and Goldsmith (1998), and Proeller (2006) for similar distinctions be-




governmental system, the shift of responsibilities to lower administrative levels can be under-
stood as the most generally accepted key feature of decentralisation. As a consequence, the 
local level might gain more autonomy in dealing with local needs and demands. Alongside the 
availability of additional resources – since more tasks usually imply the necessity of more 
funds – the own decision-making scope in the use of such additional financial means must be 
considered as important with regard to the increase in autonomy. If, however, municipalities 
gain more responsibilities, while the own income or transfers from other levels of government 
do not increase, then decentralisation measures might also result in financial pressure. 
In the context of decentralisation strategies, a further subdivision into territorial and func-
tional approaches has been made. While both approaches aim to make government more 
efficient, the former enables the adjustment to local conditions and the involvement of citi-
zens of a certain area, and the latter focuses on specific policy areas, for example by the es-
tablishment of governmental agencies (van der Meer, 2008, p. 185 f.). 
Cheema and Rondinelli (2007, p. 6 f.) distinguish four specific types of decentralisation: ad-
ministrative, political, fiscal, and economic. Administrative decentralisation describes the 
transfer of administrative tasks to lower levels of government. Political decentralisation is 
characterised by the shift of political decision-making competences to lower levels, possibly 
including an increase in citizen participation. Fiscal decentralisation implies an increase in fis-
cal competences at lower administrative levels, while economic decentralisation describes 
general measures towards market liberalisation and deregulation with related effects at the 
local level.21 In practice, reforms can imply decentralisation along more than one dimension. 
Administrative and fiscal decentralisation in particular often appear simultaneously because 
of the general interlinkage of tasks and funds. 
Apart from the general motivation to increase the overall efficiency of the political-adminis-
trative system, common arguments for decentralisation measures are further benefits in the 
field of democracy and legitimacy by bringing public services closer to the people (Page, 1991, 
p. 69; Steen et al., 2017, p. 67). However, most characteristics, especially cost reductions, can 
also be used to promote centralisation (de Vries, 2000, p. 217). In other words, an increase in 
efficiency by the decentralisation of public services is questionable and not compatible with 
the general assumption of economies of scale of larger units from a theoretical perspective. 
Overall, precise judgments on efficiency gains require a comparison of specific organisational 
arrangements and the associated costs in practice. 
In addition, the developments towards an enabling state and multi-level governance, as two 
trends largely motivated by efforts to increase the efficiency of public services and policymak-
ing as well as intentions to better adjust public services to meet citizens’ needs, facilitated 
decentralisation measures in general. In the case of the enabling state, decentralisation 
measures can be considered as one of multiple reform aspects to support the provision of 
                                                     
21 Treisman (2007, p. 28) distinguishes between only the first three types of decentralisation, not comprising 
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public services together with local partners (van der Meer, 2008, p. 181 f.). Regarding multi-
level governance, decentralisation measures are also a type of supporting development. 
Apart from general attempts to make government more efficient by bringing it closer to the 
citizens, accompanied by the developments towards an enabling state and multi-level govern-
ance, globalisation is an additional factor that is sometimes considered as increasing the ne-
cessity of decentralisation measures. Characterised by the rise of international trade and 
movement of people, globalisation extends the pressure to enhance the administrative and 
fiscal capacities at the local level in order to provide a framework for individuals, as well as 
companies, to participate in and benefit from global opportunities (Cheema & Rondinelli, 
2007, p. 5). 
In general, decentral services enable a better adaptation to local conditions (Page, 1991, p. 
69; Steen et al., 2017, p. 67), while service provision can become more fragmented. Since fac-
tors such as organisational capacities can play a major role in the reform outcome, efficiency 
gains are especially difficult to assess in advance. Furthermore, it must be taken into account 
that reforms imply restructuring costs, and efficiency gains are therefore achieved in the long 
run rather than in the short run. In other words, decentralisation measures often first imply 
additional costs and burdens for the local level itself, before advantages are achieved 
(Kuhlmann, 2015, p. 210). 
From a historical perspective, the first half of the 20th century, especially the 1940s and 1950s, 
was mainly characterised by relatively centralised nation states in the Western world. A first 
wave of decentralisation began in the 1960s, with a common focus on the deconcentration of 
governmental tasks. In the mid-1980s, a second wave followed in the context of management 
reforms mainly aiming to increase public sector efficiency, in line with the developments to-
wards an enabling state and multi-level governance. Since the 1990s, decentralisation 
measures have also been implemented to increase public participation (Cheema & Rondinelli, 
2007, p. 2 f.). However, various additional country- or regional-specific factors and intentions, 
including political motivations, also need to be considered as relevant for steps towards more 
decentralised responsibilities. 
From an empirical perspective, the majority of nations – both industrial and developing coun-
tries – became more decentralised in the last two decades (World Bank, 1999, p. 107 ff.). The 
same applies to half of the member states of the EU since 1980. Furthermore, none of the 
remaining members became more centralised during this period of time (Marks & Hooghe, 
2004, p. 15); however, exceptions are possible for individual policy areas. A system of multi-
level governance with sub-national units exists in 95% of all democratic countries as a precon-
dition for shifts of responsibilities to lower levels (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007, p. 8). 
Empirical results concerning efficiency and performance gains as a result of decentralisation 
measures reveal a mixed picture (de Vries, 2000; Kuhlmann et al., 2011; Ebinger et al., 2011). 
In this context, insufficient administrative and managerial capacities at the local level are a 
common explanation for unsatisfactory reform outcomes (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007, p. 8). 
Taken together, decentralisation measures, as the transfer of responsibilities from higher to 




Once political decisions are made regarding the shifting of competences, the public authorities 
involved need to adjust to the new circumstances, implying major challenges, especially at the 
local level with its limited organisational capacities. Similar challenges arise from territorial 
reforms describing changes at a horizontal level, compared to the vertical dimension of de-
centralisation, which will be addressed in the following sub-chapter. 
 
2.2.2. Municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation 
The relation between the size of territorial communities and the quality of governance was 
already discussed by Aristotle (2009) around 350 BC. He argued that, on the one hand, com-
munities should be self-sufficient units large enough to provide services to their citizens, and 
that, on the other hand, the units should be small enough to make responsible citizenship 
possible by enabling citizens to assess the performance of politicians as well as democratic 
participation in general. Considering both claims, the trade-off regarding the size of political-
administrative units in terms of inhabitants becomes evident (Denters et al., 2014, p. 4 f.). The 
search for the optimal size of territorial communities consequently continued (cf. e.g. Dahl & 
Tufte, 1973) and still continues, and relationships are not necessarily linear. Since size might 
have both negative and positive effects on the quality of governance, the question as to which 
type of effect prevails can be considered crucial on closer inspection. In this context, many 
additional factors, such as the composition of the local population, whose impact possibly 
changes over time, might be relevant, and this does not simplify the search for a suitable size 
of territorial units at all levels of government from a theoretical perspective (Denters et al., 
2014, pp. 16, 22, 330, 332 f.). 
However, territorial reforms at the local level have been a common development in most 
Western European countries for several decades. The corresponding decision-making process, 
as well as the consequences, is the subject of various single-country studies (e.g. Steiner & 
Kaiser, 2017; Hanes, 2015; de Peuter et al., 2011; Kjaer et al., 2010; Dollery & Crase, 2004) and 
country comparisons (e.g. Steiner et al., 2016; De Ceuninck et al., 2010; Broekema et al., 2016). 
Improving local efficiency is the common reform goal. Especially regarding public services, a 
certain scope is generally considered necessary for an efficient provision. Furthermore, larger 
territorial units are usually associated with higher problem-solving capacities. Amalgama-
tions, which describe the formation of larger units in order to realise economies of scale, make 
up the strategy that is generally regarded as most promising (De Ceuninck et al., 2010, p. 804 
f.; Steen et al., 2017, p. 68). Decentralisation measures, characterised by additional tasks at 
lower levels of government, as described in the previous sub-chapter, can accelerate the pro-
cess of municipal amalgamations. Furthermore, fiscal stress, socio-demographic changes, and 
recent amalgamation reforms, which lead to a self-reinforcing process and historical path de-
pendency, are other potential driving factors for municipal mergers (Askim et al., 2016). More-
over, political considerations can be relevant for intentions to form larger units at the local 




Additional reasons for municipal amalgamations refer back to more recent developments. 
Technical advances, especially in the area of communication technology, enable the perfor-
mance of public services on a larger scale. Where personal appointments were necessary to 
settle certain matters several years ago, contacting the local administration nowadays is pos-
sible through various digital forms, which limit the need for a widespread presence of local 
authorities and short distances. The increasing complexity of tasks is a further argument to 
perform municipal duties at a larger scale, and hence larger administrative units, by involving 
experts who are not available in small municipalities (Bos, 2013, p. 31 f.). 
However, larger municipalities in terms of territory and citizens can have various disad-
vantages as well. For example, the identification of citizens with their municipality or region 
might be negatively affected if territorial entities exceed a certain size. From a democratic 
perspective, the turnout at local elections and the interaction of citizens with political repre-
sentatives can decrease as a further consequence of a lack of local identity (De Ceuninck et 
al., 2010, p. 805). 
From a historical perspective, many municipal amalgamations were implemented in Western 
European countries in the 1960s and 1970s, with the aim of increasing the efficiency of the 
local administration by forming larger units (De Ceuninck et al., 2010, p. 805; Denters et al., 
2014, p. 3 f.). In this regard, one can distinguish between countries in which the territorial 
reforms were conducted mainly as a one-time action, such as in Belgium and Denmark, and 
countries that followed an incremental approach, such as the Netherlands, by continuously 
realising amalgamations over decades. Table 1 provides an empirical overview of the number 
of municipalities of various European countries in 1973 and 2013, as well as the percentage 
change within this period of 40 years, and the average population in 2013. 
Table 1: Changes in the number of municipalities in European countries, 1973–2013 (Adopted from Steiner et al., 
2016, p. 29) 
 Total number of mu-
nicipalities in 197322 
Total number of mu-
nicipalities in 2013 
Change (%) Average popula-
tion 2013 
Belgium 2,359 589 -75.0 18,593 
Denmark 275 98 -64.4 56,943 
Finland 483 320 -33.7 16,151 
Germany 15,009 11,197 -25.4 6,742 
Greece 6,061 325 -94.6 33,653 
Iceland 224 74 -67.0 4,447 
Italy 8,056 8,092 +0.4 7,550 
Netherlands 913 408 -55.3 41,000 
Norway 443 428 -3.4 11,802 
Poland 2,366 2,480 +4.8 15,600 
Portugal 304 308 +1.3 34,293 
Sweden 464 290 -37.5 33,240 
Switzerland 3,095 2,396 -22.6 3,163 
 
With the exception of minor increases in the number of municipalities in Poland (+4.8%), Por-
tugal (+1.3%), and Italy (+0.4%), the quantity decreased between 1973 and 2013 in all other 
                                                     




listed countries. Most of the declines in the number of municipalities in the remaining nation 
states were relatively extensive. The highest reductions in municipalities during this period in 
time were realised in Greece (-94.6%), Belgium (-75.0%), and Iceland (-67.0%), where it must 
be taken into account that major territorial reforms were already implemented in some coun-
tries, such as Sweden, before 1973 (De Ceuninck et al., 2010, p. 809). 
When reflecting on the efficiency of public services at the local level, it is interesting to note 
that apart from all reform initiatives, the average population of a municipality still largely dif-
fers across European countries. Geographical factors, such as mountainous regions or islands, 
that complicate mergers, seem to provide only a partial explanation for this circumstance. 
However, considering the intended increases in efficiency and/or service quality, empirical 
analyses addressing these issues, especially financial changes in line with territorial reforms, 
are rare in Europe; this makes evaluating previous amalgamations, as well as justifying future 
ones based on scientific standards, difficult (Steen et al., 2017, p. 72). 
More generally, it must be considered that the understanding of a municipality, described by 
its tasks, scope of political decision-making, and administrative capacities, largely differs 
across Europe. While municipalities, as the lowest level of government, are the main providers 
of public services in some countries, they have limited competences in other countries. In 
other words, assessing solely the number of municipalities, independent of their compe-
tences, can be misleading in debates on municipal mergers aiming to increase the efficiency 
of the local level. 
In addition to the complete merger in an amalgamation process, which includes considerable 
costs for restructuring, close co-operation between municipalities is a common strategy in 
many countries. In other words, inter-municipal co-operation can be considered as a more 
flexible and “soft” mechanism in comparison with amalgamations, although the intentions are 
largely similar (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007a; Hulst & van Montfort, 2007c; Niaounakis & Blank, 
2017, p. 550; Steen et al., 2017, p. 68). In this context, it should be taken into account that “in 
some European countries inter-municipal cooperation is a phenomenon (nearly) as old as the 
municipality itself” (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007a, p. 7). 
Since nearly identical tasks are performed in most municipalities within a country, co-opera-
tion also seems to be beneficial when striving for a more efficient provision of public services, 
as one of the main areas in which municipalities work together in practice. Fiscal constraints 
are thus also considered to be important drivers of municipal co-operation (Bel & Warner, 
2016). In general, the advantages of amalgamations apply to municipal co-operation as a less 
far-reaching form of arrangement as well. Apart from lower organisational costs, also ending 
a co-operation appears to be easier than separating previously merged municipalities. 
Criticism of inter-municipal co-operation, on the other hand, emphasises problems with dem-
ocratic accountability, since the arrangements are usually difficult for elected politicians to 
control, and responsibilities might be unclear (Denters, 2017, p. 95). In this context, additional 
monitoring costs can also lower the efficiency gains (Allers & de Greef, 2018, p. 128). 
On closer inspection, the focus on collaboration in certain policy areas seems especially ben-




strategies of service provision in joint working groups to the formal partnerships concerning 
the delivery of a certain public service. Since municipal co-operation is not necessarily limited 
to two partners, co-operation can take place in municipal networks. However, in practice, the 
types of co-operation largely depend on the underlying legal framework in a certain country 
or region (Steen et al., 2017, p. 68). Apart from voluntary co-operation, other levels of gov-
ernment might also force municipalities to work together. This makes it necessary to take into 
account that extensive co-operation can lead to voices calling for municipal amalgamations 
that are not always in favour of the citizens and local officials, as outlined above. 
In summary, municipal amalgamations are a second major development, next to decentrali-
sation measures, affecting the local level in recent decades. Intentions to increase the effi-
ciency of the public sector led to the formation of larger political-administrative units in most 
Western countries. In addition, municipal co-operation increased noticeably as well. In line 
with the disadvantages of amalgamations, such as longer distances and potentially negative 
effects on local identities, municipal mergers cannot be considered as a linear process without 
limitations, but rather as a search for the optimal size of public bodies in terms of territory, 
which is highly debated and depends on a large number of factors (Steen et al., 2017, p. 70). 
Further challenges for local government, at least partially supported by changes in municipal 
responsibilities in terms tasks and territory by providing windows of opportunity for additional 
reform initiatives, concern the managerial approaches within the administration. These ap-
proaches will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
2.2.3. Management changes 
Changing framework conditions often necessitate organisational adjustments. What applies 
to the private sector under competitive conditions is also the case for the public sector, with 
an increasing focus on its efficiency. As a consequence, managerial changes and reform initi-
atives are common phenomena today. It is even argued that “developing and implementing 
public sector reform initiatives is nowadays considered an indispensable part of running a 
modern and innovative government” (van der Meer, 2008, p. 174). 
Until the 1970s, administrative bodies in industrial countries were characterised by the We-
berian understanding of bureaucracy, including fixed areas of activity, written rules as the ba-
sis for action, complete documentation, and explicit hierarchy. Civil servants were experts in 
their areas of responsibility and had a determined career path. Bureaucracy was thus under-
stood as the most efficient and rational way of organising legal authority (Weber, 1922, p. 650 
ff.; Weber, 1919). Therefore, integral governmental planning was common at most adminis-
trative levels in industrial countries. During this period, welfare states with extensive public 
services comprised the most common state model in Western countries. The shift from active 
to enabling states can also be considered as a development that required, or at least facili-




In addition, financial constraints in the context of economic downturns and increasing govern-
ment debt led to searches for alternatives to integral governmental planning since the 1960s. 
Public management reforms became a common development in various countries from the 
late 1970s onwards. Aspirations towards a more flexible but still efficient administration 
formed the common goal of public sector modernisation. The reform movement became 
known as New Public Management, mainly characterised by the public sector’s adoption of 
management techniques from the private sector (Hood, 1991; Raadschelders & Vigoda-Gadot, 
2015, p. 161). As a result of disadvantages and criticism of NPM – especially its negative effects 
on an administration’s integrity and reliability – searches for compromises between hierar-
chical planning in a Weberian understanding on the one side and business style management 
in line with NPM on the other side began in the 1990s (Kickert, 2003, p. 389; van der Meer, 
2008, p. 176 f.). 
Taken together, three waves of reform thinking with the following key elements can be dis-
tinguished, according to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, p. 11), from an academic perspective: 
1. Mid 1960s to late 1970s: Rational, hierarchical planning and cost-benefit analysis; sci-
ence and expertise will produce progress. 
2. Late 1970s to late 1990s: New Public Management; business techniques to improve 
efficiency; rise of “better management” as the solution to a wide range of problems. 
3. Late 1990s to 2010: No dominant model; several key concepts, including governance, 
networks, partnerships, “joining up”, transparency, and trust. 
New Public Management in particular became a widely noted subject of research and policy 
discussions (Barzelay, 2001). According to Hood (1991, p. 3), its common understanding is re-
flected by seven doctrinal components: (1) “hands-on professional management” in the public 
sector, (2) explicit standards and measures of performance, (3) greater emphasis on output 
control, (4) shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, (5) shift to greater competition 
in public sector, (6) stress on private-sector styles of management practice, and (7) stress on 
greater discipline and parsimony in resource use (Hood, 1991, p. 4 f.). That common under-
standing makes it useful, while being a loose term rather than a theoretical concept. 
It must be mentioned that NPM-related reforms do not necessarily include all the components 
(Hood, 1991, p. 4) and that reform foci changed over time in practice. More generally, NPM 
can be described as the introduction and application of private sector management tools and 
styles in the public sector. From a practical perspective, privatisation, marketisation, decen-
tralisation, output orientation, quality systems, and the intensity of implementation are com-
mon measures in line with NPM (van Helden & Jansen, 2003, p. 69). Regarding the scope of 
NPM-related reform initiatives, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia are promi-
nent examples. While some other countries implemented comparable reform elements to a 
lesser extent, the generality of NPM is sometimes questioned (Barzelay, 2001, p. 14 ff.).23 
General criticisms of NPM include its lack of theoretical substance (Hood, 1991, p. 8 f.). Some 
critiques of NPM-related reforms include the concern that previous mechanisms ensuring 
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honesty and neutrality in the public sector are partially abolished. Fixed salaries, explicit rules 
of procedure, permanence of tenure, restraints on the power of line management, and clear 
lines of division between public and private sectors are the most important aspects in this 
context (Hood, 1991, p. 16). Further disadvantages might be derived from an ethical perspec-
tive: NPM raises new challenges to avoid behaviour that might be acceptable in the private 
sector but is not desirable in the public sector (van Helden & Jansen, 2003, p. 76 f.). 
Several decades after the start of the fist NPM initiatives, a number of empirical studies eval-
uated NPM reforms in different countries and mostly identified only limited achievements of 
the reforms in practice. In the United Kingdom, the administration and tax collection costs of 
central government increased considerably between 1980 and 2013 in absolute terms, espe-
cially in the cases of tasks that were outsourced, while civil service staff costs remained about 
the same. In other words, general cost savings were not achieved. Furthermore, citizens’ com-
plaints about public services and judicial reviews of administrative decisions rose, which does 
not indicate an increase in the quality of public services. In addition, survey data demonstrated 
that citizen satisfaction with and trust in central government did not improve in the United 
Kingdom in times of the NPM reforms (Hood & Dixon, 2015). Also, according to an evaluation 
study, the achievements of NPM reforms in the German local government in terms of perfor-
mance improvements are limited; this is partially explained by the inadequate implementa-
tion of the reform initiatives (Kuhlmann et al., 2008; Bogumil et al., 2007).  
Among the various public management reform models in recent years – also known as post-
NPM models – the Neo-Weberian state (NWS), which was introduced by Pollitt and Bouckaert 
(2004), gained wider attention. The model combines Weberian and new managerial elements 
in line with NPM. On a closer look, the following aspects represent the Weberian elements: 
the focus on the state as the main problem solver, legitimated in a reprehensive democracy, 
and an administration characterised by both its legal basis and a civil service with a distinct 
status. The “shift from an internal orientation [of] bureaucratic rule-following towards an ex-
ternal orientation [of] meeting citizens’ needs and wishes” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 118) 
characterises the main element beyond Weber’s ideal type of administration. Further new 
elements include direct democratic components as an addition to representative democracy, 
the target orientation when using governmental resources, and the professionalisation of the 
civil service focusing on managerial aspects (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 118 ff.). Criticism of 
the NWS includes a paradigmatic character and internal inconsistencies, similar to weaknesses 
emphasised in the case of NPM (Dunn & Miller, 2007). 
While prior and ongoing academic discussions about management changes and public sector 
reforms have primarily taken place or still occur in the context of national levels of govern-
ment, local levels were affected by reform initiatives in the same way because of comparable 
administrative structures (Wollmann & Thurmaier, 2012) whereby the local level’s own possi-
bilities to initiate reforms were often limited. However, in the context of certain initiatives, 
such as a broader orientation towards citizens, the local level can even be considered as the 
forerunner of public sector modernisation (Kuhlmann et al., 2015, p. 180). 
While the reform rhetoric is often extensive, it also needs to be taken into account that “dis-




(Hood, 1995, p. 106). In other words, many reform initiatives might not comprise actual far-
reaching changes, in contrast to developments suggested by the public relations work. More 
specifically, changing management tools is easier than changing management styles, since 
employees need to accept the changes (van Helden & Jansen, 2003, p. 79). 
In summary, management reform initiatives, mainly aiming to increase public sector effi-
ciency, are long-standing traditions. The related intentions to save costs on administrative ex-
penditures often led to major changes in working conditions, while the performance improve-
ments were often limited from an empirical perspective. At the local level, additional reform 
pressure often originates from other levels of government, alongside own initiatives. Similar 
mechanisms apply to Europeanisation, as a further development to be discussed in the next 
sub-chapter. In this case, provisions from a supranational level to local government are ac-
companied by attempts of municipal entities and their umbrella organisations to influence the 
policymaking of the relevant supranational institutions. 
 
2.2.4. Europeanisation 
Within a system of multi-level governance – consisting, for instance, of an international, su-
pranational, national, regional, and local level – each layer has its competences. In addition, 
mutual formal and informal influence is usually given, and policy ideas can move across the 
administrative levels (John, 2000, p. 877). However, responsibilities might be divided une-
qually, and some layers might accumulate additional tasks over time, along with a shift to-
wards a higher importance in relation to other layers. 
The EU, whose predecessor organisation was established in 1958, constitutes the suprana-
tional level of government from the perspective of its member states. While striving for an 
equalisation of living standards, the European level has continuously acquired additional com-
petencies, especially since the 1980s, and it expands its influence on national, regional, and 
local levels of government. In other words, it “changed the nature of nation state and subna-
tional politics as it had been known for at least two centuries” (Goldsmith, 2003, p. 112). 
While the theoretical and conceptual understandings differ, the “process by which increasing 
numbers of policy arenas have taken on a European dimension” (Goldsmith, 2003, p. 116) can 
be described as the Europeanisation or European integration of lower levels of the adminis-
trative system. In this context, the response by authorities of a certain administrative layer to 
European policies can be seen as the minimum requirement of Europeanisation (Feather-
stone, 2003). Other aspects include co-operation with the European level, as well as policy 
changes as a result of European standards. With regard to the content-related dimension, Eu-
ropeanisation largely varies across policy areas, and sub-national government is particularly 
involved in the actual implementation of European legislation (Goldsmith, 2003, p. 127). From 




point for greater understanding of important changes occurring in our politics and society” 
(Featherstone, 2003, p. 3).24 
Taking tendering rules into account, no area of local government in the member states is un-
affected by the EU (John, 2000, p. 879), and this calls the tradition of municipal self-govern-
ment into question in many countries (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 74). In this regard, pressure 
from the European level generally leads to more homogenous policymaking at the local level 
across different countries (John, 2000, p. 877). In addition to formal processes of European 
integration through the implementation of EU legislation, informal policy adjustments, for ex-
ample in the expectation of future European requirements, are also possible (Goldsmith, 
2003, p. 112). 
It must be noted, however, that the influence between the EU and local government is mutual. 
Apart from the European Commission’s implementation of policies affecting local authorities 
and the search for policy support at lower levels of government – known as Europeanisation 
from above – some local authorities search for more influence in European politics, which is 
known as Europeanisation from below (Benz & Eberlein, 1999, p. 331). In the 1980s, some 
larger cities and city networks opened their offices in Brussels to increase their influence on 
European legislation (Goldsmith, 1993). Since then, lobbying by the local level has grown con-
tinuously. The number of staff members that major cities are employing in Brussels increased 
along with the degree of professionalisation of their work (Dukes & van der Wusten, 2014). 
As a consequence, the Europeanisation of the local level also implies a greater pluralism of 
European policymaking (John, 2001, p. 71). In this context, it must be taken into account that 
because of financial resources, larger cities have more possibilities for individual lobbying ac-
tivities in comparison with smaller municipalities. However, municipal networks might also 
enable smaller municipalities to represent their opinions at the European level. In general, it 
needs to be noted that sub-national government usually depends on the support of national 
government when aiming to influence European policymaking (Goldsmith, 2003, p. 126). In 
general, those measures are characterised by their informal nature. 
To address the demands by the local level for a greater say, the European Committee of the 
Regions (CoR) was established as an official advisory body within the framework of European 
institutions in 1994. It is composed of 350 local and regional representatives of all member 
states in the EU. The members are elected while country quota are taken into account. While 
the CoR is entitled to express its opinion on European legislation with an impact on local gov-
ernment, and even though the committee is allowed to send appeals to the Court of Justice 
of the EU (European Committee of the Regions, 2016), it is generally considered as an institu-
tion with a limited influence on European legislation because of the lack of an official decision-
making position (Hönnige & Panke, 2013; Heinelt & Niederhafner, 2008; Goldsmith, 2003, p. 
126; Marks, 1993, p. 404). 
To describe the usual sequence of steps, as well as the variation in terms of the reactions of 
local and regional levels of government towards European legislation, John (2001, p. 72 f.) 
                                                     





developed the so-called ladder of Europeanisation. Starting with measures such as responses 
to EU directives and the maximisation of EU grants, higher rungs include the consultation of 
the EU on implementation issues. More recently, an alternative concept of European integra-
tion of the local level was developed by Guderjan (2015). With absorption, attention, adap-
tion, action, and attitudes, he identifies five empirical indicators of the positioning of the local 
level and local actors in relation to European policies. When comparing John’s ladder of Euro-
peanisation and Guderjan’s indicators, a far-reaching consensus can be observed: Both mod-
els begin with the passive collection of information and the implementation of mandatory 
legislation by the local level. Also, the gradual development towards an active influence on 
European legislation is the key point of both theoretical approaches. However, considering 
certain activities, the activities are more realistic in larger cities or city networks than in small 
municipalities. 
While most studies on the Europeanisation of the local level focus on opportunities, such as 
the chance to receive additional funding, and positive aspects in general, it must be noted that 
the increasing influence of the EU also implies aspects that can be considered as disadvanta-
geous for local authorities. Constraints in own policy choices as a result of European regulation 
and expenses for the implementation of European legislations are common examples in this 
context (Fleurke & Willemse, 2006). 
Based on the aforementioned information, it can be stated that the increasing influence of 
the EU on various policy areas did not leave local government unaffected. In addition to new 
opportunities, Europeanisation also implies new constraints from the local level’s perspective. 
While European legislation operates from top to bottom within a system of multi-level gov-
ernance, attempts by local authorities to influence policy decisions at the European level func-
tion the other way around. From a theoretical perspective, some models were developed with 
the aim of explaining the stance of local entities towards the European level as a process over 
time. In this context, the limited organisational capacities of smaller municipalities should be 
seen as critical factors in relation to the possibilities to gain influence. Influence from another 
perspective will be discussed in the following sub-chapter. With regard to developments such 
as low turnouts at local elections and dissatisfaction with political decisions, initiatives that 
are intended to increase citizen participation in municipal affairs can be observed more fre-
quently. 
 
2.2.5. Citizen participation 
Attempts to involve citizens in political affairs more directly are increasing and ongoing in 
many industrial countries. Advisory committees and participatory budgeting are practical ex-
amples in this context, and their general contribution to democratic decision-making and pos-
itive effects on the quality of governance constitute the main virtues (Michels & de Graaf, 
2010, p. 477). Furthermore, citizen involvement “contributes to the inclusion of individual cit-
izens in the policy process [and therefore a broader range of opinions], it encourages civic 




the legitimacy of the process and the outcome” (Michels & de Graaf, 2010, p. 481). Improving 
the delivery of public services is a more practical advantage, as discussed already in early stud-
ies on the topic (Cole, 1975, p. 762). 
Apart from the positive aspects of citizen participation, some scholars see potentially negative 
consequences, including the influence of authoritarian ideas often supported by lower socio-
economic classes to the detriment of democracy (Dahl, 1956, p. 89). Further disadvantages 
can result from the unequal representation of different societal groups in voluntary participa-
tion formats. Observations based on various projects confirm that the typical participant is 
male, above 50 years old, and highly educated, while other groups are usually underrepre-
sented (Michels & de Graaf, 2010, p. 486; Vollaard et al., 2018, p. 22; Arnstein, 1969). Further-
more, and in contrast to most other recent reform initiatives, increasing citizen participation 
can usually not be considered as more efficient than decision-making in committees with a 
limited number of representatives involved (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Vetter & Kersting, 2003a, 
2003b; Ladner, 2017, p. 29). However, while most public sector reforms aim to enhance effi-
ciency, it is not a necessary reform condition. 
In general, initiatives to involve citizens in public affairs can be proposed and started by both 
citizens and public authorities. A variety of participatory initiatives, ranging from informal pro-
test groups over small advisory bodies to committees with a binding decision-making power, 
can consequently be observed, and the initiatives’ legal role, information obtained, as well as 
temporal and financial resources can be considered as crucial for the outcome of their work 
(Bakker et al., 2012). 
Classifications of citizen participation programmes regarding the degree of actual citizens’ in-
fluence and the scope of programme coverage have already been discussed for several dec-
ades (Cole, 1975, p. 764). A widely cited typology is the ladder of citizen participation, which 
was introduced by Arnstein in 1969. With eight rungs in three categories, it describes a gradual 
process from non-participation to citizen power. While the ladder is certainly a simplification, 
it provides a useful categorisation of initiatives in the context of citizen participation depend-
ing on the degree of influence at any level of government. 
From the perspective of local government, involving citizens from an early stage can lead to 
more support for policy decisions. Furthermore, additional ideas can improve the policy out-
come (Michels & de Graaf, 2010, p. 481 f.). In the context of urban planning, the involvement 
of citizen initiatives can also lead to cost reductions, compared to a purely bureaucratic pro-
cess. In addition, the quality of life and safety of a neighbourhood can increase by involving 
the public and raising the citizens’ awareness for their community (Bakker et al., 2012, p. 396). 
In summary, democratic forms of government are not limited to the periodical election of 
representatives. Especially in policy areas, such as urban planning, the involvement of citizens 
appears to be beneficial at the local level. While this involvement can vary in its scope, poten-
tial resistance can be addressed with a consensual approach from the beginning. Moreover, 
digitalisation as a form of technical advancement is another development that enhances the 




digitalisation of public services as a further recent trend will be addressed in the following sub-
chapter. 
 
2.2.6. Digitalisation of public services 
Technical progress has had a major impact on communication. As an example of develop-
ments within the last century, fountain pens were partially replaced by typewriters as the 
main tool to create documents aimed to exchange information, and a few decades later, those 
were substituted with computers. Since governmental communication is not limited to inter-
nal contacts, but involves the interaction with citizens and businesses outside the administra-
tion, contemporary communication tools are inevitable. In the context of communication, dig-
italisation has been the most important step forward in recent decades, entailing correspond-
ing adjustments in governmental entities. In other words, continuous investments in an ap-
propriate technical infrastructure and its maintenance, as well as possible training courses for 
staff members, are necessary. 
In general, the digitalisation of external and internal communication is mainly characterised 
by the use of computers and the growing possibilities of services related to the Internet. With 
a focus on the digitalisation of public services, the trend is also referred to as electronic gov-
ernment or e-government. According to the United Nations (2014, p. 2), “e-government and 
innovation can provide significant opportunities to transform public administration into an 
instrument of sustainable development”25. Upon closer inspection, the administrations’ effi-
ciency, transparency, and accountability, as well as the quality of public services, might poten-
tially improve (United Nations, 2014, p. 2). Given this considerable potential, some scholars 
(Weerakkody & Reddick, 2013) even argue that e-government is “a necessity rather than an 
option” (p. 1) and that nowadays, “citizens consider it as their right to have access to govern-
ment services at anytime from anywhere” (p. 1). 
As many other developments, digitalisation implies not only possible advantages but also chal-
lenges for all levels of government. One advantage is that information and services can be 
provided more effectively and efficiently (Norris & Reddick, 2012, p. 165). The cost to disclose 
information on the Internet, for example, is much lower than the cost of printed and shipped 
reports. As an additional consequence, digitalisation can increase transparency by reaching a 
larger share of the population. Furthermore, digital services enable citizens and companies to 
arrange their matters with government, independent of time and place. In the case of many 
public services, standing in line or waiting on the phone to talk to a civil servant in person is 
no longer necessary, thereby implying efficiency gains for all the actors involved. 
Challenges include data security, since data stored on servers connected to the Internet, as 
well as data transferred over the Internet, can always become the target of attempts to gain 
unauthorised access to the information and possibly modify the data. Compared to the times 
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of handwritten files or files written on a typewriter stored in file cabinets, the risk of unau-
thorised access has certainly increased. On the other hand, however, global data access makes 
working more flexible in relation to one’s place of stay or residence, compared to non-digital 
times. 
Keeping up with technical progress can also be seen as one of the main challenges in the con-
text of digitalisation from a governmental perspective, especially since bureaucratic organisa-
tions are not known for rapidness in implementing new procedures and technical equipment. 
Furthermore, the adequate provision of information and services for all societal groups can 
be considered as important, since the use of a certain form of communication technology, for 
example, is often linked to a citizen’s age. It also needs to be taken into account that invest-
ments might be necessary before realising efficiency gains in the longer run.  
The digitalisation of information and services is relevant to all levels of government; however, 
the conditions differ. While the local level is responsible for the largest share of public services 
in many industrial countries, the targeted audience is smaller than at the national level be-
cause of responsibilities limited to citizens and companies in a certain geographical area. As a 
consequence, achieving efficiency gains by digitalising public services might be a longer pro-
cess for local authorities. Regarding the development of technical solutions for local govern-
ment, co-operation between municipalities seems to be beneficial, since the requirements of 
digital solutions are similar and development costs are relatively high. 
Research on local e-government is generally limited. Some empirical studies on the level of 
development in different countries have been published in recent years (Norris & Reddick, 
2012; Ruano de la Fuente, 2014; Fan, 2011). Other single-country studies have focused on 
aspects such as local level partnerships in the context of e-government (Hodges & Grubnic, 
2010) and citizens’ intentions to utilise digital public services (Rufín, Medina & Sánchez 
Figueroa, 2012). 
Since the role and the responsibilities of the local level vary from one country to another, a 
cross-national comparison of the digital provision of public services at the local level is com-
plex. However, when it comes to providing information digitally, municipal websites are of 
great importance in most countries. The information and public services that are provided on 
municipal websites also depend on certain factors, such as legal conditions and personnel re-
sources. From a transparency perspective, the possibilities to provide information on political-
administrative affairs online are extensive and include, for example, minutes of council meet-
ings and reports on meetings of politicians with various stakeholders. However, while a further 
potential to increase the digitalisation of public information and services exists for all territo-
rial entities, political will, alongside technical feasibility, is certainly important. 
In short, digitalisation as a form of technical advancement has changed and continues to 
change the mode of operation of the public sector (West, 2005). At the local level, public ser-
vices and information are increasingly offered digitally, often accompanied by a higher level 
of user-friendliness and cost reductions in the area of communication. Particularly in the con-




ernment. Relations between the six major trends identified in local government and govern-
ance have already been briefly addressed in some cases, and a structured discussion of the 
connections follows in the next sub-chapter. 
 
2.2.7. Towards larger territorial units and more municipal tasks 
The previous sub-chapters discussed the decentralisation of tasks, municipal amalgamations 
and municipal co-operation, management changes, Europeanisation, citizen participation, 
and the digitalisation of public services as six major developments and trends at the local level 
in recent decades. While these developments were regarded separately to emphasise the de-
tails and implications at the local level, various interactions between the trends are given. In 
fact, most developments follow common goals, especially an increase in efficiency, and they 
mutually enhance one another. However, conflicting goals might also occur when reforming 
local government. In the latter case, priorities need to be set by the persons in charge. 
In general, when reforming the local or any other level of government, transaction costs must 
be taken into account in order to have a complete overview of all costs and benefits. Transac-
tion costs involve opportunity costs for developing reform measures, operating costs to im-
plement new institutional arrangements, and potentially various types of sunk costs 
(Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2011, p. 482 f.). These costs are typically part of a multi-year reform 
process and can affect the advantageousness of the reform itself, at least in the short term. If 
the transaction costs are higher than the cost savings of the reform, then the reform can be 
considered as financially adverse. However, reforms can also be desired from a content-re-
lated perspective, even if financial advantageousness is not given. In this context, evaluations 
can serve as useful tools to assess the overall costs of a reform as well as the reform outcome 
in general. 
Decentralisation and municipal amalgamation describe changes in responsibilities from organ-
isational and territorial perspectives. In combination, these trends imply a development to-
wards larger units at the municipal level with more tasks. In other words, fewer municipalities 
are responsible for providing more public services to more citizens. Efficiency gains are usually 
considered to be the main benefits if, for example, identical public services are provided to a 
larger target group by civil servants possessing better knowledge on local conditions. On the 
other hand, large units can have a negative impact on the local identity and citizens’ interest 
in being involved in political-administrative affairs. In some cases, decentralisation measures 
were also implemented to increase the potential of citizen participation, which in turn might 
have a positive impact on local identities. From a more practical perspective, it needs to be 
taken into account that technical advances and the digitalisation of public services has enabled 
far-reaching decentralisation measures as well as municipal amalgamations, since many types 
of municipal affairs can be arranged digitally nowadays, and distances are no longer as im-




While efficiency gains represent an explicit or implicit motivation of various reform initiatives 
in the public sector, management changes in line with NPM have focused strongly on this goal. 
In the 1980s, around the same time as the beginning of many NPM-related reform initiatives, 
the digitalisation of communication within the administration, as well as with citizens and 
businesses, emerged as a suitable opportunity that aligned perfectly with NPM. Many reform 
initiatives consequently included e-government strategies as instruments to make the admin-
istration more efficient. 
Citizen participation can also largely benefit from digitalisation by providing citizens with pos-
sibilities to take part in public decision-making processes with a lower own effort, compared 
to older forms of participation procedures, which typically required personal presence. Web-
sites especially and extensively increased the availability of governmental information. More-
over, while online interaction between government and citizens has remained relatively lim-
ited in many countries, the technological development already seem to be appropriate for 
widely increasing digital citizen participation in the future, given the political will to do so. 
From a practical perspective, discussion forums and online voting tools are not particularly 
difficult to implement. 
However, increasing citizen participation in democratic decision-making processes is usually 
not considered to be more efficient, compared to decisions by committees consisting of a 
relatively limited number of persons. Involving more people requires constant additional re-
sources, at least for co-ordination purposes. Therefore, the trend towards more citizen par-
ticipation differs from the other trends discussed in this chapter regarding its main intentions, 
which can be found in the search for broad societal compromises and conflict avoidance ra-
ther than efficiency (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Vetter & Kersting, 2003a, 2003b; Ladner, 2017, p. 
29). 
Europeanisation, in relation to the increasing importance of the EU in its member states, is 
mainly characterised by the necessity to adapt legal provisions and organisational procedures 
from a local-level perspective. While the nature of the trend, as a development originating 
outside the nation state, is different from the other developments outlined before, it can also 
be considered as a type of functional reform, compared to decentralisation measures. 
While the developments discussed in this sub-chapter are largely motivated by public officials’ 
will for change – either originating at higher levels of government or at the municipal level 
itself – in combination with factors within the administration, the need for change can also 
emerge outside the political-administrative system. The global economic downturn of the 
early 1980s, in the context of the second oil crisis, for example, increased the pressure on 
public finance (Hendriks & Tops, 2003, p. 305). The same applies to the Financial Crisis in more 
recent years. In some countries, politicians and civil servants also became aware of the diffi-
culty in reacting to these challenges with given organisational structures. The pressure to mod-
ernise the public sector thus emerged from various sources, and a general tendency towards 
the necessity of achieving more with less resources explains the attempts to make the public 
sector more efficient. These circumstances can be considered as the driving force for reform 
initiatives, especially focusing on both municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation, 




study, the challenge will be to assess the impact of and responses to the Financial Crisis since 
2007 at the local level by extracting all the developments that were not initiated as a result of 
the economic downturn; in this regard, interactions between the crisis and these develop-
ments will be taken into consideration. 
In summary, local government and local governance have undergone major transformations 
in recent decades. While most of the changes have aimed to increase the efficiency of the 
local administration and public service delivery independent of the origin of the impulse for 
changes, this is not necessarily the case for all reform initiatives. In line with the mostly com-
mon goal, various links between the trends and developments at the local level can be ob-
served. After addressing these major transformations, the next chapter will focus on local gov-
ernment finance. Apart from theoretical explanations of aspects, such as taxation and budg-
eting, strategies to deal with the impact of a financial crises on local government’s financial 
situation will be discussed.  
 
2.3. The system of local government finance 
As with all other levels of government, the local government requires financial resources to 
fulfil its tasks. On the revenue side, the circumstance wherein parts of the municipal income 
are often transferred from higher levels of government is an important difference in compar-
ison with other layers of the administrative subdivision. Dependencies and limitations regard-
ing the adjustment of revenues are the logical consequence. Furthermore, the utilisation of 
financial resources is often partially earmarked for the fulfilment of certain public services in 
order to guarantee a similar standard across the country. Based on the above-mentioned fac-
tors, local authorities are usually exposed to certain limitations regarding their own possibili-
ties to shape the positions on both sides of their budget. Nevertheless, a certain decision-
making scope remains, usually with a focus on certain policy areas with local responsibilities 
and major differences from a cross-country perspective. 
In the context of a financial crisis, generally characterised by lower revenues and higher ex-
penditures of the public sector, governments might need to rethink their financial priority set-
ting or even their overall financial planning. Potential attempts to moderate the impact of a 
crisis might include changes in spending priorities and efforts to generate additional income. 
Therefore, questions arise regarding how financial planning changes on both sides of the 
budget sheet and how the corresponding decisions are made. While the topics concern all 
levels of government in general, legal and organisational conditions might, to a varying de-
gree, limit the financial room to manoeuvre. In particular, the local level might be constrained 
because of national or regional provisions excluding certain possibilities for financial changes 
by the municipalities. Independent of the governmental level, those territorial entities deeply 
in debt and with corresponding repayment obligations are also usually restricted in increasing 
expenditures. As a consequence, the intention to adjust public revenues or expenses does not 




This chapter presents the theoretical understanding of local government finance, partially de-
rived from public finance in general, and it consists of four sub-chapters. The first one ad-
dresses the income side and municipal taxation (2.3.1). Local public budgeting at the expendi-
ture side, with a focus on decision-making processes, is the topic of the second sub-chapter 
(2.3.2). The relations between public income and expenditure, including the necessity of co-
ordinating intended changes on both sides of the budget, conclude those general theoretical 
explanations (2.3.3). However, based on the occasional need to adjust the financial planning 
or even the organisational structure of a governmental entity in the case of far-reaching 
changes in the framework conditions, for example in the case of events such as a major finan-
cial crisis, insights into dealing with these circumstances are crucial. Therefore, the last sub-
chapter focuses on local government finances in times of crisis, including theories on crisis 
budgeting, austerity measures, and cutback management (2.3.4). 
 
2.3.1. The income side of municipal budgets 
To perform their tasks, public bodies need sufficient financial means, which are either gener-
ated autonomously or assigned from other levels of government. In the area of self-generated 
income, taxes and other types of duties, which are levied from citizens and businesses, can be 
distinguished, although the terms are not always used consistently, especially in public de-
bates.  
Taxes can be defined as “compulsory, unrequited payments to general government […] in the 
sense that benefits provided by government to taxpayers are not normally in proportion to 
their payments” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996, p. 3). 
While a tax is usually billed or directly subtracted by the government, in accordance with legal 
provisions, as a percentage share from personal or corporate earnings or possessions, the 
types of taxes that have developed in different countries over centuries are quite diverse and 
sometimes even exotic. 
Income taxes, property taxes, and consumption taxes are examples of common types of taxes. 
In this regard, a further distinction between direct and indirect taxes is possible. Direct taxes 
are paid to government by the person or company being charged for their benefit. Property 
taxes, for example, often follow this design. Indirect taxes are not paid by the person or com-
pany receiving the benefit through a transaction, but by the seller of the goods or services. 
Value added tax (VAT) is the most common example of an indirect tax. 
Fees and charges are the second types of duties generating public revenues, apart from trans-
fers. Those fees and charges are “levied in connection with a specific service or activity, [and] 
the strength of the link between the fee and the service provided may vary considerably, as 
may the relation between the amount of levy and the cost of providing the service” (Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996, p. 4). In other words, the connec-




charges are usually set as fixed amounts of money per person. Entrance fees for a public swim-
ming pool or a museum are typical examples. Fines, such as those related to parking offences, 
are also usually considered to be fees (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 1996, p. 4). 
In practice, a clear distinction between taxes and fees or charges is not always possible. Some 
duties that persons or companies are obliged to pay partially meet the criteria of both types 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996, p. 4). Especially at the local 
level, personal benefits could be linked to the amount of taxes paid, if a company or private 
person contributes a large share of local revenues and has an influence on policy decisions. 
Furthermore, mandatory fees per household are possible, where a clear link to an utilised 
service is not present. 
Over the centuries, politicians and civil servants have developed a broad variety of taxes and 
other types of duties, including many special rules to fine-tune the burdens, leading to often 
relatively complex taxation laws. While the generation of government revenue is certainly a 
common motivation, influencing citizens’ behaviour is also an intention in the context of some 
taxes on goods, such as alcohol and tobacco. Since people might adopt behaviour as consum-
ers based on taxes, questions also arise in the field of optimal taxation in general. Another 
potential purpose of taxation is the internalisation of external effects. Known as Pigovian 
taxes, named after the developer of the concept, Arthur Pigou, these taxes are intended to 
correct for effects that are not included in the market price (Pigou, 1920). In practice, the 
concept is most commonly used in environmental politics, for example in the context of vari-
ous types of pollution. 
In a system of multi-level governance, taxes, charges, and fees can be raised at all levels of 
government and possibly redistributed afterwards. Since double taxation should be avoided, 
and since uniformity is often intended to some extent, higher levels of government usually 
limit the opportunity for taxation of lower levels of government by law. From a theoretical 
perspective, collecting revenues by federal government is also considered more efficient be-
cause of economies of scale (Rossi & Dafflon, 2002, p. 15). However, while the scope of taxa-
tion responsibilities is always limited to a certain territory, patterns can be observed regarding 
the foci, which are often linked to important resources or industries within the region or mu-
nicipality. The possible variation and hence uneven distribution of local tax revenues, related 
to local conditions, can also serve as an argument for an allocation system where taxation is 
mainly or exclusively conducted by higher levels of government taking care of the consistent 
distribution of financial resources. 
Next to own revenues generated through taxes, fees, and charges, transfers from other levels 
of government characterise the second main source of income at lower levels of government. 
Depending on the legal conditions regarding the generation of own revenues, it can be said 
that the local level largely depends on transfers from central government in many countries. 
Non-earmarked transfers, with unrestricted usability, and earmarked transfers, linked to the 
conduction of certain tasks, can generally be distinguished. It should be taken into account 
that earmarked transfers imply municipal income, while the own decision-making scope is of-




must be conducted, but also how they needs to be done. It must also be noted that redistrib-
utive systems can create incentives to spend more than is reasonable and encourage one to 
violate fiscal discipline, since a clear link between revenues and expenditures is not given, and 
a free rider behaviour can set in (Rattsø, 2002, p. 277). In a system where the local level mainly 
depends on transfers from central government, the limitation of the political-administrative 
room to manoeuvre in general, as well as that room to manoeuvre in times of crisis in partic-
ular, also implies that pressure from voters and other groups interested in governmental ac-
tion or policy change should be directed to central rather than local government (Rodden et 
al., 2003, p. 14 f.). 
Taken together, the income side of municipal budgets is usually comprised of multiple types 
of revenues. While own income in the form of taxes, fees, and charges imply a certain leeway 
for adjustments, financial transfers from other levels of government are usually difficult to 
adjust from a municipal perspective. Alongside questions in relation to the generation of mu-
nicipal income, questions regarding the favoured allocation of financial means arise on the 
other side of the municipal budgets. Those will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
2.3.2. The expenditure side of municipal budgets 
For reasons of finite financial resources, governments need to decide on which tasks to spend 
their funds. In this context, priorities must be determined to make a choice. In practice, the 
individual share of funds for multiple tasks should be agreed on by political bodies or within 
the administration, while existing obligations limit the scope of decision-making, at least in 
the short run. Although the evaluation of whether one task is more important than another is 
subjective, all levels of government face the same challenges in deciding on their expenditure. 
Academic research on budgeting-related questions originated several decades ago. Already in 
1940, Key described “the allocation of expenditure among different purposes so as to achieve 
the greatest return” (p. 1137) as the most important aspect of public budgeting. Furthermore, 
he introduced the following question as the basic budgeting problem on the expenditure side: 
“on what basis shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?” (Key, 
1940, p. 1138). The general importance of budgeting was pointed out by Wildavsky (1961), 
who described the budget as the “the life-blood of the government, the financial reflection of 
what the government does or intends to do” (p. 184). In other words, it is not only necessary 
to formulate priorities in order to assign certain funds, but the budget also enables external 
parties to assess the political preferences of the legislator. With a focus on the procedure, 
Schick (1966) defines budgeting as “a process for systematically relating the expenditure of 
funds to the accomplishment of planned objectives” (p. 244), and planning is considered to be 
future-oriented based on present decisions. Furthermore, planning is means-end orientated 
by allocating resources according to the goals to be accomplished and taking all relevant fac-




According to Wildavsky (1961), a normative theory of budgeting “is utopian in the fullest sense 
of the word; its accomplishment and acceptance would mean the end of conflict over govern-
ment’s role in society” (p. 184). In other words, differing opinions on governmental tasks and 
preferences always include a subjective dimension when assigning financial resources to cer-
tain areas of responsibility. Budgeting consequently always needs to be considered in the con-
text of local conditions and relevant interest groups. Furthermore, changes over time might 
partially be explained by new preferences of the actors involved or shifts in the distribution of 
influence. 
From a theoretical perspective, separate budget decisions are always made based on relative 
values of certain targets because of the lack of objective targets. As a result, a budget analysis 
“is basically a comparison of the relative merits of alternative uses of funds” (Lewis, 1952, p. 
42). Furthermore, the intended goals must be worth the expected costs as a general criterion 
(Lewis, 1952, p. 42). Key (1940, p. 1138) has already pointed out that budgeting can be eco-
nomically or politically motivated in practice. More precisely, budget decisions are in reality 
influenced by non-economic and non-rational factors, including political beliefs, according to 
Lewis (1952, p. 54). While relatively little is known about how specific budgetary decisions are 
actually made in practice, and a wide variation in the general proceeding can be observed, 
budget changes often depend on policy changes or changes in the distribution of influence 
(Wildavsky, 1961, pp. 185, 187). According to Schick (1966), “the appropriations cycle, rather 
than the anticipation of future objectives, tends to dictate the pace and posture of budgeting” 
(p. 256). The difficulty to analyse the origin of changes in the financial planning of a public 
body is hereby illustrated once more. 
Budgeting systems, as a more process-oriented approach to assess budgeting, include a plan-
ning, a management, and a control orientation. While the planning orientation focuses on the 
long-range goals and policies and on how these are related to a particular expenditure, the 
management orientation has a more practical focus by searching for ways in which to achieve 
goals in the most efficient manner. The control orientation also deals with practical questions, 
such as those related to reporting procedures and the enforcement of expenditure limitations 
(Schick, 1966, p. 245). 
Given the general growth of governmental activities, the budget totals as well as the number 
of items and sub-items have increased in recent decades. Often, single items have conse-
quently become less important in relation to the overall budget. Furthermore, keeping track 
of the development of items related to certain tasks can prove difficult in the long run (Schick, 
1966, p. 249).26 
Closely related to the question as to what resources to allocate to which governmental activ-
ity, is the question of how to measure and evaluate governmental activities. An early study on 
this topic at the local level was published by Ridley and Simon in 1943. In the context of com-
mon municipal tasks in the US, such as fire protection and the police, they developed meas-
urement techniques by elaborating sets of factors that should be taken into account from an 
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economic perspective. Apart from the general complexity involved in measuring and compar-
ing municipal activities, the specific difficulty in assessing municipal performance became ap-
parent. 
In summary, public budgeting can be described as a challenge in allocating limited financial 
resources to various purposes at all levels of government. As a result, fixed or mandatory ex-
penses can largely limit the leeway regarding decisions on a changing composition of public 
expenses in the short run. Furthermore, expenses should always be considered in relation to 
revenues. This link will be addressed in the following sub-chapter. 
 
2.3.3. The relations between public income and public expenditure 
As for any household or corporation, a balanced budget, which is defined as having compara-
ble levels of income and expenditure, is the best way to guarantee the public sector’s solvency, 
especially in the long term. In other words, budgetary discipline is crucial for fiscal sustainabil-
ity (Rossi & Dafflon, 2002, p. 30). High levels of debt and interest payments can also vastly 
reduce the room to manoeuvre. Apart from possible monetary measures, governmental bod-
ies generally need to adjust expenditures to revenues, or vice versa. 
At lower levels of government, variation in public income and expenditure is possible across 
the political-administrative layer because of local priorities and geographic features. One mu-
nicipality might prefer to invest in a swimming pool, while another uses its coastal location to 
build a seaside resort. Given the long-term nature of many investments, decisions in the past 
can largely influence both sides of the budget over decades. 
From a theoretical perspective, the so-called revisited golden rule, which states that “a bal-
anced current account combined with a capital account in which government borrowing for 
investment expenditures is tolerated, or even promoted for inter-generational equity rea-
sons” (Rossi & Dafflon, 2002, p. 28), serves as a reference point for budgeting decisions. The 
involvement of inter-generational effects refers to the fact that benefits from investments can 
occur with a time shift (Rossi & Dafflon, 2002, p. 19). 
To guarantee financial stability, balanced budgets are required by law in many countries. In 
the EU, the so called Maastricht criteria, based on article 126 and article 140 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU, include government budget deficit regulations. The criteria apply 
to the public sector of each member state as a whole, which includes local government (Euro-
pean Union, 2007; Dafflon, 2002, p. 1 f.). Apart from these general requirements, budgeting 
and balanced budget rules can be designed differently. It can be determined, for example, 
that a budget needs to be balanced when prepared. Deviations from this ex ante approach 
would be possible once the expenditure is undertaken for certain duties and once taxes are 
collected. Ex post regulations, on the other hand, require that the budget is balanced after all 
transactions are performed (Dafflon, 2002, p. 4). With regard to sub-national government 




define an annual or total debt ceiling from a supervisory perspective (Rossi & Dafflon, 2002, 
p. 36). 
Especially for lower levels of government, supervisory procedures by higher levels of govern-
ment might apply, and largely unbalanced budgets might not be permitted. In addition, sup-
port and bailout mechanisms might be specified by law if financial straits cannot be avoided 
otherwise. 
In all European countries, local government budgeting and borrowing are restricted by re-
gional or national legislation and monitored in accordance with the legal requirements. In this 
context, the approaches and the scope of limitations and supervision vary widely across coun-
tries. Additional differences are given in some countries, where the regional levels decide on 
framework conditions for the local level (Dafflon, 2002, p. 13 f.). The administrative and insti-
tutional arrangements in the context of budget control, developed over decades, also reflect 
different cultural, social, and political backgrounds (Rattsø, 2002, p. 277, p. 288). However, 
the actual effect of budget rules in practice, especially regarding the relation to policy results 
and the influence of business cycles, is sometimes questioned (Rossi & Dafflon, 2002, p. 37). 
Regarding the design of local expenditures, the mobility of residents must be taken into ac-
count as well. If citizens are not satisfied with the public services and infrastructure provided, 
they might see a possibility to optimise their living conditions by moving to another munici-
pality. In this context, citizens’ preferences can largely differ depending on their personal sit-
uation. For some inhabitants of a municipality, good schools for their children might be im-
portant, while others favour investments in a high-quality municipal golf course (Tiebout, 
1956). Similar links are given for businesses; for example, appropriate infrastructure in line 
with a company’s business model can be considered as an important factor in the decision to 
remain at a location or to move to another municipality. New settlement of companies implies 
the same decision-making process. 
With taxes, fess, and charges on the revenue side of local government, burdens on citizens 
and co-operation can vary as well. Assuming a rational behaviour, both groups prefer levies 
that are as low as possible (Rossi & Dafflon, 2002, p. 18 f.). In accordance with the wish for 
comprehensive public services and high-quality infrastructure, a clear contradiction is evident. 
However, if citizens and companies deem the local tax burdens to be too high and especially 
higher than elsewhere, they might decide to resettle, depending on their geographical flexi-
bility, for the same reason as a poor quality of public services and infrastructure. 
In other words, municipalities may find themselves in competition with one another for local 
residents – especially those who pay more taxes and fees than the welfare benefits they might 
receive – and for companies (Rossi & Dafflon, 2002, p. 22). Assuming a certain mobility of both 
groups in the long run, the design of expenditure and revenues within the scope of local deci-
sion-making is important, since small differences can have a major impact on the location de-
cision. In this context, a large number of municipalities with varying services and infrastructure 
means more options to choose from. Budget deficit regulations, on the other hand, might 
serve as moderators in this context, since the scope of differences is limited, especially within 




In short, in terms of comparable levels of income and expenditure, balanced budgets can be 
considered as desirable at all levels of government in order to guarantee financial health in 
the long term. At the local level in particular, supervision and regulation by regional and na-
tional bodies were introduced to avoid extensive financial imbalances. However, plausible fi-
nancial planning can be affected by exceptional external circumstances. While potential 
changes on the income and expenditure side can be recognised with a safety margin to a cer-
tain extent, these measures are limited. Events such as major financial crises, for example, are 
relatively unpredictable factors with far-reaching implications. Nevertheless, public finances 
need to be adjusted to these new framework conditions. Possible reactions and procedures, 
such as attempts to generate additional revenues, crisis budgeting, austerity measures, and 
cutback management, will be addressed in the last sub-chapter based on political-administra-
tive theory. 
 
2.3.4. Local government finance in times of crisis 
Some times are exceptional, and previous planning is no longer applicable. This is especially 
the case if the responsibility for the changes is largely beyond one’s own influence. Financial 
crises, emerging from the private financial sector, for example, can represent events that 
make readjustments in public finances and organisational structures at all levels of govern-
ment necessary. While it can be argued that national levels of government are able to reduce 
the likelihood of financial crises with appropriate regulatory measures, lower levels of govern-
ment are mainly faced with situations for which they are not responsible, but to which they 
need to react. In this context, attempts to generate additional revenues, as strategies on the 
income side, and crisis budgeting, austerity measures, and cutback management, as ap-
proaches on the expenditure side, can be distinguished. 
Adjusting revenues is a common strategy to address changing framework conditions, such as 
a financial crisis, including higher expenses. With the intention to increase government in-
come, the assessment rates of existing taxes, fees, and charges can be raised, and new types 
can be introduced. In addition, the design of existing taxes, fees, and charges could be 
changed, for example by repealing exceptions. However, higher costs can lead to decreasing 
consumption, especially in the context of non-essential goods and services. Higher taxes can 
consequently lead to lower tax revenues if consumers adjust their purchasing behaviour, 
which illustrates the importance of simulating the adjustment mechanisms when intending to 
raise taxes.27 
In line with counter-cyclical policies, it is also possible to argue in favour of tax reductions in 
times of crisis to stimulate both private consumption and corporate investments and hence 
the economy as a whole. However, further adjustment mechanisms need to be considered in 
                                                     




this line of argumentation as well: citizens might wish to save their additional disposable in-
come, and companies might prefer to improve their cash balance, especially in times of cri-
sis.28 
The impact of an extensive financial crisis on the governmental budgetary process was dis-
cussed by Schick (2010a). While the budgets of industrial countries are usually equipped with 
automatic stabilisers to adjust revenues and expenditures in times of crisis, these mechanisms 
were not sufficient in the case of the current Financial Crisis. From a financial perspective, 
additional measures to support private households, companies, and states under pressure 
generally include grants, loans, and guarantees. Many questions arise regarding the integra-
tion of these rescue measures into a budget. Valuating assets that were secured, for example, 
can prove to be difficult.29 Furthermore, the time-based delimitation might not be easy, since 
the time horizon is hardly foreseeable, and credits might fail in the long run. From a more 
technical perspective, the following can also be questioned: where should the rescue 
measures that led to extrabudgetary entities in some countries be recognised? 
In general, crisis budgeting largely differs from normal budgeting. The budgeting procedures 
take place aside from the usual routines. Moreover, fixed schedules no longer apply, and var-
ious adjustments are made along the way. Shifts in power towards more centralised top-down 
decision-making can thus often be observed. On the outcome side, budgets might contain 
larger changes, compared to the relatively incremental changes of previous decades. Nowa-
days, spillover effects beyond national borders has also gained in importance. To address 
these changing circumstances, more supranational and international budgetary co-ordination 
is needed. Furthermore, the changes within a budgetary process because of a crisis might also 
have long-term consequences beyond the financial obligations for budgeting itself. As a con-
sequence of the “largely unstructured and improvisational rush for decisions” (p. 2), as crisis 
budgeting is characterised, many new conflicts might arise (Schick, 2010a). 
Regarding budgetary rules, Schick (2010b) argues that the recent Financial Crisis has demon-
strated that too strict regulations do not work if the government is not able or willing to en-
force them. More flexible rules are seen as a solution to increase the capacities to react to 
financial difficulties. However, too much flexibility and creative budgeting can certainly cause 
financial problems as well.  
From a historical perspective, the public sectors of Western countries have increased exten-
sively over the last centuries. Political rulers have decided on the adoption of additional tasks 
by the state, and public services have been implemented. Since services require financial re-
sources, they depend on government revenues, which, themselves, are often linked to the 
economic situation. A recession can therefore complicate the provision of public services and 
can lead to the necessity of service reduction, which was often not anticipated in public man-
agement strategies based on the assumption of continuous growth of public revenues and 
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expenditure (Levine, 1978, p. 316). The global economic downturn of the early 1980s, in the 
context of the second oil crisis, illustrates this problem. Apart from a recession or economic 
crisis, many other circumstances, such as strongly increasing expenditures in one policy area, 
mismanagement in the past, or pure political will, can constitute reasons for measures to 
downsize the public sector in order to remain solvent. Within a system of multi-level govern-
ance, the necessity to reduce spending can also originate from a decrease in funds by other 
levels of government and changes in the distribution of tasks. However, while cutbacks can 
occur at all levels of government, they are usually most notable at the local level for citizens. 
Actions involving a reduction in governmental expenditures are usually referred to as austerity 
measures or cutbacks. While both terms are often used synonymously, austerity measures are 
hereafter understood as strategic actions to reduce government spending from a broad point 
of view. In contrast, cutback management refers to more precise actions, following the defi-
nition of Levine (1979, p. 180), of “managing organizational change toward lower levels of 
resource consumption and organizational activity”. 
In times of declining public revenues, legal requirements in the form of balanced budgets, as 
well as public opinion on reasonable and sustainable management, might require govern-
ments to reduce expenditure (Levine, 1978, p. 317 f.). In addition, austerity measures can be 
decided on, especially when a more severe crisis in the near future or declining revenues are 
expected. Therefore, economic forecasts play an important role, also illustrating the high un-
certainty upon which those decisions are based. 
According to Levine (1978, p. 319), organisations are faced with three consecutive decisions 
in case of a decline. First, the organisation must decide whether it can find a strategy to resist 
or smooth the decline. Second, in the case of more than one possible strategy, it must decide 
which one is the most promising. Third, if still necessary, the organisation needs to decide how 
and where to cut. In addition, the question of when to cut seems to be relevant in the context 
of possibly delayed crisis impacts. Furthermore, co-ordination between different levels of gov-
ernment is favourable to avoid contradictory measures. From a practical perspective, dismis-
sal based on low seniority, hiring freezes, even-percentage cuts across the board, productivity 
criteria, and zero-base budgeting were considered as popular cutback methods in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Levine, 1978, p. 320). In more recent years, the importance of the relationship 
between cutbacks and management reforms has been pointed out by Pollitt (2010).30 
With the beginning of the Financial Crisis since 2007, questions regarding austerity measures 
and cutback management received renewed attention in public debates and academic litera-
ture. Raudla, Savi, and Randma-Liiv (2015b) have analysed cutback management literature 
from the 1970s and 1980s in the light of the new challenges.31 They have concluded that 
across-the-board cutbacks, which are also known as lawnmower or cheese-slicing approaches, 
and targeted cutbacks are still the two main strategies from which to choose if expenditures 
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need to be reduced.32 33 Across-the-board and targeted cuts both have a number of ad-
vantages and disadvantages; the advantages of one approach are in line with the disad-
vantages of the other and vice versa. The main advantages of equal cuts are lower decision-
making costs, lower potential for conflicts within an organisation, and the equitability of the 
approach. The missing link to public needs and preferences, the efficiency of the organisation, 
the omission of different sub-units’ varying needs, and the general possibility of declining 
scope and quality of public services are the main disadvantages of across-the-board cuts. In 
general, choices on across-the-board and targeted cuts can be made at all levels of govern-
ment. This implies that during one crisis event, different levels can opt for different strategies 
as well as variation across the same layer of government (Raudla et al., 2015b, p. 436 ff.; Kick-
ert et al., 2015, p. 566). 
Most empirical insights into cutback management were gained in the US – especially within 
U.S. local government – and in the UK. In practice, cutbacks are often realised in multiple 
rounds and by combining both abovementioned strategies. The findings demonstrate that a 
long duration and a high intensity of fiscal stress are both factors that encourage decision 
makers to opt for targeted cutbacks rather than across-the-board cuts, while at the beginning 
of a crisis, across-the-board cuts are more likely. Targeted cuts often follow if the scope of the 
crisis makes them necessary (Raudla et al., 2015b, pp. 435, 440 f.), as already outlined before. 
Overall, targeted cuts also appear to be more likely because of political preferences and the 
lobbying work of interest groups. The unequal distribution of mandatory expenditures makes 
targeted cuts more common as well. In addition, country-specific legal requirements and fea-
tures of the political-administrative system influence the choices of cutback strategies (Raudla 
et al., 2015b, pp. 439, 449). 
Apart from the general question on the need of a cutback strategy and the distinction between 
two main strategies, choices must be made on where to cut and which method to use, espe-
cially in the context of targeted cuts. Raudla, Savi, and Randma-Liiv (2015b, p. 442 ff.) distin-
guish between three categories of cutback measures: organisational expenditure, programme 
expenditure, and investments/capital expenditure. While organisational expenditure often in-
cludes the reduction of personnel costs, they are not limited to a reduction of spending in this 
area. Other types of cuts in this category involve the reduction of office space, for example. 
Considering the different measures aiming to lower personnel costs, various foci are evident. 
Some measures, such as early retirement, mainly affect older employees, whereas other 
measures, such as hiring freezes, affect potential, not current, employees. Cutbacks on pro-
gramme expenditure include measures such as the reduction of service time and service out-
lets. A lower quality of the services provided is a likely consequence of these measures. Other 
attempts to spend less on certain programmes comprise the involvement of voluntary work-
ers and a decrease in the programme period. The category of the reduction of investments / 
capital expenditure includes various strategies to lower cash flow in favour of higher reserves. 
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Especially the waiver to develop new projects and the postponement of planned capital pro-
jects are measures in accordance with this strategy (Raudla, Savi and Randma-Liiv, 2015b, p. 
442 ff.). An overview of exemplary actions within the three categories is provided in table 2. 
Table 2: Categories of cutback measures and practical examples (Adopted from Raudla et al., 2015b, p. 443) 






 Reduced overtime or working time 
 Slowing-down of promotion 
 Early retirement 
 Wage freeze 
 Reduction in the rate of salary increase 
 Reduction or elimination of fringe benefits and bonuses 
 Filling positions with less qualified, lower-paid staff 
 Reducing pay grades of vacated job lots 
 Salary cuts 
 Reshuffling of staff (e.g. making increased use of temporary staff) 
 Furloughs 
 Hiring freeze 
 Lay-offs 
 Spending limits and bans on utilities, supplies, equipment, travel, communications, etc. 
Programme ex-
penditure 
 Cut service provision 
 Shorten the reception time, limit service hours 
 Reduce the frequency of service provision, reduce the number of service outlets 
 Reduce the quality requirements for service provision 
 Programme termination 
 Engage voluntary, part-time and third-party counterparts in service provision 
 Reduce transfers 
 Change indexation rules for entitlement programmes 




 Elimination of capital spending 
 Capital spending freeze for new capital projects 
 Postponement of non-essential capital projects 
 Deferral of maintenance, cuts to maintenance spending 
 
While all the strategies are able to lower expenditure, at least in the short run, a lack of in-
vestments can lead to especially high costs in the future if it turns out that the organisations 
saved money in the wrong places. Not hiring new employees with new skills, for example, 
might make it difficult to sustain organisational performance in the long term. The same ap-
plies to cutting maintenance costs, which might lead to higher repair costs in the long run. In 
the end, various factors determine the long-term success or failure of a certain cutback strat-
egy. Therefore, such a strategy should be developed with great caution. 
Compared to the 1970s and 1980s, cutbacks have become more challenging in recent years. 
More specific public services, an increase in sub-national and international regulation, and a 
higher complexity of financial assets are among the reasons for this development (Raudla et 
al., 2015b, p. 448 f.). After decades of reforming Western welfare states and noticeable reduc-





While all cutback strategies can be implemented at all levels of government in general, a num-
ber of characteristics limit the leeway at lower levels. In municipalities with a relatively small 
administration, capacities to develop an elaborated cutback strategy might be limited, and 
support from higher levels of government might be necessary, which can lower the appropri-
ateness to local conditions. From a practical perspective, civil servants might be in charge of 
one policy area individually, which limits the possibilities to reduce personnel costs, compared 
to whole departments. In addition, mandatory tasks can largely limit the options to reduce 
expenditure in certain policy areas. 
In summary, events such as financial crises affect not only private companies and households, 
but also the public sector and its financial situation in particular. However, various strategies 
to cope with crises and the burdens on public finances have been developed in recent decades 
based on political-administrative theory. While a focus on the income and the expenditure 
side can be distinguished, the combination and sequence of various strategies appear to be 
likely if the scope of a crisis is considerably extensive. 
While this chapter focused on ongoing trends and developments at the local level, apart from 
the Financial Crisis since 2007, in order to put the current situation into perspective, local gov-
ernment finance in normal times as well as in times of crisis in order to discuss strategies to 
address crisis from a political-administrative perspective, the following chapter will be based 
on economic theory. A more detailed understanding of the emergence, impact, and potential 
responses to financial crises will be provided. This will enable the retracing of the course and 
timing of specific crises, and it will allow for an understanding of the anticipated mechanisms 





3. Financial crises and their underlying mechanisms according to the 
main economic schools of thought 
Financial crises and other types of crises can function as critical junctions (Bermeo & Pontus-
son, 2012b, p. 1); societal consensuses might change, and countries might leave previous 
paths. This implies a far-reaching significance of these types of events as well as the im-
portance of understanding the corresponding market mechanisms. Following theoretical as-
pects of local government, as the research object of this study, chapter 3 addresses the un-
derstanding of a financial crisis in economic theory as an external development with a poten-
tial impact on the municipal level. The theoretical discourse will thus focus on the emergence 
and impact of, as well as possible reactions to, financial crises. While the distinction between 
impact and responses is partially difficult to assess because of interacting factors and reactions 
by one level of government having an impact on other levels, understanding the impact is 
certainly a crucial step before reacting to the respective challenges by oneself. 
However, a common understanding of crisis mechanisms in the context of markets, as places 
where supply meets demand, and suggested countermeasures are not given in economic the-
ory. Taking the concepts of the previous centuries into account, different approaches in line 
with the main economic schools of thought can be distinguished. While economic theory on 
financial crises, as well as empirical research, mainly focuses on the international and national 
levels of government, the possible consequences of such crises at the local level will be con-
sidered hereinafter as well. 
Following the typical course of a crisis, the first sub-chapter explains the emergence of finan-
cial crises from a theoretical perspective and historical experiences, and different types of cri-
ses are distinguished (3.1). Building upon this, the potential impact of a financial crisis is ana-
lysed afterwards. Starting with general considerations, the situation at local levels of govern-
ment is discussed thereafter (3.2). Potential reactions by governmental bodies in line with the 
main economic schools of thought and political-economic trends are the topics of the final 
sub-chapter, wherein the reflections again begin with general considerations, before the focus 
is shifted towards potential reactions by local authorities (3.3). 
 
3.1. Emergences of financial crises from a theoretical perspective and 
historical experiences 
The economic history has always been accompanied by boom-and-bust cycles. Crises are no 
exceptions, but recurring events. What makes them different are the severity and the number 
of businesses and persons affected. Furthermore, the likelihood of rapid crisis expansions 
across countries and economic sectors has increased in recent decades as a result of globali-




bubble, the Panic of 183734, and the 1929 Wall Street crash, followed by the Great Depression, 
are examples of financial crises in modern history. Depending on the exact definition of a fi-
nancial crisis, dozens have occurred in recent centuries, ranging from those with a global im-
pact, such as the aforementioned Wall Street crash, to those limited to a certain region or 
economic sector, such as the 1986 Japanese asset price bubble. 
In news coverage and academic debates, the term financial crisis is used inconsistently. The 
events in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007, or parts thereof, are described as an 
economic crisis, the Eurozone Crisis, or a debt crisis, for example. Apart from common ele-
ments, such as large-scale balance sheet problems (Claessens & Kose, 2013, p. 5), different 
sub-types of financial crises are distinguished in academic literature. According to Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009, p. 3 ff.), a crisis defined by quantitative threshold and a crisis defined by 
events form the two main groups. Within the first group, currency crises and sudden-stop cri-
ses can be differentiated. The second group includes debt crises and banking crises. 
A currency crisis describes systematic doubts regarding a currency’s value in relation to other 
currencies. Divestments based on the loss of confidence and speculative attacks are the main 
origins of this type of crisis. If the authorities want to avoid devaluation, then higher interest 
rates, capital controls, or the expansion of the reserves might be necessary. A sudden-stop 
crisis is characterised by a far-reaching and non-anticipated fall in a country’s capital inflow 
and therefore disruption on the supply side of external financial means. Given the dependency 
on external funds, this type of crisis mainly occurs in emerging markets. In addition, highly 
indebted countries might be concerned if creditors stop their payments. A decrease in the 
economic output is the usual consequence (Claessens & Kose, 2013, pp. 12 ff.). 
In the case of a sovereign debt crisis35, a further distinction can be made between foreign and 
domestic debt, depending on the creditors. Both sub-types have in common that the govern-
ment as a public borrower does not service its debt. Therefore, international support in debt 
restructuring might be necessary to avoid sovereign default. The high likelihood of negative 
side effects on government spending implies negative effects on economic growth. A banking 
crisis is characterised by the refinancing problems of a bank as a private institution. Declining 
trust in banks can cause bank runs, thereby worsening the problems. As a result of the inter-
linkage of banks, financial problems can quickly affect the whole banking system as well as the 
real economy, where banks act as financial backers. Government interventions can be neces-
sary to avoid a bank’s bankruptcy being accompanied by further systemic consequences. In 
the cases of some major global banks, their role was rated as systemically relevant for money 
and financial systems during the Financial Crisis since 2007, which justified the need for ex-
tensive rescue packages from a political perspective (Claessens & Kose, 2013, pp. 12, 15 ff.). 
Apart from the general difficulty in defining the time period of a crisis, especially if it develops 
gradually and is not linked to specific events, multiple crises are likely to occur at the same 
time, and they can cause new crises of the same as well as other types. From an empirical 
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point of view, currency crises tend to overlap with banking crises, and sudden-stop crises are 
often accompanied by debt and currency crises (Claessens & Kose, 2013, p. 26). Furthermore, 
banking crises often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises and increase the likelihood 
of a sovereign default. Banking crises, on the other hand, often follow high levels of private 
debt (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2011). 
Since no single set of indicators is able to explain the various types of crises universally, possi-
bilities to detect emerging crises are relatively limited (Claessens & Kose, 2013, p. 31 f.). While 
key figures, such as public debt, exchange rates, bank reserves, and interbank interest rates, 
might serve as indicators of certain types of crises, the causal chains are more complex. For 
this reason, predictions of emerging or future crises, occasionally mentioned in academic de-
bates and on an almost daily basis in business news, are often based on unreliable simplifica-
tions. 
In summary, financial crises have a long history, even though the social memory might fade 
over time. While terms are sometimes used inconsistently, different types of financial crises, 
associated with various causes and consequences, can be distinguished from a theoretical 
perspective. Furthermore, larger crises can be comprised of various sub-types, which certainly 
does not simplify the search for appropriate countermeasures. After discussing the origin of 
financial crises, attention will first be paid to the impact of crises in the next sub-chapter. 
 
3.2. Impacts of financial crises from a theoretical perspective and his-
torical experiences 
As outlined above, the emergence of financial crises is relatively complex and possible in sev-
eral ways. Correspondingly, a broad variation of impacts might occur depending on the type 
of crisis. In line with economic theory, effects on private households, businesses, and govern-
ment can be distinguished. While a financial crisis is generally considered to be a negative 
development, positive consequences might also arise from it; the judgement is mainly a ques-
tion of perspective. 
An economic downturn, rising unemployment rates, and increasing debt are among the crisis 
implications generally assessed as negative. Opposing views regarding national objectives and 
their preferences are also likely to increase (Scharpf, 1987). In contrast, positive consequences 
might occur following Schumpeter’s (1942) understanding of creative destruction as the dem-
olition of existing economic structures and the emergence of room for new ones. Further-
more, possibilities to benefit from a financial crisis range from strategies to earn money as an 
investor with declining share prices to the social sectors helping people in need. 
The most relevant impacts of a financial crisis are discussed in this chapter based on theoret-
ical insights and historical experiences. Different assumptions on economic interrelationships 
in economic theory are kept relatively short, since the following sub-chapter of chapter three 
will address them in the context of potential responses to financial crises from the perspective 




subdivided into crisis impacts at the international and national levels of government (3.2.1) 
and impacts particularly at the local level of government (3.2.2). 
 
3.2.1. Crisis impacts at the international and national levels of govern-
ment 
A financial crisis usually implies various consequences, apart from the circumstances defining 
the crisis, such as debt and refinancing problems. Also, depending on the scope of the crisis, 
potential implications range from declines in consumption, investment, industrial production, 
and employment to lower exports and imports. Apart from economic facts, pure assumptions 
about specific future developments can trigger actions and chain reactions (Claessens & Kose, 
2013, p. 28). 
During a financial crisis, private households can experience fewer job opportunities and lower 
wages as a result of an economic downturn, which leads to a decrease in the budget available 
for consumption. Businesses, on the other hand, can be affected on the demand side because 
of a decrease in private consumption, which leads to a lower budget available for corporate 
investments. 
When discussing the impacts of a financial crisis, short-term and long-term impacts need to 
be distinguished. Furthermore, it must be taken into account that most effects occur with a 
varying time lag.36 One of the often analysed and discussed consequences of a financial crisis, 
namely job losses, and therefore an increase in unemployment, for example, does not usually 
set in directly at the beginning of a crisis. Worker rights, such as the protection against dismis-
sal, can prohibit employers from terminating employment contracts, at least in the short run. 
Long-term supply and sales contracts can also postpone crisis impacts from a company’s per-
spective. Since effects on the public sector can partially be related to crisis impacts on private 
households and businesses, such as a higher demand for unemployment benefits and support 
measures for private companies to avoid insolvencies, time lags can be given as well. 
According to economic theory, the gross domestic product (GDP) – generally understood as 
the economic performance of a country and which is composed of the sum of the consump-
tion of private households, business investments, government spending, and net exports – is 
likely to decrease in each of the different types of financial crises. Declines in consumption, 
investments, or net exports can be seen as the main reasons for these developments. Since 
lower private consumption is usually caused by lower private income, and lower business in-
vestments as well as net exports are caused by lower demand, turnover, and profit, a certain 
time lag is also given for these mechanisms. Government spending, on the other hand, is ex-
posed to contradictory effects and might change in both directions, also depending on the 
                                                     




phase of the crisis. While measures such as bailout packages involve higher expenditure, aus-
terity policies describe intentions to spend less.37 Therefore, some types of measures require 
a decision-making process and can be considered as deliberate crisis reactions. Other conse-
quences can occur via existing mechanisms, which might include the perception of a direct 
impact of the crisis; this once more illustrates the difficulty in distinguishing between both 
aspects.38 Apart from this, an increase in government spending always includes a direct in-
crease of the GDP to a corresponding extent. A financial crisis can thus have partially opposing 
impacts on the GDP, which is understood as the economic performance of a country. How-
ever, the decreasing components, especially the reduction in consumption and investment, 
are usually predominant, according to historical observations. Therefore, economic growth, 
which is usually measured as a GDP change, also decreases, including negative rates, in the 
context of a financial crisis (Reinhart & Reinhart, 2015). 
Furthermore, a financial crisis usually has a negative impact on public finance and government 
in general. On the income side, an economic slowdown leads to declining tax revenues. As 
described in the context of the GDP, the impact on the expenditure side is more complex and 
possibly subject to temporal variation. In a welfare state, public social security systems can be 
considered as automatic mechanisms providing help to the unemployed, among other people 
in need, which implies an increase in government expenditure. As a result of the existence of 
these mechanisms, a deliberate decision-making process is not necessary in order to provide 
these basic welfare services to citizens in times of a crisis. However, the situation is different 
if additional help is intended, which implies political responses beyond the existing mecha-
nisms. 
In addition, public expenditure, on the one hand, might arise from measures intended to sta-
bilise the financial system or to maintain the solvency of those banks that are considered to 
be relevant for the monetary system or other business. On the other hand, austerity policies 
might be implemented in the case of a financial crisis with the intention to avoid, or at least 
minimise, budgetary imbalances.39 However, since these measures usually include an active 
decision-making process, they can be considered as crisis responses. Various factors therefore 
determine the impact of a financial crisis on private households, businesses, and government, 
although negative consequences largely prevail in the cases of most entities. 
Overall, financial crises can imply far-reaching impacts on private households, companies, and 
the state. While most consequences are by far negative, some selective positive aspects might 
arise as well. Considering that each crisis is different, the impacts in terms of, for example, job 
losses, decline in demand, and burdens on public finances, vary broadly across countries, 
among industries, and over time. While this sub-chapter discussed the potential impacts of a 
financial crisis in general, the next one will focus on the situation at local levels of government. 
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3.2.2. Crisis impacts at local levels of government 
While national levels of government and international organisations receive the most atten-
tion in times of a financial crisis because of their co-ordinating and decision-making role, a 
certain impact of the crisis is usually given at all layers of the administrative subdivision. In this 
context, the scope and period of time mainly depend on the division of public tasks between 
the levels of government. If corporate taxes are, for example, a relevant source of income at 
the local level, then municipalities might quickly be affected by a crisis. In contrast, in cases 
where the local level mainly depends on transfers from central government, then there might 
be a certain time lag before a deterioration in the municipalities’ financial situation occurs. In 
other words, variation in the impact of a financial crisis at different levels of government is 
primarily caused by the design of the political-administrative system itself. 
In line with the typical development of a financial crisis over time, the following sequence of 
four inter-linked phases can be distinguished (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 278; Bailey & Chapain, 
2011b, p. 6 f.): 40 
1. The initial financial and banking crisis 
2. The global recession triggered by the banking crisis 
3. Stimulus programmes, public finance crisis, and/or severe cuts in public spending (with 
wide cross-country variation) 
4. The acceleration of ongoing trends of restructuring 
While the banking crisis and global recession, as the first two phases, describe impacts from a 
governmental perspective, stimulus programmes and the acceleration of ongoing restructur-
ing measures, as the two latter phases, combine impacts and responses depending on the 
administrative levels of interest. National or regional government’s countermeasures to the 
crisis, potentially including administrative provisions for the local level, can be considered as 
external factors or impacts from the perspective of local government, since own decision-
making processes are not conducted. However, this differentiation is often moderated by a 
formal involvement or informal influence of the local level in decision-making at the national 
or regional level.41 
With regard to the potential impacts of a financial crisis at the local level, including local resi-
dents, local businesses, and local government, the following five partially interlinked areas of 
impact can be distinguished (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 269 ff.): 
 People and the labour markets 
 Local economic resilience 
 Investment, construction, and property markets 
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 Strategy and positioning (of local authorities) 
 Municipal assets and balance sheets 
Rising unemployment rates and decreasing numbers of job offers are the most direct effects 
of a financial crisis on people and the labour markets. When the economy slows down, com-
panies naturally try to minimise costs by terminating labour contracts within the legal limits 
and freezing recruitment. Depending on the type of crisis, unemployment in some sectors 
might increase more than in others. In addition, young people often have experienced diffi-
culties in entering the labour market. While unemployment rates are usually indicated at the 
national level, the percentage of active and non-active members of the labour force and cor-
responding changes can be analysed at regional and local levels as well. In this way, compari-
sons across these levels of government are possible. Apart from the negative effects of a fi-
nancial crisis, mainly expressed by rising unemployment rates, some scholars have also men-
tioned minor positive effects. These concern the labour force’s enhanced entrepreneurial 
spirit, motivation for life-long learning, and increased flexibility and mobility (Clark & Huxley, 
2011, p. 270). 
With the beginning of an economic downturn, various business activities largely slow in de-
mand, and insolvencies might be the consequence in some cases. Since companies and their 
branches are always located within a certain municipality, variation in the effect on business 
cause second-round effects for certain regions or municipalities to a different degree. When 
considering local business activities as a whole, variation in the crisis’ impact on local economic 
resilience can be observed. Again, some scholars have pointed out certain positive side effects 
alongside the predominantly negative impact of a financial crisis. Companies’ aims to become 
more innovative and competitive are examples in this context (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 270 
f.). 
A financial crisis can also cause fewer activities in the field of investment, construction, and 
property markets. In this context, the decline in demand can originate from both the private 
and the public sectors. Especially in the case of private companies, it is comprehensible that 
investments are reduced if the company’s profits are declining. On the other hand, low prices 
as a result of a reduction in demand and low interest rates – relating to monetary policies to 
tackle the crisis – might lead to investments by businesses that expect a renewed increase in 
demand in their specific sector once the downturn has ended (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 271). 
In addition, a financial crisis can cause local authorities to reconsider their own strategy and 
positioning. A necessary reduction in public sector employment, for example, can raise ques-
tions regarding the role and obligations of local authorities within the public sector as well as 
from outside. In some cities, the possibilities of crisis support for citizens and businesses, as 
well as the decision-making procedures within political bodies and the administration, might 
be reconsidered if local officials realise that conventional measures and structures might not 
be appropriate in exceptional situations. As a positive side effect, it can be mentioned that 
some companies might begin to think more critically about the long-term sustainability of 
their business models. The same applies to local officials and local economic development 




Finally, a financial crisis affects municipal assets and balance sheets predominantly negatively 
because of increased expenditure, such as welfare spending, and declining revenues relating 
to the overall economic situation, as already outlined above. Public deficits might conse-
quently increase extensively. Attempts to recognise the positive side effects of this develop-
ment include the point of view that municipalities might be stimulated to increase budgetary 
discipline in the long run (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 272 f.). 
In general, the best knowledge about the actual impact of a financial crisis, especially regard-
ing an increase in the poverty of private households and the business situation of smaller and 
medium-sized companies, can be found at the local level – the tier of government closest to 
the population. Even though a structured overview of the overall impact of a crisis is certainly 
essential and at least partly present at higher levels of government, local insights can form an 
important basis for co-ordinated responses to a crisis which are usually arranged by the na-
tional level. Once countermeasures are decided upon, local government might be involved in 
the implementation process in accordance with one of its common roles. In addition, autono-
mous crisis reactions might be decided upon in some municipalities. 
In summary, financial crises can affect local levels of government in various ways. Higher un-
employment rates and lower turnover of local companies, for example, might lead to higher 
social spending and lower tax revenues. In addition, construction sites, which are often devel-
oped and sold by local government, might be less in demand. All of these developments imply 
negative impacts on the balance sheet of the local level. Questions related to governmental 
actors’ potential countermeasures and responses to financial crises will be addressed in the 
next chapters. 
 
3.3. Responses to financial crises from a theoretical perspective and 
historical experiences 
Once a financial crisis emerges or certain indicators point in the direction of potential prob-
lems in this area, politicians and civil servants should observe the situation critically. Depend-
ing on the type and scope of crisis, a reaction might not be necessary (Claessens & Kose, 2013, 
p. 36), but also the conclusion not to intervene requires a deliberate decision. However, once 
the crisis exceeds a certain scope, countermeasures are likely. Additional pressure to act might 
also emerge from a political perspective in connection with the citizens’ perception of the 
crisis. 
Taken together, the situation raises questions on how and when to react. In other words, crisis 
management is of major importance (Boin et al., 2017), while existing policies and coalitions 
might be challenged simultaneously (Gourevitch, 1986). Should certain banks or other types 
of companies receive state funds to avoid bankruptcy and to maintain jobs? Should public 
expenditure in some policy areas be reduced since social spending is likely to rise? Which 




within a few months? Which side effects and new incentives might arise from the measures 
taken?  
Since crisis are highly complex and the main schools of economic thought do not agree on the 
necessary answers, variation in the countermeasures taken is generally likely. On the other 
hand, financial crises are usually not limited to a certain area, which illustrates the advanta-
geousness of co-ordinated actions, or at least non-contradictory measures, involving various 
actors, ranging from international organisations to local councils. These circumstances cer-
tainly increase the overall complexity of crisis reaction from a more practical perspective. 
Focusing on economic theory, and in line with the previous discussion of the impact of a fi-
nancial crisis, crisis reactions at the international and national levels of government are ana-
lysed in the first sub-chapter (3.3.1). Then, in the second sub-chapter (3.3.2), special attention 
is paid to responses at the local level of government. 
 
3.3.1. Crisis responses at the international and national levels of gov-
ernment 
While political-administrative decision makers in open economics can certainly not influence 
all external developments affecting the country in which they were elected or appointed to 
be in charge of financial and economic policies, reactions to a crisis are possible within the 
scope of national policymaking and international arrangements. Regardless of the type of cri-
sis, governments can be forced, to a greater or lesser degree, to react in order to prevent far-
reaching consequences, such as national bankruptcy or the collapse of the monetary system. 
Possible common countermeasures include bailout packages, the provision of collaterals, gov-
ernment bonds for refinancing purposes, and austerity policies. 
Most measures have in common that they either cause substantial expenditure or tie up cap-
ital, at least in the short term. However, primarily depending on the economic situation and 
the occurrence of repayments, government’s involvement in rescue measures may prove to 
be cost-neutral, or even financially advantageous because of interest payments in the long 
run. It thus needs to be taken into account that a state’s involvement in limiting and moder-
ating the consequences of a financial crisis can take decades – or even centuries. In the case 
of the 1720 South Sea bubble, for example, the British government undertook a bailout of the 
South Sea Company and still paid interest on parts of these obligations in 2014 (Castle, 2014). 
A major distinction regarding reactions to a recession or financial crisis can be drawn between 
monetary and fiscal policies. While monetary policies are decided by central banks, which are 
usually politically independent by law, fiscal policies enable legislators at all levels of govern-
ment to adapt new policies with corresponding implications on public revenues and spending 
within their areas of responsibility. Various interest groups might attempt to influence both 




Monetary policy, generally based on the quantity theory of money (Fisher, 1911)42, mainly 
involves decisions on interest rates and money supply. In the case of an economic downturn, 
an expansionary monetary policy, including lower interest rates or a more extensive money 
supply, can be considered as the standard measures, following the logic that corporate invest-
ment and private consumption are encouraged by this action. Potentially higher inflation rates 
require particular attention in the context of an expansionary monetary policy. However, in 
recent decades, the limitations of standard measures in monetary policies have become clear, 
and they have led to unconventional measures, such as central banks purchasing financial as-
sets from commercial banks, also known as quantitative easing.43 
With regard to the question of how to react to a recession or financial crisis from a fiscal per-
spective, the answer varies in macroeconomic theory. Two main schools of thought, which 
represent two different approaches, can be distinguished: 
 Classical economics 
 Keynesian economics 
The understanding of how an economy adjusts during a recession and regains full employ-
ment, as well as the understanding of other economic mechanisms and interrelationships, 
differs between these perspectives. A brief introduction of the two schools of economic 
thought and the potential strategies derived to address financial crises follows hereinafter. 
Classical economics, also known as laissez-faire economics, dates back to 18th- and 19th-cen-
tury scholars such as Adam Smith44, David Ricardo, and Jean-Baptiste Say. In their general un-
derstanding, the price adjustment mechanism automatically cures an economy in crisis. They 
argue that unemployment leads to lower prices, wages, and interest rates. Since workers will 
accept working for less money, wages will reach levels where it becomes profitable for com-
panies to employ those workers. Production, corporate investments, and private consumption 
will consequently increase, which brings the economy back to its full employment equilibrium. 
Since unemployment is considered to be a natural, self-correcting part of the business cycle, 
a government intervention is neither necessary nor promising, according to classical econom-
ics. In other words, the best solution in a recession is to leave the free market to return to its 
equilibrium (Smith, 1776). It must be taken into account that this might be a lengthy process, 
thus implying difficult times for many citizens. 
Keynesian economics dates back to the thoughts of John Maynard Keynes in the context of 
the Great Depression in the 1930s, and it can be considered as a far-reaching rejection of the 
common economic views by that time. According to this school of thought, before the price 
adjustment mechanism begins to work in case of an economic downturn, it is overpowered 
by an income adjustment mechanism. As a result of the decline in income, people spend less 
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and save less, and businesses consequently produce less output and invest less. Rather than 
causing the economy to reach its original equilibrium, these mechanisms drive it deeper into 
recession in a self-enforcing manner. This also implies that cyclical unemployment can occur. 
As countermeasures, Keynes sees the need for large-scale government investments and strat-
egies to stimulate private household demand in order to stimulate the economy at large. In 
other words, anti-cyclical investments by an active government are required (Keynes, 1936). 
In this regard, it is often criticised that additional government spending is not necessarily used 
for investments, but for savings and debt reduction, which undermines the intended stimulus. 
At the least, precise specifications on the use of additional funds appear to be necessary in 
this context. 
In addition, neo-liberalism, as an influential political-economic trend since the 1930s, enables 
the derivation of recommended countermeasures to financial crises. The approach builds 
upon classical economics and generally favours a limited role of the state and corresponding 
policy measures such as austerity, deregulation, and privatisation. Neo-liberal thinking is as-
sociated with economists such as Friedrich August von Hayek and Milton Friedman, who see 
only positive short-term effects of the strategy suggested by Keynes.45 Austerity measures, as 
one key element of neo-liberalism, are justified to maintain government’s solvency, which can 
be threatened, for example, because of high increases in government spending for bailout 
packages in the context of a financial crisis or extensive borrowing in foreign currency. As a 
consequence, cutbacks are necessary in other areas to balance the budget, maintain solvency, 
and keep inflation rates low. If the country depends on credits from international financial 
institutions, then those institutions, as capital lenders, might also suggest or enforce austerity 
measures. Even though cutbacks often follow increased government expenditure, the 
measures themselves describe a reduction in government spending. Therefore, from an eco-
nomic perspective, unemployment increases, at least in the sectors that depend on the state, 
which also implies lower prices, wages, and interest rates. If austerity measures are combined 
with higher tax rates to support the process towards a balanced budget with a higher income, 
then a decrease in private consumption and business investments is the consequence (von 
Hayek, 1931). 
Overall, classical economics, Keynesian economics, and neo-liberalism reach different conclu-
sions regarding the question of how to respond to a financial crisis, since their understanding 
of dominant and foregoing mechanisms in times of recession, as well as prioritisation, varies. 
In practice, these mechanisms are influenced by further, mainly legal factors, such as protec-
tion against dismissal and minimum wages. This also implies that a decision on a strategy to 
fight a recession or the renunciation of any action must always take the local context into 
account. However, as a result of increasing public debt and limited financial leeway, it is ar-
gued that governments nowadays have few alternate options other than the implementation 
of pro-cyclical policies (Armingeon, 2012). 
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Since each crisis is different, it is also difficult to assess what would have occurred if govern-
ment would have intervened – if it did not– and vice versa. Taken together, three groups of 
fiscal policies for reacting to financial crises can be distinguished: 
 Passive policies (based on classical economic) 
 Counter-cyclical policies (based on Keynesian economics) 
 Pro-cyclical policies (based on neo-liberalism) 
In practice, policies based on a single category are relatively unlikely, especially if a crisis lasts 
over a long period. Passive policies seem especially likely at the beginning of a crisis, in line 
with a partial denial of reality or a hope that the situation will not grow much worse after all. 
Furthermore, pro-cyclical policies are likely to follow counter-cyclical policies, based on the 
need to balance the budget after prior increasing expenditures. In other words, fiscal stimuli 
might lead to austerity policies. 
Considering recent crises, also mixed strategies can be observed. On the one hand, stimulus 
packages, which often focused on education and infrastructure, were implemented. In this 
context, it also needs to be noted that such measures were often not presented or labelled as 
crisis reactions inspired by Keynesian economics, but can be considered as counter-cyclical 
investments in a Keynesian understanding by their nature. On the other hand, conscious non-
intervention in many industries – corresponding to classical economics but not necessarily 
labelled explicitly as a strategy in line with this school of economic thought – was often com-
bined with austerity measures in public expenditure to balance the budget. As these examples 
indicate, the trisection between classical economics, Keynesian economics, and neo-liberalism 
in the context of responses to a financial crisis should not be overemphasised. 
From a political perspective, it can be said that because of the free play of the markets and 
the limited role of government, classical economics and neo-liberalism are often favoured by 
conservative, liberal, and other parties to the right of the political spectrum. Keynesian eco-
nomics, on the other hand, is often favoured by socialists and social democrats, as well as 
parties to the left of the political spectrum, because of the active role of government and 
attempts to support citizens in times of crisis. 
In general, limited decision-making capacities should be taken into account. Both at the polit-
ical level and at the administrative level, far-reaching economic considerations might not be 
possible, because of a lack of personnel or the lack of personnel qualified to find suitable so-
lutions based on extensive reflections in line with scientific insights and data (Kickert, 2015, p. 
560). Especially at the local level, this factor can be considered as relevant. 
In addition, attention should be paid to measures in the fields of market regulation and suita-
ble institutional arrangements, particularly regarding the financial sector. These measures can 
most importantly contribute to crisis prevention, but they can also reduce the scope of spillo-
ver effects during a crisis. Economic growth is a second important aspect. While economic 
growth is usually negatively affected in times of a financial crisis as a result of lower levels of 
private consumption and corporate investment, persisting economic growth can make wide-




Based on historical data, a recent study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2013) has concluded that 
advanced economies do not largely differ from emerging economics with regard to the tools 
to respond to financial crises. Instead of focusing on austerity, forbearance, and economic 
growth to fight a crisis, the standard toolkit for emerging markets, including debt restructur-
ing, higher inflation, and capital controls, is often applied in industrial countries as well. In this 
context, previous practical experiences from emerging countries can prove to be helpful. Fur-
thermore, the authors have pointed out that public debt, as one of the indicators when meas-
uring the scope of a financial crisis and deciding on crisis responses, is often partially hidden 
because of varying definitions, and it is therefore often much higher than officially specified. 
In addition, financial crises usually lead to an increase in public debt, which is likely to cause 
further problems, including new crises. The question regarding strategies to reduce public 
debt was addressed in a recent study by Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2015) based on his-
torical data. In this context, the authors have distinguished between two main types of strat-
egies: first, orthodox policies, including the stimulation of economic growth, running primary 
budget surpluses, usually by implementing austerity measures, and the privatisation of gov-
ernment assets, and second, heterodox policies, including the restructuring of debt, inflation, 
taxing wealth, and the repression of private finance. Therefore, the dichotomy between eco-
nomic growth on the one hand, which is influenced by private consumption, business invest-
ment, government spending, and productivity gains, and austerity measures on the other 
hand, as a reduction of expenditure, needs to be noted. 
Considering the single choices, economic growth can be seen as the most-favoured option. 
From a practical perspective, the reduction in public debt is usually undertaken as a long-term 
process to maintain possibilities for productivity-enhancing investments, for example in the 
policy areas of education and infrastructure. The privatisation of public services and the sale 
of government assets can be viewed as short-term measures to reduce debt and increase li-
quidity. Depending on the price and the productivity of the private sector, the privatisation of 
public services might even have a negative impact on public finances (Reinhart et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that the privatisation of public services and the 
sale of government assets are always restricted to existing public services and government 
assets in combination with the willingness to dispense them; this significantly limits the pos-
sibilities of measures in this context. 
Overall, it must be considered that government is the last resort regarding all types of crisis, 
regardless of whether they occur in a private household, in a company, or at the public level. 
Once a certain crisis scope or intensity is reached, those concerned will request government 
support. Therefore, it is important that government ensures a certain own financial leeway to 
respond to crises that might appear relatively suddenly. In other words, keeping the powder 
try (Obstfeld, 2013).46 
For centuries, economists and political scientists have been discussing the most appropriate 
reactions to financial crises. While a universally accepted theory, or at least a major consensus, 
on the most accurate crisis reaction or crisis reactions – which might also help to prevent crises 
                                                     




in the first place – is not yet found, counter-cyclical policies have gained some renewed atten-
tion in more recent years. However, while the choices of fiscal and regulatory countermeas-
ures are extensive at national levels of government in line with the usual areas of compe-
tences, next to the potential monetary reactions by central banks, the potential responses by 
local levels of government are comparably less extensive. More details in answer to the ques-
tion as to what local authorities can do to react to financial crises and minimise their impacts 
will be provided in the next sub-chapter. 
 
3.3.2. Crisis responses at local levels of government 
While politicians at the national level and international organisations usually receive the most 
attention in the context of the impact of a financial crisis and general strategies to address the 
challenges, local authorities are usually most involved in dealing with the impact and succes-
sive consequences from a more practical perspective. Decentralisation measures in recent 
years have even increased the role of local authorities in many countries. Therefore, they usu-
ally experience two developments in times of an economic downturn, both stressing their or-
ganisational and financial capacities. First, as the main provider of public services in many 
countries, local authorities experience an increase in the demand for such services in times of 
crisis, especially welfare services. Second, depending on the economic situation, the share of 
local revenue, such as corporate taxes and fees for entertainment activities, usually decreases. 
While a financial crisis certainly affects all levels of government to some extent, this combina-
tion of two unfavourable developments applies to the local level in particular, where the initial 
challenge can be summarised as delivering more with less. 
As part of their fiscal responsibilities, local officials can decide on policies they consider appro-
priate to address the crisis. In this context, initial responses can differ from long-term strate-
gies, and the co-ordination of measures in a system of multi-level governance seems im-
portant but cannot be taken for granted. However, from a practical perspective, the fiscal 
options at the local level, in line with political-economic theory, can be divided into the fol-
lowing three categories (Based on Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 18 f.): 
 Passive policies: These involve taking no active policy measures and allowing the auto-
matic stabilisers to work. Such policies can result either from a lack of sub-central au-
tonomy to implement discretionary policies or from an institutional framework that 
allows automatic stabilisers to work without explicit policy decisions. 
 Counter-cyclical policies: These involve increasing investment and/or lowering tax 
rates, eventually leading to increased levels of deficits and debt. 
 Pro-cyclical policies: Through these policies, budgets are balanced by reducing spend-
ing, cutting jobs and investment, or by increasing revenues, especially by raising taxes. 
Building upon the possible areas of impact of a financial crisis at the municipal level, with a 




accompanying categories of local-level reactions can be distinguished (Clark & Huxley, 2011, 
p. 273 ff.):47 
 People and the labour markets 
 Local economic resilience 
 Investment, construction, and property markets 
 Long-term strategy and positioning 
 Local governance and leadership 
Apart from welfare payments, local authorities can establish various other measures ad-
dressed to people and the labour markets when a crisis sets in. Those measures include, inter 
alia, advice hotlines for the newly unemployed, local job fairs, and new apprenticeship and 
internship programmes. In some cases, training programmes to qualify and motivate persons 
to start new businesses might be an additional option (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 273 f.). All the 
measures can be considered as attempts to help citizens, while utilizing relatively limited pub-
lic resources. Some of the actions are more likely to take place in larger cities or in co-opera-
tion between municipalities in a certain region. Since all of the measures involve public re-
sources, even though the expenditures might be rather low, the examples provided can be 
considered as counter-cyclical policies. 
Next to policies focusing on inhabitants, local authorities can establish measures addressing 
businesses located within the municipality to strengthen local economic resilience. Actions 
taken might involve, for example, advice hotlines and attempts to speed up payment by the 
local level in case of business relations with local companies. In some cases, if the demand 
exists, municipalities might also provide development areas for new businesses and business 
incubators. Financial support, including emergency loans and direct investments, especially in 
future technologies, and loan guarantees are also possible local reactions in the context of a 
crisis (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 274 f.). Comparable to the previous category, all the examples 
involve resources provided by local government, including possible high expenditure, espe-
cially in the context of emergency loans, and they can therefore be considered as counter-
cyclical policies. 
In the areas of investment, construction, and property markets, local authorities can also pro-
vide support to crisis-hit businesses. Possible actions include public sector investments, espe-
cially into improvements of the local infrastructure. This measure is particularly popular, since 
it can contain contracts for local businesses, and it improves the economic framework condi-
tions within the municipality as a potential location factor, which is especially relevant for new 
companies. In addition, the public sector can facilitate and promote private sector invest-
ments. Simplifications can be realised, for example, regarding administrative approvals and 
procedures. Other support can be provided by information on investment opportunities, po-
litical help in finding new investors, and new financial solutions for intended investments by 
private companies (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 275 f.). While a certain overlap with the measures 
in the category of local economic resilience is certainly present, the measures in the category 
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of local economic resilience present rather short-term actions. The examples provided in the 
category of investment, construction, and property markets present counter-cyclical policies; 
however, pro-cyclical policies with the intention to invest less in order to balance the budget 
are also possible in this area. 
A crisis can lead to reconsiderations concerning a municipality’s long-term strategy and posi-
tioning from an economic perspective. While some cities might revise their economic devel-
opment strategies, especially towards a broader focus on and support of innovative business 
models and the knowledge economy, others might come to the conclusion that strategic 
changes are not necessary. Similarly, some cities might decide that a broader diversification 
of businesses should be supported, also in the context of a city’s international positioning 
(Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 276 f.). The considerations concerning a municipality’s long-term 
strategy and positioning as such do not follow any particular fiscal strategy. However, the out-
come can imply strategy changes towards more counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical policies. 
In the area of local governance and leadership, various reactions can possibly be observed in 
the presence of a financial crisis. Measures that might prove to be helpful are new or adapted 
local development strategies and policy innovations in general. From a more practical per-
spective, collaboration, improved communication, and budget consolidation are possible 
measures to be taken (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 278). Comparable to previous categories, the 
measures can follow the logic of counter- as well as pro-cyclical policies. 
Taken together, especially at the local level, fast and targeted actions can moderate the neg-
ative consequences of a financial crisis for citizens and private companies; furthermore, reac-
tions by local government might be partially based on economic theory, but are not neces-
sarily developed in a scientific manner. Next to the provision of help and assistance in the form 
of social services, advisory services by local government can be useful from a practical per-
spective. In addition, changes in the public sector’s own situation must constantly be consid-
ered. Apart from adjustments, for example in organisational and managerial approaches 
within the administration and rural development strategies, the financial position and the pos-
sible necessity of far-reaching changes in the composition of municipal budgets are most rel-
evant at the local level. Austerity measures and additional investments to stimulate the econ-
omy might consequently be decided upon. 
In summary, economic theory provides various conceptions of the emergence and impacts, as 
well as strategies and measures, to address financial crises. Major differences concern the 
question regarding appropriate reactions to a crisis in particular, and three groups of partially 
opposing policies can be derived. They are as follows: passive policies, where no actions are 
taken while relying on automatic stabilisers, counter-cyclical policies, including additional in-
vestments or tax cuts to stimulate the economy, and pro-cyclical policies, which focus on bal-
anced budgets by cutting expenditures or increasing revenues. This lack of a universal theo-
retical understanding of the mechanisms of financial crises plausibly leads to a broad variation 
in crisis management in practice. While this applies to all levels of government, it is particularly 
relevant at the municipal level, where further factors might contribute to different levels of 




a comparative perspective. These potential factors will be discussed in the next chapter based 





4. Factors determining variation in relation to the impact of and re-
sponses to a financial crisis at the local level of government according 
to public administration and political theory 
The impact of external effects on territorial entities can vary according to local conditions. In 
the case of an economic downturn, for example, some regions or municipalities might be more 
or less affected based on their economic structure and the importance of certain industries. 
Regarding public finances, some authorities might be better prepared, with a traditionally 
solid financial position, and thus able to absorb economic fluctuations. For others, a minor 
decline in revenues might cause major problems because of already existing imbalances and 
instabilities. On a personal level, some local officials might take better decisions than others 
when reacting to changing circumstances. Overall, a large number of local factors can rein-
force or moderate external effects. Therefore, identifying the relevant factors can contribute 
to the assessment of the potential severity of a crisis, the planning of measures to address a 
crisis, and the prevention of impacts of future crises. In other words, understanding the mech-
anisms behind financial crises can enable political-administrative decision makers to influence 
them to some extent in a desired way. 
A study by Wagschal and Jäkel (2010), for example, has analysed the moderating effect of 
certain factors, such as the unemployment rate and the number of veto players, on the scope 
of policy reactions and the distribution of additional expenditures in the case of the Financial 
Crisis since 2007 at the national level. This was done by comparing the measures in a number 
of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. While these 
factors might provide explanations for variation at the local level, additional factors could also 
do so. 
Furthermore, some factors might have an indirect effect on the impact of and responses to a 
financial crisis along a chain of causal mechanisms. Regional companies with businesses that 
are no longer in demand and an adverse socio-economic composition of the local population, 
for example, are possible factors explaining a higher local crisis impact and increasing munic-
ipal expenditures in line with a rising unemployment rate. Further factors of influence could 
be found in the political-administrative system and the persons involved. Especially regarding 
the reactions to changing framework conditions, local officials might choose different options 
based on their experiences and political beliefs, or even convictions based on economic the-
ory.48 
Based on the above-mentioned aspects, it can be argued that municipalities within one coun-
try are usually affected by events such as a financial crisis to different degrees. As a conse-
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quence, the changes in municipal revenues and expenditures also vary and depend on numer-
ous factors, including external influences and conditions within the municipality.49 While some 
factors can be influenced by local officials, others are difficult to change, at least in the short 
run. In other words, both the local financial situation and the impact of and reactions to a 
financial crisis always need to be considered as parts of long-term developments, building 
upon previous policy choices. This makes substantive changes rather challenging, but not im-
possible. 
The question of how municipalities react to a financial crisis concerns the following three di-
mensions: polity, referring to the institutional structures of the political system, politics, de-
scribing political processes, and policy, as the content-related perspective (Knill & Tosun, 2012, 
p. 3 f.). While all three dimensions can be relevant to explain policy outcomes and policy 
changes, the policy perspective is most important for this comparative study, since variation 
in institutional structures and political processes is relatively low across territorial entities at 
one level of government and under the same legal system. 
Since the 1950s, the policy process has commonly been described as a cycle in political theory 
(Lasswell, 1956; Jann & Wegrich, 2007; Knill & Tosun, 2012, p. 9 f.), being comprised of five 
iterative steps, namely (1) agenda setting, (2) policy formulation, (3) decision-making, (4) im-
plementation, and (5) evaluation. However, considering the policy process in practice, non-
linear developments dominate, which illustrates the chiefly theoretical nature of the policy 
cycle (Van Wart, 1998, p. 206 f.; Raadschelders, 2003, p. 282 ff.). Apart from this, various fac-
tors can influence the policy outcome at all stages of the policy process. 
Based on different theoretical approaches to understand policymaking, structure-based mod-
els, institution-based models, and interest-based models can be distinguished in this context.50 
While structure-based models focus on the socio-economic structure and associated prob-
lems in society to provide explanations for the policy outcome, formal and informal institu-
tional structures are of interest in institution-based models. Actors within the political-admin-
istrative system and their preferences describe the main explanatory approach in interest-
based models. Considering the different areas of focus, the combination of all three theoreti-
cal perspectives is necessary to understand policymaking as a whole (Knill & Tosun, 2012, p. 
69 ff.). 
In line with the three theoretical perspectives of policymaking, individual factors of relevance 
can be derived. Detecting these factors and assessing their effects in the policy process collec-
tively represent the main challenge from an analytical perspective. However, considering ter-
ritorial entities at the local level of government, it needs to be taken into account that because 
of identical institutional structures, the explanatory power of institution-based factors can be 
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50 While these three groups of theories will hereafter be labelled as models, the specific theoretical perspec-
tives within these models will be labelled as approaches or schools, or they will be referred to by their common 
names. The term factor will be used to describe a single aspect, which can be assigned to a model and its fur-




limited when aiming to explain variation. In addition, policymaking at the local level, particu-
larly in times of crisis, is subject to further limitations. 
First, the scope for local officials’ actions can be partially limited because of mandatory tasks 
of the municipality and existing commitments, which can also be regarded as path dependen-
cies. In addition, members of local councils usually exercise their mandates as an honorary 
office, implying limited time capacities and sometimes a lack of background knowledge in eco-
nomic affairs. For the administrations of relatively small municipalities, limited resources to 
address complex challenges constitute a further problem. On the other hand, tailored 
measures to local conditions seem to be most efficient, especially in times of crises. Therefore, 
customised strategies should be planned and implemented whenever possible, which can cer-
tainly be considered as a major challenge for local officials. 
Second, the perception of a crisis can vary. Based on previous experiences or the information 
one receives, different conclusions on the necessity of certain actions might emerge. There-
fore, the crisis perception of key actors such as mayors and city managers, beyond official data 
on the financial situation, can cause variation in crises reactions, and rather irrational actions 
are not excluded. 
The structure of this chapter follows the differentiation of the three theoretical approaches 
to understand policymaking. After introducing the overall conceptual model of this study, 
based on the mechanisms behind a financial crisis in a system of multi-level governance (4.1), 
the following sub-chapters are subdivided into structure-based factors (4.2), institution-based 
factors (4.3), and interest-based factors (4.4). Hypotheses regarding individual factors with a 
potential moderating or reinforcing effect on the impact of and responses to a financial crisis 
at the local level of government will be derived based on the theoretical approaches within all 
three sub-chapters. Some hypotheses can be considered as rather explorative because of the 
interaction of multiple effects, possible hidden factors, and potential variation or uncertainty 
of the preponderance of factors. Thereafter, the potential factors of influence will be summa-
rised, and relations between the groups of factors will be discussed (4.5). The perception of a 
crisis, as an additional aspect that potentially causes variation in the context of crisis reactions, 
is the topic of the final sub-chapter (4.6). 
 
4.1. The conceptual model of this study 
This study understands a financial crisis as an external development from the local level’s per-
spective. While many factors come into play when a crisis emerges, and local government 
debt, for example, might contribute to the overall development, a financial crisis is considered 




governance. Also, the main responsibilities in monetary politics, parts of fiscal politics, and 
financial market regulation are usually located at these levels of government.51 
Since governmental entities are always subject to continuous changes and developments, an 
event such as a financial crisis needs to be seen in its temporal context. Separating the differ-
ent types of impacts and reactions caused by one development from those caused by other 
developments is the corresponding challenge. In this regard, the decentralisation of tasks, 
municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation, management changes, Europeanisa-
tion, citizen participation, and the digitalisation of public services are considered to be the 
most relevant contextual factors at the local level in recent decades, and they are to be sepa-
rated from the developments dating back to the Financial Crisis since 2007. In other words, 
financial changes, excluding those based on contextual factors as framework conditions, are 
of interest from an analytical perspective. 
Variation in the impact of a financial crisis on local entities, as well as variation in the responses 
by those local entities, might be caused by various interacting factors. These can be grouped 
in line with structure-, institution-, and interest-based models as theoretical approaches in 
public policy. In addition, the perception of a crisis is included as a potential factor that causes 
variation, following the assumption that local officials evaluate the severity of a crisis differ-
ently, resulting in different countermeasures. 
At the local level, as at any other level of government, the impact of a crisis can result in 
measures taken to react, which form the most important mechanism to combat a crisis. As-
suming that political actions are evaluated, as described in the concept of the policy cycle, 
crisis responses can also be adjusted based on feedback from previous measures. Further-
more, within a system of multi-level governance, the measures at one level of government 
can represent an impact at another level of government. A complete overview of the concep-
tual model of this study is provided in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The conceptual model of this study 
The conceptual model considers the course of a financial crisis as a development originating 
at the international or national level with subsequent effects at lower levels of government. 
At the local level, a crisis impact is potentially followed by a crisis reaction, while both aspects 
are influenced by the severity of the crisis itself. Apart from moderating or reinforcing factors 
that might help to explain a varying crisis impact and different crisis reactions, when compar-
ing local entities within a country, changes in contextual factors need to be taken into account, 
especially if the financial positions of local authorities are analysed over time. As essential 
components of the conceptual model, potential factors of influence on the impact of the crisis 
and responses to it will be discussed in the following sub-chapters. 
 
4.2. Structure-based factors 
Within the group of structure-based models, the socio-economic school and the cleavage ap-
proach can be distinguished as the two main theoretical perspectives. The socio-economic 
school focuses on societal and economic influences on policymaking, as well as the resulting 




(Schmidt & Ostheim, 2007, p. 29; Obinger, 2015, p. 35 f.). By considering factors such as the 
differentiation of labour and unemployment, the model is especially applicable to welfare 
states from a historical or internationally comparative perspective. Not taking into account 
the political decision-making process, with its relevant actors and institutions, can be consid-
ered as the main weakness of the theoretical approach (Schmidt & Ostheim, 2007, p. 35 f.; 
Obinger, 2015, p. 35 f.). 
Socio-economic theories were first developed in the 19th century, and they are closely related 
to Wagner’s law in economics with regard to the increase of state spending as a share of the 
GDP in line with new public tasks (Wagner, 1892, p. 892 ff.). The rise of welfare states at 
around the same time represents the expansion of governmental activities in practice. While 
states previously focused on maintaining public order, they began to intervene in economic 
and social areas (Obinger, 2015, p. 36 f.; Knill & Tosun, 2012, p. 48). 
On closer inspection, the socio-economic school considers socio-economic developments to 
be not only the main reasons for social differentiation, economic wealth, and both societal 
and political modernisation, but also as factors leading to pressure on existing arrangements 
in the context of social security, which were relatively limited in the past. The latter develop-
ment also resulted in growing claims of an increasing role of the state in social affairs in the 
20th century; however, the scope differed across nation states. From a theoretical perspective, 
the socio-economic explanatory approaches include reflections on capitalistic industrial soci-
eties by Marx (1872), as well as later research on welfare policies, for example by Zöllner 
(1963) and Wilensky (1975) (Schmidt & Ostheim, 2007, p. 30; Obinger, 2015). 
In the case of a financial crisis, a decrease in the aggregated demand and the industrial output, 
with consequences such as lower tax revenues, is an example of a likely relation from an eco-
nomic perspective. Increasing unemployment rates, accompanied by lower purchasing power 
of private households, are typical societal consequences following this economic develop-
ment. While the socio-economic school has a traditional focus on the national level, the anal-
ysis of factors determining variation in policymaking at the local level is also possible because 
of similar organisational structures. 
The socio-economic composition of the population, distinguished, for example, by the unem-
ployment rate, share of elderly people, or average income per person52, might make a differ-
ence regarding the scope of the crisis impact and reactions undertaken. In welfare states with 
unemployment allowances, lower employment typically implies higher public expenditure in 
social affairs. In addition, unemployment is typically linked to lower revenues from income 
taxes, as well as partially lower corporate taxes. Given the decrease in purchasing power in 
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connection with unemployment, lower household expenditure results in lower public reve-
nues, which are usually in part linked to consumption (cf. Wagschal & Jäkel, 2010, p. 309 ff.). 
This argumentation leads to the following hypothesis:53 
H1: The higher the increase in unemployment, the higher the increase in municipal net 
expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in municipal net reve-
nues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Considering the nature of a financial crisis, it can be further argued that not all industries 
within a certain region are affected by the crisis to the same extent. While some sectors, such 
as agriculture and manufacturing, might also experience decreases in demand, the main im-
pact of a financial crisis occurs in the banking and financial service sector per definition. As a 
consequence, increases in unemployment, associated with higher public expenses and lower 
tax revenues, are also unequally distributed across industries. Accordingly, cities and munici-
palities, wherein the banking and financial service sector is traditionally an important industry 
with a relatively large share of local employment, are affected by a financial crisis to an above 
average degree. Following this logic, the next hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H2: The higher the share of the financial sector, the higher the increase in municipal net 
expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in municipal net reve-
nues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the age composition of the local population is a factor that potentially moder-
ates the effects of a financial crisis. Considering increasing unemployment, as a typical conse-
quence of a financial crisis, people older or younger than the official working age are usually 
not directly affected by job losses. In other words, specifically municipalities with a large share 
of elderly people experience a crisis and related effects on employment and public finances 
to a lesser extent. Therefore, the third hypothesis, in line with structure-based factors, is 
stated as follows: 
H3: The higher the share of persons aged 65 and older, the lower the increase in mu-
nicipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the lower the decrease in municipal 
net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
As the second structure-based model considered in this study, the cleavage approach focuses 
on factors of long-term socio-economic fissions and their influence on policymaking. Accord-
ing to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the following four cleavages can be identified: centre versus 
periphery, state versus church, rural versus urban, and workers versus employers. Additional 
cleavages have been formulated by other scholars in more recent years.54 However, the long-
term nature of the cleavages qualifies the model to analyse historical developments rather 
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cent decades because of a higher average mobility of the population and migration flows both within countries 




than policy changes in the short run. In addition, it can be argued that because of develop-
ments such as globalisation and Europeanisation, socio-economic cleavages are less pro-
nounced nowadays than they were several decades ago.  
Regarding the question of the impact of and reactions to a financial crisis at the local level, 
rural versus urban – a factor that is determined, for example, by the number of inhabitants of 
a certain area, population density, or the typical use of soil – is the main dimension of the 
cleavage approach that potentially explains variation in policymaking. During a financial crisis, 
it can be argued that large cities are typically more affected than small villages in the country-
side. First, the socio-economic structure of cities is often disadvantageous because of higher 
numbers of welfare recipients and resulting socio-economic pressure (cf. Wagschal & Jäkel, 
2010, p. 309 ff.; Bishaw & Posey, 2016). Second, the importance of the economic sectors dif-
fers. Agriculture is more common in the countryside, and it is generally less affected by the 
overall economic situation. Industrial production, on the other hand, usually takes place in 
more densely populated areas because of the need for sufficient infrastructure, largely de-
pending on the type of production, as well as employees. In the case of the Financial Crisis 
since 2007, the financial sector was particularly severely affected. Relevant companies in this 
sector are typically located in cities rather than in the countryside. The next hypothesis is thus 
set up as follows: 
H4: The more inhabitants, the higher the increase in municipal net expenditures per 
capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in municipal net revenues per capita 
during a financial crisis. 
Furthermore, the dominating use of local soil can be considered as an alternative way in which 
to measure the degree of urbanisation. In this context, a large share of agricultural soil usage 
is generally associated with rural areas. Following this logic, the next hypothesis is postulated 
as follows: 
H5: The higher the share of soil used for agricultural purposes, the lower the increase 
in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the lower the decrease in mu-
nicipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
In the context of these five hypotheses, in line with structure-based factors with a potential 
influence on the implications of a financial crisis at the local level, it must be taken into account 
that other factors apart from the crisis might also cause changes in financial developments 
during the relevant period of time. However, while the existence of confounding variables can 
never be completely excluded in social science research, the financial crisis is regarded as the 
main factor leading to the changes. In other words, all framework conditions are considered 
as ceteris paribus. The same applies to the hypotheses derived in the next sub-chapters. 
Taken together, structure-based factors can potentially contribute to the explanation for local 
entities facing financial crises to a varying degree. Higher unemployment rates, for example, 
are usually accompanied by higher social spending. However, considering that a number of 
different factors contribute to variation in the local impact of a crisis and responses to it, in-





4.3. Institution-based factors 
In the group of institution-based models, the classical institutional approach and new institu-
tionalism can be distinguished, and the latter is commonly further subdivided into sociological 
institutionalism and historical institutionalism. The classical institutional approach55 focuses 
on formal-legal and organisational factors next to economic and social conditions. Especially 
questions about decision-making within organisations (cf. Simon, 1947) and the related policy 
performance of differing institutional arrangements can be assessed by following this ap-
proach. The main weakness of the model is that it does not take informal decision-making into 
account. 
On closer inspection, the classical institutional approach dates back to scholars of antiquity 
and can be considered as “the first systematic thinking about political life” (Peters, 2005, p. 
3), involving questions regarding the nature of institutions and their most favourable design. 
Overall, these considerations were mainly normative, but they mark the beginning of system-
atic analyses of institutions both in general and in specific contexts (Peters, 2005, p. 3 ff.). 
Furthermore, the classical institutional approach is characterised by the “central role of law in 
governing” (Peters, 2005, p. 6), the importance of formal structures and rational choices de-
termining the behaviour of the actors involved, and its holistic nature by aiming to address 
the societal system as a whole, including its historical developments (Peters, 2005, p. 6 ff.; 
Tsebelis, 1990, pp. 92-118). 
However, when comparing municipalities within one country, variation in institutional factors 
is particularly low.56 Bodies such as the municipal council and the position of the mayor are 
usually defined by national or regional laws. In this context, the number of councilmen typi-
cally depends on the number of inhabitants; more council members are permitted in larger 
cities to represent as many societal groups as possible. 
Since every institutional member can potentially influence the policy process as a veto player, 
defined as “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the 
status quo” (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 19), variation in the form of a higher or lower number of per-
sons within an institution can potentially affect the policy output, for example as a result of 
the need for broader compromises or a longer duration of the decision-making process. How-
ever, given the close link to the number of inhabitants, which has already been considered in 
the previous hypotheses, separate hypotheses assessing the role of the number of councilmen 
in the context of changes in municipal budgets in times of a financial crisis are not set up. No 
other hypotheses based on the classical institutional approach were derived either. 
New institutionalism57 is a second group of theories within the institution-based models. 
While the concept emerged based on criticism of the previous understanding of institutions 
and insights from different disciplines, including economics, political science, and sociology, 
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the label was mainly coined by March and Olsen (1984). Furthermore, in line with the earlier 
developments of behaviouralism and rational choice theory since the 1950s, new institution-
alism can be considered as a movement away from the previous focus on formal structures 
towards informal processes, also including political factors. More generally, institutions are 
seen as entities that change over time based on the preferences of the actors involved, com-
pared to the previously prevailing understanding of institutions as factors restricting the scope 
of decision-making (Peters, 2005, p. 8, 12 ff.; Lowndes, 2009, p. 92; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, 
p. 1, 3). 
Following March and Olsen (1984), the “concern with institutions is a cumulative consequence 
of the modern transformation of social institutions” (p. 734). Therefore, new institutionalism 
“emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions, possibilities for inefficiency in his-
tory, and the importance of symbolic action to an understanding of politics” (p. 734), based 
on empirical observations. Considering the political-administrative conditions at the local 
level, such as the complexity of local governmental arrangements in a certain municipality, 
new institutionalism can be seen as a particularly relevant concept from an analytical perspec-
tive (Lowndes, 2009, p. 94). 
However, new institutionalism is not a single coherent concept, but different sub-types with 
common key elements, and the overall intention to provide more comprehensive explana-
tions than previous models can be distinguished (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 936; Lowndes, 2009, 
p. 102). While the sub-types of new institutionalism are debated, the distinction between so-
ciological institutionalism and historical institutionalism can be considered as relatively com-
mon in academic literature.58 The similarities between the various types have also led to at-
tempts to combine the approaches (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 955 ff.). 
By taking organisational procedures and cultural aspects into account, the number of relevant 
factors characterising institutions is broad, according to sociological institutionalism. The con-
cept is thus based on sociological theories, including Weber’s (1919, 1922) understanding of 
bureaucracy (Peters, 2005, p. 107 ff.; Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 946 ff.). In general, sociological 
institutionalism can be considered as superior to other sub-types of new institutionalism in 
terms of explaining individual actors’ choices based on specific preferences (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 951). 
However, a major disadvantage of the approach when aiming to apply the concept in empirical 
research is that potential factors of interest, such as organisational culture, are relatively dif-
ficult to conceptualise and measure. Also, in the context of this primarily quantitative analysis 
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tutionalism and historical institutionalism, are not further considered in this study, since potential factors de-
termining variation in the context of a financial crisis at the local level are without variation, either because of 




of the reactions of municipalities to a financial crisis, potential factors emphasised by socio-
logical institutionalism are either without much variation across the local level, as a result of 
identical legal standards determined by higher levels of government, for example regarding 
legislative procedures, comparable to factors in line with the classical institutional approach, 
or relatively difficult to operationalise, such as organisational culture or prevalent values. As a 
consequence, no hypotheses are derived based on sociological institutionalism. 
The focus of historical institutionalism is on path dependencies in policy decisions as a result 
of former choices by an institution and historical contingencies in general (Peters, 2005, pp. 
19 f., 71 ff.; Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 937 ff.; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, pp. 1 f., 10; Raadschelders, 
1998). In other words, “policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a 
policy is initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far 
into the future” (Peters, 2005, p. 71), according to this theoretical approach. The same applies 
to institutions and their internal structures, which are considered to be based on historical 
developments over time. Therefore, institutions’ formal and informal organisational proce-
dures are taken into account, and different starting points as well as critical junctures can be 
identified from an analytical perspective. However, while institutions possibly influence the 
policy outcome, it is also presumed that they are not solely responsible for it (Thelen & 
Steinmo, 1992, pp. 2 f., 27). 
While aiming for a better understanding of institutions and patterns in political and economic 
developments, institutions and their procedures are generally considered to be part of histor-
ical processes over time (Suddaby et al., 2014, pp. 100 f., 109, 111; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, 
p. 27 f.). Building upon this, “policy development can be conceptualized not as a continuous 
but as a discrete process” (Peters et al., 2005, p. 1276). Variation and persistence of the policy 
outcome over time and across countries can thus be analysed, especially if the institutions 
involved are relatively stable (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 13 f.). Interestingly, crises can be 
considered as an indication of the necessity of departing from previous paths and changing 
existing conditions, even though changes might be most difficult to implement during times 
of crises (Peters, et al., 2011, p. 16 f.). 
Criticisms of the concept include the partially static assumptions and the limited explanations 
of policy changes, in contrast to path dependencies, as well as gradual institutional changes, 
including relevant factors; these weaknesses were also pointed out for other institutional the-
ories. However, conflicts over policy ideas can also serve as part of an explanation for drivers 
of change within an institutionalist framework (Peters, 2005, p. 85; Peters et al., 2005, p. 1275; 
Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 31). Recent empirical research (Peters et al., 2005) supports this 
assumption. Further conceptual problems of historical institutionalism include difficulties in 
explaining policy initiation, the role of political actors, especially when disagreeing with cur-
rent policies, and behavioural aspects more generally (Peters et al., 2005, p. 1282 ff.; Hall & 
Taylor, 1996, p. 950). Taken together, “the principal theoretical problem with the historical 
institutionalist approach is that although it is well suited for explaining the persistence of pol-





In the case of historical institutionalism, previous policy decisions within a certain policy area 
of interest and accompanying budget changes are examples of relevant factors that can be 
analysed statistically. Another factor at the local level, closely related to budgetary develop-
ments, is municipal debt, which is often accumulated over decades. In other words, municipal 
debt can be considered as a key figure representing the sum of municipal decisions and exter-
nal influences of the past. As at any other level of government, existing debt and debt services 
also limit the scope of action at the local level. In this context, it can be argued that municipal-
ities with higher debt will be more affected by a financial crisis.59 Based on this relation, to-
gether with the common distinction between short-term and long-term debt, the two follow-
ing hypotheses are formulated: 
H6: The higher the existing municipal short-term debt per capita, the higher the in-
crease in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease 
in municipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
H7: The higher the existing municipal long-term debt per capita, the higher the increase 
in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in mu-
nicipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
In summary, alongside structure-based factors, the characteristics of the local authorities 
themselves might partly explain the varying severity of financial crises at the local level from 
a comparative perspective. On closer inspection, factors such as the number of institutional 
veto players and municipal debt might make policy changes more difficult. While the former 
factor describes difficulties in changing the status quo in relation to certain policies, the latter 
illustrates the fundamental role of path dependencies. Apart from institutions as a whole, the 
municipal representatives and employees, as well as their preferences, are of major im-
portance. Therefore, the last group of factors, with potential relevance regarding the scope of 
financial crises at the local level, are interest-based ones. These will be addressed in the next 
sub-chapter. 
 
4.4. Interest-based factors 
In addition to formal and informal rules and procedures, institutions and their activities are 
characterised by elected and appointed officials as well as employees working for them. By 
focusing on these persons or groups of persons, such as political parties or other interest 
groups, which might have own additional organisational structures, policy variation and policy 
change can be explained in line with interest-based models. In other words, people and their 
views can make a difference to the policy outcome. However, next to limitations regarding 
the legitimacy of presenting own interests in line with structural features of the political-ad-
ministrative system, as well as the reliance on personal influence and assertiveness, formal 
and informal linkages between private or group interests on the one hand and institutional 
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factors on the other hand can be concluded (Peters, 2005, pp. 123 ff., 136). Regarding the 
latter, an increasing relevance of networks, in accordance with the development towards 
multi-level governance, can be observed in practice (Kjaer, 2009). 
While focusing on individuals or groups of individuals, questions arise regarding the impact of 
political leadership on certain decisions. Particularly at the local level, where the share of per-
sonal connections of the local population are comparably high, individual characteristics as 
well as institutional and contextual factors might make a difference; in this context, interactive 
effects also need to be taken into account (Greasley & Stoker, 2009). 
Over time, numerous interest-based models, focusing on the behaviour of certain individuals 
or groups, and their rational choices in particular have emerged. Since political and adminis-
trative actors are formally and informally involved in the context of policymaking, political or 
party-focused approaches and bureaucracy-focused approaches can be distinguished from a 
theoretical perspective. 
Following Strøm (1990), and in line with party-focused approaches, the strategies of political 
parties and their officials can be described as vote-seeking, office-seeking, or policy-seeking. 
All three approaches are designed to increase the own political influence. Vote-seeking and 
office-seeking can thus help to accomplish certain policy decisions. In other words, parties 
matter for public policy. Hibbs (1977) has argued in the same direction. According to his party 
difference hypothesis, which refers back to party preferences in macroeconomic policies, par-
ties offer various policy options, associated with certain potential policy impacts, from which 
voters can choose based on their personal preferences.  
In the case of a financial crisis, various measures can be decided upon based on political pref-
erences and beliefs in economic relations. In this context, it is commonly argued that left par-
ties or political groups60 are more willing to reduce the impact on the population, which can 
be realised by increasing public expenditure or decreasing taxes in line with counter-cyclical 
policies based on Keynesian economics. On the other hand, conservative and other parties or 
political groups on the right side of the political spectrum are usually in favour of a free play 
of the markets and the limited role of government. Pro-cyclical policies based on neo-liberal 
convictions or passive policies based on classical economics are the logical consequence.61 
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on the right side of the political spectrum. 
61 Since political and economic beliefs also depend on socio-economic framework conditions, those might 
change in events such as financial crises. Even though this can be considered as a longer process, smaller ideo-
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Following the logic that parties matter and that crisis responses by left parties differ particu-
larly from other parties (cf. Wagschal & Jäkel, 2010, p. 309 ff.), the next hypothesis is set up 
as follows: 
H8: The higher the share of left parties in the municipal council, the higher the increase 
in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in mu-
nicipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
A further political factor with a potential impact on crisis management is the fragmentation of 
the relevant political bodies, such as the municipal council. A higher number of parties, each 
holding a relatively small share of the seats, might make it more difficult to change the status 
quo in a certain policy area and might thus lead to a longer duration in decision-making in 
general. In other words, finding compromises is more complicated and usually takes more 
time if more actors are involved. Veto player positions might also be given depending on the 
majorities and legal conditions (Tsebelis, 2002), and the same applies to the possibility of de-
laying tactics. Effects in accordance with this argument were also observed in a comparison of 
crisis reactions at national levels of government (Armingeon, 2012). 
Assuming that increases in municipal expenditure and decreases in municipal revenues during 
a crisis are at least partially related to decisions by the municipal council attempting to combat 
a crisis by changing its policy positions, political fragmentation is a potential moderating factor 
that delays policy changes. In other words, the more parties involved, the more difficult it is 
to adjust policies during a crisis as well as in general. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
more parties can lead to higher expenditures and lower revenues through the trading of fa-
vours, also known as log-rolling (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). While different political groups 
support one another to achieve their policy goals, a negative impact on public finances is the 
likely consequence. 
While empirical results (Volkerink & de Haan, 2001; Perotti & Kontopoulos, 2002; Ricciuti, 
2004; Elgie & McMenamin, 2008) differ regarding the relation between political fragmenta-
tion and public finances, including public deficits, the correlation between both variables is 
not necessarily linear. If political fragmentation exceeds a certain level, for example, then the 
trading of favours might no longer be possible to achieve. However, while aiming to explore a 
potential effect of political fragmentation on public finances, as well as its direction, the next 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H9: The lower the political fragmentation of the municipal council, the higher the in-
crease in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease 
in municipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Apart from politics, the administration plays a major role in the process of policymaking, as 
the bureaucracy-focused approaches emphasise. An influence is possible at all stages of the 
policy cycle, not only in the phase of policy implementation. For instance, through the provi-
sion of information to politicians, the administration’s involvement in the process can already 




Following Niskanen’s (1971) budget-maximising model, civil servants act rationally by trying 
to increase their salaries and prestige. This can generally be achieved through the maximisa-
tion of responsibilities, usually measured by the budget for which one is responsible within an 
organisation, which is itself characterised by limited resources. While criticising these assump-
tions, including the associated tendencies towards inefficiencies within the administrations, 
Dunleavy (1991) developed the so-called bureau-shaping model. Following this second ra-
tional choice approach, civil servants do not necessarily maximise their budgets, but focus on 
shaping the administrative units they are part of to be aligned with own work-related inter-
ests. While these interests can differ, examples include the design of certain policies in line 
with personal beliefs or own influence in general. Overall, civil servants can be considered as 
powerful actors who are formally and informally involved in the policy process, potentially 
aiming to promote their own interests and increase their own influence. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that civil servants, as members of an administration, tend to 
have an information advantage over politicians because of their expertise in certain focus ar-
eas, often gained over a long period of time, as well as their general experience in collecting 
information and developing policy proposals. Following this logic, politicians depend, at least 
partially, on the records and insights provided by an administration, and administrations de-
pend on civil servants as their workforce. These circumstances make the position of civil serv-
ants even more powerful and influential in policymaking, including the possibility to pursue 
own intentions. 
Next to the aspects potentially leading to an expansion of an administration in terms of staff 
members in order to increase the organisation’s influence, the appropriate number of em-
ployees necessary to fulfil certain tasks can be debated in general and might also depend on 
the desired quality of the work, as well as on the general perspective regarding administrative 
structures. Apart from a potential increase in differences of opinion, which lead to long-lasting 
processes, a higher number of staff members can generally be associated with a quicker ful-
filment of an administrative unit’s tasks if they are unchanged in scope. In other words, ad-
ministrative capacities need to be considered as relevant for the performance of administra-
tive tasks and services. 
Empirical results (Schneider et al., 2011) suggest that the administrative capacities of a mu-
nicipality mainly depend on the personnel resources, which in turn tend to be closely linked 
to the number of inhabitants as clients or potential clients of public services. In addition to 
personnel resources, financial resources – in other words, the administrative budget and its 
usage – might also have an impact on policy decisions. Financial resources spent on consulta-
tion services of external advisors, for example, can help to gain better insight into certain top-
ics, which can also lead to more convincing arguments when aiming to justify a policy proposal. 
However, depending on the scope of funds available and the advisors selected, the infor-
mation obtained, specific suggestions, the proposed course of action, and the final policy de-
cisions can vary. 
In the case of a financial crisis, public authorities are confronted with shifting priorities of ex-




spond to the new challenges and the provision of social services might require additional ca-
pacities, for example, some policy areas, such as environmental protection, might be consid-
ered as less important. However, apart from the reasons for changing focus areas and alloca-
tions of resources, the number of civil servants can influence an authority’s capacity to deal 
with the crisis in two directions. On the one hand, it can be argued that higher staffing enables 
an organisation to find better solutions to reduce the impact of the crisis. On the other hand, 
organisational decline might lead to necessary reductions in the number of staff members, as 
a strategy in the context of austerity measures and cutback management (Raudla et al., 2015b; 
Kickert et al., 2015; Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015; Pollitt, 2010). Those reductions are often 
difficult to achieve in the public sector in the short run. Taken together, a trade-off between 
the need for more staff members and the necessity to reduce costs becomes evident in the 
public sector in times of crisis. 
Considering the impact of and responses to a financial crisis in terms of the additional expend-
itures necessary to react to the crisis – next to automatic stabilisers in social affairs, as well as 
decreasing revenues, mainly in relation to the overall economic situation – the number of 
municipal employees can serve as a moderating factor in line with the argumentation of mu-
nicipal capacities to address changing conditions. Since the scope of tasks of municipal admin-
istrations are naturally linked to the size of the local entity, the number of civil servants is 
adjusted to the population in the following.62 In general, personnel planning might be more 
efficient in some municipalities than in others, which might also become obvious in times of 
crisis. Taking a rather explorative approach regarding the impact of the number of staff mem-
bers as a moderating factor, the next hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H10: The higher the number of municipal staff members in relation to the inhabitants, 
the lower the increase in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the 
lower the decrease in municipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
In addition to staff members, an organisation requires financial resources to operate, as al-
ready pointed out before. Therefore, it can be argued that a higher budget for administrative 
matters enables an organisation to find better solutions to existing problems, for example by 
investing in extensive research and external advice. On the other hand, reducing administra-
tive expenditure might be considered necessary in times of crisis, but proves difficult in terms 
of organisational decline in the short run, largely depending on existing rules and procedures. 
However, overall, the scope of the administrative budget generally enhances an organisation’s 
crisis management capacities and therefore potentially reduces the overall effect of a financial 
crisis. While this relation applies to any public authority, it also includes local government. 
Since the balance sheet totals differ widely across the local level – mainly based on the size of 
a municipality – the administrative budget needs to be adjusted for the number of inhabitants 
to enable comparative analyses. Again, the possibility of financial planning being more effi-
cient in one municipality compared to another is given in times of crisis and times without 
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crisis in the same way as in the context of personnel planning. While choosing a rather explor-
ative strategy again, the last hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H11: The higher the administrative budget per capita, the lower the increase in munic-
ipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the lower the decrease in municipal net 
revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Interest-based factors represent the last of the three groups of factors with a potential impact 
on the severity of a financial crisis at the local level. The influence of certain political ideologies 
and administrative capacities are more practical illustrations of factors in line with this argu-
mentation. In summary, an overview of all factors within the three aforementioned groups, 
which will be included in the further analyses of this study, as well as the associated hypothe-
ses, will be provided in the next sub-chapter. 
 
4.5. Potential factors influencing the severity of financial crises at the 
local level of government 
As outlined in the previous sub-chapters, various structure-, institution-, and interest-based 
factors are able to influence the impact of and responses to a crisis at the local level of gov-
ernment. Some factors are without variation within a certain country, while others cannot be 
included in an analysis, because of a lack of data availability. The factors and the accompanying 
hypotheses, which are included in the following empirical part of this study, are listed in table 
3. For a better overview, the factors are sorted in line with the three groups of theoretical 
models and the specific approaches within these groups. 
Table 3: Factors potentially influencing the impact of and responses to a financial crisis 
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Apart from the socio-economic, institutional, political, and administrative factors with a po-
tential influence on public policy, other factors might also have an impact on policy decisions 




parties, expecting a certain direction of a policy in return. Bribing or blackmailing politicians 
or civil servants would be another way for third parties to try to influence policies. These fac-
tors can be considered as interest-based factors in a wider sense, since the initial origin of the 
interest is located outside of any formal organisational structure. Even though politicians or 
civil servants might adopt certain views based on the external influence, the views do not 
correspond to those individuals’ own original interests. 
Other possible factors with an influence on policymaking in the context of a financial crisis 
include, for example, the framing of developments to influence the perception of others, the 
conscious manipulation of data for personal interest, or unintended mistakes in the legislative 
process. All of these factor have in common that they are either not publicly known or illegal, 
which makes it difficult to include them in any scientific study. This implies limitations to this 
study in accordance with those circumstances as it is the case for other studies. While addi-
tional qualitative research aiming to provide explanations for certain causal mechanisms can 
help to identify other factors of influence in the context of a financial crisis and the situation 
at the local level, which are relevant, for example, in individual cases, the possibility of further 
hidden factors can never be fully excluded. 
In short, various factors with a potential influence on the severity of a financial crisis at the 
local level can be identified; however, data availability limits empirical research in some cases. 
In the context of this study, 11 hypotheses were derived. Each one focuses on a single poten-
tial factor of influence on public finances at the local level in times of crisis, based on theoret-
ical approaches in line with structure-, institution-, and interest-based models of policymak-
ing. However, apart from measurable conditions, the subjective perception of a crisis by local 
officials might also be a relevant factor in explaining certain policy decisions. This additional 
aspect will be discussed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
4.6. The role of crisis perception 
The perception of events can vary extensively, since individuals interpret what they observe. 
In this context, the assessment is largely influenced by previous experiences. As a conse-
quence, one person might evaluate an event as a major challenge, while another could con-
sider the same event to be an issue that is easy to solve. Naturally, almost infinite judgements 
are possible in between. 
In the case of financial crises, the difficulty in measuring them contributes to the general prob-
lem of perception. Apart from objective events63, for example a bank filing for bankruptcy, 
many other aspects, such as the stability of the monetary system, and the potential conse-
quences of objective events are relatively difficult to assess and hence largely influenced by 
one’s own perception, which in turn depends on the information one receives. In other words, 
reality and the perception thereof can differ in times of crises, as well as in general, from a 
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psychological perspective. In this context, and in line with the Thomas theorem, which argues 
that “[i]f men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & 
Thomas, 1928, p. 572), it is not even important whether a crisis truly is present; “if it exists in 
the minds of many people, then it is real in its consequences” (Galtung, 1984, p. 4). In other 
words, the way in which people see and interpret a crisis is important (Steccolini et al., 2017b, 
p. 238). 
Variation in the perception of the severity and scale of a crisis can affect all societal groups. 
The population’s perception can influence their satisfaction with crisis reactions and politics 
in general. Political support can consequently change because of political dissatisfaction. If a 
crisis affects multiple countries to different degrees, then many citizens tend to assume that 
the situation in their home country can be generalised to other countries (Theißen, 2014), 
which might not represent the real global conditions. In the case of politicians, the perception 
of a crisis can largely influence policy decisions. Within the administration, civil servants might 
make use of their leeway in accordance with their perception of a crisis when implementing 
policy decisions in this area. Taken together, crisis reactions can be extensively influenced by 
the crisis perception of the persons in charge of the countermeasures. 
The perception and formation of an opinion about an event, such as a financial crisis, is usually 
largely influenced by the information and the media one reads, hears, or watches. Some peo-
ple might read reports published by central banks or international organisations, including 
statistical data on the scope of the event from a comparative perspective. However, analyses 
by economists might be difficult for other people to grasp and might not improve these indi-
viduals’ understanding of the situation (Galtung, 1984, p. 7 f.). The majority of citizens rely on 
information provided via various types of news media, ranging from printed newspapers to 
news on the television and news websites. Left-leaning news media might point out the se-
verity of a crisis and promote governmental action to lower the impact on the population, 
while conservative news media might argue, in the case of the same event, that the crisis is 
relatively small from a historical perspective. Overall, the information one receives can be 
considered as a factor that largely explains the formation of the own perception of events. In 
addition, various other factors can influence the perception of local challenges. Apart from 
the size of territorial units in terms of inhabitants and common accompanying problem struc-
tures, a more rural or more urban tradition might, for example, make a difference regarding 
people’s perceptions of certain problems (Denters et al., 2014, p. 301). 
In local politics, the crisis perception among senior officials, such as a mayors, aldermen, and 
city managers, might also influence the assessment of an event if those officials are respected 
for their professional experience. Furthermore, politicians and civil servants who are known 
as experts on a certain topic can largely influence their colleagues’ perceptions if their esti-
mates appear trustworthy. Together with the psychological phenomenon of group thinking 
(Janis, 1971), which implies the desire for conformity of a group, such as the municipal council, 
the decision-making outcome can be rather unfavourable from an objective perspective. 
Regarding the perception of a crisis, it must also be mentioned that, on the one hand, a crisis 
reinforces people’s perceptions of it, and on the other hand, the perceptions can reinforce the 




crisis from an objective perspective. Especially the role of the media can be seen as crucial 
when aiming to prevent this type of development, which can lead to bank runs, for example. 
In summary, it is not always the developments themselves, in the context of a crisis, that lead 
to certain policy responses and associated justifications of certain measures. The pure percep-
tion of certain conditions, apart from objective developments, can result in reactions that are 
deemed necessary based on the own deficient perception. Therefore, these subjective aspects 
are additional factors that potentially explain variation in crisis reactions, alongside objective 
ones based on the structure, institutions, or interests at the local level. Following the presen-
tation of the conceptual model and the derivation of hypotheses in this chapter, the next 






A financial crisis can be seen as a natural experiment conducted with public institutions and 
their budgets. In the case of the recent Crisis, an impact could be observed on all Western 
countries almost simultaneously. Variation can be explained by different fiscal and economic 
conditions within the countries, as well as other factors, such as regulatory measures and ad-
ministrative capacities. 
From a methodological perspective, the financial developments in the context of a financial 
crisis, as a combination of crisis impact and crisis responses, can be considered as dependent 
variables. These developments are potentially influenced by various other variables, such as 
structure-, institution-, and interest-based factors, as already described in chapter 4. Accord-
ingly, these factors represent independent variables in a conceptual model. This logic applies 
to all levels of government; moreover, interactions between the different levels might also be 
of interest. 
Since the Dutch local level, as the research object of this study, consisted of approximately 
400 municipalities, a further case selection was not necessary at any stage of the research 
project. While the general aim is to include all municipalities in the following quantitative anal-
yses, a lack of data availability makes the exclusion of some cases necessary. In addition, qual-
itative insights, based on open-ended survey questions, were collected to gain better insights 
into the considerations and decision-making processes at the local level. Taken together, this 
study can be considered as a nested analysis (Lieberman, 2005). 
The content of this chapter on the methodology includes the data sources and datasets used 
for the statistical analyses in the first sub-chapter (5.1). The way in which the statistical anal-
yses were conducted and the assessment of the open survey questions are the topics of the 
second sub-chapter (5.2). Finally, the operationalisations of the dependent and independent 
variables will be presented in the third sub-chapter (5.3). 
 
5.1. Data sources 
The analysis of this study relies on two types of data sources: governmental statistics and own 
survey data. The official data include, for example, details on municipal spending and revenues 
based on municipal accounts, elections results, and socio-economic figures for each munici-
pality, used for the main analyses of this study. 
The results of three own surveys, conducted among Dutch mayors, complement the official 
statistics. In addition to empirical data, for example on the popularity of certain cutback meth-
ods, open-ended questions such as those regarding the challenge to increase municipal reve-





The data sources and precise datasets of Dutch governmental statistics included in this study 
are introduced in the first sub-chapter (5.1.1). Thereafter, information on the own surveys 
conducted at the Dutch municipal level is presented (5.1.2). 
 
5.1.1. Official data published by public authorities 
Statistical analyses of a financial crisis depend on appropriate data. In the cases of this study, 
figures on municipal revenues and expenditures are of major interest in order to assess 
changes. In the Netherlands, the Central Agency for Statistics (Dutch: Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek, CBS) provides various data on local government finance. If data are provided for all 
municipalities under the same standard, this implies a major advantage compared to countries 
with regional statistical offices and differing data collection standards. Regarding election re-
sults at the municipal level, the Electoral Council (Dutch: Kiesraad) is an additional data source. 
Data on municipal staff members are available from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations (Dutch: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, BZK). In general, 
the scope of local government statistics can be judged as being notably extensive in the Neth-
erlands. 
Financial data regarding the local level in the Netherlands are provided by the CBS in six par-
tially overlapping datasets. These are named Municipal finance from 1900, Municipal accounts 
(revenues and expenses by region and by size), Municipal accounts (charges by region and by 
size), Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes), Municipal ac-
counts (balance by region and by size), and Municipal accounts (balance per municipality). 
Differences mainly concern the time periods and the levels of data aggregation. Furthermore, 
data for the intended analyses of financial changes in different types of revenues and expend-
itures for each municipality are available on an annual basis from 2005 onwards. Additional 
non-financial data sets provided by the CBS, with a focus on the topics of employment, busi-
ness locations, population statistics, and soil usage, will also be included in the analyses of this 
study. 
A complete overview of the relevant official data sets, which are all publicly available on the 
Internet, is provided in table 4. Apart from information on the names of the data sets, further 
details are listed regarding the data objects, time period, frequency, and data source, as well 








Table 4: Overview of the properties of the official statistics 
Name of the dataset Dutch name of the da-
taset 
Data objects Period Frequency Source Hy-
pothe-
ses 




Sum of all mu-
nicipalities 
1900–2015 Annually CBS  
Municipal accounts (rev-
enues and expenses by 
region and by size) 
Gemeenterekeningen 
(baten en lasten naar re-
gio en grootteklasse) 
Sum of all mu-
nicipalities 
2004–2015 Annually CBS  
Municipal accounts 
(charges by region and 
by size) 
Gemeenterekeningen 
(heffingen naar regio en 
grootteklasse) 
Sum of all mu-
nicipalities 
2004–2015 Annually CBS  
Municipal accounts (per 
municipality; revenues 
and expenses, taxes) 
Gemeenterekeningen 




2005–2014 Annually CBS H11 
Municipal accounts (bal-
ance by region and by 
size) 
Gemeenterekeningen 
(balans naar regio en 
grootteklasse) 
Sum of all mu-
nicipalities 
2004–2016 Annually CBS  
Municipal accounts (bal-
ance per municipality) 
Gemeenterekeningen 
(balans per gemeente) 
Per municipal-
ity 
2005–2014 Annually CBS H6, H7 
Population, households 
and population develop-
ment from 1899 
Bevolking, huishoudens 
en bevolkings-ontwikkel-
ing; vanaf 1899 




Consumer prices (price 
index 1900 = 100) 
Consumentenprijzen 
(prijsindex 1900 = 100) 
National level 1900–2016 Annually CBS  
Annual change of the 
consumer price index 
from 1963 
Jaarmutatie consumen-
tenprijsindex; vanaf 1963 
National level 1963–2017 Annually CBS  
Employment (regional di-
vision 2014)  
Arbeidsdeelname (re-
gionale indeling 2014) 
Per municipal-
ity 








2007–2017 Annually CBS H2 






1995–2017 Annually CBS H3 
Population development 
(region per month) 
Bevolkingsontwikkeling 
(regio per maand) 
Per municipal-
ity 
2002–2018 Monthly CBS H4 
Soil usage (typical types, 
per municipality) 
Bodemgebruik (uitge-




1996–2015 Biannually CBS H5 











and Education – Persons 
and FTE (public admin-
istration and security in-
stitutions) 
Werknemers Overheid 
en Onderwijs - Personen 
en FTE (instellingen 















Taken together, the availability of official statistics on government finance and other topics 
can be described as notably extensive and easily accessible in the Netherlands, also in com-
parison with other countries. These data enable statistical analyses as intended in this study. 
However, to obtain more detailed insights into the situation at the local level beyond official 
figures, including a better understanding of the perception of the Financial Crisis since 2007, 
three own surveys were conducted among local officials in Dutch municipalities. The design 
and realisation of these surveys will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
5.1.2. Own surveys 
To assess local officials’ perceptions of the Financial Crisis since 2007, as a further potential 
factor explaining variation in measures taken to combat the crisis, three own surveys were 
conducted between 2013 and 2015. In addition to insights into the mayors’ and city manag-
ers’64 estimations of changes in municipal budgets, information on crisis management and 
preferred austerity strategies were collected. Those quantitative and qualitative data go be-
yond the information available in official data and can be considered as a useful complement. 
Overall, the surveys enabled the gathering of estimations, preferences, and opinions of a large 
group of local officials, and they therefore resulted in meaningful insights. 
All three surveys were designed as anonymous65 complete censuses, and they were realised 
as a combination of online and hard-copy questionnaires with identical questions in order to 
allow those who were polled to choose their preferred method of participation. Concerning 
the content of the surveys, closed-ended Likert-scaled questions were the most common type. 
The advantages of this technique of ordinal measurement (Likert, 1932) are that it is relatively 
easy to understand for those interviewed and allows for the answers of tendencies compared 
to explicit statements, both of which can be considered as beneficial for high response rates. 
In some parts of the surveys, open-ended questions were also used to explore common opin-
ions and understandings. 
Austerity measures and cutback management were the topics of the first municipal survey. 
The questions addressed the scope of budget cuts in the different policy areas as well as future 
expectations and preferences. By asking about the use and the popularity of different cutback 
methods, an insight into municipal cutback management was gained as well. Overall, the sur-
vey consisted of seven questions, including three control questions on the type of municipal-
ity. From an organisational perspective, this poll was realised in three consecutive steps. First, 
in May 2013, the municipalities received an e-mail containing a brief cover letter and the link 
to the online survey via their general e-mail accounts. A request to forward the e-mail to the 
                                                     
64 While city managers, deputy city managers, and deputy mayors were included in the first and second sur-
veys, the data analysed in this study are limited to the survey responses of the mayors because of a definite 
survey population and higher response rates. 
65 The decision to conduct the surveys anonymously was taken to achieve a high response rate. Especially ques-
tions on personal preferences in the context of budget cuts and cutback management were considered to be 




mayor was stated at the beginning. Personalised postal letters to the mayors formed the sec-
ond step of the survey in May/June 2013. Those included a hard copy of the questionnaire 
and a return envelope. The third and last step was a combination of a letter of appreciation 
for those who had already taken part in the survey and a last call for those who had not. In 
this regard, the municipalities were approached via their general e-mail addresses again. The 
message contained the link to the online survey, along with a request to forward it to the 
mayors in an identical way to the first step. 
Changes in revenues and decentralisation measures characterise the topics of the second mu-
nicipal survey. Data on the recent changes in and future expectations about revenues were 
chosen to complete the picture of the municipal budget after collecting data on the spending 
side in the previous year. Decentralisation measures were included as an additional compo-
nent to gain a better understanding of the expected consequences of the reforms in this con-
text that were scheduled to become effective as of January 1st, 2015. Three control and seven 
content-related questions formed the second survey. From an organisational perspective, it 
followed the strategy of the first one by approaching the mayors with a combination of digital 
and hard-copy questionnaires. The first e-mails with the link to the online questionnaire were 
sent out to the general e-mail account of the municipalities in February 2014. Individual postal 
letters to the mayors, including a hard-copy questionnaire, followed in March 2014. The com-
bination of a letter of appreciation and a last call for participation was sent to the general e-
mail addresses in April 2014. 
Recent and future challenges, especially in the context of the Financial Crisis, constitute the 
third municipal survey. The questions and answer options were inspired by the regular Euro-
barometer surveys. Gaining a better understanding of both the Financial Crisis since 2007, in 
comparison with other challenges at the municipal level, and its influence on these challenges 
was the main motivation for this final survey consisting of three control and three content-
related questions. The organisation of the survey again followed the approach of the two pre-
vious ones. The e-mails to the municipalities’ general accounts were sent out in October 2015, 
and personal postal letters to the mayors followed in November 2015. A note of thanks and a 
last call for participation were digitally mailed to the municipalities in December 2015. A de-
tailed overview of the topics, methods of realisation, and response rates of the three surveys 











Table 5: Overview of the properties of the three own surveys 
 First municipal survey Second municipal survey Third municipal survey 
Topics Austerity measures, cutback 
management 
Revenues, decentralisation Challenges, crisis manage-
ment 
Survey period May–June 2013 February–April 2014 October–December 2015 
Interviewees Mayors, deputy mayors, city 
managers, deputy city 
managers 
Mayors, deputy mayors, city 
managers, deputy city 
managers 
Mayors 
Type of survey Complete survey; digital and 
hard-copy versions of the 
questionnaire 
Complete survey; digital and 
hard-copy versions of the 
questionnaire 
Complete survey; digital and 




(1) E-mail to the general 
address of the municipality; 
(2) Individual postal letter to 
the mayor and city manager; 
(3) Reminder e-mail to the 
general address of the 
municipality 
(1) E-mail to the general 
address of the municipality; 
(2) Individual postal letter to 
the mayor and city manager; 
(3) Reminder e-mail to the 
general address of the 
municipality 
(1) E-mail to the general 
address of the municipality; 
(2) Individual postal letter to 
the mayor; 
(3) Reminder e-mail to the 
general address of the 
municipality 
Municipalities 408 403 39366 
Response rates Mayors: 113 (27.7%); city 
managers: 141 (34.6%); 
deputy mayors: 53; deputy 
city managers: 47; others: 70; 
total: 429 
Mayors: 92 (22.8%); city 
managers: 68 (16.9%); deputy 
mayors: 40; deputy city 
managers: 46; others: 98; 
unknown: 6; total: 350 
Mayors: 218 (55.8%) 
 
The response rates of the three surveys is subject to some variation. While 27.7% and 22.8% 
of the Dutch mayors participated in 2013 and 2014 respectively, the response rate in 2015 
was about twice as high (55.8%). However, with at least one fifth of all Dutch mayors partici-
pating in each survey, the response rates are comparable to other research projects with a 
similar survey methodology and design (Baruch & Holtom, 2008; Baruch, 1999; Cook et al., 
2000). Therefore, the three datasets are considered to be appropriate for further statistical 
analyses.67 
Overall, the willingness to participate in the three surveys on the consequences of the Finan-
cial Crisis since 2007 at the Dutch local level can be described as relatively high, which led to 
satisfying response rates. While the analyses of this study on the impact of and responses to 
the Financial Crisis since 2007 at the Dutch local level will be mainly based on official statistics, 
the own survey data will complement those statistics. In the following sub-chapter of the 
methodology, the study’s statistical approach will be addressed. 
 
                                                     
66 The number of mayors during the period under investigation was 391, since in two municipalities (Neerijnen 
and Bloemendaal), the official duties of the mayor were performed by the mayor of a neighbouring municipal-
ity in an acting function. 
67 When comparing the results of the control variables of the three surveys, including the personal characteris-
tics of the mayors, with the distribution of these characteristics according to official sources (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 32 ff.), an over- or underrepresentation of certain groups 




5.2. Analytical approach 
The analyses of the changes in local government finance in the context of the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 are mainly based on official data provided by the CBS, supplemented by further 
quantitative and qualitative components. In a first step, the total income and total expenses, 
as well as the financial balance and total debt of all Dutch municipalities, are presented for 
the time period 1900 to 2015 in order to put the following analyses into perspective. 
In a next step, time series of the account balances of revenues and expenditures are evaluated 
for all policy areas as well as the separate balance sheet items68 for all Dutch municipalities 
combined. The time period for closer investigation is 2000 to 2014, which was chosen to in-
clude the situation before the recent Financial Crisis as well as during the Crisis. From this 
analytical step onwards, the financial data included are also adjusted for inflation. Overall, it 
is the intention to identity policy areas and separate balance sheet items with noticeable fi-
nancial changes since the emergence of the Financial Crisis in 2007.69  
Attention will be paid to the roughly 400 separate municipalities in the main part of the anal-
yses. Based on the data series of the account balances70 in various policy areas, as well as 
separate balance sheet items of interest, it will be possible to calculate the changes in local 
government finances in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007 for each municipality. To 
smoothen potential outliers, three-year averages will be used to compare the financial situa-
tion before the Crisis with the situation during the Crisis. Statistical key figures of the variables’ 
distributions will enable comparisons and judgements regarding whether the effects were rel-
atively homogeneous or heterogeneous, and which municipalities were affected the most and 
the least. 
Explaining variation across the Dutch municipal level is the main challenge of this study. There-
fore, the financial changes in the policy areas and balance sheet items of interest will be ana-
lysed in combination with a number of control variables, such as the change in unemployment, 
municipal debt, and the influence of left parties. From a statistical perspective, the search for 
factors with a link to financial changes at the municipal level will be realised by calculating 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. 
Considering the available data, their metrical levels of measurement, and the assumption of 
linear relationships, the use of OLS regressions, which represents one of the most common 
                                                     
68 Balance sheet items are specific budgetary sections, for example in line with certain public tasks, within a 
policy area. 
69 While the first signs of increasing numbers of credit defaults and refinancing problems became apparent in 
the context of sub-prime loans and the real estate market in the US in August 2007, the effects on other coun-
tries occurred after a certain time shift. With governmental rescue measures for a private bank in the UK, the 
Financial Crisis arrived in Europe in February 2008 at the latest. Within the eurozone, at the latest after the first 
bailout package for Greece in May 2010, an impact of the Financial Crisis was no longer deniable. However, the 
difficulty in delimiting the Financial Crisis from a temporal perspective remains. 
70 The account balance presents the net value of revenues and expenses in a certain policy area or regarding a 
certain balance sheet item. This key financial figure is chosen because conducting public tasks usually involves 





quantitative research methods in social sciences, is most suitable for this study.71 The ad-
vantage of this method is the possibility to describe the statistical relationships between a 
number of variables, including an estimation of the direction and strength of the associations. 
In addition, the prediction of the value of a variable based on the values of other variables is 
enabled (Alm & Mason, 2008, pp. 427 f., 447; Yang, 2007, p. 356 f.; Seber, 1977, p. 2 ff.). The 
necessary assumption of OLS regressions, namely that possible uncertainties in the underlying 
data are uncorrelated and normally distributed (Wolberg, 2006, pp. 19 ff., 32), applies to the 
data to be included in this study. 
In addition to the official municipal accounts and other data provided by statistical offices, 
three own surveys were conducted to understand local officials’ perceptions of budgetary 
changes and to gain further insights into topics such as cutback measures, including personal 
preferences and future expectations. As an instrument to collect data, surveys are widely used 
in research in the field of social sciences in general (Majumdar, 2008, p. 241 f., 251 f.; Mitchell, 
2007, p. 369 f.). 
In a first step, the distributions of answers to the Likert-scaled survey questions will be pre-
sented to determine the most common perceptions as well as the variation in views. The an-
swers to the open questions will be analysed in a second step. By presenting specific problem 
descriptions, it will be possible to gain an in-depth understanding of underlying mechanisms. 
The following will thus be assessed: which statements can be considered as general issues 
rather than individual situations. Overall, these insights might help to understand observa-
tions recognised in the previous analyses of official statistics. Since all three surveys were con-
ducted anonymously, a direct combination with official data is not possible. 
In summary, this study will combine quantitative and qualitative methods to address the im-
pact of and responses to the Financial Crisis since 2007 at the Dutch municipal level, as well 
as factors determining variation. While statistical analyses, including key figures on the distri-
butions of variables, time series, and regression analyses, will constitute the main part, reflec-
tions on answers to open survey questions will serve as a qualitative addition. This nested 
analysis (Lieberman, 2005) or mixed-methods approach is considered to be the most reliable 
in answering the study’s research question. Following this description of the analytical ap-
proach, the operationalisations of the variables will be presented in the next sub-chapter. 
 
5.3. Operationalisations of the dependent and independent variables 
Policy areas and individual balance sheet items with unusual developments in times of the 
recent Financial Crisis will be identified as dependent variables for the empirical analyses of 
this study. By first analysing all balance sheet categories and all individual balance sheet items 
                                                     
71 A fixed-effects model based on panel data is a potential alternative approach to analyse the links between a 
financial crisis and a budgetary situation. However, since such a model does not allow for the inclusion of rela-




of all Dutch municipalities combined, it will be ensured that no relevant budgetary develop-
ments will be missed. The changes in short-term debt and long-term debt, representing the 
financial results of budgetary decisions, will also be included as dependent variables, following 
the intention to provide a complete overview of all relevant financial developments at the 
local level in the Netherlands in times of the Financial Crisis since 2007. 
After identifying the policy areas and individual balance sheet items of interest, the inflation-
adjusted budgetary changes in times of the Crisis will be measured in two steps. First, two 
three-year averages – one representing the time before the Crisis and one denoting the time 
during the Crisis – will be calculated for each of the areas of interest and all municipalities 
separately. In this regard, average values for time spans of multiple years have the advantage 
that potential outliers are smoothened. By subtracting the former three-year average from 
the latter for each pair of values, the specific financial changes will be determined in a second 
step. In other words, the dependent variables represent financial developments in specific 
budgetary areas in times of the recent Financial Crisis. In comparison with absolute values, 
such as the level of debt, the advantage of this approach is that financial changes during a 
specific period of time are considered. The figure of a certain level of debt at a given point in 
time, on the other hand, does not involve any information regarding when the debt emerged. 
Apart from continuous developments, which are common in the case of public debt, the larg-
est shares of debt might have arisen recently or already several decades ago. 
In line with the hypotheses formulated in chapter 4, 11 independent variables will be included 
in the empirical analyses of this study. Depending on the specific focus of the separate hy-
potheses, some variables will be integrated as changes over time and other variables as abso-
lute values. 
The change in unemployment, relating to hypothesis 1, will be calculated for each municipality 
based on the unemployment rates of the labour force in two three-year periods. Average val-
ues for time spans are again chosen to smoothen potential outliers. The years 2005 to 2007 
represent the time before the recent Financial Crisis, while the years 2010 to 2012 denote the 
time of the Crisis. The average value of the three former years will be subtracted from the 
average value of the three latter years, resulting in a value measured in percentage points72. 
Since changes are possible in both directions, positive values indicate an increase in unem-
ployment, while negative values describe a decrease (Data source: CBS, Arbeidsdeelname; re-
gionale indeling 2014, 2003-2014). 
The share of the financial sector, as the second independent variable of interest in line with 
hypothesis 2, will be calculated for each municipality by dividing the number of financial ser-
vice companies by the total number of companies registered with a branch office within the 
municipality. Figures for 2007 are chosen to take the situation before the beginning of the 
recent Financial Crisis into account (Data source: CBS, Vestigingen van bedrijven; bedrijfstak, 
gemeente). 
                                                     
72 A percentage point is the unit of measurement of the result of a subtraction of one percentage value from 





Relating to hypothesis 3, the share of persons aged 65 and older will be calculated for each 
municipality. This will be realised by dividing the number of persons of the relevant age group 
by the total number of inhabitants. Again, figures for 2007 are considered in order to include 
the situation before the beginning of the Crisis (Data source: CBS, Regionale kerncijfers Ne-
derland). 
The size of the municipalities in terms of their population was stated as a potential factor of 
influence in hypothesis 4. Therefore, the number of inhabitants by the end of 2007 will be 
utilised in the empirical analyses (Data source: CBS, Bevolkingsontwikkeling; regio per maand). 
As an expression of the degree of urbanisation in line with hypothesis 5, the share of areas 
used for agricultural purposes will be determined for each municipality. This value will be cal-
culated by dividing the agricultural land by the total municipal territory in 2006. Since the rel-
evant data set is updated infrequently, the year 2006 represents the last figures available be-
fore the Crisis (Data source: CBS, Bodemgebruik; uitgebreide gebruiksvorm, per gemeente). 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 focus on the role of existing short-term debt and long-term debt at the 
municipal level. While short-term debt includes negative bank and giro balances as well as all 
other liabilities with maturities of one year or less according to budgetary rules in the Nether-
lands, long-term debt mainly consist of bonds, private loans, money invested by third parties, 
and deposit guarantees as well as all other liabilities with maturities longer than one year. To 
control for the size of the municipalities, both types of debt will be calculated for each munic-
ipality in euro per capita. Again, to take the situation before the recent Financial Crisis into 
account, data for 2007 will be considered (Data source for both variables: CBS, Ge-
meenterekeningen; balans per gemeente 2005-2014).73  
The share of left parties is the focus of hypothesis 8 and will be calculated for each municipality 
by dividing the number of seats gained by parties on this side of the political spectrum in the 
2006 election to municipal councils, representing the last regular election before the recent 
Financial Crisis, by the total number of council seats. In this regard, the Partij van de Arbeid 
(PvdA), GroenLinks (GL), Socialistische Partij (SP), Friese Nationale Partij (FNP), and Nieuwe 
Communistische Partij (NCPN), as well as all joint lists including these parties, will be consid-
ered as left (Data source: Kiesraad, Verkiezingsuitslagen 2006).74 
In line with hypothesis 9, and based on the seat shares of the political parties in the 2006 
municipal election, Rae’s (1967, 53 ff.) measure of political fragmentation75 will be calculated 
for the municipal council of each municipality as a further independent variable (Data source: 
Kiesraad, Verkiezingsuitslagen 2006). 
                                                     
73 Since the dependent variables will be adjusted to the consumer price level of the year 2007, an adjustment 
for inflation is not necessary in the cases of these two independent variables. 
74 See chapter 7.3 for more information on local politics in the Netherlands. 
75 Rae’s (1967, 53 ff.) measure of fragmentation calculates the electoral fractionalisation of a political body 
based on the vote or seat share of each party. The sum of the squared shares of all parties is subtracted from 1. 
Therefore, the Rae index can range from 0 to 1, where a value of 0 represents a one-party system without any 
fragmentation, and a value of 1 describes the maximum fragmentation of a party system. Since an infinite num-
ber of parties with an infinite small share of votes or seats is necessary to reach the latter value, it marks the 




Relating to hypothesis 10, the number of civil servants per municipality will be considered 
based on data for 2007, as the last year before the recent Financial Crisis. Apart from civil 
servants employed within the municipalities’ core administrations, those working within a mu-
nicipality based on joint arrangements to fulfil public tasks between or across the governmen-
tal levels will also be included.76 To take the different sizes of the municipalities into account, 
the figures will be adjusted for the population in the form of full-time equivalents per 1,000 
inhabitants (Data source: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 
Werknemers Overheid en Onderwijs-Personen en FTE (instellingen openbaar bestuur en 
veiligheid)).  
Lastly, the municipalities’ budgets for administrative affairs, as the independent variable 
named in hypothesis 11, will be calculated in euro per capita. Again, data for the year 2007 
will be included, and adjustments will be made to the population sizes for the same reasons 
outlined before (Data source: CBS, Gemeenterekeningen; per gemeente, baten en lasten, 
heffingen 2005-2014).77 
Overall, the later analyses of this study will involve 11 independent variables. The number of 
dependent variables depends on the number of policy areas, individual balance sheet items, 
and financial results identified as affected by the recent Financial Crisis in the further course 
of this study. 
After introducing the theoretical framework and the methodological approach, the next part 
of the study includes the first component of the analysis. Starting with the Dutch political-
administrative system and recent trends and developments at the country’s local level, as well 
as the course of the Financial Crisis since 2007, the crisis situation in the Netherlands and its 
municipalities will be addressed in detail. 
 
  
                                                     
76 See chapter 6.1 for more information on joint arrangements between territorial entities in the Netherlands. 
77 Since the dependent variables will be adjusted to the consumer price level of the year 2007, an adjustment 




Part 3: The Netherlands, its local level of government, and the Finan-
cial Crisis since 2007 
The third part of this study turns towards the Netherlands. To assess developments at the 
country’s local level, insights into the political-administrative system and the division of re-
sponsibility are provided as necessary background information. Recent changes towards an 
enabling state and multi-level governance are also discussed, building upon more general re-
flections. In addition, the “regie” approach, as a particular Dutch debate on steering capabili-
ties at the local level, is presented. 
Considering Dutch local government, particular attention is paid to municipal finances and 
legal requirements in order to illustrate the municipalities’ general leeway and procedures in 
terms of determining their own affairs. Building upon the previous analysis of recent trends 
and developments at the local level, the already presented issues are addressed in a Dutch 
context. 
Based on the economic theory outlined before, the Financial Crisis since 2007 and its course 
over time are subsequently analysed in detail. Therefore, important events in the context of 
the Crisis, as well as changes in socio-economic key figures, are presented and put into per-
spective. The following discussion of previous research on the Financial Crisis concentrates on 
the political-administrative perspective. In line with the focus of this study, insights into the 
developments at the local level are presented next to those at higher levels of the political-
administrative subdivision. 
By bringing previous insights together, this part also addresses the Financial Crisis since 2007 
in the Netherlands. The developments and countermeasures by central government are dis-
cussed in detail, and three phases of the Crisis are differentiated. Official documents and aca-
demic publications build the basis of this examination. Attention is also given to the munici-
palities, especially regarding measures by central government with an impact at the local level. 
This is followed by the first empirical component of this study. The calculations assess the 
changes in local governance finance at an aggregated level. All types of municipal revenues 
and expenses are examined in detail to identify changes potentially originating from to the 
Financial Crisis. 
The third part closes with own survey results in the form of quantitative data and qualitative 
statements collected at the local level. Next to information on the measures Dutch municipal-
ities undertook to reduce their expenditures, the mayors’ perceptions of the recent Financial 






6. The political-administrative system of the Netherlands 
“For over four hundred years the Netherlands was one of the wealthiest and most stable re-
gions in the world” (Fritschy et al., 2012, p. 39), and, furthermore, the Dutch Republic, also 
known as the Republic of the Seven United Provinces and founded in 1588, can be considered 
as the “first modern economy” (Fritschy et al., 2012, p. 39). The reasons for this early prosper-
ity can be found in the thriving linen industry, the industrial processing of various other prod-
ucts with the help of windmills, especially in the Zaan district (Dutch: Zaanstreek), and the 
general focus on trade. While central government played a minor role in the early modern 
era, Dutch cities were highly active in global commerce. Amsterdam in particular became one 
of the wealthiest places in the world. 
However, not only the economic situation of the Netherlands in relation to other countries, 
but also the roles of territorial entities within the political-administrative system of the Neth-
erlands changed over time. As a result, especially the responsibilities of the local level has 
increased in recent decades. The first sub-chapter provides an overview of the different polit-
ical-administrative levels of present-day Netherlands. In addition to explanations of the divi-
sion of tasks and responsibilities, the role of the administrative levels is also illustrated from a 
fiscal perspective (6.1). Developments towards an enabling state and multi-level governance 
are discussed in the second sub-chapter (6.2). 
 
6.1. The Netherlands and its division of tasks and responsibilities be-
tween the levels of government 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands consists of four countries: the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao, 
and Sint Maarten; the latter three are island countries in the Caribbean. As of January 1st, 
2018, the Netherlands is subdivided into 12 provinces and 380 municipalities. Three additional 
Caribbean islands, namely Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba, have a legal status generally com-
parable to the other municipalities of the Netherlands.78 
As a constitutional monarchy since 1815, including a representative democratic parliamentary 
system since 1848, the Netherlands’ political-administrative subdivision is characterised as a 
decentralised unitary state,79 being comprised of four levels of government with different 
main areas of competences. Politicians at all levels of government are regularly elected by the 
general public (Dutch Constitution, Article 4). Moreover, executive authorities and an admin-
istrative apparatus are in place at all levels of government. In addition, some direct democratic 
                                                     
78 As a result of a partly different legal situation and a lack of data availability, the Dutch Caribbean, which is 
comprised of the islands of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba, will not be taken 
into account in the following analyses of this study. 




elements, especially the possibility of advisory plebiscites, are also guaranteed by national law 
(Rijksoverheid, 2016a; Toonen, 1994; Alkema, 2006, p. 335; Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, p. 99). 
Central government, the provinces, the water boards (Dutch: waterschappen), and the mu-
nicipalities are the most important levels within the territorial subdivision of the Netherlands, 
and they can also be considered as containing functional and implementation elements of 
federalism (Toonen, 1994). In addition, a number of agency-like organisations outside the min-
isterial hierarchy have been founded in recent decades. Furthermore, various forms of co-
operation, involving local government in particular, have become increasingly common. An 
overview of all territorial layers, in line with the EU’s NUTS80 classification, and the number of 
associated entities is provided in table 6. The regions and COROP81 regions were introduced 
for analytical purposes only and do not have any other functions. 
Table 6: Territorial subdivision of the Netherlands as of January 1st, 2018 (Data source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 
2018a) 
NUTS classification Name Dutch name Number 
--- Central government Rijksoverheid, Centrale overheid 1 
NUTS 1 Regions82 Landsdelen 4 
NUTS 2 Provinces Provincies 12 
--- Water boards  Waterschappen 22 
NUTS 3 COROP regions83 COROP region’s 40 
LAU84 1 --- --- --- 
LAU 2 Municipalities Gemeenten 380 
 
At the national level, the powers are further subdivided into legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches. The legislature contains a bicameral parliament composed of the Senate (Dutch: 
Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal) as the Upper House with members elected by the provin-
cial parliaments and the House of Representatives (Dutch: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Gen-
eraal) as the Lower House with directly elected members (Dutch Constitution, Article 51, par-
agraph 1). The members of both chambers are elected for four-year terms (Dutch Constitu-
tion, Article 52, paragraph 1). Central government, representing the executive branch, is com-
prised of the King as the Head of State and the Ministers (Dutch Constitution, Article 42, par-
agraph 1), who are responsible for the acts of government (Dutch Constitution, Article 42, 
paragraph 2). The Ministers together also constitute the cabinet (Dutch Constitution, Article 
45, paragraph 1), chaired by the Prime Minister (Dutch Constitution, Article 45, paragraph 2). 
Lastly, the judicial branch includes a court system focusing on the different areas of law, and 
the organisation and composition of juridical powers are regulated by Parliament (Dutch Con-
stitution, Article 116, paragraph 1 and 2). 
                                                     
80 French abbreviation for Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques (English: Nomenclature of territo-
rial units for statistics). 
81 Dutch abbreviation for Coördinatiecommissie Regionaal Onderzoeksprogramma (English: Co-ordination com-
mission regional research programme). 
82 Additional subdivision for analytical purposes only. 
83 Additional subdivision for analytical purposes only. 




To fulfil their tasks, the Cabinet depends on the ministerial bureaucracy, as an organisation 
with duties including the development of policy proposals and the implementation of political 
decisions. At the Dutch national level, there are currently 12 ministries, differentiated in line 
with the policy areas considered as most relevant (Rijksoverheid, 2017f). However, when as-
sessing the national administration in the Netherlands, it needs to be taken into account that 
various public tasks were transferred to agency-like organisations in the form of so-called in-
dependent administrative bodies (Dutch: zelfstandige bestuursorganen, ZBOs) in recent dec-
ades. While the organisations are responsible for the execution of specific public tasks, they 
do not represent subordinate departments of a ministry. Conducting public functions in a 
more efficient and less political manner can be considered as the main motivation behind the 
establishment of the agencies as functional bodies. However, the tasks and competences of 
the independent administrative bodies are determined by national law, and the organisations 
are assigned to a ministry, which is not formally accountable for the agency itself. The only 
partial ministerial responsibility distinguishes these independent administrative bodies from 
classical agencies. While most of these bodies work under public law status, some also fulfil 
their tasks under private law status (van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 109 f.; Rijksover-
heid, 2017c). 
The number of independent administrative bodies is also subject to major changes. While 
there were 545 governmental bodies of this type in the Netherlands in 1993, the number con-
tinuously decreased to 122 in 2016. The decline mainly relates to mergers and does not imply 
that the importance of these organisations diminished. Furthermore, the size and organisa-
tional capacities of these governmental bodies vary broadly. While the Institute for Employee 
Insurance (Dutch: Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen), as an example of one of 
the largest independent administrative bodies, has about 16,000 people in full-time equiva-
lent employment, other bodies operate with a single staff member or even completely with-
out own staff (van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 109; Rijksoverheid, 2017c). 
Originating from concerns about the partial lack of democratic accountability of independent 
administrative bodies, agencies (Dutch: agentschappen) were established as a second type of 
functional governmental organisation outside the ministries. As with independent administra-
tive bodies, agencies are autonomous regarding their internal management, but are fully re-
sponsible to an assigned ministry regarding their activities. Tasks are usually agreed upon with 
a ministry by contract. The first agency of this type was established in the Netherlands in 1994, 
and the number increased to 30 as of 2017. Examples include the agency for waterways 
(Dutch: Rijkswaterstaat) and the Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (Dutch: Koninklijk Ne-
derlands Meteorologisch Instituut) (van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 110; Rijksover-
heid, 2017d). 
While provinces play a minor role in the Netherlands today, compared to previous centuries 
in general, they are structured and governed similarly to municipalities (Backes & van der 
Woude, 2013, p. 238). However, Dutch provinces can be described as relatively heterogene-
ous regarding their population and territory size (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2018b). 
This is partially explained by the geographical characteristics, especially islands and areas, 




regarding the degree of urbanisation and cultural aspects. Since most of the Dutch population 
lives in the western part of the Netherlands, the province of Zuid-Holland consists of 10 times 
as many municipalities, has approximately 10 times as many inhabitants, and has a population 
density about 10 times as high as the smallest provinces. 
Since the altitude of parts of the Netherlands is below sea level, water management is rela-
tively important. Therefore, 22 regional water boards are entrusted with this task.85 From an 
organisational perspective, the water boards are separate, task-specific, regional governmen-
tal bodies empowered to collect taxes (Dutch Water Authorities, 2016; Backes & van der 
Woude, 2013, p. 231 f.). They can also be considered as a level of government mainly parallel 
to the provinces. Given their single task focus, the water boards cannot be categorised in line 
with the NUTS classification of administrative subdivisions. 
Local government, represented by 380 municipalities in 2018, traditionally plays an essential 
role in the Netherlands. A continuous increase in tasks can be observed again since the end of 
the Second World War (Hendriks & Tops, 2003, p. 303). Also, the latest decentralisation 
measures, effective since January 1st, 2015, follow this trend by transferring responsibilities 
and tasks mainly in the policy area of social affairs from the national to the local level (Allers 
& Steiner, 2015, p. 7). 
An overview of the general division of main tasks between central government, the provinces, 
the water boards, and the municipalities in the Netherlands is provided in table 7. The respon-
sibilities in some policy areas involve more than one level of government and are character-
ised by co-operation in terms of multi-level governance. Apart from this vertical form of co-
operation, horizontal co-operation takes places particularly at the local level. 
Table 7: Main policy areas with responsibilities of the different levels of government (Based on Hendriks & Schaap, 
2010, p. 103 with own updates) 
Level of government Policy areas 
Central government  Foreign and European policies 
 Military defence 
 Police services, courts, and prisons 
 Education and research (polytechnics and universities; policies regarding 
primary and secondary education) 
 Economic affairs 
 Healthcare, universities, and supra-regional hospitals 
 National roads and railways (railways are partly privatised) 
 Culture and mass media (radio and television) 
 Integration and migration policies 
 National physical, environmental, and agricultural issues 
 Taxation 
Provinces  Physical, environmental, and agricultural issues 
 Provincial roads and public transport (outside metropolitan areas) 
 Regional development 
 Quality of local government 
 
                                                     
85 The Dutch water boards, having originated from 1000 to 1200, are among the oldest democratic institutions 




Level of government Policy areas 
Water boards  Water safety, polder maintenance (dikes, canals) 
 Waste water collection and treatment 
 Some minor roads 
Municipalities (partially in 
the form of inter-munici-
pal or regional co-opera-
tion) 
 Local physical planning (city plans are the only ones that are legally binding) 
 Housing policies 
 Sewage services 
 Fire protection 
 Garbage collection and disposal 
 Local public transportation, municipal roads, and harbours 
 Primary and secondary education 
 Social care and execution of social security 
 Labour market participation 
 Family and youth care 
 Culture, sports and leisure, tourism 
 Local taxation (mainly property tax) 
 
In summary, central government mainly focuses on tasks with an overall importance for the 
country, such as foreign policy, military defence, and higher education. The provinces take 
care of regional development and the environment, among other tasks, and they play a su-
pervisory role in relation to the municipalities. The municipalities deal with various issues 
ranging from local physical planning – a task that is important in a country with a relatively 
limited land area and which has therefore already been performed since the 17th century 
(Raadschelders, 1994, p. 432 f.) – and social services to waste collection. Many practical tasks, 
for example issuing passports, are also realised by local government (Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, 
p. 103; Rijksoverheid, 2016g; Rijksoverheid, 2016h; Overmans, 2017, p. 175 f.). In practice, a 
certain scope of variation regarding the tasks of provinces and municipalities can be observed 
because of specific agreements based on local requirements and conditions. For example, a 
city in a densely populated area has to take care of different affairs than a small village in the 
countryside (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 240). However, inter-municipal co-operation 
is relatively common in the Netherlands. 
Based on the Joint Arrangements Act (Dutch: Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen, WGR), mu-
nicipalities, provinces, and water boards can also decide to co-operate in the fulfilment of 
certain public tasks. The act distinguishes between five types of inter-municipal partnerships: 
arrangement (Dutch: regeling zonder meer), central municipality (Dutch: centrumgemeente), 
joint body (Dutch: gemeenschappelijk orgaan), operational management entity (Dutch: bed-
rijfsvoeringsorganisatie), and public body (Dutch: openbaar lichaam). While the types of co-
operation differ in various respects, such as the kinds of tasks that can be transferred to the 
partnership or the structure of the management board, it is important to note that only public 
bodies and operational management entities have legal personality (Rijksoverheid, 2016d; 
Rijksoverheid, 2017e; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 86 f.; 
Alkema, 2006, p. 337). An additional Code for Inter-administrative Relations (Dutch: Code in-
terbestuurlijke verhoudingen) was published as a guideline for inter-municipal co-operation 




To assess the importance of the four Dutch levels of government, as well as joint arrange-
ments, their resources are presented below. Table 8 provides an overview of the financial 
resources in the form of revenues and expenditure, and table 9 illustrates the personnel re-
sources. 
Table 8: Distribution of public revenues and public expenditures across the different levels of government in 2015 (Data source: 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2016; own calculations) 
 Central gov-
ernment 





Revenues (in million Euro) 171,677 52,866 52,500 117,891 394,934 
Revenues (percentage) 43% 13% 13% 30% 100% 
Revenues (percentage excluding 
social security funds) 
62% 19% 19% --- 100% 
Expenditures (in million Euro) 183,146 54,174 53,511 116,862 407,693 
Expenditures (percentage) 45% 13% 13% 29% 100% 
Expenditures (percentage ex-
cluding social security funds) 
63% 19% 18% --- 100% 
 
Table 9: Distribution of civil servants across the different levels of government in 2015 (Data source: Ministerie van Binnen-












Civil servants (number of 
full-time equivalents) 
109,150 9,993 9,368 129,574 33,790 513,328 805,204 
Civil servants (percentage) 14% 1% 1% 16% 4% 64% 100% 
Civil servants (percentage 
excluding other) 
37% 3% 3% 44% 12% --- 100% 
 
From a financial perspective, central government is the most important level of government. 
Excluding social security funds, it is responsible for 63% of the overall government expendi-
ture. Nineteen percent of the total budget is spent by the municipalities, while other sub-
national authorities, including provinces and water boards, deal with the remaining 18%. After 
transfers across the administrative levels, the picture of the income looks necessarily similar 
in order to achieve balanced budgets. 
In contrast to the financial perspective, if public employees such as judges, teachers, and sol-
diers who cannot be clearly assigned to one level of government are not taken into account, 
then 44% of the civil servants are employed at the local level. A further 12% are employed in 
co-operative agreements based on the Joint Arrangements Act, mainly involving local govern-
ment. Moreover, 37% are hired by central government and 3% each by the provinces and 
water boards.88 
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In summary, central government and the municipalities have the most important role in the 
Dutch administrative system in modern days. While the central level is responsible for the 
largest share of government spending, most civil servants are hired within the municipalities. 
The practical execution of many public services in a decentralised manner all over the country 
is the main explanation for the latter. While this sub-chapter focused on the characteristics of 
the Dutch political-administrative system and the division of tasks and responsibilities across 
the different levels of government, the following sub-chapter addresses changes regarding 
the role and functioning of the Dutch state in recent decades in order to put into perspective 
the analyses of developments in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007. 
 
6.2. Towards an enabling state, the “regie” approach, and multi-level 
governance 
Considering the developments towards an enabling state and multi-level governance as major 
transformations of the role and functioning of the state in recent decades, the Netherlands 
was not exempted. As a member state of the EU and its predecessor organisations, the coun-
try followed common trends and was even a forerunner in some areas. In addition, the “regie” 
approach, as a particular Dutch debate, focuses on local government and its changing role and 
function in policymaking, largely in accordance with the concept of an enabling state as well 
as by including aspects of multi-level governance. 
From the end of the Second World War to the mid-1970s, the Netherlands can be character-
ised as an active welfare state. Extensive governmental responsibilities in many policy areas, 
including social services, were combined with a strong regulation of the economy. A less active 
and more enabling role of government can be observed since the mid-1970s, where the state 
mainly focuses on mediating between societal actors. Direct state interventions in particular 
have further decreased in more recent years (van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, pp. 103, 
117). 
Taken together, a change towards an enabling state is noticeable in the case of the Nether-
lands. The gradual nature of the process is associated with the co-operative and consensus 
orientation of Dutch politics in general (van der Meer, 2008, p. 193; Bekke, 1991). For civil 
servants at all levels of government, the development toward enabling, instead of an own 
development, and the state’s provision of public services also imply less direct power and in-
fluence and a more co-ordinating role (van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 101 f.). 
Compared to other Western countries, it must also be emphasised that non-governmental 
organisations have already been involved in policymaking in the Netherlands since the end of 
the 19th century. This encouraged further steps towards an enabling state and also makes the 
Netherlands a frontrunner in this respect. However, as in other countries, the transformation 
of the role of the state was not only a process initiated by the state itself, but also a conse-




As a result of more dynamic and differentiated forms of cohabitation, partially challenging 
steering capabilities, and their efficiency by state actors, an additional debate on the role of 
the local level and its governing techniques emerged in the Netherlands in the late 1990s, 
largely similar to the more general discussions in line with the concept of an enabling state. 
Based on the metaphor of a director in the film or theatre industry and his responsibilities 
both on stage and behind the scenes, the so-called “regie” approach understands municipali-
ties as instructing and mediating institutions.89 While central government creates the neces-
sary framework conditions in terms of areas of responsibility and legal requirements, including 
a certain leeway for local authorities, the “regie” approach is increasingly suitable for describ-
ing the role and functioning of Dutch municipalities from a practical perspective. In general, 
the approach is convenient for portraying the ways of working in many policy areas at the 
Dutch local level, especially those where municipalities depend on the support of other actors, 
such as non-governmental organisations or citizens, as well as policy areas with a low level of 
formal authority (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2006, p. 31; Raad 
voor het openbaar bestuur, 1999, pp. 7 ff., 22, 45, 53). 
While the term “regie” is not always used consistently (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties, 2006, p. 5), the approach can be defined as “a special form of steering, 
focusing on the co-ordination of actors, their goals, and actions, towards a more or less coher-
ent whole with regard to a certain result” (Partners + Pröpper, 2004, p. 13, own translation). 
From a theoretical perspective, decentralisation and deregulation can serve as enabling fac-
tors by increasing the number of policy areas with municipal competences (Raad voor het 
openbaar bestuur, 1999, p. 9). 
In general, the “regie” approach can be considered as multidimensional and dynamic. On 
closer inspection, four important components can be distinguished in any particular case of 
“regie”. First, the municipality, as the director, requires an overview of the overall topic, ac-
companied by its accountability for the whole process and results as the second component. 
Then, as the third and fourth components, the municipality has a stimulating role in the search 
for policy ideas, and it organises the co-operation of the actors involved (Ministerie van Bin-
nenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2006, pp. 13 ff., 40 f.). 
However, the “regie” approach is not suitable for all types of municipal affairs. In some policy 
areas, for example, other actors, such as non-governmental organisations, are more qualified 
and experienced in developing and performing certain services; therefore, outsourcing the 
task entirely can be a more efficient approach. In addition, because of various forms of self-
interest, it is usually not suitable to involve outside actors in governmental decision-making 
processes related to issues such as taxation and other financial aspects. Overall, the munici-
palities must carefully decide on the policy areas and topics where the “regie” approach might 
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ing on local government. However, thinking of the content of the metaphor, similar tendencies can be ob-




be an appropriate strategy, also by taking local conditions into account (Raad voor het open-
baar bestuur, 1999, p. 9 f.). 
Taken together, the “regie” approach is characterised by a shift from content to process re-
sponsibility in Dutch local government and by the increasing importance of new instruments 
focusing on argumentation and conviction based on new communication and steering strate-
gies. Interestingly, the approach is interlinked with other trends and developments at the local 
level, especially attempts to increase citizen participation and the use of digital means of com-
munication. Since co-operation might also include other levels of government, the “regie” ap-
proach also contains aspects of multi-level governance (Raad voor het openbaar bestuur, 
1999, pp. 7 ff., 22 f., 31 f., 52 f.). However, even though the metaphor of the municipalities as 
directors – as the core of the “regie” approach – might be suitable to describe the role and 
functioning of local government, the underlying ideas and strategies are neither entirely new 
in the Netherlands nor largely different from approaches in other countries. 
Partly similar observations can be made regarding multi-level governance. Based on research 
on European integration in the early 1990s, the concept is used to describe governmental sys-
tems with increasing formal and informal exchanges between the formerly relatively distinct 
levels of government, thereby resulting in policy networks (Marks, 1993). As a member state 
of the EU, the increasing competences of the European level, in combination with the neces-
sary interactions, affected the Netherlands like all the other countries involved. 
In line with the co-operative and consensus-orientated approach of Dutch politics, the formal 
and informal exchanges between central government, the provinces, water boards, and mu-
nicipalities are long-standing traditions. Therefore, the characterisation as a system of multi-
level governance is certainly applicable in the case of the Netherlands. More details on recent 
changes in the distribution of powers in both directions of the political-administrative system 
will be discussed in later chapters in the context of decentralisation and Europeanisation. 
In summary, developments towards an enabling state and multi-level governance can be ob-
served in the Netherlands, as is the case in many other Western countries; however, the Neth-
erlands can be considered as a frontrunner, particularly in terms of involving non-governmen-
tal actors in policymaking processes. While the previous considerations addressed the Dutch 
state as a whole, these changes also involved the local level. The “regie” approach, character-
ising local government as the director in relation to other actors, is an additional concept that 
illustrates the role and functioning of local authorities in the Netherlands. In the next chapter 
of this study, specific attention will be paid to Dutch local government, its finances, and recent 





7. Local government and local government finance in the Netherlands 
The municipalities, representing local government in the Netherlands, have been of major im-
portance for centuries, and they can be considered as the roots of democracy (Voermans & 
Waling, 2018, p. 15). While city councils and administrations were the main governmental 
bodies in the early modern era before distinct levels of government emerged, the local level 
is a relevant part of a system of multi-level governance nowadays. The provision of public 
services in line with local conditions describes this level’s main role and function at present. 
In line with the administrative role of local entities, cities and provinces were mainly in charge 
of taxation in the early modern era. Already back then, a key feature of the development of 
the Netherlands was a fiscal system characterised by a broad tax base and stable public debt 
repayment (Fritschy et al., 2012, p. 39). Even though accounting was basically performed dif-
ferently in every village, at least until the 18th century, local taxation can be considered as 
having already been relatively efficient during that period of time (Janssens, 2012, p. 69).90 As 
a result of the Dutch Constitution of 1848, the Provinces Act and the Municipalities Act, both 
of which were also implemented in the middle of the 19th century, and newer legislation, the 
financial provisions for citizens as well as governmental entities converged largely until today. 
Chapter 7 focuses on Dutch local government and its legal framework, including local govern-
ment finance. The historical development of the local level is briefly outlined in the next sub-
chapter (7.1). Then, insights into the current legal framework of Dutch local government are 
presented in the following sub-chapter (7.2). Local politics and the role of local parties in the 
democratic opinion-forming and decision-making processes are the topics of the subsequent 
sub-chapter (7.3). Together with the sub-chapter on municipal finance, including explanations 
for the different types of municipal revenues and expenses as well as their legal background 
(7.4), this first part of chapter 7 is intended to point out the administrative role, legal condi-
tions, and the organisational and financial scope of decision-making of Dutch municipalities in 
order to provide an understanding of possible impacts of and reactions to events such as fi-
nancial crises. 
The second part of chapter 7, consisting of one last sub-chapter, addresses the theoretical 
insights into trends and developments in local government and governance, as presented in 
chapter 2, from a Dutch perspective (7.5). By analysing those changes that originated long 
before the Financial Crisis since 2007, a distinction between effects of the crisis and other 
separate developments is enabled at a later stage. To put the Dutch situation into perspective, 
a brief comparison with other countries is included in this part of chapter 7 as well. 
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7.1. The history of local government 
Cities and towns traditionally played a key role in the Netherlands. Between 962 and 1588, 
the territory of present-day Netherlands was part of the Holy Roman Empire, where cities 
generally had a highly autonomous status. However, attempts towards a more centralised 
system can be observed in the parts of the country under Spanish Habsburgian rule in the 
Empire’s later phase. During the Dutch Republic between 1588 and 1795, the provinces in-
creased their political influence, while the overall system remained rather decentralised, and 
local government was further on not organised in a uniform way. However, already during the 
17th century, Dutch local governments developed into “highly diversified organizations provid-
ing a variety of services” (Raadschelders, 1994, p. 433). During the Batavian Republic (1795–
1806), the structure of the Netherlands changed from a confederation to a unitary state. As a 
consequence, municipalities became more uniform, and the role of the provinces decreased 
extensively. The Batavian Republic was replaced by the Kingdom of Holland (1806–1810) and 
French occupation (1810–1815). However, while the rule over the territory and the designa-
tion of the state changed, local government remained an important level within the territorial 
subdivision (Toonen, 1994; Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, p. 96 f.; Backes & van der Woude, 2013, 
p. 235 f.). 
In 1815, the Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands was adopted. However, in 1848, 
Johan Rudolph Thorbecke, a liberal politician and later Prime Minister, was commissioned to 
draft a new constitution, and he laid the foundation for the Dutch decentralised unitary state, 
which is still in place today. His basic idea “is not that state authority is necessary to create 
unity, but, to the contrary, that a certain degree of unity – read consensus-building or will-
formation – is necessary to generate state authority” (Toonen, 1994, p. 112). Therefore, the 
orientation towards consensual decision-making,91 also in line with the understanding of con-
sensus democracy according to Lijphart (1999), within a political-administrative system con-
sisting of three92 governmental layers – municipalities, provinces plus water boards, and cen-
tral government – is also largely based on the suggestions by Thorbecke (Thorbecke, 1841; 
Toonen, 1990; Toonen, 1991; Toonen, 1994; Hendriks & Toonen, 2001; Toonen & Hendriks, 
2001; Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, p. 96 f.; Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 236; Voermans & 
Waling, 2018, p. 72 ff.). From a legal perspective, the ideas of Thorbecke were implemented 
with the Constitution of 1848, the Provinces Act of 1850, and the Municipalities Act of 1851. 
Despite various revisions, this basic legal structure still applies today. 
Based on these historical developments, today’s Dutch governmental system is characterised 
by the interaction among municipalities, provinces, water boards, and central government as 
well as the interaction between those entities and the citizens. Regarding the frequency of 
interactions between public authorities, a steady increase can be observed in recent decades. 
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Apart from the informal search for consensuses, supported by multiple linkages between po-
litical-administrative decision makers at all levels of government (van der Meer & Raadschel-
ders, 2007, p. 110), the policy areas of formal co-operative and consultative governance also 
increased. Taking public finance into account, the administrative system is partially character-
ised by the mutual dependence between central government and the municipalities: Central 
government provides financial means, and the municipalities conduct public services (Hen-
driks & Schaap, 2010, p. 110 f.).93 
In summary, the importance of the Dutch municipalities in relation to the provinces has 
changed widely since the end of medieval times. However, despite regular changes in the di-
vision of responsibilities, the municipalities have been considered to be the more important 
level of government in terms of the scope of assigned tasks, in comparison with the provinces, 
for longer than the last century. In addition, it can be observed that the orientation towards 
consensus between the actors involved in policymaking has a long history at all levels of gov-
ernment. These reflections on the history of Dutch local government lead to the question of 
today’s legal framework, which will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
7.2. The current legal framework of local government 
Article 124, paragraph 1, of the Dutch Constitution (Dutch: Grondwet) states that provinces 
and municipalities have the right to regulate and administer their own affairs. This tradition 
of local self-government is also described as the backbone of democracy (Voermans & Waling, 
2018, pp. 23, 75, 189 ff.). However, the degree of autonomy, in combination with the lack of 
a definitive list of powers at the sub-national levels of government, enables variation in the 
carrying out of tasks across the local level as well as over time. In other words, provinces and 
municipalities can regulate whatever they believe needs to be regulated within their territo-
ries as long as there is no conflict with other legislation, especially by central government; this 
is an overall approach originating from Thorbecke’s conception of consensual decision-making 
at relatively independent levels of government. However, central government is generally en-
titled to suspend or annul decisions by lower levels of government if those decisions are con-
sidered to conflict with Dutch law or public interest (Thorbecke, 1841; Toonen, 1990; Toonen, 
1991; Toonen, 1994; Alkema, 2006, p. 336; Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 232; Denters, 
2011, p. 318).94 
Article 124, paragraph 2, of the Dutch Constitution determines that tasks can be assigned to 
provinces and municipalities by law. From a practical perspective, most municipal tasks are 
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yses, the number of municipal functions increased about eightfold over the last 400 years. The same applies to 
the number of employees. Various shifts can be observed regarding the types of tasks (p. 415 f.). 
94 An extensive legal commentary on Dutch municipal law was published by Dölle, Elzinga, and Engels (2004). 




delegated by central government nowadays (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 233). Further-
more, according to the Dutch Civil Code (Dutch: Burgerlijk Wetboek) book 2, article 1, as the 
basis for own legal transactions, central government, the provinces, the water boards, and the 
municipalities are endowed with legal personality. From a legal perspective, general local reg-
ulations (Dutch: algemene plaatselijke verordening, APV) are the most common way for mu-
nicipalities to regulate certain affairs within their territories (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, 
p. 232 f.). 
The Municipalities Act of 1851, which was continuously updated, including a major update in 
1992, is the main legal source regarding the structure and functions of Dutch municipalities. 
It stipulates that every municipality has a municipal council (Dutch: gemeenteraad), an exec-
utive board (Dutch: college van burgemeester en wethouders), and a mayor (Dutch: burge-
meester) (Municipalities Act, article 6) as the three main governing organs. The autonomy of 
municipalities regarding their internal organisation can be considered as relatively limited be-
cause of numerous further provisions (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 238). 
The municipal council, as the legislative power and highest governing organ of each munici-
pality, represents the entire population of the municipality (Municipalities Act, article 7). The 
number of councillors depends on the number of inhabitants and ranges from nine (for mu-
nicipalities with less than 3,001 inhabitants) to 45 (for municipalities with more than 200,000 
inhabitants) (Municipalities Act, article 8, paragraph 1). The mayor is the chairman of the mu-
nicipal council (Municipalities Act, article 9), but not a formal member thereof (Municipalities 
Act, article 13, paragraph 1 k.). 
Legislation in the form of municipal regulation is in general decided by the municipal council, 
as long as it does not concern certain policy areas with exclusive powers of the mayor or the 
executive board (Municipalities Act, article 147, paragraph 1). From a historical perspective, it 
can be observed that these powers and decision-making outside the municipal council in-
creased over time (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 238) and that today, the municipal 
council mainly focuses on monitoring political-administrative processes in its municipality 
from a more practical perspective (Vollaard et al., 2018, p. 19 f.). 
The mayor and the aldermen (Dutch: wethouders) are the members of the executive board 
(Municipalities Act, article 34, paragraph 1), with the mayor as chairman (Municipalities Act, 
article 34, paragraph 2), and their main formal task is to prepare and execute the decisions of 
the municipal council. Furthermore, the executive board is in charge of the daily management 
of the municipality, among other responsibilities (Municipalities Act, article 160, paragraph 1). 
However, in practice, the executive board can be considered as more influential in terms of 
policymaking than the municipal council itself in some municipalities (Hendriks & Schaap, 
2010, p. 105). The aldermen are appointed by the municipal council (Municipalities Act, article 
35, paragraph 1), and the number of aldermen cannot exceed 20% of the number of council-
lors. Also, a minimum of two aldermen is predefined by law (Municipalities Act, article 36, 
paragraph 1). 
The mayor of each municipality is appointed with a Royal resolution based on a nomination 




1). An exchange of views between the King’s Commissioner, as the head of the relevant prov-
ince, and the municipal councillors regarding potential candidates for the position of the 
mayor, in the light of the personal requirements for the position, takes place before the nom-
ination by the minister of the interior (Municipalities Act, article 61, paragraph 2). While a 
mayor can be reappointed (Municipalities Act, article 61a, paragraph 1), he can also be dis-
missed (Municipalities Act, article 61b, paragraph 1) or suspended (Municipalities Act, article 
62, paragraph 1) at any time through a Royal resolution based on the recommendation by the 
minister of the interior. Given the appointment by Royal resolution, the mayor was tradition-
ally considered to play a supervisory role on behalf of central government. However, nowa-
days the municipal council decides on the person who will become mayor in practice, which 
makes the position more political (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 236). 
According to his formal role, the mayor oversees the timely preparation, adoption, and imple-
mentation of municipal policies and the co-operation with other municipalities as well as other 
public authorities, among other duties (Municipalities Act, article 170 paragraph 1). In addi-
tion, some exclusive powers are granted to the mayor by law, which mainly comprise the pol-
icy areas of safety and public order (Municipalities Act, article 147 paragraph 1). 
The municipal council can also appoint members of a municipal auditing office (Dutch: ge-
meentelijke rekenkamer) (Municipalities Act, article 81a, paragraph 1; Municipalities Act, ar-
ticle 81b; Municipalities Act, article 81c, paragraph 1). Evaluating the municipal spending re-
garding its legitimacy and efficiency is this independent body’s general task. Furthermore, 
every municipality has a city manager (Dutch: gemeentesecretaris) (Municipalities Act, article 
100 paragraph 1), who is appointed by the executive board (Municipalities Act, article 102), 
and a municipal clerk (Dutch: griffier) (Municipalities Act, article 100 paragraph 1), who is ap-
pointed by the municipal council (Municipalities Act, article 107). The city manager advises 
and assists the executive board in the performance of its duties (Municipalities Act, article 
103, paragraph 1), and the same relationship exists between the municipal clerk and the mu-
nicipal council (Municipalities Act, article 107a, paragraph 1). 
Taken together, the Municipalities Act specifies many legal provisions concerning local author-
ities’ structure and functions that are obligatory for all Dutch municipalities, supplemented by 
other laws and decrees. As part of the Municipalities Act, the municipal council, the executive 
board, and the mayor are determined as the three main governing organs of each municipal-
ity, including specific rights and obligations. Additional roles, such as a city manager, are also 
mandatory, according to the Municipalities Act. Following this general overview of the legal 
framework with regard to Dutch local government, the next sub-chapter addresses local poli-
tics and the role of political parties at the local level. 
 
7.3. Local elections and local politics 
Democracy at the Dutch local level includes elections to the municipal councils without thresh-




at the national level usually nominate candidates at the local level as well, further local parties 
with a usually restricted interest in the affairs of a certain municipality or region are also active 
in local politics. However, the freedom of parties to manoeuvre in line with political and ideo-
logical beliefs is relatively limited at the Dutch local level, according to common critics; the 
high rate of executive coalitions and the need for compromises are seen as the main reasons. 
Apart from political parties, the role of citizens as a “hidden power” with the capacity to delay 
or abandon political decisions with organised protests, should also not be underestimated in 
the Dutch context (Tops, 2001).95 
In recent decades, the turnout at Dutch municipal elections has generally declined, as table 
10 illustrates.  
Table 10: Voter turnout at Dutch municipal elections, 1986–2014 (Data sources: Kiesraad, 2017; Kiesraad, 2018) 
Year 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 
Voter 
turnout 
73.23% 62.29% 65.28% 58.88% 57.90% 58.56% 54.13% 54.00% 54.97% 
 
While 73.23% of the people entitled to vote cast their ballots in 1986, the number has de-
creased relatively continuously until today. In the latest municipal election in 2018, the par-
ticipation rate was only 54.97%. Party membership and party identification experienced a sim-
ilar development. Territorial and organisational reforms of the 1980s are seen as the main 
reasons for these changes. As a consequence, new reforms in the 1990s partially aimed to 
improve the relation between citizens and local government, including initiatives focused on 
implementing and promoting various forms of citizen participation (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 
71; van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 116). However, the trend regarding a declining 
voter turnout in municipal elections was not stopped. 
The number of independent local parties increased extensively in recent decades; this devel-
opment benefited from widespread disappointment with traditional parties and an electoral 
system without a threshold.96 Compared to local branches of parties at the national level, 
whose performance is mostly judged by the electorate based on national rather than local 
politics (Coenradij & Allers, 2017), independent local parties have also become more success-
ful in recruiting candidates for local elections and involving citizens on an ad hoc basis in recent 
years (Boogers & Voerman, 2010; Voermans & Waling, 2018, p. 114 ff.). Since these parties 
mainly focus on local interests, their general political orientation – if present – is subject to 
broad variation (Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, pp. 99, 107; Boogers et al., 2018, p. 167 f.).97 
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97 This circumstance also makes it difficult to include local parties in research designs, where the impact of dif-




Table 11 provides an overview of the vote shares of the major political parties to the municipal 
councils in the Netherlands in the last four elections. While the data provide insights into the 
relevance of the different parties at the local level by assessing all municipalities combined, a 
broad variation across the municipalities needs to be taken into account.  
Table 11: Distributions of vote shares of the municipal council elections in 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018 (Data sources: Kiesraad, 
2017; Kiesraad, 2018)98 
 2006 2010 2014 2018 
Local parties 22.10% 23.66% 27.77% 28.65% 
Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA) 16.83% 14.80% 14.43% 13.41% 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) 13.87% 15.68% 12.21% 13.50% 
Democraten 66 (D66) 2.71% 8.18% 12.06% 9.18% 
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) 23.58% 15.74% 10.25% 7.52% 
Socialistische Partij (SP) 5.68% 4.13% 6.60% 4.44% 
GroenLinks (GL) 6.03% 6.73% 5.38% 8.87% 
ChristenUnie (CU) 3.64% 3.76% 4.06% 3.83% 
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) 1.64% 1.77% 1.96% 1.90% 
 
In addition to the importance of local parties, table 11 also illustrates the influence of the main 
Dutch parties at the local level. Considering the developments in the last decade, a decreasing 
vote share of the Partij van de Arbeid and an increasing share of the Democraten 66 can be 
observed in particular. However, the often relatively high fragmentation of the composition 
of the municipal councils makes formal coalitions and informal agreements common. A recent 
study (Allers et al., 2018) has also found empirical evidence that political parties, which are 
represented in the executive board of a municipality, often lose votes in the following local 
election in the same municipality.  
Organised representation of Dutch municipalities’ interests is provided by the Association of 
Dutch Municipalities (Dutch: Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG), of which all mu-
nicipalities are members. Apart from interest representation towards other levels of govern-
ment and societal groups, the association provides services to the municipalities, such as legal 
advice, and serves as a platform for co-operation and the exchange of knowledge (Vereniging 
van Nederlandse Gemeenten 2016a; Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 249). 
Regarding the members of the municipal executive boards and municipal councils, it needs to 
be taken into account that politicians and civil servants from other levels of government are 
common members. Former Members of Parliament in particular are often recruited to munic-
ipal executive boards, while civil servants at all levels of government are regularly members 
of municipal councils. This accumulation of offices can lead to various conflicts of interest (van 
der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 106). 
In summary, Dutch local government is characterised by the influence of numerous local par-
ties, usually focusing on topics that are relevant in a certain municipality or region without a 
pronounced political orientation based on a specific ideology. Following the often relatively 
                                                     




high fragmentations of the municipal councils, the overall importance of consultations, con-
sensuses, and compromises can be understood. After the general insights and reflections on 
Dutch local government in this sub-chapter and the previous ones, the following sub-chapter 
will pay attention to municipal finances and their typical structure on both sides of the budget. 
 
7.4. The composition of municipal finances 
To fulfil its functions, a state needs financial means. These are mainly collected via taxes and 
charges, and they are assigned to the various policy areas, ranging from defence to social se-
curity. All of this requires reliable financial planning. In a system of multiple levels of govern-
ment with differentiated responsibilities, this necessity naturally applies to all public authori-
ties at all levels. In terms of financial planning and budgeting, different approaches can be 
distinguished in theory and practice.  
As a result of overly optimist budgetary predictions that did not take economic cycles explicitly 
into account, in the past, a trend-based budgetary system was introduced at the Dutch na-
tional level in 1994. The new system works with more cautious analyses and should enable 
more balanced and stable budgets in theory. However, the exact budgetary schemes are not 
defined by law, but mainly decided upon when a new cabinet is formed; nevertheless, budg-
etary discipline can be considered as relatively high. This method of operating is supported by 
a broad societal consensus regarding budgetary discipline (de Vries & Degen, 2015, pp. 151 f., 
171; de Kam et al., 2015, pp. 265-281). 
In practice, the Central Planning Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Dutch: Centraal Planbu-
reau, CPB), which was established in 1945 within the area of competences of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, plays an important role in the Dutch budgetary system as an independent 
advisor analysing the potential effects of government policies and publishing economic fore-
casts. By doing so, the bureau contributes to budgetary discipline as well. The national budget 
for the following year is usually drafted by the cabinet in spring, debated in parliament there-
after, and presented in September (de Vries & Degen, 2015, pp. 149, 160; van der Meer & 
Raadschelders, 2007, p. 111). 
Dutch local government is also responsible for the provision of a relevant share of public ser-
vices, thereby implying corresponding public spending (Wolman & Hincapie, 2014, p. 48 f.), 
receives transfers from the national level, and has the right to generate own revenues. Each 
municipality consequently needs to plan its intentions for expenditures and revenues for an 
annual or multi-annual period of time. However, according to Article 132, paragraph 6, of the 
Constitution, the local taxes that municipalities can levy, as their main source of own income, 
are limited to the types mentioned in the Municipalities Act (Dutch: Gemeentewet); this cir-
cumstance substantially limits the leeway for shaping own revenues. Therefore, the fiscal au-




f.), also from an international comparative perspective (Blöchliger & Rabesona, 2009; Blöch-
liger & King, 2006; Wolman & Hincapie, 2014, pp. 3, 48; Overmans & Timm-Arnold, 2016, p. 
1053). 
While municipalities generally have the right to regulate and administer their own affairs, the 
provinces and central government are also legitimated to oversee and supervise their policy-
making and hence finance planning, according to article 132 of the Constitution. In normal 
circumstances, given that the members of municipal councils do not necessarily have a broad 
knowledge on financial matters and legal requirements, financial supervision is a task of the 
provinces. Three forms of oversight can be distinguished in this context: (1) preventive over-
sight, also known as ex-ante supervision, (2) repressive oversight, also known as ex-post su-
pervision, and (3) oversight in light of neglect or non-compliance. Preventive oversight in-
cludes all forms of supervision by provinces or central government conducted before the de-
cision-making by municipal bodies. In other words, prior approval is required to take a deci-
sion. Financial supervision of municipalities with unbalanced budgets is an example in this 
context. However, while a province can try to convince a municipality of the necessity of cer-
tain changes in the financial planning, no legal possibilities exist to enforce certain changes. 
Furthermore, the criteria for preventive oversight vary across the 12 Dutch provinces and are 
not always explicitly defined in each detail, thereby implying a certain decision-making scope 
of the provinces. From an empirical perspective, approximately 2% of the Dutch municipalities 
were under preventive oversight in 2014, after a significant decrease from about 16% in the 
mid-1990s. Considering the possibility of negative press reports concerning municipalities un-
der preventive oversight as a result of unreliable financial planning, a certain political pressure 
on local officials might also be applied to avoid the occurrence of such a measure.99 Repressive 
oversight, on the other hand, takes place after a municipality has made a certain policy deci-
sion, and it can be considered as the regular form of supervision. Depending on the type of 
decision and policy areas, a complete annulation or time-restricted suspension by central gov-
ernment is possible. Finally, oversight in light of neglect or non-compliance is a possible meas-
ure, especially in the context of delegated tasks. If municipalities do not provide certain ser-
vices that the national levels advise them to, then other levels of government can be commis-
sioned with the service provision (Rijksoverheid, 2014b; Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 
246 f.; Allers, 2015, pp. 454, 457, 462 f.; van der Woude, 2018, p. 252 f., 255; van der Lei, 2014; 
de Widt, 2017, p. 210 ff.). 
Next to constitutional provisions, part IV of the Municipalities Act (article 186 to article 258) 
is the main legal source in the context of municipal finances in the Netherlands. Article 187 of 
the Municipalities Act stipulates that expenses can only be imposed on municipalities by law. 
The annual budget (Dutch: begroting), including the expenses for all tasks and activities as well 
as indications on the available resources, needs to be prepared by the municipal council (Mu-
nicipalities Act, article 189, paragraph 1). In general, this council shall ensure that the budget 
is structurally balanced and realistic (Municipalities Act, article 189, paragraph 1, sentence 1). 
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Deviations from this requirement are only acceptable if it can be assumed that a balanced 
budget will be achieved over a period of the next few years (Municipalities Act, article 189, 
paragraph 1, sentence 2). In other words, a relatively strict balanced budget requirement ap-
plies to Dutch municipalities (Allers, 2015; Overmans, 2017, p. 175), which, together with su-
pervision by the provinces and central government, excludes the option of major deficit 
spending in the long run. However, since budgetary supervision focuses on the balance be-
tween revenues and expenses, an accumulation of municipal debt is not completely excluded 
(van der Lei, 2014). Further requirements regarding certain financial instruments with which 
the municipalities and other lower levels of government are generally permitted to trade, as 
well as provisions in the context of borrowing and debt, are specified in the law on decentral 
government funding (Dutch: Wet financiering decentrale overheden) (Rijksoverheid, 2013b; 
de Widt, 2017, p. 201 ff.). 
In 1985, accrual accounting was obligatorily introduced at the Dutch local level, replacing the 
traditional cash-budgeting system (ter Bogt, 2008b, 211; Overmans, 2017, p. 176). General 
instructions concerning the budget calculations in accordance with the associated general 
rules of administration (Dutch: Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur), which form a type of exec-
utive decree enacted by royal order, are stated in article 186 of the Municipalities Act. More 
precise instructions on the budget compilation of provinces and municipalities, as well as min-
imum requirements on information provided, are also defined in a decision by national gov-
ernment on the budget and accountability standards of provinces and municipalities (Dutch: 
Besluit begroting en verantwoording provincies en gemeenten) (Rijksoverheid, 2003; van der 
Woude, 2018, p. 251 f.; de Widt, 2017, p. 203). 
In the process of planning the annual budget, the executive board sends the municipal council 
a draft version of their considerations for the budget, including explanatory notes on the gen-
eral situation of the municipality and estimations of the budgetary situation for at least the 
next three years to come (Municipalities Act, article 190, paragraph 1). Based on this draft 
version, the municipal council decides on the budget in the year prior to the year it concerns 
(Municipalities Act, article 191, paragraph 1). Once the budget is established, amendments 
can be made until the end of the financial year in question (Municipalities Act, article 192, 
paragraph 1). This option allows the municipalities a certain amount of room to manoeuvre in 
the case of unexpected events, usually implying the need for higher expenditures than antici-
pated, while unexpected revenues cannot be ruled out either. 
Article 193 of the Municipalities Act states the compulsory expenditures of municipalities. 
These are interest on loans, expenditures that are established by legislation, and costs arising 
from the implementation of laws. Further compulsory expenditures might arise from existing 
contracts between a municipality and private partners providing certain services to the mu-
nicipality or for the municipality in the long run. 
The annual budget requires the approval of the province confirming a structural and realistic 
balance (Dutch: structureel en reëel evenwicht) in a multi-year estimate100 (Municipalities Act, 
                                                     





article 203, paragraph 1). An approval can just be refused because of conflicts with the law or 
general financial interests (Municipalities Act, article 206). Approving the annual budget under 
certain conditions, such as changes regarding a specific expenditure item or the preparation 
of an austerity plan, is also on option for the provinces (Municipalities Act, article 208, para-
graph 4). Based on these legal requirements, the Ministry of the Interior and the provinces 
developed a number of guidelines in 2014, named Common Financial Monitoring Framework 
“A Question of Balance!” (Dutch: Gemeenschappelijk financieel toezichtkader “Kwestie van 
evenwicht!”), building upon a previous version from 2008. In addition to the guidelines, rec-
ommendations in case of financial problems are also part of the document (Rijksoverheid, 
2014b). However, because of a lack of legally enforceable and measurable standards, the judg-
ments by the provinces regarding a structural and realistic municipal balance are always based 
on more or less well-founded estimations, thereby also enabling variation across the local 
level and over time. If a province is not convinced of a municipality’s financial planning, espe-
cially regarding the balanced budget requirements, or if a municipality does not submit the 
annual budget in time, then the province can also decide to undertake preventive oversight 
on the municipality’s financial planning in the future (Allers, 2015, p. 462 f.). 
Once the financial year is over, the executive board must deliver the following to the municipal 
council: accounts on the administrative activities, an annual financial statement (Dutch: 
jaarrekening), and an annual report (Dutch: jaarverslag), focusing on the activities and devel-
opments of the municipality from a non-financial point of view (Municipalities Act, article 197, 
paragraph 1). The annual financial statement includes all revenues and expenditures of the 
municipality, and it shall be approved by the municipal council in the year following the finan-
cial year (Municipalities Act, article 198, paragraph 1). 
If the council has doubts concerning the lawfulness of any of the revenues or expenditures 
mentioned in the annual financial statement, then it informs the executive board about these 
(Municipalities Act, article 198, paragraph 2). Within two months, the executive board needs 
to send an own assessment of the doubts and a proposal for an indemnity resolution (Dutch: 
indemniteitsbesluit) to the council (Municipalities Act, article 198, paragraph 3). In the case of 
such a proposal of an indemnity resolution, the council needs to decide on the proposal before 
approving the annual financial statement (Municipalities Act, article 198, paragraph 4). If the 
annual financial statement is approved by the municipal council, then the executive board 
sends it to the province for informative purposes (Municipalities Act, article 200); if not, then 
the board sends it to the province, requesting an alternative approval (Municipalities Act, ar-
ticle 201). 
To control the financial management of the municipality in general, the municipal council 
should decide on suitable regulations (Municipalities Act, article 213, paragraph 1) and ap-
point one or more auditors to assess the annual financial statement (Municipalities Act, article 
213, paragraph 2). These options can be considered as additional measures to ensure bal-
anced budgets. 
On the revenues side, following article 216 of the Municipalities Act, the introduction, modi-
fication, or abolition of a municipal charge must be decided upon by the municipal council by 




information, such as the amount that needs to be paid, the criteria that a person or company 
must fulfil to be charged, and the underlying time period (Municipalities Act, article 217). In 
general, the amount of municipal taxes should not depend on the income, profits, or capital 
of the person or company charged (Municipalities Act, article 219, paragraph 2).101 
Considering municipal finances, a specific total debt ceiling for Dutch municipalities is not de-
fined by law (Peters & Vriesendorp, 2002; van der Lei, 2014). However, the implementation 
scheme financing decentralised authorities (Dutch: Uitvoeringsregeling Financiering decen-
trale overheden) regulates the term structures of debt by sub-national authorities. The ceiling 
for the average net short-term debt (Dutch: kasgeldlimiet) for municipalities is limited to 8.5% 
of the budgeted expenditures in each quarter of the fiscal year. Regarding long-term debt, a 
ceiling (Dutch: renterisiconorm) expressed by a maximum of 20% of credits with a duration of 
more than one year and flexible interest rates in relation to the budgeted spending applies to 
the municipalities as well. Since these requirements focus on new borrowing in relation to the 
municipal budget, an accumulation of debt over time is not prohibited. Furthermore, an em-
pirical study (Allers, 2015) has demonstrated that 38% out of a sample of 100 Dutch munici-
palities did not comply with the short-term debt ceiling in at least one quarter of 2010. On the 
other hand, 73% of the municipalities under investigation could at least double their long-
term debt before reaching the structural ceiling (Rijksoverheid, 2009; Allers, 2015, p. 461 f.; 
Allers & Merkus, 2013; de Widt, 2017, p. 201 ff.). 
If all the checks and balances do not prevent municipal budgets from being considerably un-
balanced, then article 12 of the Financial Relations Act (Dutch: Financiële-verhoudingswet) 
provides the legal framework to apply for supplementary payments from central government 
in order to maintain a municipality’s solvency, mainly since the national level is interested in 
guaranteeing the provision of public services by the municipalities.102 While local government 
bailouts were first legally introduced in the Netherlands in 1933, the current legal framework 
dates back to the year 1960 and has not underwent far-reaching changes since then. On closer 
inspection, the additional financial resources are not provided as loans, but as subsidies, even 
if a municipality can be considered as self-responsible for its own financial troubles. The finan-
cial means are provided from the municipal fund (Dutch: gemeentefonds), which is the regular 
source of general grants, thereby implying that bailouts entail burdens on the fund set up for 
all municipalities (Allers, 2015, pp. 451, 456; Peters & Vriesendorp, 2002; Allers & Merkus, 
2013; de Widt, 2017, p. 217).103 In line with the underlying legal norm, the municipalities re-
ceiving additional funds are often referred to as article-12 municipalities (Dutch: Artikel 12-
gemeenten). 
An additional allocation of funds is usually combined with requirements by the Ministry of the 
Interior to increase revenues and/or to decrease spending and therefore limitations of the 
                                                     
101 Taxes depending on income or corporate profits are charged by other levels of government. 
102 In addition, the options for Dutch municipalities to increase their own revenues are relatively limited; how-
ever, this possibility can be considered as a pre-condition for a no-bailout policy with reference to the munici-
palities’ own responsibility (Allers, 2015, p. 453). 
103 As a side effect, the guaranteed bailouts also enable Dutch municipalities to borrow money from banks at 




municipality’s autonomous decision-making. However, mandatory increases in local tax rates 
can be considered as rare measures, occurring 10 times since 1967 – four cases took place 
between 1998 and 2014 (Allers, 2015, p. 457). Overall, it can be concluded that municipal 
insolvencies are not intended in the Netherlands, while municipalities might be further re-
stricted in their decision-making leeway if their budgets are largely unbalanced. Increased in-
ter-municipal co-operation or municipal amalgamations, arranged by central government, can 
thus also be considered as strategies to improve the financial situation. 
From an empirical perspective, considerably unbalanced municipal budgets have not been a 
widespread problem in Dutch local government in recent years. Between 1999 and 2016, the 
annual number of article-12 municipalities ranged between 3 and 5 out of approximately 400 
municipalities and was comprised of the following ones: Lelystad (since 1987)104, Winschoten 
(1999–2003), Boskoop (2000–2010), Simpelveld (2003–2007), Neder-Betuwe (2004–2006), 
Nieuwkoop (2004–2006), Ouderkerk (2008–2009), Loppersum (2008–2013), Millingen aan de 
Rijn (2011–2014), Boarnsterhim (2012–2014), Ten Boer (2014–2016), Muiden (2015), and Vlis-
singen (2015–2016) (Rijksoverheid, 2016f).105 Also, the scope of the financial assistance can 
be considered as relatively low in recent years (Allers, 2015; Allers & Merkus, 2013). 
In comparison with other countries, it is surprising that guaranteed bailouts for Dutch local 
government in case of largely unbalanced budgets did not lead to a higher necessity of these 
measures, since this policy does not include any direct incentives for sustainable financial ac-
tivities. In addition, there is empirical evidence that municipalities improve their financial sit-
uations relatively quickly after receiving additional funds from central government (Allers, 
2015, p. 451 f.; Allers & Merkus, 2013). However, while the average number of article-12 mu-
nicipalities has not increased in recent years, Dutch municipalities have experienced some 
moderate budgeting pressure, at least since the early 1980s (van Helden, 1998, p. 100). From 
a more practical perspective, many municipalities had to find strategies to deal with a de-
crease in revenues and an increase of tasks.106 How these challenges were addressed in the 
context of the Financial Crisis since 2007 is one of the main questions analysed at later stages 
of this study. 
Taken together, various laws and decrees, including the Municipalities Act, specify the budg-
eting rules at the Dutch local level. Relatively strict balanced budget requirements for local 
authorities and supervisory routines by the provinces are also part of the legal framework, 
with the intention of excluding major deficit spending in the long run. Considerably unbal-
anced budgets have been observed only in a relatively small number of Dutch municipalities 
                                                     
104 Lelystad has received financial contributions according to article 12 since 1987 to compensate for additional 
costs related to spatial structuring decided upon by central government. Therefore, Lelystad is an exception, 
since financial difficulties are not the reason for the additional funds (Rijksoverheid, 2016f). 
105 Back in 1967, when the first bailouts were undertaken, about 15% of the Dutch municipalities were affected. 
As a result of amalgamations of relatively small municipalities, as well as changes in the general distribution of 
financial means to the municipalities, this share has decreased considerably since the 1970s (Allers, 2015, p. 
456 f.). 
106 Expectations on the future developments of municipal finance are also published by the Centre for Research 
on Local Government Economics (Dutch: Centrum voor Onderzoek van de Economie van de Lagere Overheden, 




in recent years. However, the development of municipal debt will be analysed later in this 
study. In line with the typical structure of a balance sheet, the following sub-chapters address 
the role and requirements of municipal revenues (7.4.1) and municipal expenses (7.4.2) in the 
Netherlands in more detail. 
 
7.4.1. Municipal revenues 
Municipal revenues in the Netherlands are composed of three different types: general grants 
(Dutch: Gemeentefonds), specific grants (Dutch: Specifieke uitkeringen), and own income 
(Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 248; de Kam et al., 2015, p. 274 ff.). While the first two 
describe transfers from central government, the latter is generated by the municipalities di-
rectly. The amount of specific grants per municipality correlates with the amount of general 
grants (Allers & Kwakkel, 2016, p. 112). In recent decades, the composition of these three 
types of municipal revenues has changed widely. While the share of specific grants as part of 
the total municipal revenues has decreased, the share of general grants and own income have 
increased (Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, p. 104; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Kon-
inkrijksrelaties, 2014, p. 41). 
The design of the system of Dutch state revenues assigns the responsibility to levy taxes mainly 
to central government. Since the legal possibilities of generating own income are relatively 
limited for local government, municipalities largely depend on regular grants provided by na-
tional government (Allers, 2015, p. 455; Overmans, 2017, p. 173 f.; Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 
67; Allers, 2009, p. 283; Vollaard et al., 2018, p. 19 f.; van der Woude, 2018, p. 242). Within 
this system of financial compensation between different levels of government, local authori-
ties are, in theory, autonomous regarding the use of their financial resources, apart from the 
grants provided for specific tasks. In practice, however, their autonomy is sometimes limited, 
since the specific grants do not cover the expenses for obligatory tasks in all cases, which 
means that other municipal revenues need to be used to fill the gap (Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, 
p. 103). In accordance with the types of municipal revenues, the following sub-chapters ad-
dress the role and determination of general grants and specific grants, representing the two 
types of transfers from central government (7.4.1.1) as well as own municipal resources 
(7.4.1.2) in more detail. 
 
7.4.1.1. General grants and specific grants 
The Financial Relations Act (Dutch: Financiële-verhoudingswet) is the legal basis for the gen-
eral and specific grants that Dutch municipalities receive. General grants, which are distrib-
uted from the so-called municipal fund (Dutch: gemeentefonds), are subdivided into four 




ances (Dutch: Artikel 12 uitkering), decentralisation allowances (Dutch: Decentralisatie-uitker-
ing), and integration allowances (Dutch: Integratie-uitkering) (Vereniging van Nederlandse Ge-
meenten, 2014, p. 9 f.; van der Woude, 2018, p. 242; de Kam et al., 2015, p. 276 f.). 
The annual change in the overall budget of the municipal fund was proportionally linked to 
the changes in expenditures at the national level by an agreement between central govern-
ment and the Association of Dutch Municipalities in 1987. This implies that if cutbacks are 
considered to be necessary, then they will be realised equally at the central and local levels. 
However, certain exceptions are possible, for example in the case of expenditures by central 
government, which are considered to be outside the regular budget (Denters & Klok, 2005, 
pp. 67, 73; Bos, 2013, p. 43; Allers, 2009, p. 285; van der Woude, 2018, p. 245 f.). 
In terms of the four above-mentioned types of payment in relation to general grants, first, 
general allowances refer to the share of funds that are not earmarked, and the usage is de-
cided upon by the municipal council (Financial Relations Act, article 6 f.). Second, article-12 
allowances are additional payments solely provided to municipalities with financial difficulties 
(Financial Relations Act, article 12). Third, decentralisation allowances are only distributed to 
certain municipalities with facilities of importance beyond municipal boarders, such as sea-
ports and municipal museums (Financial Relations Act, article 13, paragraph 4). Fourth, inte-
gration allowances are paid to all municipalities in order to balance financial advantages or 
disadvantages that are caused by the distributions of other funds (Financial Relations Act, ar-
ticle 13, paragraph 3) (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2014, p. 9 f.). 
The exact amount that a municipality receives from the municipal fund is calculated by taking 
into account factors such as the number of inhabitants and the size of the territory, as well as 
socio-economic factors (Financial Relations Act, article 8). This also implies variation across 
the local level in terms of the scope of grants from central government both in absolute num-
bers and in relation to other sources of income (Allers, 2009, pp. 283, 290; van der Woude, 
2018, p. 243 ff.). An overview of all factors is provided in table 12. 
Table 12: Categories and factors of relevance for the distribution of funds to the municipalities according to article 8, para-
graph 1, of the Financial Relations Act (Own translation) 
Categories Factors 
a) Taxation capacities of the municipalities in respect 
of property taxes (OZB) 
 Taxation capacities in respect of housing 
 Taxation capacities other than housing 
b) The inhabitants of the municipalities  Age 
 Place of residence 
 Income 
 Entitlement for benefits 
 Belonging to a minority group 
 Employment at municipal facilities 
c) The territories of the municipalities  Surface area 
 Soil conditions 
 Historical core 
d) The buildings in the municipalities  Built-up area 
 Living space 
 Historical living space 
 Need for renovation of buildings 





e) Fixed amounts for municipalities  Fixed amounts for the four largest cities 
 Fixed amounts for the Wadden Sea municipalities 
 Fixed amounts for all municipalities 




Own taxation capacities are taken into account when the amount of a municipality’s general 
grant is determined, and this might cause unwanted side effects when municipalities consider 
themselves to be disadvantaged because of their comparably high taxation capacities, which 
could potentially lead to low efforts to keep these capacities. Furthermore, local authorities 
might attempt to change the composition of the local population by domiciling persons with 
certain social characteristics in order to maximise transfers from central governments, as long 
as the costs arising from this measure are not higher than the additional earnings. 
In addition to grants from the municipal fund, a VAT compensation fund (Dutch: Btw-compen-
satiefonds) offers municipalities the opportunity to reclaim VAT expenditure for services or 
goods that are purchased externally. The law on the VAT compensation fund (Dutch: Wet op 
het BTW-compensatiefonds) is the legal basis hereof. The variety of examples that fulfil the 
necessary criterion range from the acquisition of office supplies to the construction of roads 
and the outsourcing of public services, such as waste collection (Vereniging van Nederlandse 
Gemeenten, 2014, p. 11). 
According to article 108, paragraph 3, of the Municipalities Act, central government must re-
imburse all the costs if it requests that municipalities perform certain tasks. Against this back-
ground, specific grants are provided for the execution of certain delegated tasks, primarily in 
the policy areas of employment and social affairs. In practice, the financial means are allocated 
by the responsible ministries at the national level. Compared to general grants, the share of 
specific grants that are not spent must be repaid to central government (Vereniging van Ne-
derlandse Gemeenten, 2014, p. 11; van der Woude, 2018, p. 247 f.; de Kam et al., 2015, p. 
278).107 
Detailed provisions on specific grants are regulated in the Financial Relations Act (article 15a 
ff.). Regarding this type of fund, a distinction between regular, temporally limited, and unique 
payments is made, and it is also linked to the necessary legal requirements in order to initiate 
the payment (Financial Relations Act, article 17). With respect to the determination of the 
amount of specific grants, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations depends on in-
formation about expenditures in the context of each municipality’s delegated tasks. There-
fore, the executive boards of the municipalities are obliged to report these costs annually (Fi-
nancial Relations Act, article 17a). While the number of specific grants has increased over 
time, initiatives to merge certain types of these financial allocations led to a reduction to 22 
specific grants in 2016 (van der Woude, 2018, p. 248). 
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Overall, general grants and specific grants typically constitute the largest shares of revenues 
for Dutch municipalities. While specific provisions determine the amount of both types of rev-
enues that each municipality receives, an own influence on the scope of the financial means 
obtained is hardly possible. This is different in the case of the municipalities’ own income, 
which will be considered in the next sub-chapter. 
 
7.4.1.2. Own income 
The municipalities’ own income, as a further source of revenue alongside transfers from cen-
tral government, can be subdivided into local taxes and other own resources (Dutch: Overige 
eigen middelen, OEM) (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2014, p. 12). Local taxes, on 
the one hand, can be levied on property, among a limited number of other purposes, and 
other own resources, on the other hand, result from, for example, ticket sales for a municipal 
swimming pool, museum, or theatre. Decisions regarding the introduction, adjustments, and 
abolition of local taxes and local fees are made by the municipal council. Therefore, a strategic 
use to reach certain policy objectives is possible (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 
2014, p. 12 f.; van der Woude, 2018, p. 248 f.). 
According to article 132, paragraph 6, of the Constitution, the types of local taxes are limited 
to those mentioned in the Municipalities Act. With regard to the autonomy of the different 
sources of municipal income, the highest degree of independence from other levels of gov-
ernment is given for local taxes and other own resources. Within the possible types of local 
taxes, the municipalities can decide upon which ones they consider to be reasonable for their 
territorial communities by taking local conditions into account. Municipalities are also auton-
omous concerning the use of financial means originating from own revenues (Backes & van 
der Woude, 2013, p. 248 f.). 
The types of local taxes in line with the Municipalities Act include a tax on immovable property 
within the municipality (Dutch: onroerendezaakbelasting, ozb), such as real estate (Municipal-
ities Act, article 220). A second property tax can be levied on movable housing or business 
space (Dutch: roerende woon- en bedrijfsruimten belasting) that is permanently located 
within the municipality, such as caravans and houseboats (Municipalities Act, 221). A further 
benefit charge (Dutch: baatbelasting) can be collected for property within a certain part of the 
municipality that benefits from facilities established by the local level (Municipalities Act, ar-
ticle 222). 
Municipalities can levy a commuter charge (Dutch: forensenbelasting) for persons whose main 
residence is not in a certain municipality but who spend more than 90 nights per year there 
(Municipalities Act, article 223). Furthermore, municipalities are allowed to charge a tourist 
tax (Dutch: toeristenbelasting) for persons who are not registered in a certain municipality. In 
this regard, those offering accommodation can be charged in place of the persons staying 
there (Municipalities Act, article 224). In the context of parking regulations (Dutch: parkeer-




between two possible cases: first, a fee for parking a vehicle at a certain place during a certain 
period of time and, second, a fee for permission to park a vehicle with a certain licence place 
in a certain area (Municipalities Act, article 225). 
Dutch municipalities are also allowed to charge dog owners a dog fee (Dutch: honden-
belasting). The tax needs to be levied depending on the number of dogs being kept (Munici-
palities Act, article 226). Advertising tax (Dutch: reclamebelasting) for advertisements that are 
visible from public roads is a further type of tax that municipalities can levy in the Netherlands 
(Municipalities Act, article 227). Municipalities are also allowed to charge a fee for using public 
spaces (Dutch: precariobelasting) (Municipalities Act, article 228). A restaurant using the pub-
lic space in front of its building for serving food and drinks would be an example of a taxable 
case in line with the Municipalities Act. Furthermore, municipalities can levy two types of sew-
age charges (Dutch: rioolheffing): one for the collection and transport of domestic and indus-
trial waste water, and another for the collection and process of rainwater as well as the avoid-
ance of negative effects of the groundwater level (Municipalities Act, article 228a). In the case 
of the sewage charge, as a charge linked to a certain purpose (Dutch: bestemmings-
belastingen), the charge may not exceed the costs of providing the service (Vereniging van 
Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2014, p. 14). 
Taken together, the Dutch Municipalities Act lists 10 explicit types of taxes/charges/fees108 
that a municipal council can choose to introduce. None of these local taxes need to be levied 
by local authorities. An overview of the types of municipal taxes according to the Municipali-
ties Act is provided in table 13. 109 
Table 13: Types of taxes and charges according to the Municipalities Act 
Name of the tax or charge (English) Name of the tax or charge (Dutch) Main legal source within 
the Municipalities Act 
Property tax on immovable property110 Onroerendezaakbelasting, ozb Article 220 
Property tax on movable housing or 
business space 
Roerende woon- en bedrijfsruimten 
belasting 
Article 221 
Benefit charge Baatbelasting Article 222 
Commuter charge Forensenbelasting Article 223 
Tourist tax Toeristenbelasting Article 224 
Parking fee Parkeerregulering Article 225 
Dog tax Hondenbelasting Article 226 
Advertising tax Reclamebelasting Article 227 
Public space usage fee Precariobelasting Article 228 
Sewage charge111 Rioolheffing Article 228a 
                                                     
108 While the terms taxes, charges, and fees are not always used consistently, the 10 types introduced are usu-
ally labelled as local taxes. 
109 A detailed annual overview of the tax revenues from a citizens’ perspective is provided by COELO. The re-
ports include a comparison of the municipalities, as well as the developments since the previous year. See Hoe-
ben et al. (2017) and Allers et al. (2016) for the latest versions. For the latest versions with a focus on the larg-
est municipalities and housing costs, see Hoeben and de Natris (2018), Hoeben and Kwakkel (2017), and Hoe-
ben and Kwakkel (2016). 
110 Within its statistical publications, the CBS uses a further distinction between property tax on immovable 
property for users and owners. 




In practice, the tax on immovable property usually generates the largest share of the munici-
palities’ own income (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2014, p. 14). However, the 
nature of taxes implies variation in the amount that is generated with each type across the 
municipal level and over time. Compared to taxes on income and corporate gains, the objects 
and activities taxed at the Dutch local level are generally less influenced by economic devel-
opments. However, the building of houses by private persons, as well as settlement in a cer-
tain region in the first place, the number of persons commuting to another city for work, and 
the number of tourists are examples of factors that are also linked to the economic situation, 
among other conditions. 
Article 229 of the Municipalities Act regulates that fees (Dutch: retributies) for the use of mu-
nicipal property and public services can be charged and thus constitutes the legal basis for the 
municipalities’ other own resources. The fees need to be fixed and generally based on the 
costs incurred (Municipalities Act, article 229b). 
Ticket sales for leisure activities are an example of a common way in which other own re-
sources are generated. For many years, land development (Dutch: grondexploitatie) was also 
a typical source of income for municipalities. By making land ready for building and selling, 
municipalities were able to gain profits. However, as a result of the Financial Crisis since 2007, 
the situation has changed in recent years, and some municipalities also suffered losses from 
land development. In addition, other own resources can be generated with financial opera-
tions (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2014, pp. 16, 39). Compared to local taxes, 
where 10 permitted types are defined by law, the types of local fees are subject to broader 
variation. 
Within its statistical publications, the CBS distinguishes between the following types of munic-
ipal fees: 
 Sewage charges domestic/industrial (Dutch: Rioolheffing huishoudelijk/bedrijfsafval) 
 Sewage charges groundwater and rainwater (Dutch: Rioolheffing grond- en hemelwa-
ter) 
 Cleaning fees and waste disposal (Dutch: Reinigingsrechten en afvalstoffenheffing) 
 Cemetery fees (Dutch: Begraafplaatsrechten) 
 Building permits (Dutch: Bouwvergunningen) 
 Public affairs secretary fees (Dutch: Secretarieleges burgerzaken) 
 Market fees (Dutch: Marktgelden) 
In summary, Dutch municipalities’ permitted additional sources of income, next to transfers 
from central government, are also defined by law. In this context, the list of possible local 
taxes is definitive. Furthermore, municipal fees needs generally be based on the actual costs. 
Both provisions contribute to the difficulty that municipalities face in generating a substantial 
share of own revenues. Following these insights on the income side of local balance sheets, 





7.4.2. Municipal expenses 
Performing mandatory or voluntary tasks is linked to expenditures. As outlined before, Dutch 
municipalities are responsible for social services, city physical planning, housing policies, and 
sewage services, among other duties. Additional costs arise from maintaining the local admin-
istration, including personnel and office space. 
While municipal income via specific grants from central government is earmarked for certain 
expenditures, the municipality can decide on the use of the rest of its budget. However, vari-
ous mandatory tasks and existing commitments might considerably limit the decision-making 
scope. From an accounting perspective, a further general distinction between one-time costs 
and regular expenses is possible. As outlined before, certain municipal expenditures are also 
compulsory by law in the Netherlands. These are the interest on loans, the expenditures that 
are established by national legislation, and the costs arising from the implementation of laws 
(Municipalities Act, article 193). 
From a more practical perspective, public expenses are typically divided into types of spend-
ing, such as personnel costs, subsidies, pensions, and depreciation costs, or across policy ar-
eas. As at other administrative layers and in other countries, a large part of the budget is spent 
on municipal personnel at the Dutch municipal level (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 
2014, p. 22). In the Netherlands, the official categorisation of municipal expenditures by the 
CBS is based on the so-called Information for Third Parties (Dutch: Informatie voor Derden, 
Iv3) system, which the municipalities also use to report their finances to central government 
and which includes the following main policy areas or categories (Rijksoverheid, 2017b; Min-
isterie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2017b):112 
 General administration (Dutch: Algemeen bestuur) 
 Public order and safety (Dutch: Openbare orde en veiligheid) 
 Traffic, transport and water management (Dutch: Verkeer, vervoer en waterstaat) 
 Economic affairs (Dutch: Economische zaken) 
 Education (Dutch: Onderwijs) 
 Culture and recreation (Dutch: Cultuur en recreatie) 
 Social services (Dutch: Sociale voorzieningen en maatschappelijke dienstverlening) 
 Public health and environment (Dutch: Volksgezondheid en milieu) 
 Spatial planning and housing (Dutch: Ruimtelijke ordening en volkshuisvesting) 
 Financing and means for universal coverage (Dutch: Financiering en algemene dekking-
smiddel) 
Regarding the distinction between policy areas, the categorisation is also employed to indicate 
municipal revenues in order to calculate the balance within each policy area. At a later stage, 
the categorisation will be used for the analyses in this study. 
                                                     




Taken together, Dutch municipalities are also restricted to a certain extent regarding their 
finances on the expenditure side because of mandatory tasks and services largely correspond-
ing to financial transfers from central government, as well as partially fixed expenses, for ex-
ample in areas such as personnel and office costs. From an analytical perspective, the subdi-
vision of expenses into policy areas with municipal competences, including sub-categories, 
can be considered as useful when aiming to examine financial developments over time. How-
ever, before the analyses of local public finances in times of the recent Financial Crisis at a 
later stage of this study, the following sub-chapter assesses general trends and developments 
at the Dutch local level to gain an insight into developments taking place relatively independ-
ent of the Crisis. 
 
7.5. Trends and developments at the local level of government in the 
Netherlands 
This chapter assesses general trends and developments at the Dutch local level in recent dec-
ades. The main question is as follows: How have local government and local governance in the 
Netherlands changed since the late 1970s? These insights will help to understand the impact 
of and responses to the Financial Crisis since 2007 in a later step, since all developments that 
are identified as already ongoing by the time of the emergence of the crisis are not caused by 
the crisis. However, a major crisis is certainly able to influence ongoing developments. Those 
interactions will also be analysed at a later stage of this study. 
Since the theoretical insights from chapter 2 are applied in order to assess recent trends and 
developments at the Dutch local level, the following sub-chapters are subdivided into decen-
tralisation of tasks (7.5.1), municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation (7.5.2), man-
agement changes (7.5.3), Europeanisation (7.5.4), citizen participation (7.5.5), and digitalisa-
tion of public services (7.5.6). A final sub-chapter summarises the developments in the Neth-
erlands, with a focus on mutual dependences and a comparison with the general develop-
ments identified in chapter 2 (7.5.7). 
 
7.5.1. Decentralisation of tasks 
As is the case in many Western countries, the Netherlands has followed the common trend of 
shifting responsibilities from central to local government in recent years. According to article 
117 of the Municipalities Act, central government is even obliged to promote decentralisation 
in favour of the municipalities. However, compared to various other Western European coun-
tries, many public utilities in the Netherlands have already been located at the municipal level 
since their foundation (van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2007, p. 108 f.). 
From a historical perspective, the Netherlands has experienced phases of both centralisation 




distinguishes three major periods since 1848 regarding the main governmental authority 
within the Dutch system of multi-level governance. The first is a unitary and decentralised 
state between 1848 and 1928.113 Municipalities played a major role in education, infrastruc-
ture, safety, and social policies during this period. Increasing expenditures in these policy ar-
eas were financed by levying higher local taxes, thereby leading to major gaps between the 
financial affairs of different municipalities and hence substantial differences in the quality and 
scope of local-level service delivery. These differences increasingly incentivised citizens to 
move from one municipality to another for reasons of either lower taxation or better services, 
or both. This type of rational behaviour on the side of citizens undermined local-level solidarity 
and had an overall negative impact on local-level financial affairs and quality of service deliv-
ery (Bos, 2010, p. 35 ff.). 
In 1929, the national municipal fund was introduced to address these problems, which marks 
the beginning of the second period, namely a centralised welfare state, lasting till 1982. Based 
on the factors of income and need, a compensation mechanism between the municipalities 
was created. However, with the reduction in tax revenues and the increase in spending on 
social policies during the 1930s’ economic downturn, financial problems at the local level were 
exacerbated. Additional funds from the central level were introduced to improve the financial 
situation of Dutch municipalities. While local taxes remained an important source of revenues, 
the autonomy of municipalities to determine their own taxation policies was largely restricted 
over the next decades. By taking over more responsibilities, especially for social security and 
healthcare, the Dutch national government gradually became more important than the other 
administrative levels. This trend towards a more centralised state continued until 1982 (Bos, 
2010, p. 37 f.; van der Woude, 2018, p. 242). 
Increasing public expenditure and decreasing employment rates, combined with a stagnating 
economy, partially dating back to the second oil crisis, put the welfare state under pressure 
both in the Netherlands and in most other industrial countries (Bos, 2010, p. 38; Taylor-Gooby, 
2001; Van den Berg et al., 2015). A smaller and more decentralised welfare state, which char-
acterises the third phase since 1983, was seen as a way to address these challenges. This de-
velopment towards a more decentralised provision of public services, also in connection with 
the rise of an enabling state, still continues today. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, desires to downsize central governments and to reduce government 
expenditure in general stimulated decentralisation measures. As a consequence, Dutch mu-
nicipalities received additional responsibilities in the policy areas of public housing, urban re-
newal, education, social security, social work, child care, and youth work, among others (Dent-
ers & Klok, 2005, p. 72). Furthermore, larger cities increased their involvement in local eco-
nomic development (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 73). However, to realise savings, the compen-
sation payments by central government to local government were lower, compared to previ-
ous expenditures on the provision of the corresponding public services. These savings were 
justified as efficiency gains from the decentralisation measures (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 72). 
In the 1990s, partially negative experiences in the context of decentralisation measures were 
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observed in the area of healthcare. Weak administrative control and a lack of political interest 
led to relatively negative evaluations of the municipal fulfilment of tasks (de Vries, 2000, p. 
209). 
In 2006, central government transferred a number of tasks related to the care of elderly and 
handicapped people to the municipalities as part of a continuous process of increasing respon-
sibilities at lower levels of government (Bos, 2010, p. 38 f.). However, more extensive decen-
tralisation measures, also involving these policy areas, followed in more recent years. Addi-
tional financial pressure from the beginning of the Financial Crisis since 2007 led to various 
budget cuts and the search for further saving potentials at all levels of government (Ver-
meulen, 2015, p. 2). The Dutch central government consequently announced far-reaching de-
centralisation measures in the area of social policies in their 2012 coalition agreement (van 
Nijendaal, 2014, p. 85 f.). The measures came into effect on January 1st, 2015 (Rijksoverheid, 
2015a; Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2016) and are perfectly in line with the developments 
towards a more decentralised state since 1983 as well as the developments in neighbouring 
countries (Van den Berg et al., 2015). 
According to the Central Planning Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, 
2013; Centraal Planbureau, 2014), on the one hand, expected economies of scope and a more 
effective task fulfilment are the main opportunities of the measures. On the other hand, pos-
sible diseconomies of scale and differences in the quality and level of services are stated as 
the main risks. By making the municipal level the main supplier of social services, a better 
tailoring of the services to local needs and an overall increase in efficiency through prevention 
and early intervention are also expected (Vermeulen, 2015, p. 2). A large group of those re-
ceiving social services will now receive only services provided by the municipal level, which 
simplifies responsibilities and contacts, and which might generate further economies of scale 
as a result of interaction effects between the different types of services (Vermeulen, 2015, p. 
7 ff.) Apart from increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of public services, strengthening 
the role of local democracy was an additional goals of the reform (Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, 
p. 117). 
On closer inspection, the latest decentralisation measures focused on three sub-sections of 
social policies: social support, labour market participation, and youth care (Rijksoverheid, 
2015a; Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2016). First, the 2015 Social Support Law (Dutch: Wet 
maatschappelijke ondersteuning) transferred responsibilities related to long-term care ser-
vices to the local level. With the aim of enabling people to live in their own homes instead of 
a care institution for as long as possible, the municipalities provide relevant services to chron-
ically ill, disabled, and elderly persons (Rijksoverheid, 2015b; van Nijendaal, 2014, p. 90 f.; 
Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2016). 
Additional responsibilities for the municipalities were also implemented in the policy area of 
labour market participation as the second element of the reform. While the local level was 
already in charge of the support of people with low income and low labour market access for 
disabled persons, the 2015 Participation Law (Dutch: Participatiewet) expanded the responsi-




search assistance for all citizens (van Nijendaal, 2014, p. 93; Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 
2016). 
Third, decentralisation reforms included the pooling of youth care policies at the municipal 
level. Various public authorities at different administrative levels were previously in charge of 
youth-related public tasks, partially resulting in long waiting times, increasing costs, and vari-
ous cases of serious incidents involving children in multi-problem families, which have been 
ascribed to co-ordination failures between the authorities in charge. Having the municipalities 
as the single point of contact in a unified legal and financial framework is expected to simplify 
the responsibilities and to increase efficiency also in this context. With the new 2015 Youth 
Law (Dutch: Jeugdwet), the municipalities will be in charge of all responsibilities regarding the 
support and care of young people (van Nijendaal, 2014, p. 95; Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 
2016). 
Taken together, the 2015 decentralisation reforms can be considered as relatively extensive, 
compared to the changes in previous years. With the transfer of social services to the local 
level, budget cuts were realised, since the budget for the provision of the services was re-
duced, compared to the budget available for the service provision by central government. This 
approach was already chosen in previous decentralisation reforms in the Netherlands. In the 
context of the measures implemented in 2015, the intended budget cuts amounted to ap-
proximately 10% in general and considerably more for some separate tasks (Vermeulen, 2015, 
p. 3 f., 9 f.). 
In summary, decentralisation measures have largely changed the distribution of tasks be-
tween the administrative levels in the Netherlands in a continuous process in recent decades. 
As a result, the municipal level in particular has gained additional importance (Allers & Steiner, 
2015, p. 7). When considering the various reform initiatives in the Netherlands in the last dec-
ades, the decentralisation measures implemented in 2015, which partially relate back to the 
Financial Crisis since 2007, are among the largest in scope regarding the financial responsibil-
ities transferred to a lower administrative level. Another important trend in Dutch local gov-
ernment is the formation of larger public authorities by municipal mergers, accompanied by 
municipal co-operation. These developments will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
7.5.2. Municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation 
From a comparative perspective, the Netherlands is mid-ranging in terms of the scope of 
amalgamations in recent decades. Between 1950 and 2007, the number of municipalities de-
creased from 1,015 to 443, or 56%. Table 14 provides a long-term view of the development of 
the number of Dutch municipalities between 1851 and 2018. The data illustrate that territorial 
reforms including a decreasing number of municipalities because of amalgamations have been 
a continuing process since the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the pace 
of the reduction in that number has risen in recent decades. While the territorial boundaries 




almost unchanged in recent decades (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 234; Denters et al., 
2014, p. 3; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 15 f.; Voermans 
& Waling, 2018, p. 207 ff.). 
Table 14: Development of the number of Dutch municipalities, 1851–2018 (Data sources: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 
2018a; De Ceuninck et al., 2010, p. 810) 
Year 1851 1880 1900 1928 1960 1970 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Count 1,209 1,126 1,120 1,079 994 913 672 647 647 646 636 633 
 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Count 625 572 548 538 537 504 496 489 483 467 458 443 
 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018  
Count 443 441 431 418 415 408 403 393 390 388 380  
 
Regarding the size of the municipalities in terms of inhabitants, a wide variation can be ob-
served, existing already since the introduction of the current municipal structure in 1851 
(Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 233). Geographical conditions, such as a number of islands, 
describe unusual difficulties in the context of municipal amalgamations. Taking into account 
the Dutch population of roughly 17.081 million people in 2017 (Centraal Bureau voor de Statis-
tiek, 2018b), a municipality consisted of an average of approximately 44,023 inhabitants. As a 
result of the continuous process of amalgamations, this figure increased significantly from ap-
proximately 2,500 inhabitants per municipality in 1851 (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 
234; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 16 f.). 
In the debates on municipal reforms, amalgamations in the Netherlands were generally justi-
fied by the lack of space and the need for larger areas for further industrialisation and urban-
isation, without the possible interference of diverse political interests and administrative bur-
dens, as well as the power to govern more efficiently and effectively at the local level (De 
Ceuninck et al., 2010, p. 815). The need to increase the municipal level’s ability to address 
local and regional problems was also indicated when municipal amalgamations were dis-
cussed (Hendriks & Schaap, 2010, p. 113). In general, amalgamations were always encouraged 
by national government, while the municipalities involved were often not in favour of mer-
gers. From a legal perspective, Cabinet and Parliament have the authorisation for territorial 
reorganisation, according to article 123, paragraph 1, of the Constitution. Provinces or munic-
ipalities do not need to approve intended territorial changes. However, in 1984, a law on the 
process of territorial reforms at the local level was introduced, which includes regulations on 
formal consultations of the municipalities if municipal mergers are intended (Rijksoverheid, 
2014a). 
In a government declaration in November 2012, Prime Minister Rutte justified the plans of 
“municipalities with populations of at least 100,000 inhabitants in principle” (2012), as stated 
in the coalition agreement by “considerations of cost and efficiency and to ensure continuing 
high quality” (2012). Taking into account the current Dutch population of about 17.081 million 
people (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2018b), these plans imply a maximum of 170 mu-
nicipalities – less than half the current number. Considering the current government’s posi-




amalgamations and a decreasing number of Dutch municipalities will continue over the next 
years. 
Allers and Geertsema (2016) recently conducted a quantitative analysis regarding the ques-
tion of whether municipal amalgamations affected local government spending, taxation, and 
service provision in the Netherlands.114 They have concluded that “there is no significant effect 
on total per capita municipal spending before or after amalgamation” (p. 678) and that “prop-
erty tax revenue is not affected by amalgamations either” (p. 678). However, a reduction of 
expenditures on administration affairs after amalgamations is a statistically proven result. 
Overall, economies of scale in the context of municipal mergers appeared to be relatively lim-
ited following this study. The question regarding the optimal size of a Dutch municipality was 
recently addressed by Bikker and van der Linde (2016). Based on an analysis of local-level ex-
penditure in relation to the population, they found an optimum size of municipalities of 66,260 
inhabitants in 2014, and hence unused economies of scale of 17% for an average municipality. 
Interestingly, this suggested number of inhabitants deviates significantly from the ideas of the 
current coalition government. 
Apart from municipal amalgamations, inter-municipal co-operation, as a more flexible ap-
proach, has been a long-standing tradition in the Netherlands, and it can still be considered as 
increasing in recent years, especially regarding relatively expensive infrastructure services, 
such as waste collection and disposal (Niaounakis & Blank, 2017; Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 69; 
Steen et al., 2017, p. 60; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, pp. 
15 f., 86 f.; Voermans & Waling, 2018, p. 226 ff.). The Municipalities Act of 1851 has already 
permitted co-operation between municipalities, but a narrow legal interpretation has pre-
vented a broad dissemination (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007b, p. 143). Today, the Joint Arrange-
ments Act (Dutch: Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen, WGR), first issued in 1950 and largely 
revised in 1985, provides the main legal framework for co-operation between public authori-
ties on the same administrative level as well as across different levels of the administrative 
sub-division. The introduction of the act also led to a high increase in inter-municipal co-oper-
ation in practice (Rijksoverheid, 2016d; Hulst & van Montfort, 2007b, pp. 143; 146 ff.; Minis-
terie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 86 f.). 
While co-operation is generally voluntary, and given that single-purpose arrangements domi-
nate, in some areas, such as fire and ambulance services, inter-municipal co-operation is re-
quired by law (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007b, p. 145 ff.; Allers & de Greef, 2018, p. 131; Vereni-
ging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2014, p. 41). The decentralisation measures implemented 
in 2015 can also be considered as intended to increase municipal co-operation, since many 
municipalities are hardly able to perform the additional tasks alone and at relatively short 
notice (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2014, p. 48). In recent years, co-operation in 
the form of networks of multiple municipalities, aiming to provide certain public services to-
gether, has become more common in Dutch local government as well (Backes & van der 
Woude, 2013, p. 242 f.). However, as in many other countries, inter-municipal co-operation 
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often lacks democratic accountability in the Netherlands. Partially related to the low political 
profile and often technical questions in relation to most of the municipal tasks concerned, the 
co-operations are mainly managed by civil servants. Elected representatives are hardly in-
volved in the decision-making processes in practice (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007b, p. 162; Min-
isterie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 88). 
From a statistical perspective, Dutch municipalities maintained 779 inter-municipal partner-
ships in 2016. Each municipality is part of 16 partnerships on average, and the average number 
of participants in each partnership is eight. However, a wide variation concerning the number 
of participants in inter-municipal co-operations can be observed. While the smallest co-oper-
ation includes two partners, the largest one has 54. Among the different policy areas with local 
competences, spatial planning, environmental affairs, and social services are most common in 
terms of co-operative agreements. Overall, approximately 16% of all municipal expenses were 
realised as part of inter-municipal co-operations in 2013 (Boogers et al., 2016, pp. 26, 29; Min-
isterie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 87 f.). 
While increases in efficiency are the main argument for inter-municipal co-operation, the re-
sults of a recent empirical study (Allers & de Greef, 2018) do not support this assumption 
based on analyses at the Dutch local level between 2005 and 2013. On closer inspection, there 
was no evidence that total spending reduced in the case of inter-municipal co-operation. On 
the contrary, while this form of co-operation left expenditure in medium-sized municipalities 
largely unaffected, expenditure in small and large municipalities seemed to increase as a result 
of the co-operation. However, in the area of tax collection, efficiency gains could be observed; 
however, considering a municipality’s overall balance sheet, the share of this field is generally 
relatively small. While increases in the public service quality might provide an explanation for 
additional costs in the case of inter-municipal co-operation, the authors did not find evidence 
for this hypotheses when measuring the quality of public services indirectly by observing 
trends in house prices, which are considered to be indicators of the citizens’ willingness to pay 
for housing in a certain municipality, partially linked to the municipality’s provision of public 
services. 
Another recent study (Niaounakis & Blank, 2017) has addressed the effects of inter-municipal 
co-operation in the Netherlands by solely focusing on collaboration between municipal tax 
departments and cost efficiency. In this regard, economies of scale were identified. While the 
provision of the related public services for roughly 10,000 inhabitants was calculated as about 
30% less efficient, compared to the optimal value, it has also been concluded that additional 
efficiency gains are largely not given if the services are provided for more than 60,000 inhab-
itants. In this context, it needs to be noted that tax collection is a rather repetitive type of 
public service, and possibilities to increase efficiency might largely differ for other types of 
services.  
Taken together, municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation are long-standing tra-
ditions in the Netherlands. As a result of central government’s intention to increase the ad-
ministrative efficiency at the local level, municipalities were merged in a continuous process 
since the early days of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This development can be expected to 




is so far hardly ideologically influenced. Following these insights into territorial reforms and 
municipal co-operation in the Netherlands, changes in the management approaches within 
the municipalities’ administrations are the topic of the next sub-chapter. 
 
7.5.3. Management changes 
In recent decades, local governance in the Netherlands has widely been influenced by two 
reform waves: the first one in line with NPM and the second one characterised by the partial 
abandonment of previous reform efforts. Apart from variation in the scope and the time pe-
riod, both trends were common at various levels of government in many Western countries. 
Based on new financial-economic rationales, NPM-related ideas were adopted at the Dutch 
local level from the late 1970s onwards. As a result, the administration of many municipalities 
was slimmed down by the use of privatisation measures and the outsourcing of tasks. This was 
mainly realised by transferring municipal tasks to third-sector organisations, especially in the 
areas of culture, sports, and education, to private firms or newly established production units, 
together with other municipalities, for example in the context of waste collection and the 
maintenance of municipal property, and to local administrative agencies. A shift towards per-
formance-based management is also recognisable at the Dutch local level. In the context of 
public services, attempts to measure customer satisfaction and to further improve services 
based on feedback also took place. While all the initiatives had similar intentions, the designs 
varied widely in practice (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 78 f.; Kickert, 2003, pp. 378 f., 382; ter Bogt, 
2008a, p. 31; Bekke, 1991). 
Before NPM, local governance in the Netherlands was particularly characterised by the Dutch 
tradition of consensus, consultation, and compromise, and local government was organised 
according to the clerk-service model (Dutch: secretarie-dienstenmodel). It included a secre-
tary (Dutch: secretarie), who was responsible for policy preparation, and public service de-
partments that were in charge of the policy implementation. Already since the 1970s, an in-
creasing politicisation was observed within the administration of the local level (Hendriks & 
Tops, 2003, pp. 303 f., 312), which might have challenged a purely bureaucratic functioning in 
some municipalities. The search for alternatives to the clerk-service model began in the late 
1970s, where various models were discussed in academic literature, and some of these were 
implemented on an experimental basis. The global economic downturn of the early 1980s, in 
the context of the second oil crisis, increased the financial pressure on various nation states, 
including the Netherlands and its local level. In addition to financial constraints, the ineffi-
ciency and the lack of transparency within the administration were also used to justify the 
need for reforms (Hendriks & Tops, 2003, p. 305, 308 f.). 
Privatisation was another prominent and partially contested topic in the reform rhetoric of 
the 1980s. However, the overall scope of privatisation measures in the Netherlands was rela-
tively limited (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 294; van der Meer, 2008, p. 184), and privatisations 
were generally dealt with in a relatively pragmatic manner. Furthermore, privatisations were 




state-owned public service providers, for example in the areas of energy, transport, and infra-
structure, were traditionally run more like private companies than public sector organisations, 
changes in ownership – partially realised through privatisations in the 1980s and 1990s – did 
not result in far-reaching management changes (van Damme, 2006). Moreover, further pri-
vatisation measures in these areas did not always imply the development of market systems 
(van der Meer, 2008, p. 183 f.). Apart from private entities, a number of autonomous (semi-) 
public organisations (Dutch: zelfstandige bestuursorgaanen, ZBO’s) were established in the 
1980s.115 Then, in the 1990s, a departmental agency became a common way in which to de-
centralise administrative authority (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 294). Overall, the contracting-
out of public services became more common at the local level in the Netherlands, compared 
to the national one (van der Meer, 2008, p. 184). 
While many Dutch municipalities reformed their administration in line with NPM, the city of 
Tilburg and the Tilburg model, implemented in 1985, became famous for their initiative – in 
the Netherlands as well as abroad.116 In this context, it needs to be noted that the Tilburg 
model was “exemplary rather than exceptional” (Hendriks & Tops, 2003, p. 308). Just as in 
many other municipalities, improving the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of public ser-
vices was the overall goal. The decentralisation of tasks within the administration, the profes-
sionalisation of management, and political control at key positions were the principles chosen 
to achieve the set targets (Hendriks & Tops, 2003, p. 308 ff.). While the city was certainly not 
a particularly unique case, “Tilburg was widely recognized as a paragon of a modern well-gov-
erned municipality” (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 65). 
From a more practical perspective, the Tilburg model focused on two elements: The first focus 
was on the reorganisation of the administration according to the concern-division model 
(Dutch: concern-diensten model), which is an organisational approach focusing on highly au-
tonomous sectoral departments responsible for certain policy areas, in combination with the 
general decentralisation of powers and responsibilities. The second focus was on changes in 
the annual budgetary cycle. As a consequence, tasks were defined in a product-based manner, 
with a general focus on the output. As a further consequence, the number of staff members 
of the municipal administration was downsized noticeably. Some public services were also 
privatised, and others were phased out completely. In addition, practical attempts towards 
measurable policy goals were undertaken (Hendriks & Tops, 2003, p. 308 ff.). As a reaction to 
the various reform efforts of individual municipalities, including Tilburg, and also mostly in line 
with the general elements of NPM, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations initiated 
a local-level Public Management Initiative (Dutch: Beleids- en Beheers Instrumentarium) in 
the late 1980s (van Helden, 1998; ter Bogt, 2008a; ter Bogt, 2008b; van Helden & Jansen, 
2003). The initiative pursued the following three main goals: (1) strengthening the position of 
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elected politicians, (2) improving the planning and control processes within the municipal ad-
ministration, especially by introducing output budgeting, and (3) making municipalities more 
customer-oriented, partially by decentralising the municipal administration internally (van 
Helden, 1998, p. 86). In other words, the objectives were “to make political and administrative 
decision-making more transparent and effective, and to bridge the gap between authorities 
and citizens that was found to exist at the local level” (ter Bogt, 2008a, p. 32). To reach these 
goals, the Public Management Initiative had the three premises of (1) tailor-made information 
as the basis of decision-making, (2) a focus on information about the relation between policies 
and finances, and (3) an orientation towards specific tasks instead of broader goals (Kickert, 
2003, p. 383). From a more practical perspective, output budgeting was the key component 
of the Public Management Initiative (van Helden 1998, p. 87). 
A few years later, in the early 1990s, the management style in Dutch municipalities came un-
der pressure once more. Apart from criticism from many quarters, also in line with weaknesses 
and newer approaches discussed in political-administrative theory, including concerns about 
the legitimacy of increased administrative powers, the turnout at local elections dropped con-
siderably, especially in larger cities. This development was interpreted as the population’s 
general dissatisfaction with the administrative reforms implemented at the local level, includ-
ing the ones initiated by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Hendriks & Tops, 
2003, pp. 311, 314). Subsequent changes were characterised by a mitigation and partial revi-
sion of the reforms a decade earlier. The focus was increasingly oriented back towards the 
external interaction of the municipal administration rather than the internal organisation. Cit-
izens were again considered in their role as citizens rather than customers. Furthermore, the 
previous priority of budgetary discipline and management orientation was moderated, and 
political accountability and control were strengthened (Hendriks & Tops, 2003, p. 311; Kickert, 
2003, pp. 378, 387 f.). However, in summary, NPM did not disappear at the local level in the 
Netherlands, but it became less prominent and more modest from the 1990s onwards (Hen-
driks & Tops, 2003, p. 313). 
Another development of the 1990s is the attention private-public partnerships received in 
many Western countries, including the Netherlands, as an organisational approach. However, 
not many private-public partnerships were implemented at the Dutch local level (ter Bogt, 
2008a, p. 44 ff.). The fact that public services outside the core administration were tradition-
ally run more like private companies can be considered as the main reason that additional 
benefits from this type of agreement were assessed as being relatively low, similarly to privat-
isation measures in general. 
In the late 1990s, central government began the initiative From Policy Budgets to Policy Ac-
countability (Dutch: Van beleidsbegroting tot beleidsverantwoording), with the aim of imple-
menting performance-based budgeting in the public sector. While the initiative focused on 
the national level, some municipalities changed their budgeting practice towards performance 
indicators and outcome-orientation as well (Rijksacademie voor Financiën, Economie en Bed-
rijfsvoering, 2013; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 294; van der Woude, 2018, p. 251). After re-




level, this measure can be interpreted as a renewed management change in line with private 
sector standards to increase the efficiency of local authorities.  
Empirical evaluations of the various municipal reform initiatives in the Netherlands are gen-
erally rather critical regarding the achieved results in terms of gains in efficiency and effec-
tiveness, and they noted, for example, that organisational changes often implied costly exter-
nal advice, and that performance indicators are often of limited relevance for decisions in 
practice (ter Bogt, 2008a; ter Bogt, 2008b). Furthermore, it was pointed out that the usage of 
output-oriented planning and control instruments is often limited to larger municipalities (van 
Helden & Jansen, 2003, p. 72). In addition, it was mentioned that performance-related pay-
ments are still relatively uncommon in the Dutch civil service (van Helden & Jansen, 2003. p. 
75). However, apart from personal incentives, other personnel-related factors, such as per-
sonnel management, were gradually shifted towards private sector standards (Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2011, p. 294).117 
In summary, over the last four decades, as in many other countries, the public management 
reform rhetoric in the Netherlands, including at the Dutch local level, has been more extensive 
than the actual managerial and organisational changes. Compared to the reform waves in 
other countries, the implementation of management changes was also a rather incremental 
process in the case of the Netherlands (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 295). Considering the 
reform initiatives in line with NPM, mainly during the 1980s, and the partial attempts to mod-
erate previous changes in later years, it can be concluded that discussions and new concepts 
for managerial reforms at the Dutch local level will also remain a topic in the future. Europe-
anisation is another issue that is likely to remain relevant in the coming years given the in-
creasing influence of the EU as the supranational level of government of its member states. 
This aspect will be assessed in the Dutch context in the next sub-chapter.  
 
7.5.4. Europeanisation 
In the Netherlands, which is one of the founding members of the European Economic Com-
munity – created by the Treaty of Rome and becoming effective in 1958 – European co-oper-
ation has been a long-standing tradition. After more than 50 years of further steps towards 
European integration and the renaming of the supranational entity to the European Union, 
the Netherlands is still part of the community. Interestingly, when Dutch citizens were asked 
if they are for or against the Netherlands’ approval of the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe in the context of the Dutch referendum in 2005, 61.5% rejected the proposal 
(Kiesraad, 2005). Together with the refusal of the French population, the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe did not enter into force, but was replaced by the Treaty of Lisbon in 
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2009. However, despite all reservations by the population, the general importance of the EU 
has increased at the Dutch local level over time (Denters & Klok, 2005, 73 ff.). 
As in all other member states of the EU, the Dutch local level is mainly responsible for the 
execution of European legislation. A particularly strong influence of EU law can be observed 
in the policy areas of physical planning, environmental protection, and migration (Backes & 
van der Woude, 2013, p. 244 f.). Furthermore, various voluntary networking activities are a 
prime opportunity for the local level to strengthen its role within the system of multi-level 
governance. In the Netherlands, participation in the variety of European (knowledge) net-
works is promoted by the Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse 
Gemeenten, 2012). New contacts and ideas, as well as additional financial resources from Eu-
ropean funds, are identified as the potential main benefits for the municipalities (p. 5 f.). 
In addition to the formal representation of the Dutch local level in the Committee of the Re-
gions, informal channels are also used to influence European legislation. In this regard, indi-
vidual efforts, mainly restricted to lobbying by larger cities and their representatives in Brus-
sels, and co-operative efforts, usually carried out by the Association of Dutch Municipalities, 
can be distinguished (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 74). 
Research on the Europeanisation of Dutch municipalities is relatively limited so far. De Rooij 
(2002) has examined the impact of the EU on the Dutch local government and the use of EU-
related opportunities of eight municipalities (Rotterdam, Eindhoven, Haarlem, Enschede, 
Kerkrade, Delfzijl, Kesteren,118 and Renswoude). Following his interviews and document anal-
yses, EU affairs did not play any role in the smaller villages under investigation, whereas they 
played a passive role in mid-sized municipalities and an active role in large cities. Apart from 
the size of the municipalities, as the main factor substantiating the level of Europeanisation, 
the socio-economic position is a further, but less strong factor explaining variation in EU-re-
lated activities. The worse the positions, the more the municipality attempts to use EU oppor-
tunities, such as the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, if entitled. The level of urbani-
sation and the location in a border region were not suitable to explain variation in the use of 
EU opportunities at the Dutch local level. While a wide variety of EU-related associations were 
mentioned by local officials when asked for associations to which they are affiliated, only Eu-
rocities – an informal network of major European cities founded in 1986 (Eurocities, 2016) - 
seem to play an important role in the support of EU fund matters at the municipal level and 
the expression of local views at the European level (de Rooij, 2002, p. 458). 
In the context of a more general analysis of the impact of the EU at the local level of govern-
ment in terms of opportunities and constraints, Fleurke and Willemse (2006, p. 92 ff.) have 
examined the situation in the municipality of Lelystad as a single case study. While focusing 
on the policy areas of physical planning and ground affairs, environment, as well as sanitation 
and green, the scholars analysed all relevant available files, which were created as part of the 
policymaking process. In addition, various interviews were conducted with senior officials to 
gain better insights into the interests of the municipality. Overall, a direct influence of the EU 
was identified in roughly 60% of the files investigated; in the policy area of environment in 
                                                     




particular, this share was even higher at about 70%. Considering different types of influence, 
opportunities and constraints were detected in approximately 80% and one third of the files 
respectively. 
A more recent study on the Europeanisation of Amsterdam and The Hague throughout the 
1990s and 2000s has been conducted by Dukes and van der Wusten (2014). The research is 
based on the analysis of documents and interviews with officials. As a result of the increasing 
influence of the EU on local government, Amsterdam and The Hague, together with Rotter-
dam and Utrecht, intensified their co-operation on European affairs in 2001. As of 2012, the 
authors describe the Europeanisation of Amsterdam as “mostly […] provisional and fragile” (p. 
633). Furthermore, they characterise it as “strongly embedded in a much wider emphasis on 
international orientation, always present and now again foregrounded” (p. 633). Regarding 
The Hague, they have seen an intensification of EU activities, with a focus on the acquisition 
of subsidies and participation in international city networks, since the early 1990s. While the 
political representatives want to position The Hague as an international city, the authors attest 
“a lack of awareness and knowledge of Europe within the municipal organisation at large” (p. 
634). Dutch cities’ engagement with the EU is generally described as a development from a 
formal practice with low priority, executed in various parts of the administration in the 1990s, 
towards a more active behaviour, including an identification with the topic, in recent years. 
Taken together, the influence of the EU has increased at the Dutch local level over recent 
decades. While the local government’s lobbying activities, which are aimed towards the EU in 
the opposite direction, are mainly limited to larger cities or municipal networks, some rela-
tively small villages have also begun to look into the options that the EU provides, especially 
regarding additional financial resources. However, particularly in the context of European reg-
ulation in policy areas with municipal competences, it must be taken into account that Euro-
peanisation also implies an additional workload for local government. In general, the future 
developments of the relationships between the European and the local levels are certainly 
linked to the future of the EU, and further steps of integration and a dissolution in the longer 
run cannot be excluded as prospective scenarios. As a result of the sometimes stated aliena-
tion between politics and citizens, which is partially also related to the increasing influence of 
the European level, new approaches to involve the general public in municipal affairs beyond 
regular elections has emerged as well. These developments will be discussed in the next sub-
chapter. 
 
7.5.5. Citizen participation 
Co-operation and consensuses are long-standing traditions in the Netherlands. Involving citi-
zens in decision-making is an important aspect to reach broad societal support in democratic 
policymaking. In this regard, the number and variety of initiatives are generally growing in the 
Netherlands (Michels, 2018). Some new initiatives can also be considered as reactions to the 
general perception that Dutch citizens have become less interested in politics in recent years, 




Raadschelders, 2007, p. 116). Participatory projects are especially common in the context of 
city planning and are mostly present at the local level (Michels & de Graaf, 2010, p. 481). From 
a legal perspective, local referenda are permitted as long as they are not binding (Hendriks & 
Schaap, 2010, p. 109). This implies an advisory role, while a variety of other, more active forms 
of citizen participation can be found at the Dutch local level as well. 
Additional impulses for citizen participation emerged in the 1990s in the context of the atten-
uation of NPM-related reforms of previous years, and they call for strengthening public re-
sponsiveness (Denters & Klok, 2005, pp. 65, 79). Municipalities aimed to involve citizens more 
actively by establishing citizen polls and citizen panels, among other participatory instruments. 
Compared to previous initiatives, municipalities also began to involve citizens from the begin-
ning of new projects, and not at a point where the options had already been formulated and 
only a decision needed to be taken between a small number of alternatives (Hendriks & Tops, 
2003, p. 312; Kickert, 2003, p. 387 f.; Denters, 2011, p. 319). However, until today, the number 
of citizens taking part in participatory initiatives is still lower, compared to the voter turnout 
in municipal elections (Vollaard et al., 2018, p. 14).  
A number of studies have analysed citizen participation in various Dutch municipalities in re-
cent years. Michels and de Graaf (2010) have researched initiatives in Eindhoven and Gro-
ningen. While projects in Eindhoven focus on collaborative governance, participatory budget-
ing is the main attempt chosen to include the population of Groningen. First, the authors have 
concluded that citizen participation did not change the roles of citizens and politicians in gen-
eral. The projects regarded were mainly limited to the consultation of citizens in order to col-
lect their ideas and insights. In Eindhoven, it also became apparent that social organisations 
were more influential in the policy process than groups of unorganised citizens. While the 
influence of the attendees of participatory budgeting meetings in Groningen was considered 
to be relatively high, it has to be mentioned that mainly representatives from professional 
organisations participated in the projects. Taken together, independent citizens played a mi-
nor consultative role in both cities. 
The actions that local government usually takes to facilitate citizens’ initiatives have been re-
searched by Bakker et al. (2012) in the case of 15 Dutch municipalities. They have concluded 
that local authorities have mainly employed network structuration and process management 
strategies to stimulate citizens’ initiatives and to recruit participants in recent years. In con-
trast to the different local initiatives under varying conditions, the mobilisation strategies 
were relatively similar in all the municipalities under investigation. 
A single case study on citizen participation has been presented by Geurtz and van de Wijdeven 
(2010). Their analysis of the experiences in Hoogeveen – a town in the north-eastern part of 
the Netherlands, with some more inhabitants than the Dutch average – and far-reaching pro-
grammes to involve citizens in policy decisions, such as participatory budgeting, focused on 
factors leading to successful initiatives. The authors have concluded that combining arrange-
ments in the form of official committees, professional connectors, represented by individuals 





Also, in the context of an own research project on the transparency of Dutch municipal web-
sites (Wille & Porth, 2015), data on the availability of information and services in relation to 
citizen participation were collected in November 2014 and November 2015. While focusing 
on specific content, such as contact information of the municipal council, descriptions of for-
mal procedures for citizens’ initiatives, and annual citizens’ reports, an overall tendency to-
wards the provision of more information online and therefore higher transparency was ob-
served. 
However, looking at citizen participation at the Dutch municipal level from a more long-term 
perspective, it can be stated in summary that a broad number of instruments, such as advisory 
committees and participatory budgeting, have been developed and implemented in recent 
decades. Especially in line with technological progress and digital communication, the costs to 
inform and to include citizens has decreased extensively, which has enabled new forms of 
participation. In general, it needs to be noted that, according to recent studies, various lobby 
groups have identified participatory instruments, usually originally addressed to unorganised 
citizens, as possibilities to spread their opinions. Digitalisation, as one enabler of initiatives to 
increase the involvement of citizens in municipal affairs, will also be addressed in the next sub-
chapter, this time regarding rising attempts by the municipalities to provide their public ser-
vices digitally. 
 
7.5.6. Digitalisation of public services 
From a global perspective, the Netherlands is among the leading nations in terms of the digi-
talisation of public services and e-government. In 2016, the United Nations (2016) ranked the 
country seventh (fourth within Europe) in its biannual E-Government Development Index. The 
associated 2016 E-Participation Index rates the Netherlands fifth (second within Europe). Fur-
thermore, the Netherlands is one of the countries with the highest percentage of households 
(98%) connected to the Internet (Eurostat, 2017c), which is an important requirement for the 
digitalisation of public services provided to citizens. With the support of the national govern-
ment, all levels of government have implemented initiatives to make public information and 
services available online in recent years. Initiatives to digitalise the communication within the 
administration have also been launched. 
In 2012, the Council for Public Administration (Dutch: Raad voor het openbaar bestuur, Rob) 
claimed that governmental information should be more easily accessible online. From this 
council’s perspective, in addition to laws and other juridical decisions that are already com-
monly available, citizens should also be able to find detailed information on the decision-mak-
ing, implementation, and evaluation of policies, as well as research reports and advisory opin-
ions online. In this context, from the Council for Public Administration’s perspective, all levels 
of government, including the municipal level, should take a more active role (Raad voor het 




At the local level, the Digital Agenda 2020 (Dutch: De Digitale Agenda 2020), which was agreed 
upon in June 2015, describes the intended digitalisation of public services and information for 
the period until 2020 (Rijksoverheid, 2015c, p. 40). With the support of the Association of 
Dutch Municipalities, all municipalities are motivated to participate in projects in the field of 
digital public services. The overall goals and strategies of the initiative are to make govern-
ment more transparent and to make the administration more efficient, by largely expanding 
digitalisation, while taking local conditions into account. With the financial support of central 
government, separate projects focus on innovation, standardisation, and collective implemen-
tation from a more practical perspective (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016a; 
Kwaliteitsinstituut Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016). 
While the Digital Agenda 2020 is the guideline for municipalities to digitalise public services in 
the coming years, the Implementation Agenda Digital Services 2017 (Dutch: Implementatiea-
genda Digitale Dienstverlening 2017) sets the focus on a number of specific initiatives and 
adds some further targets in this subject area to be implemented until 2017. The intentions 
include, for example, the identification of the 20 most relevant public services for citizens and 
companies in order to have a clear focus for future digitalisation measures, the purchase and 
distribution of software to receive and process digital invoices, and the development of a plat-
form for co-operation between municipalities and ministries at the national level (Rijksover-
heid, 2015c, p. 40 f.). 
While the intention to digitalise public services at the Dutch local level is given, a question 
arises regarding the achieved degree of digitalisation. According to TNS Nipo, which is a survey 
agency, 18% of Dutch public services were available online in 2006. This share is expected to 
increase to 85% in 2017 (TNS Nipo, 2014). From a practical perspective, most digital public 
services can be accessed with a so-called DigiD, a special ID system to access Dutch govern-
mental services.119 As of 2015, over 12 million people out of the Dutch population of 16.8 
million were registered as DigiD users (Rijksoverheid, 2015d). Regarding governmental web-
sites, as a potential source of various types of information, 2,093 websites and 3,889 domain 
names were counted in 2015, taking the official web presence of all types of governmental 
bodies into account (Open State, 2015). 
The general availability of digital information has also been researched in an own project on 
the transparency of Dutch municipal websites (Wille & Porth, 2015). By conducting two con-
secutive content analyses in 2014 and 2015, the websites of almost all Dutch municipalities 
were evaluated based on the availability and findability of 100 items across four dimensions, 
namely (1) the composition of the municipal board, (2) the activities of the board, (3) munici-
pal policies, and (4) general information on citizen participation. While the information pro-
vided on Dutch websites varied, some general patterns could be observed. General infor-
mation on politicians and top-level bureaucrats were widely available, while detailed infor-
mation on administrative activities were often not presented digitally. Especially information 
on the composition of political committees, policymaking, policy performance, and details on 
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citizen participation were often not part of the content that municipalities presented on their 
websites. 
The diffusion of personalised e-government services, describing services with an individual 
interaction between a citizen and government, has been analysed by Homburg and Dijkshoorn 
(2013) in the case of the Dutch local level. They have concluded that pressure to develop dig-
ital services further originates horizontally and vertically within the political-administrative 
system. In this context, the relevance of personalised e-government services is usually pointed 
out by referring to its essentiality for service delivery, contribution to efficiency, and an in-
crease in reputation and organisational control (p. 195). 
Considering the statistical data presented above and the performance of the Netherlands in 
international rankings, such as the E-Government Development Index and the E-Participation 
Index rates, it can be stated in summary that the country is among the leading nations in terms 
of digitalisation and the provision of public services and information online. However, specif-
ically at the local level, and particularly in small municipalities, further potential exists to ex-
pand the opportunities for citizens to settle their public affairs online. As pointed out before, 
the six trends and developments in local government and local governance that were reflected 
upon in this chapter and in chapter 2 did not occur completely separate – neither in the Neth-
erlands, nor in other Western countries. Common interactions, especially mutual reinforce-
ments, will be discussed in the last sub-chapter hereinafter. 
 
7.5.7. The interactions of trends and developments at the local level of 
government in the Netherlands and the accordance with general de-
velopments in local government and local governance 
In recent decades, Dutch municipalities have undergone far-reaching changes. While some 
trends can be considered as part of overall developments in government and governance, 
such as an enabling state and multi-level governance, others solely concern the local level. 
One major aspect is the continuous process of decentralisation measures, which involves the 
transfer of tasks, primarily in the policy area of social affairs, from the national to the municipal 
level. In this regard, the scope of efficiency gains realised, as the main argument used to pro-
mote the provision of services at lower levels of government, is relatively difficult to assess. 
Alongside some smaller steps towards more public services provided by the local level, the 
decentralisation measures implemented at the beginning of 2015, partially as a reaction to 
financial pressure from the Financial Crisis since 2007, describe the most important develop-
ment in the context of transferring responsibilities to the local level in recent years. A question 
that remains to be answered in a few years is whether the ambitious long-term savings in-
tended by the 2015 reforms will be achieved. 
From a comparative perspective, the Netherlands is among the European nations with a rela-
tively high degree of decentralisation, measured by the share of local tasks and expenditures. 




the country appears to more centralised than others (Kuhlmann & Bouckaert, 2016, p. 11 f.). 
This traditional, rather unusual relation between local dependence and independence at the 
revenues and expenditures side has not been essentially affected by the decentralisation 
measures of recent years. However, since the tasks of Dutch municipalities have increased in 
recent years, while legally authorised options to generate own revenues did not, a tendency 
towards a greater financial dependence of the local level on the national level can be con-
cluded. Since shifts of tasks to lower levels of government do not change the fact that services 
are often provided more efficiently for a larger number of clients, decentralisation measures 
have promoted co-operation across the local level.  
In the Netherlands, to increase the efficiency of the local administration by the formation of 
larger units, municipal amalgamations have a long history. Those territorial changes, mainly 
promoted by central government, have been implemented as a steady process over the last 
centuries. Compared to other European countries, the Netherlands is positioned in the upper 
middle range, with a 55.3% decrease in the number of municipalities between 1973 and 2013. 
Considering today’s average number of inhabitants per municipality, the Netherlands is 
among the countries with the largest local government units in Europe (Steiner et al., 2016, p. 
29). However, the country’s relatively small area and dense settlement certainly foster the 
formation of larger units in comparison with the conditions in other countries.  
As a closely related development and a potentially preceding step of a merger of local govern-
ment units, municipal co-operation is a similarly long-standing tradition in the Netherlands, 
with an increasing tendency. In some policy areas, municipalities are even obliged to co-oper-
ate by law. However, a recent empirical study (Allers & de Greef, 2018) has concluded that 
inter-municipal co-operation has not led to lower total spending in Dutch municipalities in 
recent years. On the other hand, the necessity of working together has also recently been 
demonstrated with the decentralisation measures, which came into effect in 2015, and it has 
implied that the municipalities had to organise the provision of additional public service with 
a relatively short preparation time. 
Apart from territorial changes, regular managerial and organisational reforms are long-stand-
ing traditions at the Dutch local level as well as elsewhere. In recent decades, the attempts to 
renew the public sector relate to two major reform waves. First, NPM, originating in the late 
1970s, and, second, reforms aiming to moderate previous changes. From a theoretical per-
spective, the reform initiatives at the Dutch local level during the 1980s largely corresponded 
to the ideas of NPM; only the flexibilisation of personnel policies played a minor role in the 
Dutch case (van Helden, 1998, p. 98). 
Compared to other European countries, the Netherlands was in the upper mid-range in terms 
of NPM (Hood, 1995), and the Dutch local government followed the trend relatively early, 
extensively, and closely linked to international, especially Anglo-Saxon, developments (John, 
2001, p. 102 f.). In this context, Dutch municipalities can be considered as trendsetters in 
terms of NPM reforms at the local level, compared to municipalities in other countries. How-
ever, when criticism of NPM-related reforms gained broader attention and public authorities 
began to moderate previous changes, the Dutch local level followed this second development 




increase the local level’s accountability, further measures were taken to increase the involve-
ment of citizens in municipal affairs as part of the second reform wave in the Netherlands. 
The Europeanisation of the Dutch local government follows the general tendency of an in-
creasing influence of EU legislation at all levels of its member states in recent decades. While 
legal requirements usually affect all municipalities from a top-down perspective to a similar 
extent, lobbying at the European level is mainly limited to larger cities or municipal networks 
from a bottom-up perspective. Compared to the Europeanisation of the local level in other 
European countries, no major deviations are recognisable when assessing the developments 
in the Netherlands. 
In recent years, various local initiatives, involving, for example, advisory committees or partic-
ipatory budgeting, have been launched to increase the participation of citizens in municipal 
affairs in the Netherlands. Often benefiting from technological developments, especially re-
garding digital communication, a large number of new instruments were developed. While 
the actual influence of the average citizen is often questioned, the development towards a 
general increase in attempts to involve citizens in governmental affairs can be observed in 
various other Western countries as well. However, it must be taken into account that this 
trend differs from the other ones discussed in this study, since it is not necessarily linked to 
the general motivation to increase efficiency. On the contrary, increased citizen participation 
might lead to higher costs, while other aspects, such as transparency in municipal decision-
making and satisfaction with local politics, might benefit. 
In the field of digitalisation and in relation to the provision of public services and information 
online, the Netherlands is among the leading nations from a global perspective, especially re-
garding the services provided by the national level (United Nations, 2014; United Nations, 
2016). At the local level, especially in smaller municipalities, further potential exists to expand 
e-government-related activities. As a frequent enabler, digitalisation at the local level is also 
closely related to attempts to increase citizen participation. Apart from the digitalisation of 
communication with parties outside the municipal administration, major changes along the 
same lines have been implemented for communication within the administration in recent 
decades. 
In summary, the Netherlands can be considered as a leading nation from a European or even 
global perspective regarding various aspects of public sector modernisation, thereby illustrat-
ing the country’s progressive nature. Especially in terms of NPM-inspired reforms and digital-
isation, the country and its local level are among the global trendsetters. Considering recent 
decentralisation measures and municipal mergers, as well as increased co-operation between 
municipalities over the last decades, more changes in local government and local governance 
took place in the Netherlands than in many other countries. However, the eventual effects of 
various reform initiatives, generally aiming to increase the efficiency of the public sector, are 
debated in the Netherlands – the same as elsewhere. The role that the already ongoing trends 
and developments played during the time of the Financial Crisis since 2007 will be assessed at 
a later stage in this study. In the following chapters, the events and implications of the recent 
Financial Crisis will first be addressed from a global perspective, before focusing specifically 




8. The Financial Crisis since 2007 as a major challenge at all levels of 
government 
Starting in the late summer of 2007, the Financial Crisis was, and partially still is, the dominat-
ing topic and a major challenge in industrial countries. Within a few months, the developments 
included scenarios not seen in most of the affected countries since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. In retrospect, bank runs and bailout packages illustrated the drastic impact of the 
crisis in a number of countries. However, while the economic situation has begun to recover 
in recent years, it can be stated that the scenario could have been far worse.120 
As a further consequence of the Crisis and the high government expenditures to battle it, aus-
terity measures followed in most industrial countries. Based primarily on the overall financial 
situation and the accumulation of public debt in the past in particular, those measures began 
sooner or later and had, or still have, a varying scope. It should be noted that wealthy and 
financially healthy countries also addressed the Crisis with tax cuts or similar opposing 
measures, especially during the Crisis’ early phases (Bermeo & Pontusson, 2012b, p. 27). 
At the time of writing, in autumn of 2018, the Financial Crisis since 2007 could be considered 
as fading, and it no longer receives much media coverage. New challenges, particularly in the 
areas of migration and terrorism, have evolved in the meantime. However, since various 
emergency measures, especially in the case of Greece, are still persisting, and because some 
effects of the Crisis, such as higher government debt, constrained public budgets, and slower 
economic growth, will be relevant factors for years to come (Lindquist et al., 2015a, p. 1), a 
complete overcoming of the Crisis cannot currently be reported.121 Apart from the beginning 
of an economic recovery in recent years, the limited amount of media attention, despite long-
term solutions for at least some aspects of the crisis still being missing, can be explained by 
two additional reasons. The first reason comprises the duration of the crisis and the tendency 
to become accustomed, as well as indifferent, to an event if it lasts for a long period of time, 
without any noticeable changes. The second reason involves new crises, which overlay previ-
ous ones, and the associated limited capacity to perceive and assess multiple problems at the 
same time. In some of the countries affected by the Financial Crisis since 2007, the European 
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migrant crisis since 2015122 can be considered as a new crisis, alongside the partially connected 
challenge of increasing Islamic terrorist activities on European soil, both of which have gained 
attention in place of the Financial Crisis. 
Building upon the theoretical economic insights from chapter 3, as well as the elaborations on 
crisis management from a political-administrative perspective in chapter 2, chapter 8 ad-
dresses the Financial Crisis since 2007 in detail. To analyse the impacts of and the responses 
to the crisis at the Dutch municipal level at a later stage, the first sub-chapter contains a chron-
ological overview of events from a global and nation-state level perspective, which constitutes 
the overall time frame. The sub-chapter also includes socio-economic key figures to illustrate 
the developments from an empirical perspective, as well as an assessment of the Crisis from 
an economic and political-administrative perspective, including previous research on the topic 
(8.1). Then, in the next sub-chapter, the impact of the crisis on the public sector, especially 
local government, is described, based on academic sources and policy documents. By includ-
ing countries other than the Netherlands, the question of lessons learned from experiences 
abroad will be answered at a later stage (8.2). Thereafter, governmental responses to the crisis 
are analysed, again with a focus on the local level and the same types of literature sources. 
Here, too, other countries are included to enable a comparison (8.3). 
 
8.1. Developments at the global and national levels of government 
The Financial Crisis since 2007 affected all levels of government. Within a system of multi-level 
governance, the different administrative layers need to be seen as part of the system because 
of various dependencies, including organisational and financial aspects. Therefore, chapter 8 
starts with an overview of the developments at the global and national state level before the 
local level is analysed in the next step. 
The first sub-chapter contains a chronological overview of the events shaping the Financial 
Crisis. In addition to global developments, the situation of the countries most affected by the 
crisis is outlined. This overview helps to demarcate the relevant time period for investigation 
in the Dutch context and at the local level later on (8.1.1). Empirical insights into the course of 
the Crisis are presented in the next sub-chapter. The key figures illustrating the socio-eco-
nomic developments of a number of countries and groups of countries include data on eco-
nomic growth, unemployment, and government debt (8.1.2). The Financial Crisis is subse-
quently assessed from an economic perspective, building upon the theoretical elaborations of 
chapter 3 (8.1.3). The sub-chapter closes with previous insights into the Crisis from a political-
administrative perspective, building upon chapter 4 (8.1.4). 
 
                                                     
122 While the number of migrants coming to the European Union has decreased in recent months, this crisis can 
also still be considered as ongoing. Long-term solutions, addressing the root cause of migration and flight in 




8.1.1. A chronological overview 
August 9th, 2007 is the day the world changed, as Adam Applegarth, then chief executive of 
the former British bank Northern Rock, remarked. That day, BNP Paribas, a French bank, froze 
three of its funds, arguing that it was no longer able to value the containing assets, especially 
packages of sub-prime loans. In retrospect, this event marked the first perception and corre-
sponding measure of a commercial bank in the context of potentially excessive risks in the 
sub-prime mortgage market.123 What followed in the next months and years were financial 
turbulences and a global economic decline without any comparison other than to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, and one of the greatest challenges for industrial countries since the 
end of the Second World War (The Guardian, 2012; The Telegraph, 2011; BBC, 2012; European 
Commission, 2009, pp. 9, 14 ff.; van Ewijk & Teulings, 2009, pp. 11-51). 124 
In September 2007, the trading prices of mortgages decreased, leading to liquidity crises of 
several banks, including Northern Rock. Many frightened customers consequently withdrew 
their savings from the bank, marking the first bank run in Britain in 150 years. A loan from the 
British government was necessary to improve the situation, and the nationalisation of the 
bank followed in February 2008. In March 2008, Bear Stearns, a former American investment 
bank, was sold to JP Morgan Chase, another American bank, to avoid bankruptcy as a result 
of the sub-prime mortgage turbulences. Only a few months later, in early September 2008, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two American mortgage trading companies, were bailed out by 
the U.S. government because of similar liquidity problems and systemic risks (The Guardian, 
2012; The Telegraph, 2011; BBC, 2012; European Commission, 2009, p. 9; van Ewijk & Teulings, 
2009, pp. 11-51). 
On September 15th, 2008, Lehman Brothers, a major American investment bank, filed for 
bankruptcy, marking the next climax in the financial market’s turmoil. Furthermore, the day 
can also be considered as the point in time when the severity of the crisis became obvious to 
the general public. A few days later, Washington Mutual and Wachovia, two other American 
banks, collapsed. Around the same time, Ireland was the first European country that was ex-
periencing a recession, generally defined as negative economic growth for two consecutive 
quarters. In early October 2008, the three largest commercial banks in Iceland collapsed as a 
consequence of the turmoil in the financial markets. In response, eight central banks cut their 
interest rates in an unprecedented global attempt to fight the crisis. Various governmental 
bailouts of banks in industrial countries followed. In the context of the bank rescue measures, 
Paul Myners, who was then the British Commercial Secretary to the Treasury, commented, 
                                                     
123 A small number of individual investors and hedge fund managers, such as Michael J. Burry, recognised a 
bubble in the housing market already a few years earlier. In the case of Burry (2010), his analyses proved to be 
quite correct. On the other hand, when reading the business press, more or less detailed predictions of poten-
tial future crises can be found on an almost daily basis, which implies a certain likelihood of an applicable pre-
diction of a financial crisis once in a while, also explained by economic cycles, including regular downward 
phases. 
124 While the Financial Crisis since 2007 comprised various events that were more or less directly linked to the 
crisis all over the world, this chapter focuses on the main developments as well as those relevant for both the 




“[w]e will never appreciate how close we came to a collapse of the banking system” (As cited 
in The Guardian, 2012) In April 2009, the Group of Twenty, representing the world's major 
economies, agreed on a package of measures worth 5 trillion dollars to fight recession and 
stimulate economic growth (The Guardian, 2012; The Telegraph, 2011; BBC, 2012; European 
Commission, 2009, p. 9). Further recovery and stimulus measures amounting to 200 billion 
euro, to be implemented between 2009 and 2010, were arranged by the EU. At the national 
level of government, some countries opted for expansionary fiscal measures, while others 
mainly relied on automatic stabilisers as parts of their regular budgets. Variation was also ob-
served regarding changes in financial market regulation (Cameron, 2012, pp. 91 f., 98 ff.). 
On May 2nd, 2010, Greece was bailed out in a co-ordinated action by the European Commis-
sion, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, also known as the 
troika, in order to avoid the country's sovereign default. In retrospect, the event marked the 
beginning of the Eurozone Crisis as part of the overall Financial Crisis. A few months later, in 
November 2010, the bailout of Ireland was arranged. Then, in May 2011, Portugal was the 
third country to receive a rescue package in the context of the Eurozone Crisis. Greece’s sec-
ond bailout followed in July 2011, after which rescue measures for Spain were arranged in July 
2012. To improve the overall financial situation, all the emergency bailouts of national gov-
ernments by international and European institutions were accompanied by instructions on 
measures to reduce public debt and to rebalance the states’ budgets. Concerning the cur-
rency’s stability and the non-standard monetary policy measures implemented to ensure it, 
Mario Draghi, president of the ECB, announced on July 26th, 2012, that “within our mandate, 
the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”; this statement clearly illus-
trated the seriousness of the situation. In April 2013, Cyprus was the fifth European country 
to receive a bailout package. The third rescue package for Greece was arranged in August 
2015, with a duration of three years. By the time of writing, in autumn of 2018, Greece had 
obtained the final disbursement from its latest bailout package (The Guardian, 2012; The Tel-
egraph, 2011; BBC, 2012; European Stability Mechanism, 2018; Stiglitz, 2016, p. 3 ff., 177 ff.; 
Teulings et al., 2011).125 
However, as with any other type of credit, the bailout packages include time plans for the loan 
repayments. For Spain, those repayments are scheduled between 2022 and 2027, for Cyprus 
between 2025 and 2031, for Portugal between 2025 and 2040, for Ireland between 2029 and 
2042, and for Greece between 2023 and 2060 (European Stability Mechanism, 2018). How-
ever, a postponement of payments would not be atypical, as previous experiences with rescue 
measures have illustrated. In other words, the relatively direct consequences of the Financial 
Crisis since 2007 will remain at least for the next few decades to come. Considering the finan-
cial and economic situation of some countries, especially in southern Europe, a resurgence of 
the crisis would not come as a surprise either. 
Apart from the bailout measures by supranational institutions, most industrial countries re-
acted to the Financial Crisis with national countermeasures. Those actions included costly res-
cue package for banks and other private companies under pressure, stimulus packages, often 
                                                     





focusing on investments in the country’s infrastructure, and austerity measures at a later 
stage. In this context, some countries focused on reacting to the short-term effects of the 
crisis, while others mainly addressed the long-term consequences (Bailey & Chapain, 2011b, 
p. 20). In general, when considering the details of the policies that were implemented, na-
tional governments reacted to and managed the crisis differently and adopted their counter-
measures according to ongoing developments (Peters, 2011). However, while the overall in-
tentions of the crisis reactions were similar, variation was also caused by factors such as polit-
ical considerations and the search for broad compromises.  
A comparative study by Kickert et al. (2015) on the consolidation measures and political deci-
sion-making processes in 14 European countries as a consequence of the increasing govern-
ment expenditure, because of the Financial Crisis since 2007, has concluded that the consoli-
dation measures, compared to the direct reactions to the crisis, followed relatively similar 
patterns. Hiring freezes and pay freezes were the most common measures implemented in 
almost all countries under investigation. Those two measures were accompanied by more 
drastic actions in some countries. The authors have also concluded that cutback measures 
usually followed as a series of separate decisions, often with a shift from across-the-board to 
more targeted cutbacks, which is a fairly typical chronology to lower expenditure in the con-
text of a crisis, as already pointed out in chapter 2 of this study. 
Considering the implementation of the cutback measures, the authors have recognised a gen-
erally gradual process. By realising more severe and rapid austerity measures, the European 
countries, which were bailed out by supranational institutions, were exceptions. In these 
countries, the far-reaching cutback measures also stem from reform pressure by the creditors 
as well as the perception of such pressure. Variation in consolidation measures can thus be 
best explained by economic factors and supranational influence, rather than political factors 
at the national level, according to the study (Kickert et al., 2015). However, taking into account 
the different political ideologies of coalition parties, as well as political fragmentation in legis-
lative bodies in some countries, political considerations can be seen as necessary early steps 
to enact a policy to address the recent Financial Crisis. Furthermore, as already noted before, 
the developments of the Crisis were complex and highly interconnected across countries and 
industries, which makes implementing targeted countermeasures generally difficult and im-
plies spillover effects to a high extent. Therefore, the possibility of assessing the success or 
failure of a certain policy reaction will always be relatively limited. 
Further patterns can be observed within the governmental authorities dealing with the Finan-
cial Crisis and their decision-making. Since the beginning of the Crisis, decision-making pro-
cesses within these organisations were usually centralised by involving limited numbers of 
persons in high positions. Furthermore, the power of the budgetary units within the organisa-
tions, as well as the power of the Ministries of Finance, increased because of their central role 
in policy planning from a political-administrative perspective (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 
128 f.). 
Since about 2013, the eurozone’s financial situation and Europe’s economic situation gener-
ally improved. The same applies to the US and other industrial countries already since a few 




housing market (Bartelsman, 2009, p. 33 ff.), it needs to be taken into account that the early 
impact led to early countermeasures, including a recovery act decided upon already in 2008. 
However, as pointed out before, because of ongoing bailout measures and a partial lack of 
long-term solutions to underlying problems, such as an unbalanced public budget and high 
government debt in combination with a weak economy in some countries, the crisis and its 
problems cannot be considered as completely solved yet. The developments since 2007 have 
also illustrated that financial problems in one country can lead to a global crisis. 
Furthermore, the examples above demonstrate that the Financial Crisis since 2007 is mainly 
taking place in certain geographical regions from a global perspective. While the Crisis had an 
extensive impact on the economic situation in the US, Europe, and wide parts of Asia, Aus-
tralia, for example, was much less affected (Bailey & Chapain, 2011b, p. 19). The same applies 
to most developing countries. The size and international orientation of the national financial 
markets can be considered as the main explanations. Also, central and eastern European coun-
tries were affected by the Crisis relatively differently than Western countries and subse-
quently opted for different reactions (Bideleux, 2011). However, while the direct impact of 
the Crisis, especially regarding consequences for the financial service industry, was limited, 
these countries were also severely affected by the global economic downturn at a later stage 
of the recent Financial Crisis (Staehr, 2010). 
Overall, the emergence and course of the Financial Crisis since 2007 is comparable to previous 
financial crises involving unsustainable increases in asset prices, a credit boom, excessive debt, 
and therefore systemic risks as underlying causes, in combination with the failure of regulation 
and supervision. While unsustainable increases in asset prices were, for example, also the 
main causes in the cases of both the Dot-com bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s and 
the 1986 Japanese asset price bubble, regulation and supervision can always be considered as 
insufficient if they do not prevent markets from failing. However, while all the aforementioned 
factors were not new as separate triggers of financial crises, the Financial Crisis since 2007 was 
caused by a particularly unfavourable combination of factors. In addition, some relatively new 
factors played a role in this latest crisis. Those include the widespread use of relatively com-
plex financial instruments, the increased interconnectedness of financial markets, the high 
degree of leverage of financial operations, the involvement of the public sector in various fi-
nancial activities, and excessive public debt. While the first symptoms of a crisis were experi-
enced in the housing market, the problems quickly affected the highly related banking sector. 
Given the central role of private banks in modern economic systems, all other sectors also 
faced the Crisis to a certain extent (Carmassi et al., 2009; Allen & Carletti, 2010; Claessens & 
Kose, 2013, p. 21 f.; Bartelsman, 2009, p. 33 ff.). 
In 2010, the U.S. government appointed a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to “ex-
amine the causes of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States” (Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. xi), which is sometimes considered to be the starting point 
of the Financial Crisis at the global level. According to the FCIC’s final report, presented in 
January 2011, the “financial crisis was avoidable” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, 




cial regulation and supervision” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. xviii) at the po-
litical-administrative level as the result of deregulation policies implemented over the last dec-
ades (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, pp. 52-66), which “proved devastating to the 
stability of the nation’s financial markets” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. xviii), 
“dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically im-
portant financial institutions” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. xviii) at the corpo-
rate level, and “a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transpar-
ency” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. xix) at both the household and corporate 
levels. 
Furthermore, the commission pointed out that “the government was ill prepared for the crisis, 
and its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets” 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. xxi). Its final conclusion states a “systemic break-
down in accountability and ethics” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. xxii) of all 
actors involved as a contributing factor to the Crisis.126 
In summary, the nature of the developments shaping the recent Financial Crisis since August 
2007 are not new. Collapsing prices for financial products and bank runs, for example, are 
events that have occurred quite regularly throughout the history of mankind, at least since 
barter trade became less important. However, what distinguishes this Crisis from others is the 
severity and connectedness of events; the latter was largely fortified by the globalisation of 
markets. The Crisis implied risks for global financial stability to an extent not been seen for 
several decades. Also, more than 10 years after the beginning of the Financial Crisis, certain 
types of systemic risks either remain or newly emerge. In more recent years, for example, the 
business models of many private banks have come under pressure because of the low interest-
rate policies by most central banks (Bikker & Vervliet, 2018). Empirical insights into the devel-
opments of the Crisis will be presented in the next sub-chapter, with a focus on socio-eco-
nomic indicators. 
 
8.1.2. Socio-economic developments from an empirical perspective 
From an empirical perspective, socio-economic data, such as the GDP growth rate, the unem-
ployment rate, and government debt, are suitable to illustrate and analyse the chronological 
sequence and scope of the Financial Crisis since 2007.127 It must be taken into account that in 
addition to the impact, reactions to the crisis are also reflected in the developments of the 
figures. An overview of the GDP growth rate of selected countries and groups of countries 
since 2000 is illustrated in table 15. 
                                                     
126 For an overview of the Financial Crisis since 2007, including a timeline of the main events, see also Lindquist 
et al. (2015a).  
127 One further lesson from the recent Financial Crisis is that governmental statistics should be assessed care-























































































World 4.3 2.0 2.2 2.9 4.5 3.8 4.4 4.3 1.8 -1.7 4.4 3.1 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.6 
European Union 3.9 2.2 1.3 1.3 2.6 2.1 3.4 3.1 0.5 -4.4 2.2 1.7 -0.5 0.2 1.6 2.2 
Euro area128 3.9 2.2 1.0 0.7 2.3 1.7 3.2 3.0 0.4 -4.5 2.1 1.5 -0.9 -0.3 1.1 2.0 
Austria 3.4 1.4 1.7 0.8 2.7 2.1 3.4 3.6 1.5 -3.8 1.9 2.8 0.7 0.1 0.6 1.0 
Belgium 3.6 0.8 1.8 0.8 3.6 2.1 2.5 3.4 0.7 -2.3 2.7 1.8 0.1 -0.1 1.7 1.5 
Denmark 3.7 0.8 0.5 0.4 2.6 2.4 3.8 0.8 -0.7 -5.1 1.6 1.2 -0.1 -0.2 1.3 1.0 
Finland 5.6 2.6 1.7 2.0 3.9 2.8 4.1 5.2 0.7 -8.3 3.0 2.6 -1.4 -0.8 -0.7 0.2 
France 3.9 2.0 1.1 0.8 2.8 1.6 2.4 2.4 0.2 -2.9 2.0 2.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 1.3 
Germany 3.0 1.7 0.0 -0.7 1.2 0.7 3.7 3.3 1.1 -5.6 4.1 3.7 0.5 0.5 1.6 1.7 
Greece 3.9 4.1 3.9 5.8 5.1 0.6 5.7 3.3 -0.3 -4.3 -5.5 -9.1 -7.3 -3.2 0.4 -0.2 
Ireland 9.9 6.1 5.6 3.7 6.7 5.8 5.9 3.8 -4.4 -4.6 2.0 0.0 -1.1 1.1 8.5 26.3 
Italy 3.7 1.8 0.2 0.2 1.6 0.9 2.0 1.5 -1.1 -5.5 1.7 0.6 -2.8 -1.7 0.1 0.7 
Japan 2.3 0.4 0.3 1.7 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 -1.0 -5.5 4.7 -0.5 1.7 1.4 0.0 0.5 
Luxembourg 9.5 3.6 3.6 1.4 4.4 3.2 5.1 8.4 -0.8 -5.4 5.7 2.6 -0.8 4.3 4.1 4.8 
Netherlands 4.2 2.1 0.1 0.3 2.0 2.2 3.5 3.7 1.7 -3.8 1.4 1.7 -1.1 -0.2 1.4 2.0 
Norway 3.2 2.1 1.4 0.9 4.0 2.6 2.4 2.9 0.4 -1.6 0.6 1.0 2.7 1.0 1.9 1.6 
Portugal 3.8 1.9 0.8 -0.9 1.8 0.8 1.6 2.5 0.2 -3.0 1.9 -1.8 -4.0 -1.1 0.9 1.5 
Spain 5.3 4.0 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.7 4.2 3.8 1.1 -3.6 0.0 -1.0 -2.6 -1.7 1.4 3.2 
Sweden 4.7 1.6 2.1 2.4 4.3 2.8 4.7 3.4 -0.6 -5.2 6.0 2.7 -0.3 1.2 2.6 4.1 
Switzerland 3.9 1.4 0.1 0.0 2.8 3.0 4.0 4.1 2.3 -2.1 3.0 1.8 1.0 1.8 2.0 0.8 
United Kingdom 3.7 2.7 2.4 3.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.6 -0.6 -4.3 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.9 3.1 2.2 
United States 4.1 1.0 1.8 2.8 3.8 3.3 2.7 1.8 -0.3 -2.8 2.5 1.6 2.2 1.7 2.4 2.6 
 
Considering economic growth, the period between 2000 and 2007 was characterised by a con-
tinuous increase in most industrial countries. At the global level, the annual GDP growth rates 
ranged between 2.0% and 4.5%. In 2008, a number of countries, such as Ireland and Italy as 
well as the US, experienced negative growth rates or, in other words, an economic downturn. 
However, at the global level, in comparison with previous years, a significantly lower, but still 
positive growth rate was attained. This changed in 2009, when the global GDP decreased by -
1.7%. Accordingly, an economic downturn was observable in most, if not all, industrial coun-
tries. As illustrated above, the economy shrunk by more than 5% in a number of countries, 
including many European ones. The year 2010 was characterised by economic growth in most 
industrial countries comparable to, or slightly below, the years before 2009. In the sample 
presented above, Greece is the only outlier, with a sustained negative growth rate. In the years 
since 2011, economic growth is generally lower, compared to the period between 2000 and 
2007. Negative growth rates occurred in a number of countries, such as Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, and the Netherlands in 2012 and 2013. Overall, the development of economic growth 
and economic decline in the Netherlands since 2000 can be considered as a European average. 
The unemployment rate is another indicator to assess the impact of and reactions to the Fi-
nancial Crisis since 2007. Table 16 lists the share of persons of the total labour force without 
a job for a number of industrial countries and groups of countries. 
                                                     

















































































World 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.5 5.7 6.3 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.9 
European Union 9.2 8.7 9.0 9.0 9.2 8.9 8.2 7.2 7.0 9.0 9.6 9.6 10.5 10.9 10.2 
Euro area 9.3 8.4 8.7 8.9 9.2 9.0 8.3 7.4 7.5 9.6 10.2 10.2 11.4 12.0 11.5 
Austria 3.5 3.6 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.2 4.7 4.4 3.8 4.8 4.4 4.1 4.3 4.9 5.0 
Belgium 6.6 6.2 7.5 8.2 8.4 8.4 8.2 7.5 7.0 7.9 8.3 7.1 7.5 8.4 8.5 
Denmark 4.5 4.2 4.6 5.4 5.5 4.8 3.9 3.8 3.4 6.0 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.6 
Finland 9.7 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.8 8.4 7.6 6.8 6.3 8.2 8.4 7.7 7.6 8.2 8.6 
France 10.2 8.6 8.7 8.6 9.2 8.9 8.8 8.0 7.4 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.9 10.4 9.9 
Germany 7.7 7.8 8.6 9.3 10.3 11.1 10.3 8.6 7.5 7.7 7.1 5.9 5.4 5.3 5.0 
Greece 11.1 10.2 10.3 9.7 10.5 9.8 8.9 8.3 7.7 9.5 12.5 17.7 24.2 27.2 26.3 
Ireland 4.3 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.4 4.6 6.0 12.0 13.9 14.6 14.7 13.1 11.6 
Italy 10.8 9.6 9.2 8.9 7.9 7.7 6.8 6.1 6.7 7.8 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.2 12.5 
Japan 4.8 5.0 5.4 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.0 5.0 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.0 3.7 
Luxembourg 2.3 1.8 2.6 3.7 5.1 4.5 4.7 4.1 5.1 5.1 4.4 4.9 5.1 5.9 6.1 
Netherlands 2.7 2.1 2.6 3.6 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.2 2.8 3.4 4.5 4.4 5.3 6.7 6.9 
Norway 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.4 4.4 4.6 3.4 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.5 3.4 
Portugal 3.9 4.0 5.0 6.3 6.7 7.6 7.7 8.0 7.6 9.5 10.8 12.7 15.6 16.5 14.2 
Spain 14.2 10.7 11.6 11.5 11.2 9.3 8.6 8.4 11.5 18.1 20.2 21.7 25.2 26.3 24.7 
Sweden 5.9 5.1 5.3 5.9 6.6 7.8 7.1 6.2 6.3 8.4 8.7 7.8 8.1 8.1 8.0 
Switzerland 2.7 2.5 2.9 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.4 4.1 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.4 4.5 
United Kingdom 5.6 4.8 5.2 4.9 4.7 4.8 5.5 5.4 5.4 7.8 7.9 7.8 8.0 7.5 6.3 
United States 4.1 4.8 5.9 6.1 5.6 5.2 4.7 4.7 5.9 9.4 9.7 9.0 8.2 7.4 6.2 
 
Interestingly, the global unemployment rate, ranging between 5.5% and 6.5%, did not change 
significantly between 2000 and 2014. However, in most industrial countries an increase in un-
employment can be observed in recent years. Within the EU, the unemployment rate slightly 
decreased between 2000 and 2008. However, from 2009 onwards, more people were increas-
ingly jobless, with a peak of 10.9% in 2013. While a turning point, from a decreasing to an 
increasing unemployment rate, can be observed in the US in 2008, most European countries 
faced the same development one year later. Until 2013, the most significant increases in un-
employment took place in Greece and Spain. In both countries, more than one quarter of the 
total labour force have been without a job in recent years. From a comparative perspective, 
the Netherlands has been one of the countries with the lowest unemployment rates in Europe 
during the entire period. However, the country has not been exempt from an increasing num-
ber of people without jobs in recent years. 
When comparing unemployment to economic growth, it can be observed on average, as gen-
erally expected that the latter figure decreased before the former one increased significantly. 
Furthermore, many industrial countries experienced economic growth rates similar to the 
long-term average in the years after 2009, while the unemployment rates continued to in-
crease steadily. The often discussed time shift of unemployment in times of economic difficul-





Government debt is the third key figure assessed in the context of global developments in 
recent years. Budget deficits commonly lead to increasing levels of public debt, while budget 
surpluses may result in debt reductions. The general government gross debt as a percentage 
of GPD is illustrated in table 17 for a number of industrial countries and groups of countries. 


















































































European Union 60.2 59.4 58.9 60.4 60.9 61.5 60.1 57.5 60.7 72.8 78.4 81.1 83.8 85.7 86.7 85.0 
Euro area 68.1 67.0 66.9 68.1 68.4 69.2 67.4 65.0 68.6 78.4 83.8 86.1 89.5 91.3 92.0 90.4 
Austria 65.9 66.5 66.5 65.7 65.1 68.6 67.3 65.1 68.8 80.1 82.8 82.6 82.0 81.3 84.4 85.5 
Belgium 108.8 107.6 104.7 101.1 96.5 94.6 91.0 87.0 92.5 99.5 99.7 102.3 104.1 105.4 106.5 105.8 
Denmark 52.4 48.5 49.1 46.2 44.2 37.4 31.5 27.3 33.4 40.4 42.9 46.4 45.2 44.7 44.8 40.4 
Finland 42.5 41.0 40.2 42.8 42.7 40.0 38.2 34.0 32.7 41.7 47.1 48.5 53.9 56.5 60.2 63.6 
France 58.6 58.1 60.0 64.1 65.7 67.1 64.4 64.3 68.0 78.9 81.6 85.2 89.5 92.3 95.3 96.2 
Germany 58.9 57.7 59.4 63.1 64.8 67.0 66.5 63.7 65.1 72.6 81.0 78.7 79.9 77.5 74.9 71.2 
Greece 104.9 107.1 104.9 101.5 102.9 107.4 103.6 103.1 109.4 126.7 146.2 172.1 159.6 177.4 179.7 177.4 
Ireland 36.1 33.2 30.6 29.9 28.2 26.1 23.6 23.9 42.4 61.7 86.3 109.6 119.5 119.5 105.2 78.6 
Italy 105.1 104.7 101.9 100.5 100.1 101.9 102.6 99.8 102.4 112.5 115.4 116.5 123.3 129.0 131.9 132.3 
Luxembourg 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.9 7.3 7.5 7.9 7.8 15.1 16.0 19.9 18.8 21.8 23.5 22.7 22.1 
Netherlands 51.8 49.2 48.5 49.7 49.9 49.3 44.8 42.7 54.8 56.9 59.3 61.6 66.4 67.7 67.9 65.1 
Portugal 50.3 53.4 56.2 58.7 62.0 67.4 69.2 68.4 71.7 83.6 96.2 111.4 126.2 129.0 130.6 129.0 
Spain 58.0 54.2 51.3 47.6 45.3 42.3 38.9 35.5 39.4 52.7 60.1 69.5 85.7 95.4 100.4 99.8 
Sweden 50.7 52.1 50.2 49.7 48.7 48.9 43.7 39.0 37.5 41.0 38.3 37.5 37.8 40.4 45.2 43.9 
United Kingdom 37.3 34.6 34.7 35.9 38.8 40.1 41.0 42.0 50.2 64.5 76.0 81.6 85.1 86.2 88.1 89.1 
 
Within the EU, an increase in government debt from 60.2% of the GDP in 2000 to 85.0% in 
2015 can be observed. While the debt growth took place relatively continuously in general, 
also including some minor decreases in two consecutive years, the most significant rise in pub-
lic debt occurred in 2009 and 2010. The same applies to most member states of the EU. A 
significant debt reduction in more recent years cannot be observed. Until today, a number of 
industrial countries are highly indebted, exceeding 100% of their GDP. Compared to the other 
European countries, the indebtedness of the Netherlands increased, but ranks below average 
(Afman & van de Coevering, 2012, pp. 68 f., 75 ff.). 
As the three above-mentioned key figures on global economic developments in recent years 
illustrate, an economic downturn from around 2009 onwards, with a partial mitigation in the 
following years, is perceptible. While there are certainly many potential causes for the devel-
opments, such as a general increase in unemployment, as described above, the events of the 
Financial Crisis since 2007 are closely related from a chronological perspective and seem to 
provide the best explanation. The number of bankruptcies is an additional indicator of a coun-
try’s economic situation. While data are sometimes difficult to compare because of different 
legal backgrounds, the data available indicate that the insolvencies of private companies sig-
nificantly increased in all countries of the Group of 7 (G7)129 with the exceptions of Canada 
and a minor increase in Germany from 2007 onwards. After 2009, the number of companies 
that went bankrupt decreased again in most G7 countries; Italy and France are exceptions 
with still significantly higher insolvency rates in 2015, compared to 2007. After a decrease in 
                                                     




2008, the Netherlands experienced a volatile, but overall increasing insolvency rate until mid-
2013. In 2015, the rate fell below the level of the year 2007 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2016, p. 20 f.). 
Taken together, the data on economic growth, unemployment, and government debt of a 
number of industrial countries provide insights into the economic developments since 2000. 
While the recent Financial Crisis’ course of time slightly varies from a cross-country perspec-
tive, the full impact of the Crisis can be identified in the broad economic decline of 2009 at 
the latest. The following sub-chapter addresses what characterised the Crisis from the per-
spective of economic theory. 
 
8.1.3. The Financial Crisis from an economic perspective 
Considering the distinction between different types of financial crises, discussed in chapter 3, 
the Financial Crisis since 2007 meets the characteristics of more than one type of crisis during 
its chronological development.130 In 2007, the Crisis originated as a banking crisis. As a result 
of credit defaults and high default risks, particularly in the housing market (de Kam, 2009a, p. 
85 ff.; Bartelsman, 2009, p. 33 ff.), commercial banks experienced refinancing problems. The 
global interlinkage of banks implied, and still implies, substantial systemic risks for the finan-
cial system if large banks face financial troubles. While the overall economic framework con-
ditions for commercial banks have improved in recent years, banks must still deal with the late 
effects of the crisis, especially continuing low interest-rate policies by central banks and debt 
(Bikker & Vervliet, 2018). Governmental rescue packages had a negative impact on public fi-
nance in the course of the Financial Crisis since 2007. In addition to existing public indebted-
ness, the Crisis implied an even faster increase in public debt in most industrial countries, as 
demonstrated above. This aspect of the Crisis can be considered as a sovereign debt crisis, 
particularly illustrated by a number of European countries that were saved from sovereign 
default by supranational and international institutions. In addition, private debt has increased 
extensively in various industrial countries in recent years; this was also one of the causes of 
the credit defaults in the U.S. housing market in the first place. 
Originating from financial difficulties of a number of eurozone countries, the euro as a cur-
rency and its exchange rates experienced pressure in the course of the Financial Crisis since 
2007 (Teulings et al., 2011), fulfilling the general criteria of a currency crisis. From an empirical 
perspective, this development is illustrated by the exchange rate between the euro and the 
U.S. dollar, for example. While the euro increased in value in 2007 and early 2008 when the 
Crisis mainly affected the US, its value decreased since mid-2008, when the crisis emerged in 
European countries and eased in the US. 
While indicators of these three types of crises can be found in a number of industrial countries 
since 2007 to a varying extent, signs of a sudden-stop crisis, which is the fourth type of crisis 
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and is most common in emerging markets, are not apparent in Western Europe and the US. 
However, the measures taken to prevent a number of European countries from sovereign de-
fault can be considered as measures preventing such a development. Furthermore, a number 
of Eastern European countries experienced a decline in capital inflow (Marer, 2010). 
While each crisis is different, which makes the drawing of comparisons between them difficult 
from a historical perspective, a slightly different distinction between types of crises has also 
been used by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p. 248 ff.) to assess the overall scope of Financial 
Crises. Their banking, currency, default (domestic and external), and inflation composite 
(BCDI) index adds up the five eponymous types of crises per country, weighted by the coun-
try’s share of world income, to one annual global figure. According to the latest available data 
(Reinhart, 2010), the Financial Crisis since 2007 had a scope only comparable to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and is the largest economic downturn since the end of the Second 
World War, especially in advanced economies. 
Considering the reactions to the Financial Crisis since 2007, which are also partly reflected in 
the key figures presented above, measures in line with all three main schools of economic 
thought, as discussed in chapter 3, can be observed in the course of the Crisis in different 
countries. However, it is questionable whether political-administrative decision makers 
agreed on certain policy measures because of theoretical economic beliefs. There is reason to 
argue that theoretical considerations were often limited and practical deliberations predomi-
nant. 
Since the delimitation between regular economic fluctuations and a financial crisis is blurry, 
the exact time at which countermeasures are appropriate, if those measures are considered 
to be desirable at all, is difficult to determine. In the early stages of the Financial Crisis since 
2007, there were also reasons to believe that the problems would remain limited to the real 
estate sector or the U.S. economy, which explains decisions by other countries not to inter-
vene. In other words, not taking action can also reflect the belief in a lack of necessity of ac-
tion, rather than a theoretical conviction. 
In September 2008, the U.S. government took a passive approach, theoretically in line with 
classical economic thinking, by not preventing Lehman Brothers from bankruptcy, while two 
mortgage trading companies were bailed out just a few days before. The reason that this ac-
tive decision for a passive approach was taken is questionable and still subject to various spec-
ulation. Official statements refer to legal concerns; however, it can also be argued that Leh-
man Brothers was used as a warning to the financial industry as a whole, since rescue 
measures can comprise adverse incentives. In addition, other non-interventions when private 
companies in various industrial sectors experienced severe financial troubles can also be con-
sidered as examples of passive policies. 
Stimulus packages to promote economic growth and to secure employment are the most rel-
evant measures that can be interpreted as counter-cyclical policies in line with Keynesian eco-
nomics. Those investments, usually including a broad range of separate measures with a focus 




of the Financial Crisis since 2007. Various examples of stimulus packages with different com-
positions can be found in European countries and the US from early 2008 onwards (Ter-Mi-
nassian, 2016, p. 26). Furthermore, economic stimuli were also realised through tax reductions 
(Hörisch, 2013, p. 118). 
Pro-cyclical policies in line with neo-liberal beliefs are usually represented by austerity 
measures. These measures form a common approach to balance the budget, which is a neces-
sity that can increase as a result of stimulus and rescue measures. Since 2010, austerity pack-
ages have been implemented in various European countries (Ter-Minassian, 2016, p. 26). In 
the case of Greece, for example, more than a dozen of these packages have been arranged 
until today. Compared to stimulus packages, austerity packages usually focus on either budget 
cuts in the public sector or measures to increase the public sector’s efficiency, as well as at-
tempts to decrease expenditures or increase revenues in the context of taxation and pensions. 
The role of institutions is another aspect of the recent Financial Crisis that can be assessed 
from an economic perspective. A distinction can be made between banks and other financial 
service providers as financial institutions with certain internal rules and procedures, on the 
one hand, and regulatory and supervisory institutions responsible for specifying and monitor-
ing certain standards for financial markets and market participants, on the other hand. At the 
corporate level, the Crisis revealed questionable incentives for employees of financial service 
providers, leading to excessive risk-taking. For example, bonuses as rewards for performance 
are usually calculated based on profits or revenues, while losses might not have a direct con-
sequence for the individual staff members, at least in the short run.131 In addition, monitoring 
and supervising strategies at the company level – in other words, risk management – proved 
to be insufficient in some cases, as the necessity of external rescue measures illustrates. 
Regulatory and supervisory institutions at the national, supranational, and international levels 
were also not able to prevent the Financial Crisis since 2007 from emerging and spreading. 
Their abilities to detect and prevent financial crises have thus been questioned for a long time, 
with reference to their limited competences and resources. However, discussions on the 
scope and methods of regulation, mainly from an economic perspective, were revitalised as a 
result of the Crisis, since existing regulation proved insufficient (Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mission, 2011). At the international level, especially the Third Basel Accord, also known as 
Basel III, which was developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and imple-
mented in 2013, can be considered a reaction to the recent Financial Crisis. The agreement 
includes a wide range of measures, most importantly higher capital requirements and addi-
tional liquidity requirements for banks, as well as increased transparency and disclosure duties 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2017). Further regulatory measures were taken at supra-
national and national levels of government, partially building upon the Third Basel Accord. 
However, while institutional failure could be observed in the context of the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 at all levels, ranging from the company to the international level, various measures 
– again ranging from changes in internal rules at the corporate level to a more strict regulation 
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of international financial markets – illustrate a certain willingness to change the institutional 
framework conditions towards a higher crisis resilience. The effectiveness of these measures 
remains to be seen. 
In summary, the Financial Crisis since 2007 comprised aspects of multiple sub-types of finan-
cial crises distinguished in economic theory, thereby illustrating its severity once more. The 
complex and multi-dimensional nature made decisions on suitable countermeasures difficult 
as well. This is reflected in sequences of reactions in industrial countries, including measures 
ranging from bailouts and stimuli to austerity and cutbacks, in line with different, or even op-
posing, schools of economic thought. Therefore, it can be concluded that most decisions fol-
lowed rather practical considerations and do not reflect profound economic beliefs. From a 
cross-country perspective, varying foci regarding the main types of countermeasures can also 
be observed, while striving towards the goal of overcoming the financial turbulences and their 
side effects. In addition, changes in the regulation and supervision of financial markets and 
market participants are further consequences of the Crisis. However, since economic consid-
erations alone are not sufficient to assess a financial crisis with a dimension as seen since 2007, 
conclusions and lessons from a political-administrative perspective will be analysed in the next 
sub-chapter. 
 
8.1.4. The Financial Crisis from a political-administrative perspective 
Events such as extensive financial crises do not leave the institutions and predominant political 
views in the affected countries unchanged. Within government, personnel and financial 
means might be transferred to those units of the administration concerned with crisis man-
agement in the short run. A different alignment of the organisation’s priorities might follow in 
the longer term. In this context it must be taken into account that organisational changes can 
also unintentionally reinforce a crisis. Furthermore, and partially also depending on crisis man-
agement, voters might lose confidence in the ruling parties. However, while many publications 
on financial crises usually focus on economic developments and interrelationships, political-
administrative perspectives are often underrepresented. 
In the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007, the Co-ordinating for Cohesion in the Public 
Sector of the Future (COCOPS) project has addressed the questions of how national govern-
ments in 14 European countries reacted to the Crisis and how decisions were made. Apart 
from official records, insights were primarily gained by interviewing senior civil servants with 
a standardised survey. According to the scholars’ overall conclusion, European governments 
seem “to treat the immediate symptoms rather than long-term underlying causes of the crisis” 
(Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 215) and that “the crisis seems to have promoted pre-pro-
grammed responses, and not necessarily new ways of behaviour” (p. 215). The cutback 
measures taken typically consisted of a subsequent number of steps (Kickert et al., 2015, p. 
574). Within the public sector, all countries under investigation froze payments and hiring. 
Reductions in salaries and the dismissal of civil servants predominantly occurred in countries 




international organisations (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 221). As previously mentioned, as 
necessary as these approaches might be to reduce expenditures, they are certainly not bene-
ficial for finding solutions to the underlying problems and consequences of the Crisis. This is 
because these measures are not suitable to motivate the existing personnel, and they largely 
rule out the possibility of hiring new experts for new challenges. 
On a political dimension, the assumption that governments politically oriented to the right opt 
for larger cutbacks than governments oriented to the left, as stated by Hibbs (1977), was not 
statistically confirmed. However, some statistical support has been found for the hypothesis 
that governments with a board majority in parliament take larger cuts; this is linked to the 
government’s assertiveness (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 222 f.). Furthermore, it has been 
observed that most European governments were not re-elected after the implementation of 
consolidation measures as a political consequence. Considering the fact that budget cuts are 
certainly not popular among those concerned, this is not a surprise. However, there are rea-
sons for attempts to balance the budgets – financial and monetary stability in particular – but 
reasonable approaches unfortunately do often not prevail. Other parties thus did not really 
offer serious alternatives to the previous strategies (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, pp. 214, 
224). 
Regarding the scope of fiscal consolidation, a positive relation to the scope of the Crisis, indi-
cated by the economic situation expressed by the GDP growth rate and the financial situation 
expressed by the budget deficit, was statistically proven (Kickert et al., 2015, pp. 574, 576; 
Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 222 f.). Interestingly, however, the correlation between fiscal 
consolidation and budget deficit reduction was relatively low, according to the study results. 
In addition, a relation between fiscal consolidation and economic growth resulting from it 
could not be confirmed, and some cases appeared in parts to be paradoxical (Kickert & 
Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 223). Following the insights into fiscal consolidation and budget deficit 
reduction, the measures that European governments decided upon and implemented can be 
called into question quite generally, since lower deficits make up one of the main aims of fiscal 
consolidation. The lack of a positive effect of consolidation measures on economic growth is 
less surprising, since lower government expenditures are directly linked to a lower GDP in line 
with the usual method of calculation. 
The research by Kickert and Randma-Liiv (2015) has also provided insights into changes within 
the national administrations of European countries during the Financial Crisis. Based on the 
survey results, it has been observed that the decision-making processes at the national level 
became more centralised in many countries during fiscal consolidation. The influence of poli-
ticians, the ministry of finance, and budget units within the organisations thus increased. The 
general information advantage of budget managers partially explains this development. In the 
case of politicians, attempts to influence organisational behaviour from the top have also been 
reported. In general, tendencies of centralisation in comparison with previous phases of de-
centralisation could be observed (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 221; Raudla et al., 2015a; 
Peters et al., 2011, p. 18). This, together with the research of the COCOPS project, illustrates 
that the Financial Crisis since 2007 did indeed change political-administrative relations within 




political and administrative shifts of power were concluded. Political parties implementing fis-
cal consolidation measures lost votes in recent elections, and the power within the admin-
istration shifted to those responsible for the budget. Statistical correlations between the 
scope of measures taken to address the crisis and their success, however, remained relatively 
low or non-existent. 
The scope, composition, and timing of policy responses to the recent Financial Crisis in 28 
OECD countries have been analysed by Wagschal and Jäkel (2010). The study was limited to 
the measures taken or decided upon until 2009, while monetary measures, financial guaran-
tees for private banks, and legal changes were generally excluded. According to their results, 
socio-economic factors, such as the number of inhabitants, and the amount of existing debt 
limited the possibilities of anti-cyclical investments. Furthermore, election dates played an 
important role regarding the scope and timing of stimulus packages independent of the polit-
ical orientation of the governing party. A higher degree of openness of the economy explained 
smaller stimulus packages, as a result of limited incentives, as well. Based on the expansionary 
measures implemented in recent years, the authors also expect a further increase in public 
debt in the medium to long term (p. 315 f.). An empirical study (Cameron, 2012) on European 
countries has also concluded that countries which reduced taxes, recovered earlier from the 
Crisis. However, the possibility of these measures correlates with the countries’ general eco-
nomic situations. 
Regarding a moderating effect of the different political orientations of the political parties in 
charge, Wagschal and Jäkel (2010) have observed that parties at the centre of the political 
spectrum were most active regarding economic stimulus measures. This finding contradicts 
the classical partisan theory, which generally identifies parties on the left side of the political 
spectrum as most active regarding expansionary policies. Furthermore, according to their 
analysis, the number of veto players had a negative effect on the timing and scope of the 
policy responses to the Crisis (p. 315 f.). 
Responses to the Financial Crisis since 2007 at the national level have also been investigated 
by Armingeon (2012). He addressed the question regarding the main strategies and some fac-
tors that could explain variation from a cross-country perspective already at an early stage of 
the Crisis by analysing responses until 2009. Following his results, most governments chose a 
limited expansionary strategy. In other words, government spending was somewhat in-
creased. Apart from the intention to fight the Crisis, this strategy had the further advantages 
of demonstrating the ability to act towards the citizens and voters as well as limiting the in-
crease in indebtedness (Armingeon, 2012, p. 544). 
On closer inspection, the study distinguishes three groups of OECD countries regarding their 
fiscal responses. The first group consists of six countries, including the United States and the 
United Kingdom, with extensive counter-cyclical stimulus measures. A unified government is 
identified as a factor that enables and supports this strategy. The second group is made up of 
nine countries with pro-cyclical responses and the intention to reduce government spending 
in particular. Ireland and Hungary are mentioned as examples. The third group is comprised 




mon approach, as pointed out above. In addition to countries such as Germany and Switzer-
land, the Netherlands also belongs to this group (Armingeon, 2012, pp. 549, 559 f.). Regarding 
further factors that potentially determine variation in crisis responses, partisan politics had 
limited explanatory power, which is in turn explained by similar intentions of all political par-
ties in challenging times (Armingeon, 2012, p. 561 f.). However, it generally needs to be taken 
into account that these observations and categorisations are limited to the developments un-
til 2009, whereas various changes in governmental strategies to address the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 were observed in later years. 
Similar research questions have been addressed by Hörisch (2013). He focused on the scope 
and composition of fiscal stimulus packages during the Financial Crisis since 2007 at national 
levels of government from a comparative perspective. Regarding the framework condition for 
stimulus packages, he has concluded that there was not one necessary condition for the im-
plementation. However, he has found some support for the hypotheses that governments on 
the more left side of the political spectrum opt for larger fiscal policy reactions. Lower deficits 
were, to some extent, an additional factor related to a larger scope of fiscal stimulus packages. 
Overall, the events of the Financial Crisis since 2007 were analysed by a number of scholars 
with a focus on political-administrative developments. Next to some studies with a focus on 
the impact on or responses by single countries, or both, country comparisons can be consid-
ered as particularly interesting in order to comprehend the implications for the public sector 
as well as the reactions decided upon by political-administrative actors. While various sepa-
rate measures were implemented, ranging from economic stimuli to austerity, variation can 
be observed depending on the national contexts. After the discussion of these general insights 
into the global and national developments of the recent Financial Crisis from different per-
spectives, the following sub-chapters will address the situation at the local levels of govern-
ment, starting with the crisis impact in the next sub-chapter. 
 
8.2. The Financial Crisis’ impact at the local level of government 
The Financial Crisis since 2007 affected all levels of government. In Iceland, the United King-
dom, and the Netherlands, for example, local authorities lost assets as a result of the banking 
crisis (Dethier & Morrill, 2012, p. 9). In general, the types of impact and policy areas affected 
are closely linked to the administrative levels’ main tasks. Furthermore, local levels of govern-
ment are affected by measures from higher levels within the system of administrative subdi-
vision. In other words, crisis reactions by national or regional levels of governments can be 
considered as part of the crisis impact from a municipal perspective. Furthermore, the local 
level is also differentiated from the national level, since a varying impact of a financial crisis 





In many countries, the local level is the main provider of social services and responsible for 
the largest share of public expenditures, depending on the structure of the administrative sys-
tem. In times of an economic downturn, the demand for these public services can increase 
extensively, especially if many people lose their jobs. Even though the local level often largely 
depends on other levels of government on the income side, the financial situation can be af-
fected if revenues at other levels of government decrease and if transfers are adjusted, or if 
decisions on austerity measures are taken (Vammalle & Hulbert, 2013). The municipalities’ 
own resources, which are usually composed of local taxes and fees, might decrease in times 
of crisis as well. Taken together, the generally expected effects of a Financial Crisis at the local 
level are quite adverse on both sides of the budget. 
As explained in chapter 3, the types of impacts of a financial crisis at the local level can be 
grouped into five categories. They are (1) people and the labour markets, (2) local economic 
resilience, (3) investment, construction, and property markets, (4) strategy and positioning, 
and (5) municipal assets and balance sheets (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 269 ff.). Regarding the 
consequences of the Financial Crisis since 2007, unemployment was, and still is, one of the 
main challenges. This type of impact within the category of people and the labour markets 
usually concerns all levels of government more or less directly. As the major provider of public 
services in many countries, local authorities must deal with increasing requests for social ben-
efits and hence higher public expenses. The development of the unemployment rate in a num-
ber of industrial countries was presented in table 16 of the previous sub-chapter. A relatively 
significant increase in recent years can be observed in most countries included in this analysis, 
especially those in southern Europe. In addition to variation in the rise in unemployment as a 
result of the Financial Crisis from a cross-country perspective, further variation occurred 
within the nation states. Other effects of the Crisis within this category, such as fewer job 
openings, lower real wages, and labour immigration, are closely linked to the employment 
situation. 
Before affecting employment, the Financial Crisis since 2007 had an impact on the economic 
situation of businesses in various sectors. Especially at the early stages of the Crisis, financial 
institutions and companies with business activities in real estate faced severe declines in de-
mand. Over time, an increasing number of sectors were affected by the Crisis, which implied 
negative consequences for local economic resilience. Cities, which are financial centres within 
certain regions or countries, were affected the most. In contrast, rural areas, where the agri-
cultural sector is most relevant from an economic perspective, were less affected. 
Declining activities in the areas of investment, construction, and property markets were a fur-
ther consequence of the Financial Crisis since 2007, relating to the negative impacts on busi-
ness operations and employment, partially amplified by periodic market fluctuations. With 
the economic decline, the demand for new development areas decreased, and previous mu-
nicipal investments in land development became partially unprofitable. As with all other types 
of impact, variation was a given across the local level, dependent on other factors connected 
with the location. Since land development was traditionally a common source of income for 
many Dutch municipalities, and because it has decreased widely in profit since the beginning 




In terms of to changing framework conditions, local authorities began to reconsider their 
strategy and positioning in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007. On the one hand, the 
increasing demand for social benefits and other welfare services, typically provided by local 
government, strengthened the importance of the local level within the administrative subdi-
vision. On the other hand, increasing financial constraints led to considerations of potential 
cost reductions and increases in efficiency, which already describe aspects of a crisis reaction. 
Overall, the consequence of the Financial Crisis since 2007 – as the major challenge in recent 
years, apart from the migrant crisis since 2015 – was that officials at all levels of government 
called into question the importance of various tasks carried out at the local level and the way 
in which those responsibilities are performed. In addition to the general reasonableness of 
certain tasks, costs and benefits also came under scrutiny. 
Partially related to the types of impacts discussed previously, the Financial Crisis since 2007 
negatively affected municipal assets and balance sheets. Increased expenditure, especially in 
the context of welfare spending, and declining revenues because of fewer economic activities 
have unfavourable implications for both sides of the municipal balance sheet. In this context, 
financial pressure also encouraged reform activities. Comparable to the other types of im-
pacts, various factors such as the resilience and autonomy of public finances led to broad var-
iation across the local level in terms of consequences for the overall financial situation (Ladner, 
2017, p. 28 f.; Ter-Minassian, 2016, pp. 23, 42 f.). Since municipal budgets are publicly availa-
ble in most countries – because of transparency standards – financial impacts of a crisis are 
best to study. Therefore, changes in municipal revenues and expenditures will be the focus of 
the empirical analysis of the situation in the Netherlands in the next chapter. 
Further insights into the impact of the Financial Crisis at the local level relate to the research 
of international organisations and scholars. In 2009, at an early stage of the Crisis, United Cit-
ies and Local Governments (UCLG), which is a worldwide organisation representing the inter-
ests of local governments, and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), 
which is the ULCG’s European section, analysed the impact of the Crisis on the local authorities 
within their member states. They concluded that “the most significant direct impact of the 
crisis has been on the level and composition of local government finances on both the revenue 
and expenditure sides of the budget” (United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 9). 
On closer inspection, local government’s own revenues usually declined faster than shared 
revenues and transfers from other levels of government. However, exceptions were observed. 
In this context, the developments mainly depend on the country’s taxation and financial allo-
cation system. Considering different types of own resources, those types with a fairly stable 
subject of taxation, such as property taxes, declined less than other types (United Cities and 
Local Governments, 2009, p. 9).132 According to a survey by the CEMR, 61% of local authorities 
in Europe experienced a decline in own revenues in the context of the Financial Crisis since 
2007. More specifically, 61% reported lower tax revenues and 42% lower revenues from fees. 
36% of the respondents indicated lower revenues from shared taxes. Furthermore, 55% of the 
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municipalities participating in the survey experienced a decrease in intergovernmental trans-
fers (United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 10; Dethier & Morrill, 2012, p. 8 f.). It 
should be taken into account that the figures illustrate the situation as of 2009. Considering 
the socio-economic developments after 2009, as illustrated in tables 15 to 17 of the previous 
sub-chapter, a further deterioration of the financial situation of local government needs to be 
assumed in most countries.133 
In the context of the recent Financial Crisis’ impact on revenues at the local level, UCLG (2009, 
p. 10 f.) has identified six separate types of changes in own revenues and transfers, namely 
the (1) reduction in own revenues obtained from own taxes, fees and charges, (2) reduction 
in yields of specific tax shares, (3) reduction in transfers from the national (or regional) budget, 
(4) constraints on local government access to their own revenues, (5) reduction in revenues 
from capital holdings, and (6) loss of assets and deposits. The first three types of impact were 
already discussed in previous paragraphs, and the fourth impact mainly applies to developing 
countries and capital shortages within the treasury system. Numbers five and six are related 
to the local level’s financial operations. The public sector was affected by lower interest rates 
comparable to private businesses and households. In addition, some public authorities, for 
example in the Netherlands, experienced substantive losses from speculative investment de-
cisions (United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 11). 
On the expenditure side, UCLG has observed that local authorities in various countries had to 
reduce their expenditures because of declining revenues. In this regard, the policy areas of 
social services and employment, which were usually less concerned about spending cuts in 
previous crises, were also affected (United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 11 f.). How-
ever, it must be mentioned that welfare systems, especially in Western Europe, include man-
datory payments by the public sector, with a limited leeway for local authorities to cut ex-
penditures. Since the demand for social services usually increases in times of crisis, two com-
peting developments affected municipal expenditures: the need to cut spending because of 
declining revenues on the one hand, and increasing expenditure for mandatory social services 
on the other hand. Therefore, the overall changes in municipal expenditures during the Finan-
cial Crisis since 2007 occurred in both directions, with variation across countries and periods 
under review. Following the CEMR’s survey results, recurrent spending increased, according 
to 33% of the respondents. Higher expenditures were mainly reported in Western Europe and 
Scandinavia (United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, p. 11 f.). In those cases where ex-
penditures increased, higher debt was a frequent further consequence. However, in some 
municipalities, where the financial situation deteriorated noticeably, it was also reported that 
municipalities experienced difficulties in lending money (Paulais, 2009, p. 10 ff.). Further limi-
tations to expenditure increases originated from debt ceilings and other budgetary rules. 
In addition to the types of impact outlined above, the Financial Crisis had further relatively 
indirect side effects from a local government perspective. It can be argued, for example, that 
the Crisis illustrated weaknesses from previous decentralisation measures. If local authorities 
have far-reaching responsibilities, but limited possibilities to influence their own financial 
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means because of extensive dependencies on transfers from other levels of government, then 
their possible reactions to a financial crisis are also limited. Furthermore, local governments’ 
financial situations can deteriorate quickly if other levels of government reduce transfers to 
the municipalities as a result of their own crisis reactions (United Cities and Local Govern-
ments, 2009, pp. 5, 8). In other words, changes on the expenditure side are difficult if limited 
possibilities exist for adjustments on the revenue side. The Financial Crisis consequently led 
to considerations regarding the distribution of tasks and the corresponding financing in a 
multi-level system. Administrative reforms might follow in some countries in the long run. 
Furthermore, managerial weaknesses, for example regarding the refinancing of debt, became 
evident in some municipalities in the context of the Financial Crisis (Canuto & Liu, 2010). Con-
sidering crisis management more generally, politicians and civil servants partially appeared to 
be overstrained at all levels of government, including the local one. Enormous time pressure 
sometimes calls into question the capacity for action in line with existing procedures. There-
fore, reflections on appropriate changes in the organisational structures and administrative 
procedures within local authorities, potentially leading to managerial reforms in the long term, 
can be considered as a further impact of the Crisis, closely related to considerations regarding 
changes in the distribution of tasks and sources of financial means within a system of multi-
level governance. 
In general, the financial position of local government has been more stable than that of central 
government in most industrial countries in recent decades, from an empirical perspective. 
Lower deficits and less volatility on the expenditure side are the main reasons. Tax revenues, 
on the other hand, were often subject to fluctuations comparable to the national level. In this 
regard, business and income taxes were generally more affected than property and consump-
tion taxes –property taxes in particular were relatively stable (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 6, 14 
f.). The circumstance that the latter types of taxes are more common at the local level explains 
a relatively stable tax income of the municipalities in some countries. As a consequence, the 
budgetary situation of local authorities was generally less affected by the Financial Crisis since 
2007 than central government. This observation is comparable to the developments of previ-
ous economic downturns (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 5 f.). However, several simultaneous de-
velopments, such as common decentralisation measures in the time period of the recent Fi-
nancial Crisis, make it difficult to identify a sole cause of a certain observation. Considering 
changes in transfers from the national level, it should be taken into account that potential 
adjustment based on political decisions usually takes a few years and affects the municipalities 
after a certain time period (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 14). 
When comparing the impacts of the Financial Crisis since 2007 at the local level of government 
in Western countries, it appears that municipalities were affected differently (Ladner, 2017, 
p. 29). Variation in the general responsibilities of local government and the sources of income, 
as well as the overall financial situation, can be considered as the main reasons. The extent to 
which private companies and households within the country were affected by the Crisis is an 
additional factor describing variation in the impact of the Crisis on local government as a sec-
ond-round effect. On average, local authorities in the UK and France seem to have been more 




low level of national debt before the crisis and a generally low impact on the commodities 
sector explain the situation in Australia, while banking regulations and less speculation in the 
real estate sector are the reasons in the case of Canada (Bailey & Chapain, 2011b, p. 20). 
From a comparative perspective, a relation between the average size of a country’s munici-
palities and the impact of the recent Financial Crisis has not been recognisable. While, for 
example, Portugal and Ireland have relatively large local units in terms of inhabitants, and Italy 
and Spain have relatively small ones, all these countries were considerably hit by the Crisis. 
Regarding local autonomy, the evidence of a relation in terms of a higher or lower average 
impact of the Crisis was also limited (Ladner, 2017, p. 29 f.). 
In summary, the Financial Crisis since 2007 affected local authorities in various ways. In the 
context of public finances, it can be observed that revenues generally decreased. While the 
effect on the expenditure side was less uniform, higher spending, especially on social services, 
dominated in most Western European countries, when leaving out other developments during 
the same time period apart from the Crisis. Compared to central government, local authorities 
were often affected by the Financial Crisis less directly. Different factors, especially in the con-
text of municipal responsibilities and sources of revenues, provide an explanation for variation 
in the Crisis’ impact from a cross-country perspective. However, as is the case at all levels of 
government, the long-term impacts of the crisis, in combination with the success of the re-
sponses to it, remain to be seen. The following sub-chapter address the latter in more detail 
in the context of local government. 
 
8.3. Local responses to the Financial Crisis 
In the same way that all levels of government were affected by the Financial Crisis since 2007, 
all levels reacted to it, or at least attempted to react to it, within their spheres of possibility 
and capability, which are mainly linked to the policy areas in charge and financial means. Typ-
ical responses at the local level included austerity measures, higher tax rates, a reduction in 
investments, and, to a lesser extent, own stimulus plans (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 5; Paulais, 
2009, p. 10 ff.). The different types of governmental measures followed different levels and 
mechanisms of impact (Ter-Minassian, 2016, pp. 23, 42 f.), as well as different assumptions 
from an economic perspective, and they were therefore often applied with a temporal offset. 
From a more practical perspective, increased co-operation with the private sector or other 
municipalities was an additional strategy sometimes observed to lower the costs for the pro-
vision of public services (Ladner, 2017, p. 45). 
When analysing crisis reactions at the local level, it generally needs to be taken into account 
that budget rules are often stricter at lower levels of government than at the national level. 
Furthermore, fiscal regulations often rule out counter-cyclical reactions by the local level com-
pletely (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 13 f.). In other words, the measures to react to a financial 
crisis from which local officials can choose are relatively restricted. Apart from responses in 




the budgets is also justified to maintain both the ability to meet financial obligations and a 
certain financial leeway (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 23 f.). However, since local authorities in 
some countries largely depend on the national level from a financial perspective, as pointed 
out before, their own capacities to respond to the Crisis were often relatively limited (Bailey 
& Chapain, 2011b, p. 21). On the other hand, many national governments provided additional 
financial support to the local level or lifted borrowing constraints in order to help municipali-
ties to cope with the Financial Crisis (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 2). However, while those 
measures represent a crisis reaction by national government, the measures can be considered 
as an additional, and in some ways even positive, second-round impact of the Crisis from the 
perspective of the local level. 
As described in chapter 3, five categories of local-level reactions to a financial crisis, closely 
related to the five categories of impact, can be distinguished. Those categories are (1) people 
and the labour markets, (2) local economic resilience, (3) investment, construction, and prop-
erty markets, (4) long-term strategy and positioning, and (5) local governance and leadership 
(Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 273 ff.). By definition, welfare states provide help to those in need. 
While the cases that qualify for social assistance and the scope of benefits largely vary from 
one country to another, the services are usually relatively similar within a nation state. How-
ever, since the local level is often responsible for the provision and at least partially for financ-
ing these services, expenditure differs depending on the socio-economic composition of the 
local population. This explains why, apart from a general increase in welfare payments as a 
rather automatic consequence of and reaction to the Financial Crisis since 2007 within the 
category of people and the labour markets, some municipalities were affected more than oth-
ers. 
Apart from existing support measures, various additional measures were arranged, which il-
lustrate the severity of the recent Crisis once more. In Germany, for example, the following 
measures were implemented as part of two stimulus packages: training programmes for older 
employees on the job and the extension of the funding period for reduced hours’ compensa-
tion (German Bundestag, 2008; German Bundestag, 2009; Cameron, 2012, p. 92). While those 
packages, which included further measures such as infrastructure investments and tax breaks, 
were funded by federal government, the local level was involved from an administrative per-
spective. Local offices of the Federal Labour Office were responsible for implementing the 
additional measures as a reaction to the Financial Crisis since 2007, focusing on people and 
the labour market, for example.134 In addition to measures initiated by the national level, a 
number of cities started their own programmes. Amsterdam, for instance, established a so-
called mobility centre to help the newly unemployed to find jobs in other sectors, especially 
                                                     
134 Since the measures were decided upon at the federal level, it can be argued that they are not measures 
taken by local government itself, but describe an additional external impact on the local level. However, for 
various reasons, especially the striving for comparable standards and procedures as well as limited decision-
making capacities at the local level, the major decisions on how to react to the Financial Crisis were made at 
the national level in most Western countries. Within the general measures that were decided upon by central 
government, a certain room for local government to manoeuvre usually remained when implementing the poli-
cies. In addition, a more or less strong formal and informal influence by local authorities and their associations 
on central government’s policy decisions can also be given, depending on the policy area of interest and the 




those with labour shortage. Local job fairs are also examples of a relatively cost-effective 
measure taken in some larger cities. Along with helping those who lost their jobs, encouraging 
innovation and entrepreneurship is an additional type of reaction with a focus on people and 
the labour market. In recent years, various cities around the world have introduced training 
and support programmes to qualify and motivate persons to start new business (Clark & Hux-
ley, 2011, p. 273 f.). 
Further reactions to the Financial Crisis since 2007 focused on improving the situation of pri-
vate companies in various sectors. While the measures primarily addressed businesses, local 
economic resilience was indirectly strengthened as well. Compared to the labour market and 
social benefits, automatic mechanisms are not common in this area; therefore, rescue 
measures for individual companies, as well as stimulus packages supporting certain sectors, 
were implemented. Co-operation between different levels of government was also common 
in this category. 
In Germany, for example, the two stimulus packages included inexpensive credit lines and 
more advantageous depreciation rules for private companies (German Bundestag, 2008; Ger-
man Bundestag, 2009). In case of economic problems of major companies, local government 
in the region had a mediating role; however, the decisions regarding supporting measures, 
such as credits and guarantees, were mainly taken by federal government. By doing so, insol-
vencies of some major companies under financial pressure and expected second-round effects 
within certain local areas were avoided. Various cities took additional countermeasures to the 
Financial Crisis since 2007, focusing on strengthening local economic resilience, for example 
by granting emergency loans for smaller companies and supporting investments in future 
technologies. In this regard, the city of Amsterdam, for instance, initiated an investment fund 
for innovative business ideas (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 274 f.). 
With measures focusing on investment, construction, and property markets, all levels of gov-
ernment addressed the Financial Crisis since 2007, partially with joint initiatives. Apart from 
actions by local authorities, it was usually the national level that provided funds for additional 
investments by the local level, especially in the field of infrastructure. 
In the case of Germany, for example, the stimulus packages included financial resources for 
investments in education, transport, hospitals, urban development, and information technol-
ogies, as well as inexpensive credit lines for municipalities in underdeveloped areas (German 
Bundestag, 2008; German Bundestag, 2009). While the financial means were provided by the 
federal and the Länder levels, decisions on the projects were taken by the municipalities. In 
other words, local authorities were financially supported in investing in projects focusing on 
various types of infrastructure. Compared to the other components of the stimulus packages 
discussed before, a high decision-making scope existed at the local level in the context of this 
measure to address the Financial Crisis. Alongside investments, local authorities’ further reac-
tions to the Crisis included simplifications regarding administrative approvals, information on 
investment opportunities, political help in finding new investors, and new financial solutions 
for intended investments. While those measures were closely linked to attempts to 




and the necessary official building permits, as a field with typically many competences at the 
local level in particular (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 275 f.). 
Compared to the previous categories, changes in local governments’ long-term strategy and 
positioning are more difficult to assess, since intentions often include partially informal con-
siderations. However, in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007, some cities revised their 
economic development strategies by shifting the focus towards business ideas in the fields of 
innovation and knowledge, as well as the general promotion of economic diversification. Am-
sterdam, for example, adopted a new joint economic agenda together with the regional level. 
These measures can be considered as closely related to attempts to strengthen local economic 
resilience as well (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 276 f.). 
Changes in the category of local governance and leadership can also be regarded as relatively 
difficult to assess, since governance and leadership both include formal and informal aspects. 
During the Financial Crisis since 2007, various local authorities changed internal procedures 
as a basis for other reactions to the Crisis. Those changes were in relation to communication 
channels and contact persons, for example, and reflect the circumstance that existing proce-
dures reached their limitations because of the scope of the Crisis. Further measures on the 
administrative side involved collaborations and attempts at budget consolidation to expend 
the capacity for action in general (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 278). 
From a political-administrative perspective, the Financial Crisis since 2007 comprised some 
further interesting developments. It can be observed, for instance, that the local level was 
hardly involved in crisis management in various countries, thereby calling into question its 
relevance within the political-administrative system. Rather centralised decision-making, 
which might be an effective choice in times of crisis, was observed as a common development 
during the crisis in countries such as Italy (Meneguzzo et al., 2013; Barbera et al., 2016; Bol-
gherini, 2014). This trend can also be interpreted as a disruption of the developments of pre-
vious decades, which were mainly characterised by a process of additional decentralisations. 
From a financial perspective, decreasing revenues and a smaller financial leeway are also not 
suited to strengthen the role of local government. Considering the broad responsibilities of 
the local level, citizen trust might be negatively affected in the long run if local authorities are 
not able to meet citizens’ demands both in the context of a crisis and in general (United Cities 
and Local Governments, 2009, pp. 5, 8). 
When all levels of governments began to reflect on possible reactions to the economic down-
turn of recent years, a partial lack of co-ordination and different political conceptions become 
apparent within some countries. This resulted in measures by local authorities that under-
mined the crisis reactions at higher levels of government in some cases, while local crisis re-
actions supported the strategies of the national level in most nation states, according to a 
study on OECD countries (Wolman, 2014; Wolman & Hincapie, 2014). However, the necessity 
of an improved co-ordination in crisis responses between the different administrative levels 
in order to increase the overall efficiency of the measures can be considered as a further gen-
eral lesson from the recent Crisis (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 5 f.). Depending on the scope of 
contrary measures, structural, administrative, and fiscal reforms might be advisable in certain 




More generally, the crisis raised questions about the capacities of local authorities to under-
stand economic connections sufficiently before deciding on crisis reactions. Previous experi-
ences seem to be a relevant factor in this context (Bailey & Chapain, 2011b, p. 21). However, 
the complexity of identifying relevant factors and their interaction in order to decide on effi-
cient local reactions to a financial crisis can be considered as a major challenge, where external 
support is necessary in the short run, especially in small municipalities with a relatively limited 
number of employees.135 
In line with the crisis impact as well as financial and managerial capacities, crisis reactions by 
local authorities varied from a cross-country perspective as well as within countries. While 
one group of countries focused on counter-cyclical policies, another cut spending and in-
creased taxes (Blöchliger et al., 2010, p. 6). According to a study on OECD countries (Wolman, 
2014; Wolman & Hincapie, 2014), counter-cyclical fiscal policies by local government were 
more common, but in many cases less pronounced in comparison with the national level. The 
study has also concluded that most national governments aimed to steer local fiscal behaviour 
via increases or decreases in the grants allocated to the local level, in line with phases of fiscal 
stimuli or consolidation. However, when decisions on how to address the crisis were neces-
sary, some local authorities also reacted relatively independently within their capacities, while 
in other countries, such as the UK, regional authorities played an important role in co-ordinat-
ing countermeasures and representing local interests at the national level (Bailey & Chapain, 
2011b, p. 20). 
In the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007, recommended countermeasures for local au-
thorities were also published. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), for example, developed a number of suggestions based on a survey with local officials 
in 41 larger cities, including Amsterdam. These recommendations, known as the Barcelona 
principles, include aspects such as improving local leadership, expanding collaborations with 
external partners, and attracting external investments (Clark, 2009, pp. 80-86; Clark & Huxley, 
2011). However, most of the Barcelona principles can be considered as rather general and 
hardly innovative. Since the principles focus primarily on larger cities and gained little atten-
tion in policy papers or academic literature, they will not be further addressed in this study. 
Other suggestions on how to react to the recent Financial Crisis and increase the local level’s 
resilience include the diversification of revenues and the search for new forms of income. Fur-
thermore, the following might help to strengthen the local levels’ financial position: new eco-
nomic strategies, new investment strategies and tools, improved intergovernmental relations, 
and a new approach to delivery in order to more efficiently provide services in times of limited 
resources (Clark & Huxley, 2011, p. 285 f.). Further considerations on how to improve the 
situation of local government in times of crises mention territorial and internal reforms, which 
can strengthen the local position by forming larger units and increasing the efficiency of mu-
nicipal administrations. In addition, it has also been pointed out that increased co-operation 
with the private sector or other municipalities can be helpful to ensure public service delivery 
                                                     
135 In the event of a crisis, on the one hand, relevant expertise is usually required quickly. On the other hand, 
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by decreasing the associated costs. In a similar way, centralisation can also be considered as a 
strategy to realise economies of scale in the field of public services (Ladner, 2017, p. 41 f.). 
Based on the aforementioned information in this chapter, local government was not the most 
relevant political-administrative entity regarding responses to the Financial Crisis since 2007 
in Western countries. This role was usually fulfilled by central government, although the local 
level was a relevant player regarding joint reactions and the implementation of countermeas-
ures. Traditionally limited financial and managerial resources and the dependency on trans-
fers on the revenues side were the main reasons for the often supportive role of local author-
ities. Considering the crisis responses as such, relatively individual measures were often taken 
next to extensive stimulus packages. In general, a process from short-term responses towards 
more long-term recovery strategies can be observed regarding governments’ attempts to fight 
the recent Financial Crisis and all its far-reaching consequences for society, private companies, 
and government itself, including public finances. Following this chapter on the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 from a global perspective, which included a focus on local government in Western 
countries, the next chapter will address the developments in the Netherlands, starting with 





9. The Netherlands and the Financial Crisis since 2007: impacts and re-
sponses at the national, regional, and local levels of government  
After providing theoretical insights into financial crises and potential reactions, an overview 
of the general trends and developments at the Dutch local level in recent years, as well as 
events and implications of the Financial Crisis since 2007 from a global perspective, this chap-
ter focuses on the developments in the context of the recent Financial Crisis in the Nether-
lands. Beginning with the impact of and the reactions to the Crisis at the national and regional 
levels, the situation at the local level of government will be addressed by presenting and dis-
cussing previous research results. 
Considering the overall economic situation, the Netherlands experienced a period of recession 
from the second quarter of 2008 until the second quarter of 2009 (Cameron, 2012, p. 96; 
Bartelsman, 2009, p. 39). However, before analysing the recent Financial Crisis in the Nether-
lands in detail, further background information is necessary to understand the country-spe-
cific mechanism behind the developments. First, the Netherlands is an open economy largely 
dependent on international trade. A considerable share of the country’s GDP is directly or 
indirectly influenced by economic developments outside the nation’s borders,136 which im-
plies a spillover effect in the context of a crisis as well as in general. In this context, the Dutch 
economy depends on economic developments in Germany in particular (de Vries & Degen, 
2015, p. 155). 
Second, the Netherlands has a comparably large and internationally oriented financial sector, 
and it is the home country of some of the world’s leading financial institutions and insurance 
companies, supported by a system of corporate taxation with major exemptions.137 Just as in 
many other industrial countries, financial businesses were growing in the years before the 
Crisis,138 and financial products became more complex. As a result of the transformation to-
wards more international business activities in pre-crisis years, the Netherlands had the ninth 
largest financial sector in the world. While financial activities contributed to just over 6% of 
the GDP, the total balance sheet of the financial institutions added up to several times the 
GDP in the years before the Crisis.139 The only European countries with a higher balance-to-
GDP ratio during the same period were Britain, Switzerland, and Ireland (de Vries & Degen, 
2015, pp. 147, 154; Kickert, 2012d, p. 439; Kickert, 2012e, p. 51 f.; Engelen & Musterd, 2010, 
p. 701). Within the Dutch financial sector, ING, ABN AMRO, and Rabobank are the largest 
                                                     
136 Estimates range between one third (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 155) and two thirds (Engelen & Musterd, 
2010, p. 701) of the Dutch GDP, depending on economic developments abroad. 
137 Therefore, the Netherlands is sometimes considered as a tax haven or at least as a country enabling tax 
avoidance by paving the way for tax havens abroad (The Guardian, 2017b). 
138 In terms of employment, for example, approximately 233,000 persons were working in the Dutch financial 
and insurance sector in 1995. This figure increased relatively continuously until 2002, when about 288,000 per-
sons were working in this industry. The following years were characterised by some volatility. In 2007, roughly 
284,000 people were working for financial service and insurance companies in the Netherlands. Since 2008, 
this number is largely decreasing. In 2016, the number of employees was lower than in 1995 (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017). 
139 Estimates of the degree to which Dutch financial institutions’ total balance sheets exceed the GDP range be-




banks in terms of total assets, and they are also among the 100 largest banks in the world. The 
same applies to the three Dutch insurance companies Nationale-Nederlanden (NN), AEGON, 
and Delta (Kickert, 2012d, p. 439). 
Third, it needs to be noted that corporate taxation and financial market regulation follow a 
more liberal approach in the Netherlands than in other countries in general (Lindquist et al., 
2015b, p. 319). Considering that the Financial Crisis since 2007 began as a real estate and 
banking crisis, the aforementioned conditions suggest effects on the Netherlands above the 
average of industrial countries. However, compared to the United States, the Dutch housing 
market is more regulated, and the regulation of financial markets is at least less fragmented 
(Engelen & Musterd, 2010, p. 704). 
Furthermore, it is necessary to assess the Netherlands’ economic situation before the Finan-
cial Crisis since 2007 in order to provide a benchmark when analysing the effects of the Crisis. 
As tables 15 to 17 on economic growth, unemployment, and public debt in chapter 8.1.2 illus-
trate, the overall socio-economic developments in the Netherlands were relatively favourable 
in pre-Crisis years. Economic growth was relatively high, the unemployment rate comparably 
low, and government debt decreasing (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 150 f.; Kickert, 2012a, p. 
301; Afman & van de Coevering, 2012, pp. 68 f., 75 ff.). 
The sections in this chapter are outlined as follows. The first sub-chapter addresses the Dutch 
central government’s reactions to the Financial Crisis since 2007. By providing an overview of 
the measures at the national and regional levels and the time course during which they were 
taken, the analyses of the situation at the local level is prepared, since some of the decisions 
can be considered as highly relevant for the municipalities. The crisis reactions are subdivided 
into three phases, starting with bank rescue measures, continuing with fiscal stimulus and 
economic recovery measures, and leading to austerity and consolidation measures (9.1). The 
current state of research on the developments in the context of the Financial Crisis at the 
Dutch local level is presented and discussed in the sub-chapter thereafter. Overall, six scien-
tific publications, addressing the situation in one or more Dutch municipalities, are identified. 
Those previous studies are mostly based on interviews with local officials and use qualitative 
research designs limited to small numbers of municipalities. Furthermore, implications for 
public finances have hardly been addressed by previous research (9.2). 
 
9.1. The recent Financial Crisis at the national and regional levels of 
government 
Apart from supranational and international institutions and organisations, a financial crisis is 
first an event concerning nation states, and therefore the national level of government, since 
monetary140 and fiscal policies as well as financial regulation are usually within the competen-
cies of central government or independent national institutions. However, within a system of 
                                                     





multi-level governance, lower levels are affected by decisions at higher levels of government. 
From a local level’s perspective, some responses by national government can be considered 
as an additional type of crisis impact, for example in the case of a reduction in transfer pay-
ments. Therefore, analysing the reactions by central government is crucial to understand the 
complete situation that the local level has to deal with. In the case of the Netherlands, it needs 
to be taken into account that the provinces, representing the regional level of government, 
were hardly involved in managing the Crisis because of their main competences in policy areas 
such as physical planning as well as environmental and agricultural issues. 
More importantly, crisis reactions by the Dutch national level were influenced by the EU and 
eurozone membership. Following the Stability and Growth Pact, EU member states need to 
ensure a government deficit below 3% of the GDP and a total government debt below 60% of 
the GDP in order to sustain fiscal stability (European Union, 2007, article 126). This budget 
deficit ceiling had a major influence on the national measures taken to address the Crisis, and 
it is even argued that “the primary objective of all successive fiscal consolidation measures 
was to reduce the budget deficit to that percentage [of a government deficit below 3% of the 
GDP]” (Kickert, 2015, p. 545). 
In addition to accompanying crisis reactions by the ECB, joint decision-making by eurozone 
countries was both required and in the member states’ own interest, since co-ordinated fiscal 
measures appear to be reasonable in the case of uniform monetary policies and expected 
spillover effects. Further co-ordination and negotiations took place at the international level, 
involving institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as at the EU level, since not 
all member states are part of the eurozone. The measures taken to prevent a number of eu-
rozone members from national bankruptcy included loans and guarantees provided by other 
countries via different channels. In other words, default risks for highly indebted countries, 
mainly in southern Europe, were accepted by the Netherlands and other eurozone mem-
bers.141 The Dutch Prime Minister thus had the most prominent role, representing the inter-
ests of the Netherlands in terms of crisis management at the supranational and international 
levels, while the Dutch Minister of Finance, on the other hand, had a more prominent role in 
crisis management at the national level (de Vries & Degen, 2015, pp. 148, 162, 167; Teulings 
et al., 2011). 
Taken together, the Dutch central government’s room for manoeuvrability in the context of 
the Financial Crisis was certainly limited by supranational commitments, since the Dutch gov-
ernment was aiming to fulfil the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact (Kickert, 2015, p. 
557). Therefore, supranational influence plays a major role in explaining cutbacks in the Neth-
erlands as well as in other European countries (Kickert et al., 2015, p. 578). In this context, it 
is also argued that “the GFC [Global Financial Crisis] ratcheted up the level of European inter-
ference in national budgetary processes of the member states, leaving this as the main legacy 
of the GFC in Europe” (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 169). 
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of the rescue measures abroad are outlined. With a focus on Greece, it is also pointed out that it is assumed 




Given the duration of the Financial Crisis, it also needs to be taken into account that the polit-
ical majorities and political orientations at the Dutch national level changed over the course 
of 10 years. In 2012, the Financial Crisis and disagreement on austerity measures were among 
the main reasons for the fall of the coalition cabinet and early elections. Similar events can be 
observed in other countries as political consequences of the Financial Crisis. More details on 
the political developments in the Netherlands will be provided in the sub-chapters hereinafter 
to assess these changing framework conditions, which local authorities have to deal with at a 
later stage. 
In line with the phases of the Financial Crisis since 2007 and the measures taken by the Dutch 
central government, as well as the overall intention to provide a complete overview of the 
developments in context of the Crisis, the following sub-chapters are structured as follows. 
The first sub-chapter explains the measures taken to prevent private banks and insurance 
companies from bankruptcy in 2008 and 2009 (9.1.1), and the second one illustrates the fiscal 
stimuli and similar measures to promote an economic recovery decided upon in 2009, includ-
ing additional investments until 2012 (9.1.2). Then, the third sub-chapter describes the aus-
terity and consolidation measures that have followed since 2010 (9.1.3). A concluding sum-
mary is provided in a final sub-chapter (9.1.4). 
 
9.1.1. Crisis phase 1: bank rescue measures 
As pointed out before, the Dutch financial and insurance sector is relatively large and interna-
tionally oriented. Therefore, once the refinancing problems of major private banks began to 
spread in the summer of 2007, Dutch authorities should have been alarmed about the poten-
tial developments and implications for the Netherlands. However, at the beginning of the Fi-
nancial Crisis, the estimation that the real estate and banking crisis would be mainly limited 
to the United States prevailed among Dutch politicians. While it was known that housing prices 
increased less in the Netherlands than in the United States, and sub-prime mortgages were 
also less common, it was not widely known that Dutch banks bought financial products, in-
cluding insecure mortgages issued in the United States (Kickert, 2012d, p. 439; Teulings, 2014, 
p. 9 ff.; van Ewijk & Teulings, 2009, pp. 169-189).142 
However, a few weeks after September 15th, 2008 – the day Lehman Brothers went bankrupt 
– Dutch banks were visibly affected by the Financial Crisis. It needs to be mentioned, however, 
that at least ABN AMRO faced financial difficulties already before and relatively independent 
of the Crisis. When interbank interest rates increased sharply, Dutch banks, the Dutch central 
bank (Dutch: De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB), and central government appeared to be relatively 
surprised. The first warning by the Central Planning Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis was 
released in October 2008; this illustrates the lack of critically anticipating the possible conse-
quences of the developments in the United States that had already been in effect since one 
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year earlier. As an early financial implication, Dutch banks wrote off approximately 10 billion 
euro of toxic assets in 2008, while the total of insecure assets was estimated at about 39 billion 
euro by that time. The unusual nature of these developments is also illustrated by the fact 
that 2008 was the first year since the end of the Second World War that the Dutch banking 
sector reported operational losses (Kickert, 2012d, p. 439; de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 149 f.; 
Bijlsma et al., 2009, p. 49). 
Once the scope of the financial troubles of Dutch banks became clear, including all the risks 
regarding the stability of the monetary and financial system as well as the national economy, 
central government began to act. The rescue measures were mainly comprised of bank na-
tionalisations, capital injections, and credit guarantees. While some of the measures, espe-
cially nationalisations, are relatively unusual for market economies, they are comparable to 
the crisis reaction by other Western countries and once more illustrate the severity of the 
Crisis (Kickert, 2012a, p. 301). 
Among the financial institutions in trouble in other countries were various banks in Iceland, 
where many Dutch citizens invested parts of their savings in the years before the Crisis be-
cause of profitable interest rates. Since these savings were secured via the Icelandic deposit 
protection fund to a relatively limited extent, the Dutch government also gave guarantees for 
these deposits in order to avoid an amplification of the ongoing Crisis (de Vries & Degen, 2015, 
p. 156; Kickert, 2012d, p. 440; de Kam, 2009a, p. 89 f.; van Ewijk & Teulings, 2009, pp. 169-
189). Compared to previous crises, this step can also be considered as rather exceptional, il-
lustrating the possible consequences of the globalisation of the banking industry also from a 
customer’s perspective. 
The first rescue measures involving a Dutch bank in 2008 concerned ABN AMRO. The Dutch 
government bought the company’s stocks for 16.8 billion euro; these stocks were acquired by 
the Fortis Bank, together with the Royal Bank of Scotland and the Banco Santander, just one 
year earlier. Further credits and credit guarantees for ABN AMRO and Fortis followed, sum-
ming up the rescue of ABN AMRO to 29.4 billion euro. Anticipating the difficulties that Dutch 
financial institutions were facing, central government also created a 20 billion euro capital 
injections facility. In the course of the Crisis, ING (10 billion euro), AEGON (3 billion euro), and 
SNS Reaal Bank (750 million euro) received financial means from the fund in exchange for 
stocks, which were mostly sold in the following years. In addition, a bank loan guarantee fa-
cility of 200 billion euro was set up by national government. LeasePlan, NIBC Bank, SNS Bank, 
and ING were among the financial institutions that received guarantees. Despite all rescue 
measures, some smaller banks, including Indover Bank and Van der Hoop Bankiers, as well as 
some smaller insurance companies, went bankrupt (Kickert, 2012d, p. 439 f.; Kickert & 
Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 8; Kickert, 2012e, p. 52; de Kam, 2009a, p. 89 f.; Bijlsma et al., 2009, p. 
58 f.; de Haan, 2009, p. 95 ff.; van Ewijk & Teulings, 2009, pp. 169-189). 
While some figures slightly vary because of differing definitions of financial operations as well 
as different periods under review, the interventions and financial injections by the Dutch cen-
tral government in the context of the banking crisis in the years 2008 and 2009 can be sum-




 Acquisition of Fortis/ABN AMRO: 16.8 billion euro 
 Acceptance of liability of Fortis’ debts: 50 billion euro 
 Capital injection facility: 13.75 billion euro (of 20 billion euro provided) 
 Prefunding of bank deposit guarantee payments in Iceland: 1.236 billion euro 
 Bank loan guarantee facility: 200 billion euro 
 Backup facility for ING Bank: 27 billion euro (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 156; de Kam, 
2009a, p. 89 f.; Bijlsma et al., 2009, p. 58 f.) 
Taken together, the Dutch state provided financial securities of up to 308.786 billion euro to 
private banks and insurance companies. However, the financial means have not been claimed 
completely. While some credits have been paid back in recent years, the overall costs of this 
first phase of the Financial Crisis for the Dutch state are still uncertain, since some financial 
institutions are still partly state owned. Privatisations of previously nationalised banks are 
planned and have already partly been realised; however, they are not completed yet (de Vries 
& Degen, 2015, p. 157). It must thus be taken into account that price gains by the Dutch gov-
ernment are also possible.143 That the Dutch government’s capital injections to Dutch financial 
institutions in 2008–2009 and the guarantees correspond to 6.4% and 34.3% of the GDP, re-
spectively, illustrates the scope of the banking crisis in the Netherlands. Compared to other 
European countries, the scope of Dutch bank rescue measures in relation to the GDP was the 
highest (Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 30; de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 157; Kickert, 2012a, p. 
301; de Haan, 2009, p. 95 ff.).144 
The Dutch central government’s crisis management and decision-making during the banking 
crisis in 2008 and 2009 was characterised by its urgency. Therefore, far-reaching decisions for 
the Netherlands and its citizens were made by a group of only three people: the Prime Minis-
ter, the Minister of Finance, and the chairman of the Dutch National Bank. While the Minister 
of Finance played the most prominent role, the number of further persons assisting in the 
decision-making processes, such as civil servants and external advisors, was kept as low as 
possible to minimise the possibility of information becoming public and leading to undesired 
effects, such as capital withdrawals by citizens and institutional investors. As a consequence, 
the Dutch parliament was also hardly involved in the decisions taken (Kickert, 2015, p. 546; 
Kickert, 2012d, p. 440; Kickert, 2012e, p. 53). While this approach was certainly not favourable 
from the view of democratic theory, it represents a path similarly taken in other countries in 
times of crisis, and it illustrates the difficulty in attaining fast responses when following the 
regular decision-making process, especially in case of the absence of a parliamentary majority 
of one single party implying the need for a consensus. Following the Financial Crisis and its 
management, the need for better banking supervision and regulation, as well as the necessity 
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of changes in the governance of the Dutch National Bank, was also discussed in the Nether-
lands (van Hengel & van der Burg, 2008; Hazeu, 2011). 
In summary, the Netherlands was strongly affected by the troubles in the banking sector, as 
part of the recent Financial Crisis, in 2008 and 2009. While the adequacy of rescue measures 
for private banks is debated, and some people argue that banks should become insolvent in-
stead of being rescued with taxpayers’ money, the Dutch central government, as well as other 
national governments around the globe, managed to stabilise the situation by opting for large-
scale rescue operations. However, since the Crisis was not limited to banks, further support 
measures, addressing wider parts of the economy, were arranged in the Netherlands as well. 
These will be reflected upon in the next sub-chapter. 
 
9.1.2. Crisis phase 2: fiscal stimulus and economic recovery measures 
Next to the rescue measures for financial institutions, the Dutch central government aimed to 
support the national economy, which faced economic consequences, such as a generally lower 
demand, as a result of the economic downturn. In March 2009, the Dutch government an-
nounced an economic recovery plan named “Working on the future” (Dutch: Werken aan 
toekomst). Additional investments were planned in four areas: (1) employment, education, 
and knowledge, (2) sustainable economy, (3) infrastructure and housing, and (4) financial sup-
port for business. Taken together, the stimulus package amounted to 2.731 billion euro in 
2009, 3.206 billion euro in 2010, 0.112 billion euro in 2011, and 0.465 billion euro in 2012. 
Further investments of 0.5 billion euro in 2009 and 1.0 billion euro in 2010 were also an-
nounced for the provinces and municipalities (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2009; Kickert, 
2012d, p. 440 f.; Kickert, 2012e, p. 53; Kickert, 2015, p. 542; de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 158).145 
In the field of labour market polices, which was the main focus of the recovery package, part-
time unemployment benefits were introduced for employees who were working in companies 
with economic problems and who would be dismissed otherwise (Ministerie van Algemene 
Zaken, 2009; Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 39; Kickert, 2012d, p. 441; de Vries & Degen, 
2015, p. 158).146 In addition, already existing automatic stabilisers, which provide unemploy-
ment benefits to those who lose their jobs, in combination with declining governmental reve-
nues in social security contributions – amounting to approximately 60 billion euro in total – 
can be seen as a fiscal stimulus in a broader sense as well (de Kam, 2009b; de Vries & Degen, 
2015, p. 158). 
On closer inspection, the additional investments as part of the economic recovery strategy 
were relatively limited. On the one hand, some investments were already planned and imple-
mented earlier as a reaction to the Financial Crisis. Some planned cutbacks, on the other hand, 
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were postponed. The recovery plan also included an agreement on future budget cuts 
amounting to 3.2 billion euro in order to rebalance the state budget in times when the eco-
nomic situation improves (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2009; Kickert, 2012d, p. 441). How-
ever, overall public debt increased in the Netherlands in times of the recent Financial Crisis, 
mainly as a result of bank rescue measures and fiscal stimuli (Afman & van de Coevering, 2012, 
pp. 68 f., 75 ff.). To avoid an exceedance of the previously agreed debt ceiling, the expendi-
tures for labour market policies and interest payments in the context of the recovery package 
were excluded from the debt calculations (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 158). 
From a theoretical perspective, the economic recovery measures by the Dutch central govern-
ment, as well as similar measures in other countries, followed the Keynesian logic of additional 
anti-cyclical investments in order to stimulate the economy (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 157 
f.; den Butter, 2009, p. 258 ff.). However, the policies were not actively justified or promoted 
as Keynesian in the Netherlands, the same as in most countries. 
The question of whether the economic recovery package was large or small is a matter of 
perspective and comparison; therefore, views differ. While one scholar (Kickert, 2015) labelled 
it “an expensive economic recovery package” (p. 542), other scholars (de Vries & Degen, 2015) 
have described it as relatively small in comparison with other OECD countries (p. 170). In the 
comparisons of fiscal stimulus packages by Wagschal and Jäkel (2010, p. 299) as well as Hörisch 
(2013, p. 119), the measures in the Netherlands range in the midfield of OECD countries. From 
an economic perspective, Armingeon (2012, p. 549) has evaluated the early fiscal response by 
the Dutch government in his cross-country comparison as slightly counter-cyclical in its char-
acteristic – the same as the responses in most other OECD countries. However, considering 
the financial means that the Dutch central government invested and made available to rescue 
the country’s financial institutions, the amount used to stimulate the economy was relatively 
moderate. 
After the urgent crisis management in the context of the banking crisis in 2008 and 2009, the 
decisions made to support the country’s economic recovery followed the regular political pro-
cess. After political debates, the coalition parties decided upon the recovery plan and formally 
implemented it as an addition to their 2007 coalition agreement titled “Working together, 
living together” (Dutch: Samen werken, samen leven) (Kickert, 2015, p. 547; Kickert, 2012a, p. 
306). The circumstance that the economic recovery package was agreed upon later than in 
other countries can be explained with concerns that investments flows abroad because of the 
highly internationally oriented nature of the Dutch economy; this issue applies to open econ-
omies quite generally, and it enables free-rider positions. In the Dutch case, it was expected 
that about 60% of any public investment would leaks abroad. Furthermore, general scepticism 
of Keynesian policies played a role in the decision-making process and therefore delayed the 
stimulus package (de Vries & Degen, 2015, pp. 157 f., 170). 
In summary, the measures by the Dutch central government to address the recent Financial 
Crisis were not limited to rescuing banks from insolvency, but contained additional policies 
focusing on fiscal stimulus and economic recovery between 2009 and 2012. While comparable 
measures, such as additional investments in infrastructure and labour market programmes, 




are in line with Keynesian ideas, indicating a move away from prevailing economic approaches 
of previous decades. However, since additional public expenditure usually requires cutbacks 
in other areas, the Dutch central government have also decided upon austerity and consoli-
dation measures in recent years, comparable to other Western nations. The choices made in 
the Netherlands will be addressed in the following sub-chapter. 
 
9.1.3. Crisis phase 3: austerity and consolidation measures 
Considering the general goal of financial sustainability, fiscal consolidation seemed to be nec-
essary in the case of the Netherlands after the bank rescue measures and the economic re-
covery package, as well as by taking the expected costs of the demographic change into ac-
count (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011, p. 158; Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012, p. 186; de Geus & Kraan, 2011). As al-
ready agreed upon in the context of the economic recovery package in 2009, budget cutbacks 
of 3.2 billion euro were planned to be realised as soon as the economic situation improves. 
However, while there was certainly fiscal pressure to implement more extensive consolidation 
measures in order to reduce the budget deficit and state debt, the cabinet had no incentive 
to take unpopular decisions on additional austerity measures in times of the upcoming general 
election in 2010. Therefore, to explore saving potentials, the central government installed 19 
working groups, consisting of senior civil servants and covering all relevant policy areas. By 
doing so, the responsibility for further cutbacks was partially moved to the administrations. 
The working groups’ reports on ideas for scenarios of different degrees of austerity measures 
were published before the general election. However, these did not receive much attention, 
neither at the political level nor in public debates (Kickert, 2015, pp. 542, 548 f.; Kickert & 
Randma-Liiv, 2015, pp. 47, 122 ff., 231; Kickert, 2012d, p. 441 f.; Kickert, 2012e, p. 54; Kickert, 
2012a, p. 306; den Butter, 2009, p. 244 f.; Afman & van de Coevering, 2012, pp. 68 f., 75 ff.). 
The first general election in the Netherlands since the beginning of the Financial Crisis was 
held on 9 June, 2010. In the run-up to the election, the Central Planning Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis published its economic forecast, which is an annual procedure.147 In the 2010 
report, an increasing budget deficit was pointed out. In addition, the Study Group on Budget 
Room (Dutch: Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte), consisting of senior officials from various min-
istries, the Central Planning Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, and the Dutch National Bank, 
published their report on the assumed financial leeway within the national budget, which is 
also a regular process before general elections in the Netherlands. Their report built upon the 
CPB’s economic forecast and provided a basis for discussions on financial-economic issues in 
the frequent coalition negotiations after the election.148 In the 2010 report, major retrench-
ment options were pointed out (Centraal Planbureau, 2010; Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte, 
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2010; Kickert, 2015, p. 547 f.; Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 131; Kickert 2012a, p. 307 f.; de 
Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 164 f.). 
After the 2010 general election, the VVD and CDA formed a centre-right minority cabinet sup-
ported by the PVV, inaugurated in October 2010, and replacing the previous CDA, PvdA, and 
CU coalition. Mark Rutte (VVD) followed Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA) as Prime Minster of the 
Netherlands. The coalition agreement, named “Freedom and responsibility” (Dutch: Vrijheid 
en verantwoordelijkheid), included a retrenchment programme of up to 18 billion euro, in-
volving a variety of measures, such as a wage freeze for civil servants, a merger of ministries, 
a reduction of regional police corps, an increase of the pension age to 66 years, savings on 
social service, higher tuition fees for long-term students, and a decrease in international de-
velopment aid, starting in 2011 and all to be realised by the end of 2015, with the exception 
of the pension age raise, which was set to come into effect by 2020. This rather fragmented 
list of fiscal cutback measures can be explained by political compromises, which were reached 
during the coalition formation process. In relation to the Dutch GDP and in comparison with 
cutback initiatives in other countries, the scope of the intended cutbacks was medium to large. 
Furthermore, the programme included cutbacks to the total value of 1.1 billion euro at the 
provincial and municipal levels, realised via a reduction in the financial means of the provincial 
and municipal fund. The consolidation plans also included a reduction in the number of prov-
inces and municipalities; however, hard figures were not mentioned (Rijksoverheid, 2010a; 
Rijksoverheid, 2010b; Rijksoverheid, 2010c; Rijksoverheid, 2010d; Kickert, 2015, pp. 548 f., 
554 f.; Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, pp. 95, 136 f.; Kickert, 2012d, p. 442; Kickert, 2012e, p. 55 
f.; Weske et al., 2014, p. 407; Kickert, 2012a, p. 303 f.; de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 165; Teulings, 
2014, p. 14 f.; de Geus & Kraan, 2011). 
Regarding the accompanying attempts to reform the Dutch civil service, it needs to be noted 
that a reform programme named Civil Service Renewal (Dutch: Vernieuwing Rijksdienst) was 
already initiated in 2007. The programme included budget cuts of 750 million euro that were 
to be partially realised via the reduction of 15,000 staff members at the national level. While 
the reform was decided upon shortly before the Financial Crisis, the implementation was ac-
celerated by the Crisis. In 2011, the next civil service reform, named Compact Government 
(Dutch: Compacte Rijksdienst), followed and built upon the previous reform. The measures 
were mainly related to the cutbacks determined in the 2010 coalition agreement, as described 
before. A further strategy to lower expenditures was realised by forming shared infrastructure 
services for public authorities at the national level (Rijksoverheid, 2007; Rijksoverheid, 2011; 
Jilke et al., 2016, p. 76 f.; Kickert, 2015, p. 556; Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, pp. 204 f., 224, 
226).149 
The next cutback package was agreed upon in April 2012 after the CPB published a relatively 
pessimistic economic forecast. The agreement was reached between the two coalition parties 
and three opposition parties, after the PVV withdrew its support for additional cutback 
measures. The five-party compromise was reached relatively quickly, which is exceptional in 
Dutch consensual politics. With an additional scope of 14 billion euro to be saved in 2013, the 
                                                     




intended cutbacks contained a wide variety of measures, ranging from an earlier increase of 
the pension age, in contrast to the previous plans, a reduction in tax exemptions for house 
buyers, another round of wage freezes for civil servants, an additional reduction in social ser-
vices, and an increase in the VAT rate. Cuts in local government were also proposed (Centraal 
Planbureau, 2012; Kickert, 2015, pp. 550 f., 555; Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, pp. 95, 136 f.; 
Weske et al., 2014, p. 407; Teulings, 2014, p. 14 f.). 
However, since the PVV withdrew its support not only for additional cutback measures but 
also for the coalition cabinet in general, early general elections were called for on 12 Septem-
ber, 2012. In the run-up to the election, the Study Group on Budget Room pointed out the 
risks for Dutch public finances emerging from the developments of the Eurozone Crisis and 
the need to further strengthen the resilience of the Netherlands’ public finances, which in-
cluded the recommendation to reduce national debts. After the election, a new Liberal-Social 
democratic coalition cabinet, comprising the VVD and the PvdA, was formed in November 
2012, and Rutte remained Prime Minister. Promises within the coalition agreement included 
various measures to relieve the citizens in areas such as healthcare insurances and income 
taxes, which were withdrawn rather quickly. Cutbacks of 17.708 billion euro, on the other 
hand, were planned in areas such as tax exemptions for house buyers, student bursaries, the 
public sector, and international development aid (Rijksoverheid, 2012a; Rijksoverheid, 2012b; 
Rijksoverheid, 2012c; Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte, 2012; Kickert, 2015, p. 550 ff.; Kickert & 
Randma-Liiv, 2015, pp. 95, 136 f.). 
Further cutbacks and reforms were also announced for sub-national levels of government. 
The plans included the merger of the provinces into five regions and municipal amalgamations 
in order to form municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, although it was pointed 
out that territorial reforms needed to be realised voluntarily. On the other hand, large-scale 
decentralisation measures were planned as well. Taken together, larger local units with more 
responsibilities were intended (Rijksoverheid, 2012a; Kickert, 2015, pp. 552, 555; Kickert & 
Randma-Liiv, 2015, p. 95). 
In summary, decision-making in the context of attempts to rebalance the budgets via cutbacks 
was mainly characterised by compromises, as expected in the consensual democracy of the 
Netherlands and a central government that is usually comprised of multi-party coalitions. 
These circumstances largely explain the incremental steps and cuts mostly across the board, 
illustrated by the broad variety of austerity measures. However, more targeted measures, fol-
lowing political priorities, can be observed along the process, which might also reflect a wider 
recognition of the necessity of cutbacks. During the whole period of fiscal consolidation, the 
administration –particularly senior civil servants of the Ministry of Finance and the Central 
Planning Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis – had a major influence on the types and scope 
of measures taken; this is because of their formal involvement in the process by providing 
economic and fiscal projections (Kickert, 2015, p. 541 f.). 
The next regular general election took place on 15 March, 2017, and it resulted in a four-party 
coalition government. The report by the Study Group on Budget Room, published in the run-
up to this election, pointed out that the immediate risks for public finances in the context of 




should shift towards the stabilisation of public finances and the promotion of economic 
growth (Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte, 2016). 
Taken together, the Dutch central government decided not only on measures to rescue banks 
and to stimulate the economy in the context of the recent Financial Crisis, but also on austerity 
and consolidation measures to counterbalance the additional expenditure at least in parts. As 
a consequence, multiple rounds of cutbacks have been implemented since 2010. However, 
the political debates on the scope and areas of savings also led to an early general election. 
As outlined above, the Crisis and the Dutch central government’s corresponding reactions in-
cluded a broad range of measures that can be categorised into three phases. The links be-
tween these phases will be analysed in the final sub-chapter hereinafter. 
 
9.1.4. From rescue measures and fiscal stimuli to austerity 
The Financial Crisis since 2007 affected the Netherlands rather unexpectedly (de Vries & De-
gen, 2015, p. 169) and “had remarkable effects on Dutch government” (Kickert, 2012d, p. 443). 
Reflecting on the process of crisis management and its major aims, it can be said that “the 
primary objective of government during the crisis was to stabilize the financial markets, to 
support the economy and to keep people working. The emphasis soon shifted to the reduction 
of the deficit, which required severe budget reforms” (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 163). 
As partially mentioned before, the Financial Crisis in the Netherlands and crisis management 
by central government can be subdivided into three phases, comparable to the developments 
and reactions in other countries: (1) Immediate rescue measures for financial institutions in 
order to avoid a collapse of the financial and monetary system were followed by (2) attempts 
to stimulate the economy with additional investments, And the third phase is characterised 
by (3) cutbacks to rebalance the budgets after comprehensive additional expenditures and 
public guarantees in the first and second phases. While the rescue measures for banks were 
decided upon by a small number of politicians and civil servants, the fiscal stimuli and cutbacks 
followed the usual political process (Kickert, 2012a, p. 309). 
The way in which the Dutch central government addressed the Financial Crisis occurred in line 
with the theoretical expectations, as described in chapter 3.3. After a first short period of de-
nial and postponement, because of the upcoming general election, far-reaching measures 
were taken. Cutbacks followed in a series of steps, developing from smaller measures to larger 
ones. In this context, the cutback method shifted from across-the-board cuts, mainly imple-
mented in 2010, toward more targeted spending reductions, at least partially in line with po-
litical priorities in the following years (Kickert et al., 2015, pp. 558 f., 580 f.; Kickert & Randma-
Liiv, 2015, p. 135; Kickert et al., 2015, p. 571 f.).150 Interestingly, senior civil servants in the 
                                                     
150 Other countries followed a similar process, and the sequence of steps was generally quicker in countries 
that were bailed out by international and supranational organisations, implying additional external reform 




Netherlands perceived the cuts to be more targeted than they actually were, according to the 
results of the COCOPS surveys (Kickert et al., 2015, p. 573). 
From a financial perspective, the crisis reactions by the Dutch central government began with 
rescue packages for banks and insurance companies, where slightly more than 300 billion euro 
were provided as financial securities in 2008 and 2009. While not all the provided funds were 
claimed, and the money was partially paid back in the meantime, the sum reflects the dimen-
sion of the Dutch banking crisis as part of the overall Financial Crisis. Additional governmental 
expenditures of 6.514 billion euro followed to stimulate the economy between 2009 and 
2012. 
Cutbacks were the logical consequence in the following years. Savings of 18 billion euro were 
agreed upon in autumn of 2010, 14 billion euro in spring of 2012, and 17.708 billion euro in 
autumn of 2012. While the cuts realised between 2010 and 2012 were relatively moderate, 
the reduction in government expenditures increased in the following years. Regarding the 
main cutback strategy, a shift from across-the-board to more targeted savings could be ob-
served. The focus of austerity in the Netherlands was mostly on central government, similarly 
to that in other European countries. During the whole period, cutback measures in the Dutch 
administration included hiring freezes, pay freezes, public sector job cuts, and reorganisation. 
Unlike some other European countries, wage cuts in the public sector were not realised in the 
case of the Netherlands (Kickert, 2015, p. 553; Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, pp. 98 f., 108 f.; 
Kickert et al., 2015, p. 571 f.). An overview of the Dutch general government’s annual deficit 
or surplus and the volume of fiscal consolidation measures in recent years, both expressed in 
terms of percentage of GDP, are presented in table 18. 
Table 18: Developments of Dutch public finances, 2007–2015 (Data sources: Eurostat, 2017b; Kickert & Randma-Liiv, 2015, 
pp. 156, 268) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Government deficit/surplus as 
percentage of GDP 
0.2 0.2 -5.4 -5.0 -4.3 -3.9 -2.4 -2.3 -1.9 
Fiscal consolidation volumes 
as percentage of GDP 
--- --- --- --- 0.3 1.0 1.7 2.4 2.9 
 
The data illustrate that the Dutch deficit in the years between 2009 and 2012 was not in ac-
cordance with the restrictions of the Stability and Growth Pact. However, the same applied to 
many other European countries during the Financial Crisis. As a consequence, the scope of 
attempts of fiscal consolidation has increased in the Netherlands in recent years, as the data 
also demonstrates. Apart from attempts to fulfil legal requirements, sound public finances and 
continuous economic growth can be considered as the overall goals. 
The austerity measures decided upon by the Dutch central government comprised the local 
level as well. In addition to the provinces’ and municipalities’ joint additional investments of 
0.5 billion euro in 2009 and 1.0 billion euro in 2010, which were announced in the context of 
the stimulus package, and the planned reduction in the financial resources of the provincial 
and municipal funds by 1.1 billion euro in total between 2010 and 2015, the budgets of central 




cuts at the national level bring about cuts at the local level. The same mechanism applies for 
expenditures increases by central government. Furthermore, central government limited the 
tolerated budget deficit achieved by the municipalities during the Financial Crisis as a result 
of attempts to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (Weske et al., 2014, pp. 408, 410). 
Apart from reductions in financial transfers to the local level, further indirect cutbacks arose 
from the assignment of tasks without financial compensation. According to the VNG, some 
specific grants are lower than the actual costs emerging from the provision of the associated 
public services by local government. In the policy area of social assistance, for example, a def-
icit of more than 1 billion euro was reported between 2010 and 2011 (Weske et al., 2014, p. 
410). Similar claims were made in the context of the 2015 decentralisation reforms. While 
estimates on the actual costs of public services are difficult to verify, the municipalities and 
their representatives certainly have an incentive to report high costs for the provision of public 
services in order to improve their position in future negotiations. The same applies to central 
government vice versa. However, what can be stated in general is a relatively high financial 
uncertainly at the local level in the longer run because of the dependence on central govern-
ments and potential future cutbacks (Weske et al., 2014, p. 411). 
In the Netherlands, the Financial Crisis since 2007 also had a major impact on budgeting rules 
and procedures, especially at the national level. While broad societal consensus exists regard-
ing budgeting procedures and balanced budgets, sticking to the existing rules – and which 
implies a relatively limited financial room to manoeuvre – would have presumably had a sig-
nificant influence on the course of the Crisis in the Netherlands and, because of to the size of 
the Dutch financial service and insurance sector, probably even abroad. Rescuing private 
banks on short notice, without deciding upon the measures in parliament, for instance, would 
not have been possible. The bankruptcy of most Dutch major banks would have been the likely 
consequence. Following this line of thought, the rescue measures and the temporary relaxa-
tion or even abandonment of budgetary rules, combined with the intentions to return to pre-
vious agreements as soon as possible, can be understood. The alternatives would probably 
have led to even greater problems. However, considering the financial troubles in countries 
all across Europe and beyond, it is also argued that, as a lesson of the recent Financial Crisis, 
national budgeting needs to be seen in its supranational and international contexts. There-
fore, co-ordinated budgetary decisions, as well as fiscal policies in general, should become the 
normality (de Vries & Degen, 2015, pp. 148, 160, 170 f.). 
De Vries and Degen (2015) have conducted an analysis of the budgetary rules and procedures 
at the Dutch national level before and during the recent Financial Crisis, illustrating the formal 
and informal changes. Before the Financial Crisis, budgeting was characterised by an annual 
deadline for budgetary decisions based on cautious economic predictions and projections. 
Furthermore, revenues and expenditures were strictly separated for delimitation and control 
purposes. On the expenditure side, a certain ceiling was agreed upon, and a projected deficit 
of 2% of the GDP functioned as a signal value regarding the necessity of additional measures 
to balance the budget in order to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact (de Vries & Degen, 




These budgetary rules and procedures changed noticeably during the Financial Crisis. Expend-
itures and revenues in the context of the rescue measures for the Dutch financial service and 
insurance sector were generally excluded from the national budget. In addition, the previously 
clear distinction between the expenditure and revenue sides was relaxed. Crisis-related ex-
penditures, such as the stimulus packages, unemployment benefits, and interest payments, 
were also excluded from the previous expenditure ceiling. The signal value regarding the an-
nual deficit was temporarily suspended as well, and the provisions of the Stability and Growth 
Pact were consequently not fulfilled between 2009 and 2012 (de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 159). 
In more recent years, particularly after the rescue measures and fiscal stimulus, budgetary 
rules and procedures at the Dutch national level successively returned to the pre-Crisis mode, 
with an annual deadline for budgetary decisions and a clear separation between the revenue 
and the expenditure sides. The signal margin regarding the annual deficit was even lowered 
to 1% of the GDP, and the deficit limitations of the Stability and Growth Pact were achieved 
between 2013 and 2015. However, the expenditures and revenues from the rescue measures 
for the Dutch financial service and insurance sector, as well as payments and guarantees in 
the context of bailouts at the European level, still remained off the budget (de Vries & Degen, 
2015, p. 166). 
Comparable to many other countries, such as the United States (Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mission, 2011), the Financial Crisis and its causes and reactions were investigated by a tempo-
rary parliamentary committee in the Netherlands. This so-called Committee for Investigating 
the Financial System (Dutch: Commissie Onderzoek Financieel Stelsel), which is also known as 
Committee de Wit, after its chairman Jan de Wit, focused on the bank rescue measures and 
issued two reports on the developments in the context of the Financial Crisis in the Nether-
lands. The first report concluded that the inspection and compliance monitoring of financial 
institutions by the Dutch central government and the Dutch Central Bank largely failed. The 
second report mainly criticised decision-making during the Crisis. In addition, the national 
Court of Audit (Dutch: Algemene Rekenkamer) was also relatively critical of the measures 
taken during the Crisis (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2010; Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, 2012a; de Vries & Degen, 2015, p. 161). 
According to the second and final report by the Committee for Investigating the Financial Sys-
tem, it can be concluded that “the Dutch authorities made major mistakes in the billion-euro 
interventions involving Fortis/ABN AMRO and ING. Both financial institutions ran into serious 
problems in the autumn of 2008 through their own actions, thereby jeopardising financial sta-
bility in the Netherlands. The Ministry of Finance and the Dutch central bank (DNB) were in-
sufficiently prepared for a crisis of such magnitude, and they were overwhelmed by the crisis. 
The State was forced to take large-scale bailout measures. In many cases, the House [of Rep-
resentatives] received late and incomplete information” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
2012b). 
In summary, crisis management by the Dutch central government in the context of the recent 
Financial Crisis started with swift bank rescue measures in 2008 and continued with deliber-
ated attempts to stimulate the economy. These additional expenditures led to policies aiming 




Crisis slowed down, the contributions, and therefore the success of measures by individual 
national governments, can be debated, because of far-reaching spillover effects as well as a 
possible relatively natural recovery as part of an economic cycle. Overall, it needs to be taken 
into account that the complexity of economic interrelationships in case of a financial crisis, as 
well as in general, make the assessment of causal relations difficult. However, what can be 
said is that the recent Financial Crisis was not limited to only national levels of government 
and above, but also affected regional and local government. In the case of sub-national levels 
of government, countermeasures to a crisis by higher levels of government within a country’s 
political-administrative sub-division might imply additional direct or indirect consequences. 
Previous publications that have addressed the developments in the context of the recent Fi-
nancial Crisis at the Dutch local level will be presented and discussed in the next sub-chapter 
to illustrate the current state of research. 
 
9.2. Previous research results on the financial developments at the lo-
cal level of government 
Overall, previous insights into the situation of the Dutch local level in the context of the Finan-
cial Crisis since 2007 are relatively limited. Some studies have investigated the developments 
in individual municipalities or in a small number of municipalities in detail, while others have 
analysed certain aspects of the Crisis by collecting data from larger numbers of municipalities. 
However, especially broad comparisons, which might help to explain why some municipalities 
were more affected than others, are only sparsely available.151 Furthermore, these insights 
might prove helpful in preventing or moderating the consequences of potential future crises. 
The results of previous studies on the impact of the recent Financial Crisis on Dutch munici-
palities as well as the responses – in other words, the current state of research – is presented 
and discussed in this chapter. A distinction is made between studies with primarily qualitative 
approaches (9.2.1) and those with primarily quantitative approaches (9.2.2). While the former 
group generally focused on relatively small groups of municipalities by analysing documents 
and conducting interviews, the latter group mostly included relatively large groups of munici-
palities in their research based on own survey data as well as assessments of official govern-
mental statistics. 
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9.2.1. Primarily qualitative studies on financial developments of 
smaller groups of Dutch municipalities 
Within the group of studies with a primarily qualitative approach, Overmans and Noordegraaf 
(2014) have analysed the austerity strategies of eight Dutch municipalities. Building upon this 
research, Overmans and Timm-Arnold (2016) have compared the municipal austerity plans of 
five Dutch municipalities and five municipalities in the German state of North Rhine-Westpha-
lia with more than 100,000 inhabitants each. An early study on the situation of Amsterdam 
during the Crisis has been published by Engelen and Musterd (2010). The impact of the Finan-
cial Crisis on the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area was also one selected case in a study by the 
Local Economic and Employment Programme of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (2013), with the general intention to compare local developments in a num-
ber of cities around the globe. Overmans (2017) has focused on the financial resilience of four 
Dutch cities during the recent Financial Crisis. A study by Weske et al. (2014) has addressed 
local government austerity policies in two Dutch municipalities, with a focus on public em-
ployment and social dialogue. 
Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014) have analysed 609 austerity strategies of eight Dutch mu-
nicipalities, whose names were kept anonymous, in the context of the recent Financial Crisis. 
The municipalities were selected by taking into account different sizes in terms of inhabitants, 
political majorities, and budgetary challenges, among other factors. By conducting interviews 
with local officials in 2012, they collected information on the crisis responses by local govern-
ment. All measures were assigned to four categories: (1) decline, (2) cutbacks, (3) retrench-
ment, and (4) downsizing. According to their chosen definitions, decline focuses on the stabil-
ity of governance and factors within the organisation. The reduction of social services is a typ-
ical measure in this context. Cutbacks also have an emphasis on stability, but on a mostly fiscal 
dimension. Across-the-board cuts are the most typical strategy in this category. Retrenchment 
and downsizing both imply policy changes; however, retrenchment focuses on fiscal 
measures, while downsizing addresses the organisation. Increasing tax rates and higher fees 
for municipal services are typical measures in line with the former strategy, whereas the op-
timisation of work processes is an example of the latter. 
While it needs to be taken into account that the measures analysed describe only intentions, 
certain patterns can be observed. First, almost all interviewees expressed the need for exten-
sive austerity packages at the Dutch local level. In addition, most respondents stated the in-
tention to reach balanced budgets again, also through the use of innovative strategies. Over-
all, 33.5% of the measures analysed in detail followed the logic of cutbacks, while 31.5%, 
22.5%, and 12.6% followed the logic of retrenchment, decline, and downsizing respectively. 
While all four types of measures were intended in all eight municipalities, larger municipalities 
planned to use measures more broadly, compared to smaller municipalities, which in some 
cases mainly focused on one type of measure. Considering the four types of strategies, the 
variation in fiscal measures was higher than that in organisational measures. The control var-
iables chosen were not able to explain variation within the small sample of eight municipali-




tried to increase their revenues as the second main approach to rebalance their budgets. More 
generally, Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014) have pointed out that “almost all Dutch cities 
are experiencing severe fiscal stress” (p. 103). Based on their research, they have also con-
cluded that each municipality needs to find its own strategy to deal with austerity. In the con-
text of managing fiscal stress in practice, they see leadership skills and carefully chosen re-
sponses as crucial factors (Overmans & Noordegraaf, 2014). 
Building upon previous research, Overmans and Timm-Arnold (2016) have compared munici-
pal austerity plans in the Netherlands and North Rhine-Westphalia between 2010 and 2012. 
Five Dutch municipalities and five municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia were selected, 
and the names of the cities were not disclosed. All the cities had more than 100,000 inhabit-
ants, and the intention was to match similar cases in both countries. The researchers analysed 
a total of 1,128 separate austerity measures; these measures needed to be agreed upon in 
the municipal decision-making process, but were not necessarily implemented. 
In general, Overmans and Timm-Arnold (2016) have concluded that “the effects of the crisis 
took more time to be noticeable at the local level, but municipalities are now dealing with 
serious levels of fiscal stress” (p. 1054 f.). Regarding the measures taken to address these cir-
cumstances, similar strategies were observed in both countries. Lowering expenses for 
maintenance and higher fees for municipal services, for example, were among the most typi-
cal measures introduced in all 10 municipalities under investigation. Building upon the cate-
gorisation of Overmans and Noordegraaf (2014), the austerity measures were classed slightly 
differently, namely as (1) organisational cuts, (2) fiscal cuts, (3) fiscal changes, and (4) organi-
sational change. While all five Dutch municipalities used all four strategies, variation could be 
observed regarding the distribution. Mainly depending on the scope of organisational 
changes, it has been pointed out that some austerity measures can also be considered as pub-
lic management reforms or parts thereof. This relates to the fact that a crisis can be used to 
justify long-awaited reforms. In other words, a crisis can provide a window of opportunity for 
public management reforms or other types of reforms and might therefore lead to broader 
organisational or legal changes beyond adjustments directly related to the crisis. 
In the Dutch case, organisational cuts, as the most common strategy, amounted to about 30% 
of the austerity measures in the longer run. Fiscal change, as the least common strategy, still 
amounted to approximately 20% of the measures chosen, which illustrates the relatively 
broad use of all four strategies. The distribution between the least and most common strategy 
varies across the five Dutch cities. However, the variation decreases in the longer run when 
taking the duration of the strategies into account. According to the authors, the commonness 
of organisational measures also implies that the “Dutch municipalities studied aim to restore 
the fiscal balance indirectly by reforming and reducing organizational activity” (Overmans & 
Timm-Arnold, 2016, p. 1058). However, apart from many similar strategies on the surface, the 
exact measures vary in detail. In some cases, it is also obvious that the Financial Crisis is seen 
not only as a burden, but also as a reform opportunity. Regarding the process of deciding upon 
and implementing austerity measures at the local level in the Netherlands, it needs to be taken 




Local officials develop the plans in detail before the executive board issues its approval. Dis-
cussions amongst the municipal council and council committees then follow before a final de-
cision is taken by the council. While the austerity measures are usually planned within the 
municipal administration, and even though specifications by higher levels of government are 
relatively limited, the decision-making process within the municipality itself can be generally 
described as top-down and highly political, according to Overmans and Timm-Arnold (2016). 
From a comparative perspective, the study has concluded that the five Dutch municipalities 
focused on organisational reforms and the expenditure side of the municipal budgets, while 
the five municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia preferred fiscal-oriented measures with a 
focus on the revenue side. The general scope of measures was also influenced by the austerity 
plans of central government. The authors have deemed differences in the financial autonomy 
and administrative culture to be the key explanations for variation. It has been argued that a 
low degree of fiscal autonomy often leaves few options other than cutting costs, while a high 
degree allows for additional options, including the possibility to increase revenues in particu-
lar, which also leads to broader variation in austerity measures. More generally, other differ-
ences within the political-administrative system and the organisational structure of the local 
authorities can be considered as additional factors that potentially explain variation regarding 
municipal austerity plans. In summary, based on the insights from five municipalities in the 
Netherlands and five in Germany, austerity plans are not universal, but depend on politico-
administrative features (Overmans & Timm-Arnold, 2016). 
A single case study on the effects of the Financial Crisis on the city of Amsterdam152 has been 
presented by Engelen and Musterd (2010). Since the study was published in 2010, it needs to 
be taken into account that it captures only the early developments of the Crisis. In the case of 
Amsterdam, it is also important to know that the city was already hit rather heavily by the 
Dot-com bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s. As a consequence, some banks and finan-
cial service firms moved to London or other destinations, and employment in financial services 
in Amsterdam had already been in slow decline since that time. While the troubles in the 
banking sector characterised the early stages of the recent Financial Crisis, the Amsterdam 
area, as the financial centre of the Netherlands, will face lower employment losses than other 
financial hubs around the world, according to the predictions of the authors. The partially 
more domestically oriented services provide the main explanation. A negative second-round 
effect is expected for the local economy in the Amsterdam region because of a declining num-
ber of tourists, also affecting Schiphol airport as a major employer. 
Regarding public sector employment in the Amsterdam area, the authors (Engelen & Musterd, 
2010) have argued that the state is “not only functioning as the buyer of last resort but also 
as the employer of last resort” (p. 705). Following this line of thought, they have argued that 
the public sector and public sector employment will only be affected by the Financial Crisis to 
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a relatively limited extent.153 A moderating role of the state has also been observed in the area 
of real estate. In Amsterdam, the share of home ownership is relatively small, while that of 
social housing is relatively large. In this share of state-owned houses and apartments, specu-
lation remained low, and the same applied to state-owned land. Based on these circum-
stances, a counter-cyclical effect on the local economy was postulated, since it enables the 
municipality to do both of the following: “stimulating growth and investment during the up-
swing and […] protecting its citizens sufficiently during the downswing” (p. 707). 
The economic and financial situation of the wider Amsterdam region has also been analysed 
as part of a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2013). In 
the years before the Financial Crisis, the economy of the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area grew 
above the Dutch average. However, since most of the expansion occurred in the financial sec-
tor, the Crisis hit this region harder than others, characterised by a higher increase in unem-
ployment, for example.154 It has also been observed that major office capacities in the city 
remained empty as a result of the economic downturn. Moving towards a more diversified 
economy that is less dependent on the financial sector can be seen as the still-ongoing chal-
lenge that Amsterdam and its surrounding municipalities are facing. To improve the financial 
situation, the city of Amsterdam and the municipalities of the wider region implemented cut-
backs in 2011. However, priority investments were still taken in areas such as information and 
communications technology, poverty reduction, sport events, and a new entrance to the Am-
sterdam central train station (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2013, p. 53). 
A book chapter by Overmans (2017) has focused on the financial resilience of four Dutch cities 
(Ede155, Hengelo156, Hoorn157, and Zwolle158) during the recent Financial Crisis; the cases were 
selected based on cities’ financial performance and financial volatility. The insights are based 
on interviews with local officials regarding the long-term consequences of the Crisis. 
Ede experienced burdens not only because of the recent decentralisation measures without 
complete compensation, which are not directly linked to the Crisis, but also because of lower 
transfers from central government and less income for developing and selling construction 
land. To reach a balanced budget during the Crisis, the city had to use its reserves multiple 
times. Its responses to the Crisis are generally characterised by a relatively short-term focus, 
                                                     
153 However, considering that women are overrepresented in the Dutch public sector, the authors have also 
pointed out an interesting side effect, namely that men are more likely to be affected by the Financial Crisis 
than women (Engelen & Musterd, 2010, p. 705 f.). 
154 These seemingly contradictory findings, in comparison with the study by Engelen and Musterd (2010), can 
be best explained by the circumstance that economic growth in recent years has mainly taken place in the sur-
rounding municipalities, such as Amstelveen, rather than in Amsterdam itself. 
155 Ede is located in the centre of the Netherlands (Province Gelderland) and has about 115,000 inhabitants. 
156 Hengelo is located in the eastern part of the Netherlands (Province Overijssel) and has approximately 80,000 
inhabitants. 
157 Hoorn is located in the north-western part of the Netherlands (Province North Holland) and has roughly 
70,000 inhabitants. 





also including the reduction of operational costs, increased sale of land, and cancelling or post-
poning of planned investments. In addition, long-term responses involved the intention to in-
crease administrative efficiency and the quality of partnerships with external actors (Over-
mans, 2017, p. 178 ff.). 
Zwolle was also affected by the reduction in transfers from central government as well as 
losses from developing and selling construction land. However, the city had substantial re-
sources and relatively low debts from pre-Crisis times. To address the Crisis, Zwolle employed 
a variety of strategies, including cost reductions, generating new sources of revenues by find-
ing partners for new investments, terminating some public services, and postponing planned 
investments. Within the municipal administration, the working efficiency and the quality of 
partnerships with external actors, as well as risk management, were improved (Overmans, 
2017, p. 180 f.). 
Hengelo had not only balanced budgets and some financial reserves in the years before the 
recent Financial Crisis, but also high debts. The three burdens of higher expenditure, as a result 
of decentralisation measures, lower transfers from central government and less income from 
developing and selling construction land also affected the city. In addition, the high debts im-
plied high interest payments, further reducing the city´s financial leeway. Crisis responses in-
cluded the termination of public services, the cancellation or postponement of planned in-
vestments, and general expenditure cuts. Starting with cuts across the board, they were 
shifted towards more targeted cuts further along in the process. Risk management was also 
improved. Lastly, shared services were introduced in the municipal administration to make 
the organisation more efficient (Overmans, 2017, p. 181 f.). 
The three above-mentioned issues of higher expenditure also affected the city of Hoorn. An 
additional budgetary shock was the collapse of a theatre building under construction, implying 
extra costs for the reconstruction and legal settlement. Even though the city had relatively low 
debt before the Crisis, Hoorn’s financial situation deteriorated. In the context of developing 
and selling land, it also needs to be taken into account that there is no municipal land left. As 
a consequence of the Crisis, municipal risk management was improved in particular. In addi-
tion, public services were terminated, costs were cut, and planned investments were post-
poned (Overmans, 2017, p. 182 f.). 
Overall, similar responses to the recent Financial Crisis at the municipal level can be observed 
in the four case studies by Overmans (2017). Cutting costs and cancelling investments were 
part of the strategies of all municipalities; the former took place by reducing the number of 
staff members, reducing maintenance levels, and terminating certain public services. From a 
more practical perspective, both across-the-board and targeted budget cuts were realised. 
Interestingly, increases in local taxation were not reported. The respondents explained that 
given the small share of local taxation on the municipalities’ revenue side, major increases in 
local taxes are necessary to generate a significant effect. Furthermore, it needs to be noted 
that local officials sometimes viewed the recent Financial Crisis as a welcome opportunity to 




The last study to be presented and discussed in this sub-chapter was published by Weske et 
al. (2014), with a focus on social dialogue, describing collective labour agreements and the 
accompanying consultation and negotiation processes, in times of austerity measures at the 
Dutch local level. As a result of lower budgets in the context of the Financial Crisis and the 
need for a reduction in public services, as well as a downgrade of municipal employment con-
ditions, the authors have researched the role of social dialogue during this process. The situa-
tions of the two municipalities Leeuwarden159 and Zwolle have been analysed in depth. The 
authors’ general conclusion emphasises that the recent Financial Crisis did not have an impact 
on social dialogue at the Dutch local level. While pressure to reduce budgetary deficits was a 
given because of the Crisis, “social dialogue has to date been a resilient institution and has 
been able to influence austerity measures in which municipal budget cuts are balanced with 
employment interests of municipal employees” (p. 415). Following the collective bargaining, 
the civil servants employed at the local level even received minor wage increases between 
2009 and 2014 to adjust for inflation. In 2012, a flexibilisation of the working hours was ac-
cepted in return. A personal career budget for further training and development on the job 
was also part of the deal. Civil servants at the national level, on the other hand, faced a pay-
ment freeze during this period. 
In the case of Leeuwarden, municipal budget cuts of 14 million euro, including spending re-
ductions on certain public services as well as on the costs of the general administration, were 
planned for the time period 2011 to 2017. Regarding the cuts in public services, the focus was 
on the following policy areas: sports, the maintenance of the public space, and social assis-
tance. The savings within the municipal administration were planned with 3 million euro to be 
realised between 2011 and 2015 and 3.4 million euro between 2015 and 2017. Apart from 
across-the-board cuts with a scope of 5% to 10%, the spending reductions were planned to be 
achieved via a higher standardisation of products and services in order to increase efficiency. 
As a consequence of these measures, a reduction in municipal employment estimated be-
tween 80 and 100 full-time equivalents could be achieved via natural fluctuation (Weske et 
al., 2014). 
In Zwolle, as the second case under investigation, budget cuts of 8 million euro were planned 
in 2010, and they were increased to 11 million euro one year later. While a cut of 5 million 
euro was intended to be achieved through cutbacks within the administration, the remaining 
6 million euro addressed public services in different policy areas, focusing on sheltered work-
places in the context of social services, maintenance of the public space, and public safety. 
The reduction in administrative costs were planned to be reached via more efficient manage-
ment, process optimisation, and increased co-operation with partners outside the municipal 
administration. Additional budget cuts of 8 million euro, split equally between the administra-
tion and public services, were introduced in 2012. Cutbacks in public services focused on the 
cultural sector, with lower subsidies for institutions such as museums, which also implied a 
reduction in the number of staff members. Within the municipal administration, savings 
                                                     





mainly implied a reduction in the number of employees of various positions, including man-
agers. Between 2011 and 2015, a total decrease of 120 full-time equivalents was planned 
(Weske et al., 2014). 
Taken together, the six primarily quantitative studies provide insights into the developments 
in Dutch municipalities in the context of the recent Financial Crisis mainly based on document 
analyses and interviews. While this approach enables detailed insights, they are not neces-
sarily generalisable to other municipalities or to the local level as a whole. This characteristic 
is a general advantage of studies with a larger number of objects of research, which will be 
addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
9.2.2. Primarily quantitative studies on financial developments of 
larger groups of Dutch municipalities 
Within the group of studies that have primarily applied quantitative methods, a policy paper 
by the Central Planning Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, 2016) has 
identified four financial shocks that Dutch municipalities have faced in recent years and has 
analysed their impact from a comparative perspective. Two of these shocks are directly linked 
to the Financial Crisis since 2007. The studies by Allers and Bolt (2010) and Allers and Hoeben 
(2010) are based on two own surveys. While the former focuses on changes in municipal rev-
enues and expenses as a result of the Financial Crisis, the latter analyses planned austerity 
measures as reactions to the Crisis. Furthermore, a survey by the Council of European Munic-
ipalities and Regions (2009a), in co-operation with the Association of Dutch Municipalities, has 
provided some information on the developments during the early phases of the Crisis. A re-
port by van der Lei (2015) has offered further insights into changes in municipal debt. Lastly, 
eight mainly quantitative reports on the financial developments in municipal land develop-
ment have been published by two consultancies (Deloitte, 2010; Deloitte, 2011; Deloitte, 
2012; Deloitte, 2013; Deloitte, 2014; Deloitte, 2016; Deloitte, 2017; Ernst & Young, 2015). 
The policy paper by the Central Planning Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbu-
reau, 2016)160 has identified four financial shocks that Dutch municipalities experienced be-
tween 2007 and 2013. The first shock was the increased need for social assistance, mainly 
provided by the local level in the Netherlands, as a result of the recent Financial Crisis. Accord-
ing to the Central Planning Bureau’s calculations, the net expenses for social support increased 
by 17 euro per capita between 2005 and 2011. The second shock concerns social services and 
relates to legal changes in the Social Support Act (Dutch: Wet maatschappelijke ondersteun-
ing, Wmo), including additional local-level tasks in the area of household care from 2007 on-
wards. In 2009, the sales of Essent and Nuon, two energy companies, marked the third shock. 
Almost half of all Dutch municipalities previously owned shares in the two companies, and 
while many municipalities benefited from the sales, it needs to be taken into account that 
long-term revenues in the form of dividends ceased at that point in time. Similar to the first 
                                                     




shock, the fourth shock is again linked to the recent Financial Crisis. As a result of the declining 
real estate market, the revenues of many Dutch municipalities from land development and 
sale decreased significantly. Taking into account development costs, which were planned in 
the longer run, deficits also occurred. According to the Central Planning Bureau’s calculations, 
the decrease in net revenues in this area amounted to 55 euro per capita on average between 
2007 and 2013. 
All four shocks have in common that they were relatively heterogeneous and affected the 
municipalities to differing extents, implying wide variation in the additional burdens on mu-
nicipal finances in recent years across the local level in the Netherlands. Considering changes 
in municipal assets and debts as possible consequences, linkages to the financial shocks could 
not be observed, according to the study. However, some effects might be visible on the bal-
ance sheets with a certain temporal delay, including possible variation in time periods across 
the local level, which complicates comparisons. Furthermore, various other socio-economic 
developments and political decisions imply continuous changes in the municipalities’ financial 
positions even without specific shocks (Centraal Planbureau, 2016). 
Already in early 2010, Allers and Bolt (2010) conducted a survey among Dutch municipalities 
on financial changes in revenues and expenses as a consequence of the recent Financial Crisis. 
With 174 participants, about 40% of all Dutch municipalities took part in the research. Accord-
ing to the overall results, the Crisis is expected to entail lower revenues and higher expenses 
at the Dutch local level amounting to 1,769 million euro in 2009 and 1,329 million euro in 
2010. Approximately three quarters are the result of lower revenues, especially in the context 
of land development, while the remaining quarter concerns the expenditure side. According 
to the data, larger cities are expected to be more affected by these adverse financial develop-
ments than small municipalities. 
Expressed in euros per capita, the decline in revenues from land development is estimated to 
amount to roughly 70 euro in 2009 and about 42 euro in 2010. In the cases of building permits, 
property taxes on immovable property, and dividends from public assets, as the three other 
types of income under research, the negative impact of the Crisis is expected to be much 
smaller. With additional expenses of approximately 10 euro per capita in 2009 and 10 euro 
per capita in 2010, the highest additional expenses in the context of the recent Financial Crisis 
are awaited in the policy area of social services. In addition to the financial changes on both 
sides of the budget, the survey has also included a question on counter-cyclical measures 
taken to address the Crisis by stimulating the economy. While the two predefined methods, 
namely performing investments faster than originally planned and paying bills quicker than 
usual, did not both take place in the majority of municipalities, financial effects of roughly 16 
euro per capita in 2009 and about 42 euro per capita in 2010 were estimated in the case of 
the first method. While the authors have pointed out that their research focuses on the short-
term effects of the recent Financial Crisis, possible long-term effects also imply the possibility 
of a moderation or neutralisation of previously estimated effects. Furthermore, the financial 
changes of only a limited number of balance sheet items were included in the research, and 




A second survey was realised by Allers and Hoeben (2010) in late 2010, with a focus on Dutch 
municipalities’ austerity plans; 253 municipalities participated in this survey, which equals a 
response rate of about 59%. According to the results, the local level intends to reduce its ex-
penditures by about 7% in 2011 and approximately 12% in 2012, both in relation to 2010. 
Expressed per capita, this implies a decrease of roughly 258 euro and 445 euro respectively. 
The expenditures in the policy areas of public housing and urban renewal are expected to be 
reduced the most. In 2011, roads and public space were expected to be the policy area with 
the second highest cuts; this also applied to social work in 2012. In addition to the variation 
across the different policy areas, larger cities also indicated plans to save more per capita than 
smaller municipalities. The same applies to municipalities with a weak social structure, com-
pared to those with a strong one. 
Furthermore, many municipalities stated the intention of budget cuts within their own admin-
istrations. On average, the expenditure reductions were expected to amount to about 19 euro 
per capita in 2011 and approximately 31 euro per capita in 2012, both in relation to 2010. 
Again, larger cities and municipalities with a weak social structure planned to cut more in com-
parison with smaller villages and municipalities with a strong social structure. Overall, it needs 
to be taken into account that the research by Allers and Hoeben (2010) mainly works with 
preliminary financial data during an early phase of the recent Financial Crisis, similar to the 
first study by Allers and Bolt (2010). In addition, the research is limited to a few selected policy 
areas. 
Following the survey results of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (2009a, p. 
45 f.), in co-operation with the Association of Dutch Municipalities, 14 Dutch municipalities 
invested parts of their savings in Icelandic banks. The total sum was specified as 85 million 
euro, and it has also been pointed out that a share of the investment was transferred back. 
Total or individual losses were not specified. From a more general perspective, according to 
the survey result, Dutch municipalities, similar to many other state and non-state actors, ex-
perienced difficulties in borrowing money and had to accept higher interest rates, implying 
higher costs, during the early stages of the Crisis. However, this effect has certainly diminished 
in more recent years, and borrowing money can currently be considered as cheaper, com-
pared to the long-term average. According to the recommendations of the VNG in February 
2009, presented as part of the aforementioned study, additional expenditures at the Dutch 
local level should focus on investments in public lighting, the energy performance of public 
buildings, the energy performance of private buildings, and the renovation of national and 
local monuments, since an investment backlog has been identified in these areas. The total 
cost of potential projects is estimated at 2 billion euro. 
Empirical insights into the financial developments at the Dutch local level in times of the re-
cent Financial Crisis have also been published by van der Lei (2015) as part of an annual report 
by the VNG. In the context of the general increase in public debt in the Netherlands between 
2007 and 2014, it has been pointed out that the debt ratios in net terms were more adverse 
for central government in comparison with the local level. However, the net debt of all Dutch 
municipalities combined was specified at 31.9 billion euro in 2014, after a significant increase 




to unusually high municipal revenues in 2009. Overall, the financial position of the local level 
in the Netherlands has deteriorated in recent years because of lower revenues and additional 
investments. However, while the indebtedness has increased, the interest payments for the 
debt have even slightly decreased as a result of lower interest rates. In the context of the 
statistical analyses, it has also been observed that larger municipalities in terms of inhabitants 
experienced higher increases in debt, which also led to lower degrees of solvency. As a conse-
quence, the expectation of a future increase in the number of article-12 municipalities has 
been stated, but has not yet occurred. 
As an area of municipal activities extensively affected by the recent Financial Crisis, the Dutch 
central government and partially also the VNG commissioned private consultancies to analyse 
the financial changes in municipal land development. According to Deloitte (Deloitte, 2010; 
Deloitte, 2011; Deloitte, 2012; Deloitte, 2013; Deloitte, 2014; Deloitte, 2016; Deloitte, 2017), 
effects concerning the related balance sheet items are observable since 2009, and were fol-
lowed by reactions by local government in the form of delaying and cancelling of development 
projects. The latest data have identified losses and lower revenues with regard to municipal 
land development amounting to about 3.5 billion euro in total. While it has also been pointed 
out that the book values of municipal land decreased during the recent Financial Crisis, it must 
be taken into account that this effect might be temporary and disappearing over time without 
municipal action. As part of its reports, Deloitte has also analysed the market demand and 
market prices for houses, flats, and office space, representing the demand side in relation to 
land development. While price increases for flats have once again been observed in more re-
cent years, after continuous price decreases since the beginning of the Crisis, the demand for 
real estate is still volatile. Overall, Deloitte’s reports are based on varying numbers of munici-
palities included in the different case studies, which might also be part of the explanation for 
why the calculations of the total Crisis effects on municipal land development in the Nether-
lands slightly differ over time. Regarding the predictions formulated in the reports, it needs to 
be noted that, in general, the annual losses and lower revenues in land development were 
lower than the forecasts and that also the expected sharp increase of article-12 municipalities 
did not occur until now.  
Furthermore, a report by Ernst & Young (2015) has calculated the total financial impact of the 
recent Financial Crisis on municipal land development in the Netherlands to be about 4 billion 
euro by considering losses as well as lower revenues. The study has also pointed out the com-
parably higher risks of land development in the form of municipal co-operation and private-
public partnerships, since the influence of the individual municipalities on the decisions taken 
by the joint ventures can be limited. Based on a forecasted oversupply and declining prices for 
flats and company sites, as well as office space to a lesser extent, Ernst & Young predicts fur-
ther losses in municipal land development in the near future. 
Taken together, a small number of studies have aimed to measure the consequences of the 
Financial Crisis since 2007 at the local level in the Netherlands by collecting data on a relatively 
large number of municipalities and multiple areas of crisis effects. However, most of the stud-




and a high uncertainty when estimating long-term effects. In addition, potential problems 
with the validity of survey data should be taken into account. 
Reflecting on the six primarily qualitative studies, the five mainly quantitative studies, and the 
eight predominantly quantitative consultancy reports on the situation of Dutch municipalities 
in the context of the recent Financial Crisis presented and discussed above, the uniform expe-
riences of fiscal stress and the searches for strategies to reduce expenditures describe the 
shared challenges in recent years, and they can be expected to remain crucial issues at least 
for the near future. Alongside excessive spending in the past, which in some cases has resulted 
in relatively high levels of existing debts, the Financial Crisis since 2007 can be considered as 
the main reason for the various cutback initiatives discussed in local political bodies, some-
times also gaining wider public attention, and implemented in the last few years. However, 
since only a relatively small group out of the almost 400 Dutch municipalities was included in 
some studies, which might not be representative of local government in the Netherlands as a 
whole, while other studies mainly worked with preliminary financial data or focused on se-
lected policy areas, questions remain regarding the overall patterns of financial development 
at the Dutch local level in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007 and the factors respon-
sible for variation. Therefore, official financial data of all Dutch municipalities will be analysed 
in the following chapters as the main contribution of this study. Starting with aggregated data 
on financial changes in all Dutch municipalities combined in order to assess common develop-
ments, the statistical analyses will continue with a focus first on variation between the munic-




10. Empirical analyses of the impact of and responses to the recent 
Financial Crisis at the local level of government in the Netherlands 
After presenting and discussing different policy reports as well as academic publications on 
countermeasures and political intentions addressing the recent Financial Crisis in the Nether-
lands, mainly including cutbacks in different policy areas, partially also implying changes in 
municipal finances, as well as a number of scholarly studies on relatively small groups of mu-
nicipalities and their experiences during the Crisis, this chapter will analyse official govern-
ment statistics, provided by the Central Agency for Statistics (Dutch: Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek, CBS), to answer the question of how the financial position of the Dutch local level 
has actually changed in recent years. In other words, the relation between political ambitions 
and the financial reality will be investigated from a quantitative perspective. The main objec-
tive is to identify balance sheet items and policy areas with noticeable changes in recent years 
in comparison with the long-term trends. Taken together, these analyses will constitute the 
first empirical component of this study. 
Accordingly, the following sub-chapters will address in detail the long-term developments in 
municipal finances as well as the changes on the revenues and expenditures side in more re-
cent years. Also, against the background of public finances generally being highly path-de-
pendent based on multi-year planning and with often relatively long contractual periods, the 
first sub-chapter presents a brief overview of the financial developments since 1900, and it 
pays closer attention to the changes since 2000, including figures such as the balance sheet 
total of all municipalities combined and total municipal debt (10.1). Then, sub-chapter (10.2) 
provides more detailed insights into the changes in municipal revenues and expenditures 
within the different policy areas with municipal competences between 2004 and 2014. In the 
last sub-chapter (10.3), special attention is paid to the developments of the different types of 
municipalities’ own income between 2004 and 2015. 
 
10.1. Municipal finances from a long-term perspective 
Government budgets, which are comprised of revenues and expenditures, are generally 
planned for the longer run and continuously adjusted in detail. Most public services, repre-
senting offers for citizens they make use of more or less frequently, for example, are usually 
provided with an open time horizon. While the number of users of a certain public service and 
an obligatory usage fee, if applicable, can change – which also applies to tax revenues, based 
on the number of taxpayers and tax rates – a large share of the cost arising from the provision 
of public services and the collection of taxes is generally relatively stable, at least in the short 
term. Changes in the financial affairs of public bodies are usually incremental, thereby also 
guaranteeing a certain degree of continuity. While major shifts in public finances are not im-
possible, as the example of the Dutch central government’s reactions to the banking crisis 
already illustrated, events of this dimension are an exception in relation to rather continuous 




in public finances are almost exclusively caused by different types of crises or large-scale re-
forms. However, the developments of Dutch municipal finances since 1900 (10.1.1) as well as 
the developments since 2000 (10.1.2), including a number of key figures in both cases, are 
illustrated and discussed in the two following sub-chapters. 
 
10.1.1. Financial developments since 1900 
Aggregated financial data of the Dutch local level are provided by the Central Agency for Sta-
tistics from 1900 onwards (Dataset: Municipal finance from 1900). The dataset includes infor-
mation on income and expenses, as well as the resulting balance and potential debts accumu-
lated over time. All figures in this sub-chapter are directly based on data extracted from mu-
nicipal accounts and are therefore not adjusted for inflation. An overview of the total income 
and total expenses of all Dutch municipalities between 1900 and 2015, both illustrated as pos-
itive values, is provided in figure 2. However, it must be noted that the data for 2015 are pre-
liminary, while all the other data are definitive. 161 
 
Figure 2: Total income and total expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro, 1900–2015 (Data source: CBS, 
Municipal finance from 1900) 
In the course of more than 100 years, the financial positions of both sides of the budgets of all 
Dutch municipalities combined increased significantly. Starting with revenues of 158 million 
euro and expenses of 161 million euro in 1900, both converted from Dutch guilder,162 the total 
                                                     
161 The same applies to all further analyses in chapter 10.1. 

































































































































sums amounted to 56.537 billion euro on the income side and 57.010 billion euro on the ex-
penditure side in 2015. However, looking at the developments over time, the expansion was 
not constant.163 
While having an increasing tendency, the financial resources of the Dutch local level were rel-
atively limited in nominal terms before the 1950s and 1960s. A major expansion began in the 
following years, lasting until the mid-1980s, which corresponds to the general extension of 
welfare states in the Western world during this period of time. However, fluctuations with a 
continuing overall increasing tendency characterise Dutch municipal finances in the times 
since then. In the years before 2009, it can also be observed that municipal revenues and 
expenditures developed relatively homogenously, while a wider gap between the two figures 
can be recognised in the following years. 
The peak in municipal income in 1995 describes an exception originating from organisational 
changes in municipal housing. Before 1995, housing corporations received annual subsidies 
from central government. Those subsidies were abolished and bought off for approximately 
16 billion euro or 5% of the GDP, resulting in the particularly high municipal revenues in one 
year (Bos, 2013, p. 39). Apart from the municipal housing reform, three other important 
events that impacted on municipal finances have also been pointed out by the CBS within the 
dataset. The first event involved changes in the financing of retirement homes, resulting in an 
additional 2 billion euro on the municipalities’ income side in 1986. Second, the shares of Nuon 
and Essent, two energy companies, were sold, resulting in municipal gains of 5.2 billion euro 
in 2009. The third event addresses the recent decentralisation measures as of 2015, already 
discussed in chapter 7.5.1. As a result of the transfer of tasks and responsibilities from central 
to local government in three policy areas, generally addressing social affairs, the CBS expects 
municipal revenues and expenses to increase by approximately 4 billion euro. 
To gain a more detailed impression of municipal finances in the Netherlands, figure 3 builds 
upon figure 2 and illustrates the development of municipal total income and total expenses 
per person. Again, income and expenses are pictured as positive values. 
                                                     
163 See also Steen and Toonen (2010) for an overview of the developments of Dutch municipal finances be-





Figure 3: Total income and total expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined in euro per person, 1900–2015 (Data sources: 
CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; CBS, Population, households and population development from 1899; own calculations) 
As a result of the relatively constant growth of the Dutch population since 1900, the courses 
of the graphs in figure 2 and figure 3 are similar. However, the data on municipal income and 
expenses per person offers better insight into the general extent of public service provision at 
the local level. As pointed out before, the main increase in municipal budgets started around 
the 1950s and lasted until the mid-1980s. During this period, municipal income and expendi-
ture per person grew more than fifteen-fold, from less than 200 euro per person to about 
3,000 euro per person. While the developments in the following years also included decreases 
in municipal income and expenditure, an overall increasing tendency on both sides of the bal-
ance sheet can be observed. 
Debts or surpluses are the results of unbalanced budgets. An overview of the development of 
the annual balance of income and expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined is presented 
in figure 4. The data originate from the same dataset as the previous figures and cover the 



































































































































Figure 4: Total balance of income and expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro, 1900–2015 (Data source: 
CBS, Municipal finance from 1900) 
While the time period between the 1960s and mid-1980s was characterised by municipal def-
icits, expressed by negative values in figure 4, the following years until 2000 mainly entailed a 
positive balance, as the positive values illustrate. The highest surplus was achieved in 1995 as 
a result of the reform in municipal housing described before. In general, the nominal nature 
of the data needs to be taken into account when assessing the total municipal balance and 
accompanying debts and surpluses over time. However, recent years have been more volatile, 
as the graph illustrates, including the highest deficits in absolute figures of 4.913 billion euro 
in 2010 and declining deficits in the following years. 
Since municipal income and expenses have generally grown over the last century, the balance 
as share of the total budget can be considered as more informative when analysing the overall 
developments in the longer run. Therefore, figure 5 illustrates the total balance of all Dutch 

































































































































Figure 5: Total balance of income and expenses as share of the total expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined, 1900–
2015 (Data source: CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; own calculations) 
Interestingly, figure 5 indicates a different picture, compared to figure 4, at least for the years 
before the 1980s. Relatively high surpluses, which exceeded 10% of the total expenses, were 
achieved in the late 1900s and early 1910s as well as in 1921, apart from the previously men-
tioned exception of 1995, as the positive values in figure 5 illustrate. The highest annual 
budget deficit at the Dutch local level in relative terms occurred in 1951, with a scope of ap-
proximately 26%, pictured on the negative range of the scale. Also, in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, during the Great Depression, the municipal balance sheets closed with major deficits, 
partially exceeding 20%. Relatively high deficits can also be observed from the late 1940s until 
the early 1970s, often exceeding the level of 10%. The deficits in relative terms in more recent 
years, on the other hand, were generally lower, compared to the deficit levels more than 40 
years ago. 
However, high debts are the usual consequence of continuous deficits over time. The devel-
opment of the total debt of all Dutch municipalities since 1900 combined is presented in figure 



































































































































Figure 6: Total debt of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro, 1900–2015 (Data source: CBS, Municipal finance from 
1900) 
Between 1900 and the mid-1980s, the total debt of all Dutch municipalities combined, de-
picted as positive values in figure 6, grew relatively exponentially, reaching its all-time high of 
79.286 billion euro in 1985. Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, local government debt also 
amounted to the most relevant share of total government debt in the Netherlands (Bos, 2013, 
p. 32 ff.). In the years after 1985, debts were reduced significantly, also as a result of the re-
placement payments for subsidies in the context of the previously explained municipal hous-
ing corporations in 1995. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, municipal debts maintained at a 
relatively constant level of about 40 billion euro, which is half the value of that in the mid-
1980s. However, in more recent years, including the time period of the Financial Crisis, the 
total debt of the Dutch local level increased again. By the end of 2015, the total debt of all 
Dutch municipalities combined was reported at 51.437 billion euro. 
Considering debt in the context of public finances, debt per person as a relative measure is 
usually more illustrative in comparison with the total amount. Therefore, an overview of the 




































































































































Figure 7: Total debt of all Dutch municipalities combined in euro per person, 1900–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal finance 
from 1900; CBS, Population, households and population development from 1899; own calculations) 
Based on the relatively linear increase in the Dutch population since 1900, as already pointed 
out in the context of the developments of income and expenses at the Dutch municipal level 
per capita, the debt per person evolved comparable to the total local debt, and liabilities are 
again pictured as positive values in figure 7. After a rather exponential increase over decades, 
the highest indebtedness was reached in 1985, when every Dutch citizen had an average mu-
nicipal debt of 5,457 euro. The decrease in the following years resulted in a relatively stable 
debt level of approximately 2,500 euro per person in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, 
in later years, a time period that was characterised by the Financial Crisis, the municipal debt 
level of 3,000 euro per person was surpassed again. 
As pointed out at the beginning of this sub-chapter, the data presented therein are not ad-
justed for inflation,164 but represent figures directly taken from municipal accounts. However, 
in the context of financial developments, for example in the area of municipal finances, infla-
tion rates can be considered in order to understand balance sheet totals and other key mon-
etary figures in relation to the accompanying purchasing power, which is particularly im-
portant if the purchasing power was subject to major changes. In economic analyses, the in-
flation rate is usually calculated by the annual percentage change in a price index. In this re-
gard, consumer price indices (CPIs), which indicate the price level of a typical market basket, 
consisting of goods and services purchased by an average household, are most common. The 
annual percentage changes in the official Dutch consumer price index between 1900 and 
2016, calculated by the CBS, are illustrated in figure 8. Positive values denote years of inflation, 
and negative values indicate years of deflation. 
                                                     
164 The data of the more detailed analyses from the next sub-chapter onwards, on the other hand, will be ad-

































































































































Figure 8: Annual percentage changes in consumer prices, 1901–2016 (Data source: CBS, Consumer prices; price index 1900 = 
100) 
First, reflecting on the inflation and deflation rates in the Netherlands since 1900, expressed 
by the consumer price index, declining fluctuations can be observed. While the highest peaks 
were recorded in the first half of the 20th century, the annual inflation rates since 1988 are 
below 5%. Years of deflation can be observed in the 1920s and 1930s as well as in 1987. Over-
all, the price stability has increased in the Netherlands over the last century. 
In summary, the balance sheets of Dutch municipalities have significantly increased in nominal 
terms over the last century. Although balanced budget laws apply to the local level, the mu-
nicipalities build up increasing debts over time. Debt reductions in the 1990s can be explained 
by a reform in municipal housing. Furthermore, recent renewed increases in municipal debt 
correlate temporally with the time period of the Financial Crisis. However, following this ra-
ther historical overview, which is intended to introduce the position of Dutch municipal fi-
nances and accompanying path dependencies from a long-term perspective, the following 
sub-chapter will examine the developments since 2000 in more detail to move the attention 
closer to the times of the Financial Crisis. 
 
10.1.2. Financial developments since 2000 
In line with the focus of this study on the Financial Crisis since 2007, more detailed insights 
into the financial situation of the Dutch local level in recent years are provided next. To take 


































































































































the Dutch consumer price level of the year 2007, unless stated otherwise.165 Figure 9 includes 
the data on municipal total income and total expenses that were already presented in figure 
2, but limited to the time period from 2000166 to 2015. Income and expenses are again pic-
tured as positive values. 
 
Figure 9: Total income and total expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer 
price level of the year 2007), 2000–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; CBS, Annual change of the con-
sumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Based on this closer inspection, it can be observed that municipal total revenues and total 
expenditures increased by roughly 15%, or 8 billion euro, between 2000 and 2009. After this 
recent peak slightly above 55 billion euro on both sides of the municipal budgets, the following 
years until 2014 were characterised by a downward trend towards 45 billion euro. In other 
words, municipal total income and total expenses decreased by approximately 10 billion euro, 
or 18%. 
In 2015, total local revenues and total expenditures increased again in the Netherlands, largely 
as a result of the decentralisation measures, implying additional municipal tasks and respon-
sibilities, as already outlined in chapter 7.5.1. In this context, the CBS’s estimated expansion 
of municipal budgets of about 4 billion euro as a result of the decentralisation measures, can 
also be understood when looking at the graph in figure 9. However, what can be considered 
                                                     
165 The year 2007 was chosen as the baseline, since it represents the last year before the first consequences of 
the recent Financial Crisis became evident in the Netherlands. According to the CBS, the Dutch consumer price 
index (CPI) changed in relation to the previous year between 2000 and 2015 as follows: 2000: 2.6%; 2001: 
4.5%; 2002: 3.4%; 2003: 2.1%; 2004: 1.2%; 2005: 1.7%; 2006: 1.1%; 2007: 1.6%; 2008: 2.5%; 2009: 1.2%; 2010: 
1.3%; 2011: 2.3%; 2012: 2.5%; 2013: 2.5%; 2014: 1.0%; 2015: 0.6% (Data source: CBS, Annual change of the 
consumer price index from 1963). 
166 Apart from some disputes regarding the exact beginning of the recent Financial Crisis, the year 2000 was 
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as most interesting in the graph is the gap between total income and total expenses, implying 
unbalanced budgets, which is most notable between 2009 and 2014. During this period, the 
expenses were higher than the income, which describes an unfavourable budgetary scenario. 
Also, by taking into account the long-term developments since 1900, as presented in figure 2, 
the gap between income and expenditure is largest during this period in absolute terms. In-
terestingly, the period of time correlates, at least temporally, with the years of the recent 
Financial Crisis. 
Closely related to the total balance sheets, and building upon figure 3, the inflation-adjusted 
developments of the average municipal total income and total expenses per person between 
2000 and 2015 are illustrated in figure 10. In this figure, both income and expenses are also 
pictured as positive values.  
 
Figure 10: Total income and total expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined in euro per person (adjusted for inflation, 
consumer price level of the year 2007), 2000–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; CBS, Population, house-
holds and population development from 1899; CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Based on to the stable growth of the Dutch population, the developments of the average mu-
nicipal total income and total expenses per person were relatively similar to those of the total 
income and total expenses at the local level, presented in figure 9. Starting with an average 
total income and total expenses of about 3,000 euro per person in 2000, an increase to 3,500 
euro followed on both sides of the budget until 2009. The subsequent decrease between 2009 
and 2014 implied a 1,000 euro reduction in the average total income and total expenses per 
citizen. A renewed increase to 3,000 euro followed on both sides of the budgets in more re-
cent years and can be considered as mainly being caused by the corresponding decentralisa-
tion measures. 
Building upon figure 4, the following figure 11 illustrates the inflation-adjusted development 
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Figure 11: Total balance of income and expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro (adjusted for inflation, 
consumer price level of the year 2007), 2000–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; CBS, Annual change of 
the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Considering the years between 2000 and 2015, all Dutch municipalities combined achieved 
budget surpluses only in 2000, 2006, and 2009, as the positive values in figure 11 illustrate. 
With approximately 1 billion euro, the highest surplus in later years was realised in 2006. All 
the other years resulted in total municipal deficits, which are pictured as negative values. On 
closer inspection, these were the highest in 2010, with 4.676 billion euro, followed by rela-
tively high deficits above 3 billion euro in the two subsequent years. 
For a better understanding of the municipal surpluses and deficits in relative terms, the total 
balance of income and expenses as share of the total expenses of all Dutch municipalities be-
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Figure 12: Total balance of income and expenses as share of the total expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined (adjusted 
for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2000–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; CBS, Annual 
change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
As previously mentioned, the annual total accounts of all Dutch municipalities combined were 
mostly negative in the years since 2000; especially between 2009 and 2014, particularly unfa-
vourable budgetary developments could be observed, as the negative values in figure 12 illus-
trate. Expressed as the share of the total expenses, the highest deficit was reached in 2010, 
with 8.6%. In the two following years, the annual deficit amounted to about 6%. 
Following the logic that deficits often lead to increasing levels of debt in the longer run, figure 
13 illustrates the inflation-adjusted development of the total municipal debt in the Nether-
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Figure 13: Total debt of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the 
year 2007), 2000–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index 
from 1963; own calculations) 
While municipal debt, pictured as positive values in figure 13, decreased in the Netherlands 
between 2000 and 2007, an increase can be observed in the following years until 2012. This 
rise from roughly 40 billion euro to about 47 billion euro corresponds to a growth of approxi-
mately 18% in only five years. In the following years, the total debt of the Dutch local level 
remained relatively stable with a minor decreasing tendency. 
Closely related, the accompanying inflation-adjusted development of the average municipal 


















Figure 14: Total debt of all Dutch municipalities combined in euro per person (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of 
the year 2007), 2000–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; CBS, Population, households and population 
development from 1899; CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Based on the relatively linear growth of the Dutch population, as pointed out before, the 
course of the average municipal debt per person developed comparable to the total municipal 
debt, as the positive values in figure 14 illustrate. Between 2000 and 2007, the local debt per 
person decreased below 2,500 euro, followed by an increase until 2012. A minor decrease 
subsequently took place in the three following years. As of 2015, the average municipal debt 
per person in the Netherlands amounted for roughly 2,640 euro.167 
As argued before with a focus on the national level, the recent Financial Crisis hardly affected 
the Netherlands before late 2008. Considering the regular budgetary process, apart from crisis 
budgeting and back-room decisions taken in the middle of the night, such as in the case of 
some bank bailouts, as well as the role and functioning of the sub-national level in the Neth-
erlands, Crisis effects can be expected with a further time shift in comparison with central 
government. However, in 2008, the balance of all Dutch municipalities combined had a nega-
tive inflation-adjusted total of 2.018 billion euro, followed by a positive total of 492 million 
euro the year after. The years 2010, 2011, and 2012 rank first, fourth, and third respectively 
in terms of the highest negative balance totals of Dutch municipalities since 2000. The nega-
tive balance amounted to 4.676 billion euro in 2010, 3.054 billion euro in 2011, and 3.059 
billion euro in 2012. With 2.001 billion euro, the deficit in 2013 was still relatively large. In 
2014 and 2015, Dutch municipalities still spent 788 million euro and 412 million euro more, 
respectively, than they earned. Taken together, the expenses of Dutch municipalities ex-
ceeded their revenues by 15.516 billion euro between 2008 and 2015. 
                                                     
167 See appendix 3 for a summary of the official financial data of the Dutch local level between 2000 and 2015 
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On the one hand, while a direct link between these financial developments and the recent 
Financial Crisis is not provided yet, high imbalances in Dutch municipal finances can be ob-
served during the times of the recent Crisis. On the other hand, a correlation to the electoral 
cycle in line with the argument of increasing expenditure before elections cannot be ob-
served.168 As also already mentioned before, apart from all fiscal stress in recent years, the 
number of article-12 municipalities did not increase since the beginning of the Financial Crisis. 
An increase could possibly point to structural problems unlike problems of individual munici-
palities. 
Taking the above-mentioned findings together, a comparably extensive gap between the total 
inflation-adjusted municipal expenses and income can be observed in the Netherlands be-
tween 2009 and 2014, while both figures decreased. Accordingly, inflation-adjusted municipal 
debt grew during this period of time. However, to gain better insights into the municipal tasks 
and related policy areas responsible for the financial changes and financial stress, more de-
tailed analyses will follow in the next sub-chapter. 
 
10.2. Developments of municipal revenues and expenses in the differ-
ent policy areas in recent years 
After providing an overview of the financial situation of local government in the Netherlands 
since 1900, this chapter will address the developments in recent years in more detail based 
on aggregated financial data also provided by the Central Agency for Statistics (Dataset: Mu-
nicipal accounts (revenues and expenses by region and by size)). While the changes in the total 
net balances of all 10 policy areas with municipal responsibilities, as well as varying numbers 
of balance sheet items within these policy areas, will primarily be analysed, it needs to be 
taken into account that all the items contain both income and expenditure.169 Levying a cer-
tain tax, for example, implies administrative costs for collecting the money.170 
However, to first provide an impression of the importance of the different policy areas at the 
local level in the Netherlands, represented by the corresponding balance sheet categories, 
table 19 provides an overview of the revenues and expenses within the different categories, 
as well as their share as part of the total budget of all municipalities combined in 2014. The 
data are not adjusted for inflation, based on the intention to illustrate the scope of the budg-
ets in nominal terms as well.  
                                                     
168 Regular municipal elections take place in the Netherlands every four years, with the most recent election 
having occurred in 2018. Representatives at the provincial and national levels are elected for four years as well, 
and early elections were held several times at the national level in recent decades (Kiesraad, 2018). 
169 See appendix 2 for a more detailed subdivision of policy areas with municipal expenses and revenues. 
170 See appendix 4 for an overview of the balance of revenues and expenses of all Dutch municipalities com-




Table 19: Revenues and expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined in the different policy areas in 2014 (Data source: CBS, 


















General administration 0.721 1.36 3.416 6.42 -2.695 
Public order and safety 0.134 0.25 1.796 3.38 -1.661 
Traffic, transport and water 
management 
1.797 3.38 5.124 9.63 -3.326 
Economic affairs 0.801 1.51 0.914 1.72 -0.114 
Education 0.821 1.54 3.109 5.84 -2.288 
Culture and recreation 0.817 1.54 5.233 9.83 -4.416 
Social services 10.284 19.33 16.874 31.71 -6.590 
Public health and environment 4.119 7.74 5.259 9.88 -1.141 
Spatial planning and housing 6.556 12.32 8.243 15.49 -1.687 
Financing and means for univer-
sal coverage 
27.159 51.04 3.242 6.09 23.917 
Total 53.209 100.00 53.210 100.00 -0.001 
 
As table 19 indicates, revenues and expenses were given in all 10 balance sheet categories. 
On closer inspection, the highest net expenses171 were realised in social affairs (6.590 billion 
euro), culture and recreation (4.416 billion euro), and traffic, transport and water manage-
ment (3.326 billion euro). While some local taxes and fees are recognised within the appropri-
ate policy areas, financing and means for universal coverage (23.917 billion euro) was the only 
category with a positive balance, since most revenues, especially the transfers from central 
government, are accounted for in this section of the balance sheet. 
In line with the imbalances of revenues and expenses within the different policy areas, repre-
sented by the corresponding categories of the balance sheet, their shares of the total budget 
differed depending on the side of the budget under investigation. On the income side, financ-
ing and means for universal coverage (51.04%), social services (19.33%), and spatial planning 
and housing (12.32%) accounted for the largest shares. A different composition was given on 
the expenditure side, where social services (31.71%), spatial planning and housing (15.49%), 
and public health and environment (9.88%) marked the largest shares. 
However, public revenues and public expenses are naturally subject to continuous changes. 
Therefore, an overview of the developments of the net balances of all the policy areas of all 
Dutch municipalities combined between 2004 and 2014 is illustrated in figure 15. Within the 
figure, positive values indicate areas where municipal revenues exceed expenses – in other 
words, areas of net revenues, where municipalities receive or earn money. In the cases of 
negative values, on the other hand, the expenses are higher than the revenues in the corre-
sponding areas, resulting in net expenses. Since the following analyses address financial de-
velopments over time, all data are again adjusted to the Dutch consumer price level of the 
year 2007. 
                                                     





Figure 15: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the different policy areas in million euro (adjusted for in-
flation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues and expenses 
by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Considering the changes in recent years, it can be observed that the net revenues in the cate-
gory of financing and means for universal coverage increased overall, particularly between 
2009 and 2010. An overall increase can also be recognised for the net expenses for social ser-
vices during the period under investigation, but to a lesser extent in direct comparison. The 
year 2009 is also characterised by unusually high net revenues in the policy area of economic 
affairs, which stem from the sales of shares of energy companies by a large number of munic-
ipalities as a one-time event. At first glance, all other policy areas remained rather unchanged 
during the period under investigation. However, this does not exclude the possibility of far-
reaching changes of the composition of revenues and expenses within the policy areas. Fur-
thermore, it needs to be taken into account that the scale of the figure, which was chosen to 
display all graphs, makes it difficult to recognise changes in the policy areas with relatively low 
net balances. 
To address the former issue, the developments of the total income and total expenses of all 
Dutch municipalities in the different policy areas between 2004 and 2014, represented by the 
corresponding balance sheet categories, are illustrated separately in the two following figures. 
By paying closer attention to all the areas with municipal activities in the following sub-chap-
ters, the second issue will also be addressed. However, figure 16 first provides an overview of 
the inflation-adjusted financial changes on the income side of local government in the Neth-
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Figure 16: Total income of all Dutch municipalities combined in the different policy areas in million euro (adjusted for inflation, 
consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues and expenses by region 
and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
As already mentioned before, transfers from central government account for the largest 
source of local government’s income. Together with most types of local taxes and local fees, 
the transfers are predominantly recorded in the category of financing and means for universal 
coverage, which is illustrated by the relevance of this category in terms of the scope of reve-
nues. Also, in the policy areas of social services, spatial planning and housing, and public health 
and environment, the Dutch municipalities generated some notable financial inflows, even 
though the expenses outweigh the income in recent years, which was not always the case for 
spatial planning and housing in particular. In the other policy areas, including, for example, 
public order and safety, hardly any income was attained, which is not unusual considering the 
nature of the related tasks. In terms of recent financial changes, the lower revenues in spatial 
planning and housing after 2008 are most notable. Furthermore, in the policy area of educa-
tion, the revenues decreased significantly already during the first half of the period under in-
vestigation. Some fluctuations can be further observed regarding the income in relation to 
financing and means for universal coverage and social services, next to the one-time exception 
in revenues in the context of economic affairs in 2009, as already mentioned before. 
Following these more detailed insights into local revenues, the developments of inflation-ad-
justed local expenditure of all Dutch municipalities combined in the different policy areas be-
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Figure 17: Total expenses of all Dutch municipalities combined in the different policy areas in million euro (adjusted for infla-
tion, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues and expenses by 
region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
On the expenditure side of municipal balance sheets, social services accounted for the highest 
costs during the whole time period under investigation. Comparable to the income side, some 
fluctuations with an overall increasing tendency can also be observed for the expenses in this 
policy area. Also, the aforementioned declines in revenues in spatial planning and housing as 
well as in education are reflected by declining expenditures. While the expenses in the cate-
gory of financing and means for universal coverage – in other words, the costs for administer-
ing the transfers from central government and for raising most types of local taxes and local 
fees – declined since 2005; the year 2009, however, marks a notable exception. Moreover, 
the expenses within the remaining policy areas were predominantly characterised by minor 
but continuous increases between 2004 and 2014. 
Following these insights into developments in local government finances in the Netherlands 
at the level of policy areas, the sub-chapter hereinafter addresses the balance sheet items 
within the policy areas in detail. In line with the distinction of policy areas, the sub-chapters 
are structured accordingly: general administration (10.2.1), public order and safety (10.2.2), 
traffic, transport and water management (10.2.3), economic affairs (10.2.4), education 
(10.2.5), culture and recreation (10.2.6), social services (10.2.7), public health and environ-
ment (10.2.8), spatial planning and housing (10.2.9), and financing and means for universal 
coverage (10.2.10). The chapter closes with a summary highlighting the most relevant financial 
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10.2.1. General administration 
General administration is the first policy area analysed in detail. The changes in the inflation-
adjusted net balance of each individual item within this policy area between 2004 and 2014 
for all Dutch municipalities combined are illustrated in figure 18. Again, positive values indi-
cate areas of net revenues, and negative values denote those with net expenses. 
 
Figure 18: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of general administration in million euro 
(adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues 
and expenses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
In the policy area of general administration, it can be observed that public affairs secretary 
fees provided a fairly stable net income of about 200 million euro between 2004 and 2014. On 
the expenditure side, net spending overall increased, particularly for citizen affairs. The net 
expenses for the administrative support of the executive board, involving parts of the civil ser-
vice, the city manager, and other services mainly in relation to the preparation of the munici-
pal budget and the realisation of the financial planning172 – as the most relevant type of ex-
penditure in this category – were subject to some volatility, with an overall decreasing ten-
dency. However, the highest expenses for this balance sheet item took place during the years 
of the climax of the recent Financial Crisis, which possibly implied a more extensive need for 
administrative support in times of political decision-making, apart from previous routines also 
at the local level. The financial developments in the policy area of public order and safety will 
be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
                                                     
172 All the information and definitions of policy areas and separate balance sheet items within the policy areas, 
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10.2.2. Public order and safety 
While maintaining public order and safety is an important task of Dutch municipalities, the 
relevance of this policy area in terms of overall revenues and expenses can be considered as 
comparably low. An overview of the inflation-adjusted developments of the individual balance 
sheet items in this category between 2004 and 2014 is presented in figure 19, where the neg-
ative values indicate net expenses.173 
 
Figure 19: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of public order and safety in million euro 
(adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues 
and expenses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
According to figure 19, fire brigades and disaster relief characterise the highest net expenses 
in this category. While these costs increased significantly from 2004 to 2010, they decreased 
in the following years. The Dutch municipalities’ general costs for public order and safety, on 
the other hand, rose relatively constantly during the complete time period under investiga-
tion. However, a contextual connection between this policy area and the recent Financial Cri-
sis is not evident. The financial changes in the policy area of traffic, transport and water man-
agement will be analysed in the following sub-chapter. 
 
                                                     
173 As a result of changes in the delimitation of balance sheet items for statistical purposes, data are not availa-
ble for all items for the entire period 2004–2014. The same applies to a small number of balance sheet items in 
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10.2.3. Traffic, transport, and water management 
The policy area of traffic, transport and water management consists of several individual 
items. Figure 20 displays the inflation-adjusted net balances for all of these items and the 
changes between 2004 and 2014. While positive values indicate areas of net revenues, nega-
tive values point to areas of net expenses. 
 
Figure 20: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of traffic, transport and water management 
in million euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal ac-
counts (revenues and expenses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calcu-
lations) 
As figure 20 illustrates, parking fees are the main source of revenues in this policy area. While 
this type of income increased constantly in more recent years, so did expenses for parking. 
With a net expenditure of about 2.3 billion euro in 2014, the most relevant type of net ex-
penses in this policy area are for roads, streets and squares. It needs to be noted that the 
spending for these types of public infrastructure increased between 2005 and 2010, followed 
by decreases in more recent years. However, considering the start of the rise, there are no 
indications of anti-cyclical investments in infrastructure as are often suggested in times of cri-
ses. The same applies to the other infrastructure-related balance sheet items. In the next sub-
chapter, the policy area of economic affairs will be addressed. 
 
10.2.4. Economic affairs 
The policy area of economic affairs also includes a number of separate balance sheet items. 
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2014 are depicted in figure 21. Areas of net revenues are again presented on the positive 
range of the scale and areas with net expenses on the negative range. 
 
Figure 21: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of economic affairs in million euro (adjusted 
for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues and ex-
penses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
As figure 21 illustrates, the main net revenues in this policy area are collected with public util-
ities, which includes services in the domain of electricity, gas, drinking water, heat, and com-
munication, which are provided by companies that are at least partly owned by municipalities. 
An income peak in 2009 is most notable. It can be explained by the sales of Essent and Nuon, 
two energy companies, whose shares were hold by almost half of all Dutch municipalities, 
bringing along one-time gains in the year of the disposition (Centraal Planbureau, 2016; Min-
isterie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 41; van der Lei, 2015, p. 175).174 
Already in the years before 2009, the net income in public utilities increased, while a slightly 
decreasing tendency can be observed afterwards. Most net expenses occurred in trade and 
craft175, consisting of measures focusing on local business development and promotion, in-
cluding activities such as local markets and fairs, as well as, to a minor extent, subsidies. The 
costs of this balance sheet item as a whole almost doubled between 2004 and 2014, also when 
taking the changes in statistical accounting into account. However, considering the timeframe 
of the recent Financial Crisis, the development of the trade and craft balance sheet item did 
not change noticeably. Following these insights into economic affairs at the Dutch local level, 
the next sub-chapter addresses the policy area of education. 
 
                                                     
174 See also chapter 9.2.2. 






















In the policy area of education, various tasks at the local level can be distinguished in the 
Netherlands. Different levels of education, in combination with the associated financial flows 
for educational services and housing, can be differentiated on closer inspection. An overview 
of the inflation-adjusted net balances for all separate items between 2004 and 2014 is pro-
vided in figure 22. Areas of net expenses are indicated by negative values and areas of net 
revenues by positive values. 
 
Figure 22: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of education in million euro (adjusted for 
inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues and expenses 
by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
First, it can be seen that within the policy area of education, expenses largely prevail at the 
local level. The highest annual expenses between 2004 and 2014 were recorded in the general 
category of common revenues and expenses of education. In 2014, the net expenditures for 
this balance sheet item amounted to approximately 750 million euro. In comparison with pre-
vious years, an increasing tendency, with particularly high costs in 2010, can be observed. The 
same tendency applies to most other balance sheet items within this policy area, especially 
those with the already highest financial scopes, until the most recent years. Considering the 
costs for the different types of education and associated housing, it can be observed that 
housing usually comprises the higher proportions of costs. In the case of adult education, it 
could also be argued that the demand for these services might increase in times of economic 
troubles, when unemployment rates generally increase and those concerned might try to en-
hance their chances of finding a job by extending their professional qualifications. However, 
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Crisis. On the contrary, expenses for adult education slightly decreased in recent years. In the 
next sub-chapter, the policy area of culture and recreation is addressed. 
 
10.2.6. Culture and recreation 
The policy area of culture and recreation is also characterised by net expenses at the local 
level in the Netherlands. Figure 23 provides an overview of the inflation-adjusted expendi-
tures in different areas of activity, pictured as negative values, and the developments between 
2004 and 2014. 
 
Figure 23: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of culture and recreation in million euro 
(adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues 
and expenses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
According to the data in figure 23, public green and outdoor recreation, sport, and art are the 
three activities with the highest expenses for Dutch municipalities within the policy area cul-
ture and recreation in recent years. While the overall costs for all of these balance sheet items 
increased from 2004 to 2014, the expenses related to public green and outdoor recreation 
were characterised by a declining development since 2010. Considering the other sub-fields, 
the expenses were mostly relatively stable or slightly declining in their tendencies during the 
time of investigation. Since culture and recreation is a typical area that includes many volun-
tary tasks at the local level, it is often mentioned in the context of searches for policy areas 
where cost cuts can be realised in times of tight budgets. However, far-reaching austerity 
measures during the recent Financial Crisis cannot be observed in this field with municipal 
activities in the case of the Netherlands. The policy area of social services will be examined in 
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10.2.7. Social services 
As the largest share on the expenditure side, social services account for roughly one third of 
all municipal expenses in the Netherlands. An overview of the inflation-adjusted net balances 
of all separate balance sheet items within this policy area and the developments between 
2004 and 2014 is provided in figure 24. Negative values illustrate areas of net expenses, and 
positive values denote those with net revenues. 
 
Figure 24: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of social services in million euro (adjusted 
for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues and ex-
penses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Following figure 24, social support and advice is the type of social service with the highest net 
expenses at the Dutch local level in 2014; the costs increased significantly between 2005 and 
2014. In the years before 2014, the highest costs for a specific type of social service by far took 
place in the field of home care. However, local-level expenditures to provide this service de-
creased significantly since 2010, after a previous rise. The item assistance and income provi-
sions was also characterised by rather unstable developments; however, an overall cost in-
crease can be observed during the time period under investigation. A relatively constant 
growth of expenditures, on the other hand, can be observed for the balance sheet item mu-
nicipal minimum policy, mainly entailing the possibilities for local authorities to abate local 
taxes and fees as well as to offer discounts on cultural activities for comparably poor citizens. 
However, in total, the local expenses for social services increased in the Netherlands, particu-
larly between 2006 and 2010, as already illustrated in figure 15 and figure 17. Considering the 
different types of services, it must be taken into account that some citizens might benefit from 
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financial crisis on social services for the disabled and the elderly is not plausible from a con-
tent-related perspective, those types of services provided to the unemployed in particular 
might increase in demand in times of economic troubles. However, in the case of the Nether-
lands, a continuation or further rise of existing tendencies can be observed rather than major 
changes in the relevant time period. In addition, various reforms in social affairs, also including 
changes in responsibilities between the different levels of government, need to be taken into 
account when assessing the financial developments in recent years in the Netherlands. The 
financial changes in the policy area of public health and environment will be analysed in the 
following sub-chapter. 
 
10.2.8. Public health and environment 
Public health and environment is the policy area with the third highest expenditures at the 
local level in the Netherlands in recent years. An overview of the associated balance sheet 
items and the inflation-adjusted financial changes between 2004 and 2014 is illustrated in 
figure 25. Again, positive values represent areas of net revenues, while negative values indi-
cate those with net expenses. 
 
Figure 25: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of public health and environment in million 
euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (reve-
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As figure 25 illustrates, the policy area of public health and environment is comprised of bal-
ance sheet items with net revenues as well as those with net expenses. However, some of the 
items are directly linked. The income from cleaning fees and waste disposal is the counterpart 
to the costs for waste disposal and processing. The same applies to sewage charges (com-
bined) and sewerage (combined): the income and expenses increased significantly and rela-
tively continuously in this field between 2004 and 2014. The expenses in other areas, such as 
environmental management, can be considered as relatively stable over the last decade. How-
ever, the different balance sheet items in this policy area have in common that a direct impact 
of a financial crisis on the associated financial flows is not obvious from a content-related per-
spective. This is different for the policy area of spatial planning and housing, which will be 
addressed in the following sub-chapter. 
 
10.2.9. Spatial planning and housing 
Albeit with some distance, spatial planning and housing is the policy area with the second 
highest expenses at the local level in the Netherlands in recent years. More details on the 
separate balance sheet items within this field and inflation-adjusted financial changes be-
tween 2004 and 2014 are provided in figure 26. Areas of net revenues are shown on the pos-
itive range of the scale and areas of net expenses on the negative range. 
 
Figure 26: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of spatial planning and housing in million 
euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (reve-
nues and expenses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
As the data in figure 26 illustrate, the policy area of spatial planning and housing consisted of 



















period under investigation. Changes from revenue items to expenditure items can also be ob-
served. Land development includes all local activities related to the acquisition and exploita-
tion of land, such as site and infrastructure preparations, in order to sell the areas to individ-
uals or companies, and it is traditionally an area in which municipalities earn money. Apart 
from some uneven developments, the municipal income in this area of activity increased be-
tween 2004 and 2008. Also, the issuance of building permits, as an administrative service pro-
vided by the municipalities in the Netherlands, mainly including inspection and regulation 
tasks, is traditionally a source of revenues. Between 2004 and 2008, the municipal net income 
in this area increased fairly constantly. In 2008, Dutch municipalities earned approximately 
600 million euro in revenues from land development and about a further 600 million euro in 
revenues from building permits. In other words, each Dutch municipality gained more than 
1.5 million euro in both of these two areas of activity on average. 
The financial developments of both balance sheet items changed considerably from 2009 on-
wards. In the case of building permits, the downturn was comparably moderate and continu-
ous. The revenues in this areas still amounted to about 325 million euro in 2014. In the case 
of land development, the balance sheet item changed from net income to net expenses from 
2009 onwards. With expenditures of roughly 1.0 billion euro, the highest losses were achieved 
in 2012, followed by significant cost reductions in later years. However, the range between 
the net revenues from land development in 2008 and the net expenses in 2012 amounted to 
approximately 1.6 billion euro. In other words, based solely on this area of activity, the finan-
cial situation of Dutch municipalities deteriorated by about 4 million euro on average during 
the aforementioned time period. In addition, housing exploitation and construction, which in-
volve tasks in the context of the development of public housing, changed from a field with 
municipal net revenues to one with net expenses from 2009 onwards. It must be taken into 
account, however, that the financial scope of the related activities, especially in comparison 
with land development, is traditionally relatively low. Furthermore, a direct link between a 
financial crisis and changes in the municipalities’ choices in relation to investments in social 
housing is not necessarily given. 
Other public housing, which involves activities such as rent allowances and fire prevention, as 
the main type of net expenditure in this policy area in most years during the time period under 
investigation, increased overall between 2004 and 2014. The net expenses for spatial plan-
ning, as a preliminary step for some of the other activities in this category, as well as urban 
and village renewal, as a municipal planning and preparation task, on the other hand, were 
relatively stable over time. In the case of the former, it needs to be taken into account that 
large shares of the administrative costs in the policy area of spatial planning and housing are 
mostly fixed in the short run, while slumps in demand for the related services might also occur 
rapidly. 
Overall, the consequences of the recent Financial Crisis at the Dutch local level become most 
evident in the municipal activities of land development and to some extent also building per-
mits. This is because of both public budgets and the logic that companies or private house-
holds do not usually choose to invest in business locations or to start building a home in times 




as demand shocks. As the last remaining category on municipal balance sheets, financing and 
means for universal coverage will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
10.2.10. Financing and means for universal coverage 
While financing and means for universal coverage is not exactly a policy area with municipal 
competences, but a category of municipal income and expenses for accounting purposes, 
transfers from central government and hence most revenues of the local level are booked 
within this category. An overview of the separate inflation-adjusted balance sheet items and 
the developments between 2004 and 2014 is presented in figure 27. Also in this figure, posi-
tive values indicate areas of net revenues, while negative values illustrate those with net ex-
penses. 
 
Figure 27: Budget balance of all Dutch municipalities combined in the policy area of financing and means for universal cover-
age in million euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal 
accounts (revenues and expenses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own 
calculations) 
As figure 27 illustrates, general payment from the municipal fund is of major importance on 
the income side for Dutch municipalities. Payments within this sub-category increased signif-
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after adjusting for inflation. In 2014, about 16.3 billion euro were transferred to all Dutch mu-
nicipalities combined via this funding mechanism, which equals more than 40 million euro per 
municipality on average. In direct comparison, the revenues from local taxes, which are mostly 
also accounted for within this category, were relatively low. However, municipal own income 
will be addressed separately in chapter 10.3 based on a more detailed dataset. Prior to that, 
the last sub-chapter of this chapter summarises the most relevant financial changes at the 
Dutch local level, with a focus on the recent Financial Crisis. 
 
10.2.11. Identified changes in municipal finances in times of the Finan-
cial Crisis since 2007 
While many items on municipal balance sheets in the Netherlands have been subject to 
changes in recent years, the Financial Crisis since 2007 does not offer an explanation in all 
cases. Higher expenditure for certain social services, for example, are partially caused by legal 
changes and modifications in the distribution of responsibilities between the different levels 
of government, as the latest major decentralisation reforms, which entered into force in 2015, 
illustrate. However, in some policy areas or in the case of certain tasks and related balance 
sheet items within a policy area, an impact of the recent Financial Crisis or the effects of re-
sponses and countermeasures by local authorities can be causally explained and empirically 
recognised. 
As demonstrated in chapter 8.1.2., the recent Financial Crisis implied an increase in unemploy-
ment in the Western world. In countries with social security provisions, such as the Nether-
lands, the corresponding costs for these services consequently rose. While some programmes 
are directly linked to unemployment, with a focus on assisting people to find jobs, others are 
linked indirectly. If parents, for example, lose their jobs, then this might imply that their chil-
dren also qualify for certain types of social support. Therefore, the policy area of social services 
provided by local government will be addressed in the following analyses as a whole.176 
In addition, some balance sheet items within certain policy areas were likely affected by the 
recent Financial Crisis, as already pointed out in the previous sub-chapters. In the case of ad-
ministrative support of the executive board, as part of the general administration policy area, 
the high complexity and time pressure of policymaking in times of crises provides an explana-
tion for higher expenditures. Not only central government and the ministerial administration 
but also the executive boards at the local level faced an increased workload. Therefore, the 
costs for the support of local officials, particularly provided by parts of the civil service and the 
city manager, and hence policymaking in general became more expensive. Against this back-
ground, the balance sheet item administrative support of the executive board will also be in-
cluded in the following analyses. 
                                                     
176 Since the latest data included in the analyses in this policy area refer to the year 2011, potential effects of 




Within the policy area of spatial planning and housing, revenues collected through the issu-
ance of building permits, as a municipal administrative task, also declined during the Financial 
Crisis in the Netherlands. This development can be explained by a decreasing demand for con-
struction sites, since times of economic uncertainties are usually not chosen as periods in 
which to make new investments. Accordingly, the balance sheet items will be included in the 
following analyses. 
As pointed out in previous studies (Overmans, 2017, p. 173; Weske et al., 2014, p. 411; Bos, 
2013, p. 46 f.; Allers, 2009, p. 283; Centraal Planbureau, 2016; Kattenberg et al., 2016; 
Deloitte, 2010; Deloitte, 2011; Deloitte, 2012; Deloitte, 2013; Deloitte, 2014; Deloitte, 2016; 
Deloitte, 2017; Ernst & Young, 2015), the income of Dutch municipalities from land develop-
ment and sale decreased significantly during the Financial Crisis since 2007. According to the 
literature, the main impact of the Crisis at the Dutch local level can be observed in the case of 
this balance sheet item. Considering an economic downturn, as the GDP growth rates in chap-
ter 8.1.2 illustrate in the context of the recent Financial Crisis, most private companies are not 
concerned with further expanding their business operations. On the contrary, many corpora-
tions are pleased if they are able to keep their activities stable. As a consequence, the reve-
nues from municipal land development declined similar to the other balance sheet items 
within the policy area of spatial planning and housing. Therefore, the financial developments 
in relation to land development will be further analysed as well. 
During the recent Financial Crisis and the corresponding austerity measures by the Dutch cen-
tral government, various initiatives to reduce the transfers to local government were dis-
cussed, as already pointed out in chapter 9.1.3 in particular. To assess the actual scope of 
these measures for individual municipalities, the balance sheet item general payments from 
the municipal fund, within the category of financing and means for universal coverage, will 
also be included in the further analyses. However, since the distribution of payments to the 
municipalities in the Netherlands is based on a number of given factors, as described in chap-
ter 7.4.1.1, no regression analysis of factors of influence will be performed in the case of this 
balance sheet item. 
Representing the overall financial result of municipal actions and reactions or revenues and 
expenses, short-term debt and long-term debt will also be included in the empirical part. Taken 
together, the following policy area, balance sheet items, and financial results177 will be ana-
lysed more closely in part 4 of this study. 
Policy area: 
 Social services 
Balance sheet items: 
 Administrative support of the executive board within the policy area of general admin-
istration 
 Building permits within the policy area of spatial planning and housing 
                                                     




 Land development within the policy area of spatial planning and housing 
 General payment from the municipal fund within the category of financing and means 
for universal coverage 
Financial results: 
 Short-term debt 
 Long-term debt 
However, before focusing on variation in the impact of and responses to the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 at the Dutch local level in part 4, the following sub-chapter addresses financial 
changes in municipal own income. While the data originate from a different data set, they 
partly overlap with the financial changes in the separate balance sheet items, in line with the 
policy areas with municipal competences presented in this sub-chapter. This enables a com-
parison and control of some of the previously discussed figures. 
 
10.3. Developments of the different types of municipal own income in 
recent years 
Alongside data on changes in municipal revenues and expenses, or net results, detailed statis-
tics, compiled by the Central Agency for Statistics, are also available specifically for the finan-
cial developments of the Dutch local level’s own income since 2004 (Dataset: Municipal ac-
counts (charges by region and by size)). Apart from general grants and specific grants, both of 
which describe transfers from central government, the municipalities are entitled to generate 
certain types of own revenues, which can be subdivided into local taxes and other own re-
sources in the form of fees. Building upon the previous sub-chapter, this sub-chapter will again 
evaluate aggregated values for all Dutch municipalities combined in order to assess overall 
patterns, before focusing on variation between the municipalities at a later stage. Since the 
next analyses address financial developments over time, all data are adjusted to the Dutch 
consumer price level of the year 2007.178 
The inflation-adjusted developments of the own income of all Dutch municipalities, as well as 
the corresponding subdivision into local taxes and local fees, between 2004 and 2015179 are 
illustrated as positive values in figure 28. 
                                                     
178 See appendix 5 for an overview of the own income of all Dutch municipalities combined in nominal terms, 
not adjusted for inflation. 





Figure 28: Total own income of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level 
of the year 2007), 2004–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (charges by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of 
the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Reflecting on the total own income of Dutch municipalities, a continuous increase can be ob-
served from 2006 onwards. While amounting to approximately 7 billion euro in 2006, close to 
8 billion euro were earned in 2015. Higher revenues from local taxation are the main explana-
tion for the increase in the municipalities’ own income in total. Between 2006 and 2015, the 
sum that Dutch municipalities earned by taxing their citizens increased from about 3.5 billion 
euro to roughly 4.25 billion euro. The earnings from municipal fees, on the other hand, slightly 
decreased since 2008 after adjusting for inflation. In 2015, the income from this source 
amounted to about 3.5 billion euro. 
Considering the Financial Crisis since 2007, with an impact on the Netherlands since 2008 at 
the latest, as discussed in chapter 9, a noticeable structural impact on the total own income 
of all Dutch municipalities, local taxes, or local fees cannot be observed during the time period 
under investigation. Previous financial trends concerning these shares of municipal revenues 
mostly continued rather unimpaired. However, while an overall effect cannot be observed, 
this does not exclude the possibilities that some balance sheet items within these categories 
or individual municipalities experienced different developments. 
In line with the common distinction between types of own income of Dutch municipalities, 
the two following sub-chapters will address local taxes (10.3.1) and local fees (10.3.2) more 
closely. A summary of noticeable financial developments will be provided in a final sub-chap-
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10.3.1. Local taxes 
More detailed insights into the developments of local taxes in the Netherlands will be pro-
vided next. Figure 29 illustrates the inflation-adjusted income from local taxes in total, as well 
as the revenues from the different types of property taxes on the immovable property of all 
Dutch municipalities combined, between 2004 and 2015 as positive values. Since the extent 
of financial resources collected via the other types of local taxes is comparably smaller, those 
are separately illustrated in figure 30 to guarantee sufficient visibility of the graphs. 
 
Figure 29: Total income from local taxes and income from different types of property taxes on immovable property of all Dutch 
municipalities combined in million euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2015 (Data 
sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (charges by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; 
own calculations) 
First, it can be observed that property taxes on immovable property amounted to about three 
quarters of all local taxes in the Netherlands during the whole period of time under investiga-
tion. On closer inspection, property taxes on immovable property can be further subdivided 
into a tax for users and one for owners. The tax income from property taxes on immovable 
property for owners increased relatively continuously between 2004 and 2015. Adjusted for 
inflation, the total earnings from these types of municipal revenues rose from about 2 billion 
euro to approximately 2.5 billion euro during the aforementioned time period. After a major 
decrease between 2005 and 2006, as a result of legal changes,180 property taxes on immovable 
property for users also increased relatively continuously, from roughly 500 million euro in 2006 
to about 625 million euro in 2015. Overall, a structural impact of the recent Financial Crisis, 
                                                     
180 While the property tax on immovable property for users covered users of dwellings and non-dwellings until 
2005, the taxation of the former was abolished. However, the municipalities received additional financial re-
sources from the municipal fund as compensation (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2006; van der Woude, 
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usually expressed by a deviation from previous financial trends, cannot be observed in case of 
the illustrated types of local taxes. Considering home ownership as the object of taxation, this 
circumstance can be understood (Allers, 2009, p. 288). 
As pointed out before, property taxes on immovable property amount to roughly three quar-
ters of local taxes in the Netherlands. The composition of the remaining quarter and the infla-
tion-adjusted financial developments between 2004 and 2015 are illustrated in figure 30. 
Again, areas of revenue are pictured on the positive range of the scale. 
 
Figure 30: Income from different types of local taxes of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro (adjusted for inflation, 
consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (charges by region and by size); 
CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Within this group of eight types of local taxes in the Netherlands, apart from the property 
taxes on immovable property, parking fees have by far the largest share in the whole period 
under investigation. This type of local tax also increased relatively continuously from about 
370 million euro in 2004 to approximately 590 million euro in 2015. Revenues from tourist 
taxes also rose extensively during this period of time. Starting with roughly 110 million euro 
in 2004, all Dutch municipalities combined earned about 180 million euro in 2015. Public space 
usage fees followed a relatively similar development, and the increase mainly occurred in 
more recent years. The revenues from dog taxes, on the other hand, remained relatively un-
changed, amounting to about 55 million euro during the whole period under investigation. 
However, a slightly increasing tendency can be observed for this type of local tax as well. 
Commuter charges, advertising taxes, benefit charges, and property tax on movable housing 
or business space, as the four remaining types of Dutch local taxes, each amounted to less 
than 30 million euro annually in more recent years; this corresponds to less than 75,000 euro 
per municipality on average. In comparison with the other types of local taxes, particularly the 
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considering the total amount of local tax revenues as well as the total local revenues. How-
ever, the income from commuter charges, advertising taxes, benefit charges, and property tax 
on movable housing or business space remained relatively stable in more recent years consid-
ering the amount all Dutch municipalities earned in total. 
Reflecting on the recent Financial Crisis as an event with a potential impact on municipal rev-
enues and expenditures a significant impact on the eight additional types of local taxes in the 
Netherlands, other than property taxes on immovable property, cannot be observed. Solely 
the revenues from tourist taxes slightly decreased from about 134 million euro in 2008 to 
approximately 117 million euro in 2009. This decline of 17 million euro can be explained by 
the decisions of individuals affected by the Financial Crisis, or those expecting to be affected 
by the Crisis in the near future, to waive their holidays in the Netherlands. In this context, the 
socio-economic developments in the home countries of the potential tourists must be taken 
into account as well. However, even though the noticeable impact of the Financial Crisis since 
2007 on the revenues from tourist taxes was relatively small in scope and temporarily re-
stricted, it will still be further analysed at a late stage of this study. 
In summary, according to the data published by the CBS, the revenues from the different types 
of local taxes were either relatively stable or followed existing financial trends during the years 
of the recent Financial Crisis in the Netherlands. A minor impact of the Crisis on tourist taxes, 
which was relatively limited in terms of its extent and its duration, is the notable exception. 
The financial developments of local fees will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
10.3.2. Local fees 
Next to local taxes, local fees generate the second share of municipal own income in the Neth-
erlands. The inflation-adjusted financial developments of the revenues from the different 
types of local fees of all municipalities combined between 2004 and 2015 are pictured as pos-





Figure 31: Income from different types of fees of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro (adjusted for inflation, 
consumer price level of the year 2007), 2004–2015 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (charges by region and by size); 
CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Comparing the six types of local fees, it can be observed that the highest annual revenues at 
the Dutch local level were generated from cleaning fees and waste disposal in the last decade. 
However, over the time period 2004 to 2015, an overall decrease of revenues from this type 
of fee can be noticed after adjusting for inflation. All Dutch municipalities combined collected 
about 1.6 billion euro in the area of cleaning fees and waste disposal in 2004 and roughly 1.5 
billion euro in 2015. Increases in earlier years of this period in time were followed by declines 
in later years. 
Sewage charges181 rank second in terms of revenues collected by the Dutch local level via fees 
in recent years. This type of fee is characterised by the strongest rise in direct comparison to 
the other fees, which took place continuously between 2004 and 2015. While approximately 
890 million euro were collected in sewage charges in 2004, the amount increased to about 1.3 
billion euro in 2015. 
Building permits comprise the type of municipal fees that have developed most unstably over 
the last decade. Starting with total revenues of about 350 million euro in 2004, an increase to 
590 million euro occurred in 2008. From 2008 to 2009, a significant decrease to 400 million 
euro followed. This tendency continued until 2013, when a value just below 300 million euro 
was reached. The two subsequent years were again characterised by minor increases, result-
ing in revenues from building permits of about 360 million euro in 2015. In the case of building 
permits, it also needs to be taken into account that the fees for a dwelling of a certain financial 
scope vary widely across the local level in the Netherlands (Bos, 2013, p. 44 f.). 
                                                     
181 The two sub-types – sewage charges domestic/industrial and sewage charges groundwater and rainwater – 
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Public affairs secretary fees experienced increases in the early years of the time period under 
investigation, followed by a more stable development thereafter. Starting with about 210 mil-
lion euro in 2004, approximately 270 million euro were earned by all Dutch municipalities 
combined in 2015. With annual revenues of roughly 100 million euro and 30 million euro, 
Dutch municipalities’ collective income from cemetery fees and market fees respectively was 
also fairly stable in more recent years. 
Considering the overall developments of the recent Financial Crisis, the decreasing revenues 
from building permits in the Netherlands after 2008 correspond to the course of the Crisis 
from a temporal perspective. Following the logic that economic troubles and times of uncer-
tainty imply lower investments in construction projects by private companies and households, 
the decreasing revenues can be explained, as already argued in the previous sub-chapter. On 
closer inspection, Dutch municipalities earned about 200 million euro less from building per-
mits annually in the following years in comparison with 2008. Expressed per municipality, this 
corresponds to annual lower revenues of about 500,000 euro on average. However, on the 
other hand, it needs to be noted that the revenues from building permits since 2009 are com-
parable to those between 2004 and 2005. 
Taken together, the revenues from local fees in the Netherlands have developed rather dif-
ferently in recent years, according to the data provided by the CBS. The most abrupt change 
can be observed in the case of income from building permits after 2008. A more detailed sum-
mary of the financial changes in municipal own income in the years since the beginning of the 
recent Financial Crisis will be provided in the next sub-chapter, building upon previous in-
sights. 
 
10.3.3. Identified changes in municipal own income in times of the Fi-
nancial Crisis since 2007 
Considering local taxes and local fees in the Netherlands in recent years, the most notable 
changes can be observed regarding building permits and tourist taxes. Both types of municipal 
own income decreased at an aggregated level since the beginning of the Financial Crisis, and 
the link between these developments and the Crisis can be explained in terms of the underly-
ing causal mechanisms. That times of economic uncertainty are not the most common periods 
for investments in real estate or holidays is understandable. On closer inspection, the financial 
impact on municipal budgets as a result of lower revenues from building permits appears to 
be larger in direct comparison with tourist taxes. 
Overall, the observations based on the dataset regarding municipal budgets in chapter 10.2 
can also be identified in the dataset regarding municipal accounts in chapter 10.3, for those 
parts where the same policy areas and balance sheet items or the corresponding types of mu-
nicipal own income are addressed within the datasets. Based on the insights from this chapter, 
tourist taxes, as part of the category of financing and means for universal coverage, are added 




of this study, including analyses on the variation across the Dutch municipal level. However, 
before doing so, the mayors’ perceptions of various aspects of the recent Financial Crisis 
within their municipalities will be addressed in the next chapter of this study based on three 





11. Dutch mayors’ perceptions of the impact of the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 at the local level of government in the Netherlands and the 
countermeasures taken 
Official statistics are usually the most reliable data source in terms of government finance. 
However, the subjective impression of a financial situation can differ from official statements 
for various reasons. As a result of news reports on serious financial problems in many major 
economies around the globe, for example, local officials might also perceive the financial sit-
uation of their municipality as worse than the real budgetary position suggests. Another ex-
ample concerns the belief in a high likelihood of being affected by a crisis in the future, which 
might prevail in local officials’ financial considerations. Both aspects have in common that they 
might lead to budgetary decisions based on assumptions which do not reflect reality. 
To assess the perception of the Financial Crisis since 2007 at the Dutch municipal level and 
possible deviations from official financial data, three own consecutive surveys were conducted 
with local officials, particularly mayors, between 2013 and 2015. The focus on mayors is mo-
tivated by their central role in Dutch local politics and far-reaching competences, especially in 
relation to the implementation of municipal policies and some exclusive powers. Answers to 
questions, for example, regarding changes in certain types of revenues and expenditures in 
the municipalities also enable a comparison between the perceptions and official data. Build-
ing upon these insights, it might be possible to explain some less obvious crisis reactions. 
The results of the municipal surveys in the form of quantitative data, as well as qualitative 
statements, are presented in this chapter. In the first sub-chapter, the Financial Crisis since 
2007 is addressed in relation to other challenges at the local level in order to assess its per-
ceived relevance from a comparative perspective (11.1). Thereafter, the perceptions of recent 
changes in municipal revenues (11.2) and municipal expenses (11.3) are analysed in detail and 
compared to official governmental statistics. Survey results on municipal cutback manage-
ment strategies are subsequently presented, including insights beyond official statistics on 
municipal budgets (11.4). 
 
11.1. The Financial Crisis in comparison with other challenges at the 
local level of government 
The Financial Crisis since 2007 is certainly not the only challenge that European countries have 
been facing in recent years. While other problems, such as rising unemployment and govern-
ment debt, are typically considered to be closely intertwined with the Crisis and the accom-
panying economic downturn, climate change is an example of a challenge that is usually inter-
preted as interacting with the Financial Crisis only to a very limited extent, in line with the 
argumentation that a lower industrial output leads to a lower emission of greenhouse gases 




In addition, it needs to be taken into account that political challenges vary over time. Immi-
gration, for instance, had a very steep ascent on the political agenda of European countries in 
the summer of 2015, when considerably higher numbers of migrants and refugees started 
coming to the EU compared to previous years. The deprioritising of a certain topic on the po-
litical agenda, on the other hand, can be caused by, for example, either a far-reaching political 
or technical solution, which might be generally possible in the case of some challenges, but 
rare in practice, or a shift of attention towards other problems. In other words, the decline of 
news reports on a certain topic does not necessarily mean that it is no longer an issue. 
In Europe, systematic empirical research on public opinion has been realised by the European 
Commission’s biannual Eurobarometer surveys since 1973. Apart from various questions on 
the perception of European institutions, one question about the two most important issues 
that one’s home country is facing at the moment182 has been included in the surveys since 
2005 (European Commission, 2018). By not mentioning a specific level of government, the 
question assesses the challenges of a country as a whole. The distribution of Dutch citizens’ 
answers183 over time is illustrated in figure 32. 
                                                     
182 Original question: “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the mo-
ment?” (European Commission, 2018, Question QA3a). 
183 The answering options changed slightly over time. In some cases, items were renamed or replaced. To in-





Figure 32: Public opinion on important issues in the Netherlands, percentage shares, 2005–2017 (Data source: European Com-
mission, 2018) 
Following the Eurobarometer surveys, various issues were considered to be relevant to a cer-
tain extent in the Netherlands, according to public opinion in recent years. However, on closer 
inspection, a number of significant shifts regarding the highest ranking topics can be observed. 
The perception of the economic situation as one of the two most important issues increased 
from 22% to 64% between April and October 2008 – in other words, around the time when 
the recent Financial Crisis began to widely affect European countries and their economies. A 
second peak in the perception of the economic situation as being among the most important 
challenges in the Netherlands occurred in May 2012, with 56%, around the time when the 
Eurozone Crisis reached its climax up to now, after a minor previous decline of the issue on 
the public agenda. Following public opinion, the importance of the economic situation de-
creased again after 2014. Similarly, unemployment was perceived to be an important issue in 
the Netherlands, with a peak of 40% in June 2009 and another peak of 51% in May 2013. 
Comparing the courses of the two graphs illustrates the close connection between both issues 
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years, healthcare and social security and immigration were perceived as the two largest public 
issues, according to the Dutch population. 
While Eurobarometer analyses the situation in European countries as a whole, the challenges 
– also in line with the areas of responsibilities – can vary within a country’s administrative 
subdivision. To assess the situation at the local level, similar questions were posed to the 
Dutch mayors in an own survey in late 2015. The overall intention was to assess the perceived 
relevance of the recent Financial Crisis in comparison with other challenges. 
To estimate the expectations of future developments as well as interaction effects, apart from 
the current impact of the Financial Crisis, the original Eurobarometer question was split into 
three separate questions. First, the mayors were asked to rate a number of given issues in 
terms of being current challenges for their municipalities. Instead of the Eurobarometer ap-
proach of naming the two greatest ones, a five-point Likert scale, ranging from “not at all” to 
“very big”, was employed for each item.184 Second, the extent to which the topics are expected 
to be challenges for the municipalities over the next five years was questioned. The listed 
issues and the scale range to choose from were identical to the previous question. Third, the 
participants were asked how all the named challenges were influenced by the Financial Crisis, 
based on their own impressions. In this case, the possible answers ranged from “much 
smaller” to “much bigger”, also on a five-point Likert scale.185 
While a generally wide range of answers can be observed for each of the named challenges, 
the differences between the issues are relatively low. In other words, according to the mayors, 
no single challenge is considered to be by far the most or least relevant. However, immigration 
(very big: 7.4%; rather big: 20.4%), unemployment (very big: 6.5%; rather big: 20.7%), and 
housing (very big: 6.0%; rather big: 34.4%) are among the challenges that were named as most 
relevant. The economic situation (very big: 5.5%; rather big: 24.9%), as well as health and so-
cial security (very big: 4.6%; rather big: 20.8%), can also be considered as relevant, according 
to the survey results. Interestingly, terrorism (not at all: 39.3%; rather small: 44.9%) is not 
considered to be a major issue. In this context, it needs to be taken into account that the 
survey participants include a large number of mayors from smaller cities and villages. Other 
topics that are currently considered to be smaller challenges in direct comparison are govern-
ment debt (not at all: 17.1%; rather small: 31.8%) and taxation (not at all: 12.5%; rather small: 
37.5%). 
The second question asked for the mayors’ expectations regarding the challenges for their 
municipalities over the next five years. On the one hand, comparable to the current chal-
lenges, the economic situation (very big: 5.7%; rather big: 26.9%), unemployment (very big: 
4.7%; rather big: 20.5%), immigration (very big: 4.2%; rather big: 35.8%), and environment, 
climate, and energy (Very big: 4.2%; rather big: 29.1%) are expected to remain challenges in 
the near future. Also, housing (very big: 3.7%; rather big: 35.0%) will continue to be a greater 
challenge, according to the mayors’ projections. Terrorism (not at all: 24.2%; rather small: 
                                                     
184 In comparison with the latest Eurobarometer surveys, the issues of inflation and pensions were excluded in 
all questions, since they are considered to be topics beyond municipal influence. 




40.2%), taxation (not at all: 8.9%; rather small: 29.6%), and government debt (not at all: 8.4%; 
rather small: 25.6%), on the other hand, are expected to be least relevant in comparison with 
the other named issues. Taken together, no major changes can be observed between the chal-
lenges currently perceived by the Dutch mayors and their expectations for the near future. 
The Financial Crisis since 2007 undoubtedly was and partially still is one of the most relevant 
topics in recent years, and it affects municipalities in various ways. Apart from financial as-
pects, the interaction with other challenges is also possible. To gain a better understanding of 
the scope of influence, the mayors were asked about the extent to which the challenges men-
tioned in the previous questions increased or decreased as a result of the recent Financial 
Crisis. As the results of this survey question illustrate, especially government debt (much big-
ger: 11.4%; bigger: 53.6%), unemployment (much bigger: 8.0%; bigger: 71.7%), and the eco-
nomic situation (much bigger: 6.6%; bigger: 71.1%) worsened because of the recent Financial 
Crisis, according to the mayors. Also, housing (much bigger: 4.8%; bigger 35.4%) and immigra-
tion (much bigger: 4.7%; bigger: 24.5%) are perceived to be somewhat more challenging as a 
result of the Crisis. In the case of all the other named issues, the impact of the Crisis was indi-
cated as fairly low in terms of a relatively unchanged situation. A significant reduction in any 
of the challenges resulting from the Financial Crisis cannot be observed according to the data. 
In summary, based on the answers provided by the mayors in an own survey, the Financial 
Crisis since 2007 affected the Dutch municipalities in different areas based on various mecha-
nisms. In line with the nature of the Crisis, a negative influence on government debt, unem-
ployment, and the economic situation can be considered as almost unavoidable; this was also 
confirmed by the perception of the mayors. However, other issues, such as housing and im-
migration, were often mentioned as also being negatively affected by the Crisis. While it must 
be taken into account that the survey data were collected in late 2015, when the recent Fi-
nancial Crisis was already declining in some respects, it is interesting to observe that unem-
ployment and the economic situation were still considered to be among the major local chal-
lenges by that time. Concerning future challenges, the two topics are expected to remain im-
portant, and other issues, particularly immigration, housing, and environment, climate and 
energy, are forecasted to be of major relevance as well. Following these insights into the rel-
evance of the recent Financial Crisis as a challenge at the local level in the Netherlands, the 
next sub-chapter will address changes in municipal revenues. 
 
11.2. Perceptions of changes in municipal revenues 
Municipal revenues in the Netherlands were the focus of the second municipal survey, con-
ducted in spring of 2014. In line with the distinction between transfers from central govern-
ment and both local taxes and local fees, as types of own resources,186 the survey questions 
                                                     
186 With regard to a less formal distinction between the different types of revenues, not all types are grouped in 
line with the schemes used by the CBS. Furthermore, to limit the scope of the survey, not all types of revenues 




addressed changes in municipal revenues in recent years, expected changes in the near future, 
and personal preferences in the area of municipal income.187 
The extent to which the different types of municipal revenues changed between 2008 and 
2013 was polled in the first survey question on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “de-
creased very strongly” to “increased very strongly”. At first glance, the mayors mostly re-
ported decreases in transfers from central government, some additional earnings with local 
taxes and local fees, and somewhat lower revenues from other sources during the time period 
under investigation. On closer inspection, general grants (decreased strongly: 30.0%; de-
creased to some extent: 43.8%) and specific grants (decreased strongly: 22.8%; decreased to 
some extent: 40.5%) were mostly indicated as decreasing in recent years. Especially in the 
case of general grants, more than 80% of the participants indicated a reduction in the transfers 
from central government. 
Regarding local taxes and local fees, it needs to be taken into account that not all different 
types are levied in each municipality. Within the survey, most mayors responded that a tax or 
fee is not applicable in their municipality in the cases of parking fees (67.1%), advertising taxes 
(63.5%), public space usage fees (44.0%), and dog taxes (38.0%). Also, tourist taxes (17.5%) 
are not levied in a considerable number of municipalities.  
While the income from almost all types of local taxes and local fees has slightly increased on 
average in recent years, according to the survey results, this is particularly the case for other 
fees (increased to some extent: 57.5%; unchanged: 33.8%), property taxes on immovable prop-
erty (increased to some extent: 55.7%; unchanged: 19.0%), tourist taxes (increased to some 
extent: 42.5%; unchanged: 31.3%), and sewage charges (increased to some extent: 40.5%; 
unchanged: 27.8%). Also, dog taxes (increased to some extent: 22.8%; unchanged: 34.2%), 
parking fees (increased to some extent: 19.0%; unchanged: 11.4%), public space usage fees 
(increased to some extent: 10.7%; unchanged: 37.3%), and advertising taxes (increased to 
some extent: 5.4%; unchanged: 21.6%) had the tendency towards slightly higher revenues. 
Only in the case of cleaning fees (increased to some extent: 29.5%; unchanged: 23.1%; de-
creased to some extent: 35.9%) did more mayors indicate a minor decrease rather than an 
increase. 
While the transfers from central government as well as local taxes and local fees represent 
the main types of revenues at the local level in the Netherlands, a few other possible sources 
of own income exist. In this category, based on the mayors’ statements, income from invest-
ments (decreased strongly: 22.5%; decreased to some extent: 28.8%; unchanged: 35.0%) and 
income from own land/buildings (decreased strongly: 25%; decreased to some extent: 27.5%; 
unchanged: 26.3%) have decreased on average in most Dutch municipalities in recent years. 
Rates, on the other hand, were not applicable (55.0%) in many municipalities, and if collected, 
they remained mainly unchanged (30.0%). 
The mayors’ expectations regarding financial changes on the revenue side of their municipal-
ities’ budgets in the coming years were also investigated as part of the survey. A seven-point 
                                                     




Likert scale similar to the first survey question was used. In general, it needs to be noted that 
this type of forecast provides insights beyond official statistics. Overall, the Dutch mayors do 
not expect fundamental changes regarding the different types of municipal revenues over the 
next years. Transfers from central government are generally estimated to decrease, while lo-
cal taxes and local fees are expected to slightly increase. On closer inspection, general grants 
(decrease strongly: 21.5%; decrease to some extent: 48.1%) and specific grants (decrease 
strongly: 25.3%; decrease to some extent: 35.4%) are both expected to decrease rather 
strongly in the near future. 
All types of local taxes and local fees, on the other hand, are expected to slightly increase in 
the coming years; it needs to be taken into account that the decisions regarding changes con-
cerning these types of municipal income are made within the municipalities as far as national 
laws allow. However, parking fees (68.4%), advertising taxes (56.6%), public space usage fees 
(40.3%), dog taxes (38.2%), and tourist taxes (16.7%) are expected to be inapplicable to many 
Dutch municipalities in the near future. Since these figure are comparable to the results of the 
previous survey question on recent changes, it can be stated that an additional introduction 
of these taxes or fees does not seem to be widely planned. Considering the scope of the 
awaited financial changes, the mayors expect property taxes on immovable property (increase 
to some extent: 57.7%; unchanged: 26.9%), sewage charges (increase to some extent: 46.2%; 
unchanged: 41.0%), tourist taxes (increase to some extent: 44.9%; unchanged: 34.6%), and 
other fees (increase to some extent: 40.3%; unchanged: 50.6%) to increase in many munici-
palities, though at a relatively low level. Also, for dog taxes (increase to some extent: 18.4%; 
unchanged: 40.8%), parking fees (increase to some extent: 15.8%; unchanged: 14.5%), public 
space usage fees (increase to some extent: 14.3%; unchanged: 37.7%), and advertising taxes 
(increase to some extent: 7.9%; unchanged: 30.3%), a slightly increasing tendency can be ob-
served on average, according to the mayors’ forecasts. In the case of cleaning fees (increase 
to some extent: 36.4%; unchanged: 33.8%; decrease to some extent: 23.4%), on the other 
hand, the expectations regarding financial changes on the municipalities’ income side are 
more balanced. 
In the category of possible further own resources, income from investments (decrease to some 
extent: 29.9%; unchanged: 33.8%) and income from own land/buildings (decrease to some 
extent: 33.3%; unchanged: 35.9%) are expected to decrease on average in the coming years. 
Rates are mostly expected to be inapplicable (52.6%) to most municipalities. If applicable, no 
major changes (Unchanged: 30.8%) are expected in the case of this possible type of municipal 
income. Overall, a continuation of previously perceived developments in municipal financial 
affairs is largely expected by the Dutch mayors. In the cases of income from investments and 
income from own land/buildings, the situation is expected to slightly improve by a mitigation 
of previous decreases. However, increasing revenues from these types of income are still not 
expected on average. 
In addition to the projections of future developments in municipal revenues, the survey also 
included a question on personal preferences in terms of the scope of income from the differ-




cused on “increase” and “decrease”, instead of allowing for more detailed statements. Re-
garding the data collected, they provide insights beyond official statistics and are also in-
tended to offer an impression of local officials’ preferences concerning the diversification of 
revenues at the municipal level in the Netherlands. Overall, the results reveal a mixed picture; 
moreover, many respondents had no preferences regarding changes in certain types of mu-
nicipal revenues in the Netherlands. However, most mayors personally favour higher general 
grants (increase: 84.4%) from central government, whereas in the case of specific grants (in-
crease: 54.7%; decrease: 21.3%; no preference: 24.0%), the opinions are more diverse. This 
circumstance can be best explained by the higher flexibility of the usage of general grants, in 
contrast to specific grants, and hence the general preference for the former as well as debates 
on the replacement of specific grants by general grants. When comparing the mayors’ per-
sonal preferences with their expectations from the previous survey question, the mayors 
largely prefer the opposite of what they are expecting in the category of transfers from central 
government. However, receiving more financial means from other levels of government, or 
third parties in general, can always be considered as more comfortable than generating own 
revenues; however, the far-reaching restrictions of the Dutch Municipalities Act need to be 
taken into account. Thinking of the sometimes expressed calls for more financial independ-
ence of the Dutch local level, this aspiration is also not traceable in the survey data. 
In the case of property taxes on immovable property, as one of the main types of local taxes, 
the mayors’ preferences are also diverse (increase: 38.7%; decrease: 33.3%; no preference: 
28.0%). Regarding the other types of local taxes and local fees, many respondents did not state 
a wish in terms of a future increase or decrease. Notable exceptions are tourist taxes (increase: 
25.7%), where many respondents are in favour of an increase, and both cleaning fees (de-
crease: 45.3%) and sewage charges (decrease: 33.3%), where the preferences for decreases 
were frequently stated. 
Concerning the additional types of possible financial resources, higher income from invest-
ments (increase: 60.0%) and higher income from own land/buildings (increase: 60.0%) are in 
most mayors’ favour. Taking into account that these two types of revenues have largely de-
creased in recent years, those preferences are not unexpected. Furthermore, it also needs to 
be taken into consideration that the aforementioned types of revenues do not imply burdens 
for the citizens, in contrast to local taxes and local fees in particular. In the case of rates, on 
the other hand, not many preferences were stated. 
After collecting data on perceived recent changes, future expectations, and personal prefer-
ences concerning different types of municipal revenues, the following survey question ad-
dressed possibilities to increase revenues. While there was a choice between four answering 
options, developed based on talks with experts in the field of municipal finance, it was also 
possible to further elaborate on these options as well as to state other ideas. In this regard, 
the open part of the question represents a qualitative addition. In the case of the given an-
swering options, it needs to be noted that multiple choices were possible. The question was 
answered by 56 Dutch mayors. About half of the mayors (48.2%) who participated in the sur-
vey see the introduction of additional taxes or fees as an option to increase their municipali-




which are currently not levied in their municipality, such as advertising taxes, public space 
usage fees, and dog taxes. Other answers included the idea of a new resident tax, which could 
be levied in general or for the use of a certain group of public services, according to the survey 
participants. In addition, it was stated that specific fees could be introduced for the use of 
some municipal services; this is not the case at the moment. Some mayors mentioned the idea 
of a municipal income tax, which is similar to a resident tax, but would be based on personal 
income. Regarding the property taxes on immovable property, as one of the most important 
sources of municipal own income, it was also mentioned that alternatives would be preferred. 
Other ideas for new taxes included the taxation of roads, cables, and pipes. Overall, it needs 
to be taken into account that the introduction of new local taxes would require changes in the 
Constitution and/or the Municipalities Act. Along this line of thought, one respondent also 
expressed the wish for more autonomy of Dutch municipalities in terms of generating own 
revenues in general. 
Selling municipal waste, as a relatively new strategy to increase municipal revenues, was the 
second answering possibility given. A relatively large share of the participating mayors (41.1%) 
viewed this strategy as an option to generate additional income for their municipalities. 
Closely related are renewable energy sources, as the third answering option. A similar number 
of participants (39.3%) were in favour of this strategy. In the open part of the question, wind 
turbines and solar panels were mentioned as practical approaches. 
The last answering option was establishing business clusters in a certain sector. While only a 
small number of respondents (10.7%) saw this strategy as an option to increase revenues in 
their municipalities, it should be taken into account that this strategy can be considered as 
being limited to large cities. One participant also pointed out that municipalities could utilise 
additional charges for shops in the centre of a city for investments in industrial areas outside 
the city centres instead. 
Other mentioned ideas to increase municipal own revenues included the sale of land and the 
sale of other public property, which cannot be considered as new strategies. The same applies 
to supporting tourism in order to generate more income from the corresponding type of tax. 
Private-public partnerships and the private co-financing of public projects, as well as increased 
municipal co-operation with various actors, were also mentioned in the context of the ques-
tion; however, they can be considered as strategies to lower public expenses. Another answer, 
which also focuses on the expenditure side and which has already been debated in line with 
management strategies and public sector reforms for decades, is increasing the efficiency of 
the municipal administration. Furthermore, two mayors expressed ideas involving rather far-
reaching changes. One wrote that local taxes and local fees could be abolished completely and 
replaced by additional transfers from central government. The second one mentioned that 
government should become smaller in general in a process of privatisation. 
The last survey question, which was open-ended, addressed the largest obstacles expected in 
the context of increasing municipal revenues in the coming years. In other words, various 
statements by the mayors were collected by following a qualitative approach. Looking at the 
results, the legal situation, referring to the limited autonomy of Dutch municipalities to levy 




answer that was given multiple times refers to the role of central government. On closer in-
spection, a perceived lack of willingness of central government to co-operate with local gov-
ernment in financial affairs and a perceived lack of confidence of central government in local 
government were stated. Closely related, decentralisation measures – or, more generally, ad-
ditional tasks – which are assigned by central government without sufficient financial com-
pensation, were also mentioned as obstacles when aiming to increase municipal revenues. In 
addition, a lack of political willingness to increase own financial resources was also pointed 
out by the mayors with regard to some members of the municipal councils. 
Some other issues were mentioned that address the local level and its citizens more directly, 
and which likely correspond to the reasons that some councilmen disapprove of the increase 
in local taxes and local fees. In particular, the personal opinion that tax burdens are already 
high at the local level in the Netherlands and should hence not be increased, was frequently 
stated by the mayors. Next to the general tax burden for citizens, the high housing costs for 
families, as well as the high taxation of local companies, were highlighted by some mayors. 
More specifically, it was also pointed out that the property tax on immovable property only 
addresses official residents and therefore not all persons making use of municipal services. 
This latter statement is in line with the calls for a replacement of the property tax on immov-
able property, as the main type of municipal own income, by a broader tax that is based either 
on residency independent of property or on income. 
Another group of obstacles mentioned involves the recent Financial Crisis. A number of 
mayors mentioned the stagnating economy and low interest rates, which led to lower tax rev-
enues and lower income from investments. The cutback measures, decided upon by the Dutch 
central government as a reaction to the Crisis, were also criticised in this context, where a lack 
of codetermination and choices of the local level were pointed out.  
Lastly, a few mayors also questioned the intention to increase municipal revenue itself. One 
wrote that “increasing [municipal] income is not an end in itself. It involves dealing efficiently 
and effectively with the available resources and making clear choices” (Own translation). An-
other mayor wrote that one should, “above all, strive for smaller government with fewer tasks, 
so less income is needed” (Own translation). 
In summary, the own survey on municipal revenues provided broad insights into the Dutch 
mayors’ perceptions of the recent financial developments on this side of the balance sheets 
as well as their future expectations and personal preferences. When comparing their state-
ments on recent changes in municipal revenues with official governmental statistics, the 
mayors’ average perception of substantially lower transfers from central government does 
not comply with the data already presented in chapter 10.2. The extensive political discussions 
on austerity measures, including intended cutbacks of the municipal fund in the context of the 
Financial Crisis since 2007, might provide an explanation for these survey results. In contrast, 
regarding local taxes and local fees, as well as other types of local own income, the average 
statements by the mayors largely comply with the official governmental statistics discussed in 
chapters 10.2 and 10.3. While the Dutch mayors largely expect a continuation of previously 
perceived developments in the area of municipal revenues in the near future, they do not 




is most notable for cleaning fees and sewage charges, where most mayors are in favour of a 
decrease, while expecting an increase in revenues from this source. The same applies to in-
come from financial investments and income from own land and buildings. However, in these 
cases, the mayors expect lower revenues in the near future, but would prefer higher ones. 
Reflecting on the survey results, it is also interesting to observe that a certain trade-off exists 
between the Dutch mayors’ wishes for more transfers from central government on the one 
hand and their calls for more local autonomy in financial affairs and the creation of own rev-
enues on the other hand. Following these insights into the mayors’ perceptions, expectations, 
and preferences in the context of municipal revenues, the results of another own survey fo-
cusing on municipal expenses are presented in the next sub-chapter. 
 
11.3. Perceptions of changes in municipal expenses 
The first municipal survey, conducted in the summer of 2013, focused on municipal expenses 
and austerity measures in the Netherlands. The intention was again to gain insights into the 
Dutch mayors’ perceptions, expectations, and preferences to complement official govern-
mental statistics on this second side of municipal balance sheets.188 
The first content-related question asked about the extent to which the budgets changed in 
the different policy areas with municipal competences since 2008. Participants could choose 
from answers on a six-point scale, ranging from “additional investments” and unchanged 
budgets to four degrees of savings. According to the mayors’ statements, the recent financial 
changes on the expenditure side were subject to some variation. Additional investments were 
most often indicated in the policy areas of safety (32.7%), education (29.9%), traffic (26.2%), 
and spatial planning (25.2%). Next to integration (43.0%) and youth (36.4%), safety (33.6%) is 
also among the policy areas in which most Dutch mayors mentioned an unchanged budget in 
recent years. 
Considering the sum of the four different degrees of savings, culture (83.2%) is the policy area 
where most mayors indicated savings in their municipalities’ budgets since 2008. Managing 
public space (79.6%), welfare (79.4%), and sport (70.1%) are further policy areas in which many 
respondents mentioned budget cuts. On closer inspection, savings to a very high extent were 
hardly indicated by the mayors. Saving to a high extent were stated in culture (21.5%) most 
often. Also, savings to a medium extent were specified most often in the policy area of culture 
(40.2%), followed by welfare (38.3%), sport (33.6%), traffic (30.8%), and managing public 
space (30.6%). Taken together, the perceived budget changes in recent years can be consid-
ered as relatively diverse along the different policy areas as well as across the local level, po-
tentially illustrating distinct priorities. However, while the shares of municipalities with addi-
                                                     




tional investments, unchanged budgets, and budget cuts are roughly balanced in the two pol-
icy areas of safety and education, savings are more common than additional investments in 
all other policy areas, according to the mayors’ statements. 
Interestingly, not all the survey results on recent changes in municipal expenditures comply 
with the official governmental statistics presented in chapter 10.2. According to the aggre-
gated data provided by the CBS, decreasing municipal expenses in spatial planning and hous-
ing as well as in education – both in combination with decreasing revenues – were noticed 
between 2008 and 2013. Regarding all the other policy areas, relatively continuous increases 
on the expenditure side can be observed. Especially in culture and recreation, major budget 
cuts, as indicated by many Dutch mayors in the survey, cannot be confirmed on average. Re-
flecting on the possible reasons for the discrepancies, social desirability in terms of cutting 
costs in certain areas that are considered to be less essential for the municipality and its citi-
zens in direct comparison, while omitting others, might have played a role. 
Expectations about future savings at the local level in the Netherlands comprised the topic of 
the following survey question. The mayors were asked to rank the 13 policy areas regarding 
the expected situation in their municipality. Rank 1 describes the highest expectations on sav-
ings, and rank 13 the lowest ones. Each rank could only be assigned once. Reflecting on the 
results, the variety of expectations is illustrated by the fact that almost every rank was stated 
for each policy area at least once. According to the average ranks, measured on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 13, the Dutch mayors expect the highest future savings in culture (4.6), welfare (4.8), 
and managing public space (5.3). The lowest expectations on budget cuts were stated for 
safety (10.3), education (8.1), and youth (8.0). Considering the results of the previous survey 
question on perceived recent financial changes on the expenditure side, it can be concluded 
that the mayors largely expect a continuation of prior financial developments. 
The last survey question on municipal expenses to be presented and discussed in this sub-
chapter asked about the policy areas in which the mayors personally have the least and the 
greatest number of reservations regarding savings in the near future. Participants were al-
lowed to state up to three policy areas for each of the two categories of least and greatest 
reservations. In absolute figures, the Dutch mayors most frequently mentioned having the 
greatest reservations concerning future budget cuts in the areas of safety (70), youth (56), and 
social polices (43). In contrast, development co-operation (49), spatial planning (44), and traf-
fic (37) were most often named as the policy areas with which mayors had the least amount 
of reservations in terms of future savings. Considering the percentage distribution of the votes 
of each policy area, the picture is largely similar. In addition to safety (97.2%), youth (96.6%), 
and social policies (82.7%), education (87.2%) is also part of the group of policy areas with 
which mayors had the most concerns in terms of future cutbacks. Regarding the fewest reser-
vations with future savings, development co-operation (94.2%) and spatial planning (89.8%) 
are still among the leading policy areas, when assessing the percentage distributions. High 
values were also assigned to sport (84.0%) and integration (81.8%). Interestingly, the vote 
shares for welfare (least reservations with future savings: 53.2%; most reservations with fu-
ture savings: 46.8%) and culture (least reservations with future savings: 42.5%; most reserva-




When comparing the mayors’ expectations in relation to future financial developments on the 
expenditure side of municipal budgets with their personal preferences, the picture is largely 
uniform, especially in the case of some policy areas, such as safety, education, and youth, 
where the least amount of savings are expected and favoured. Regarding welfare and culture, 
the mayors on average expect somewhat higher cutbacks than they would prefer. In the cases 
of development co-operation, spatial planning, sport, and integration, on the other hand, res-
ervations about future budget cuts are comparably low, while the mayors also do not expect 
extensive future savings in these areas. 
In summary, the Dutch mayors’ statements concerning budget changes on the expenditure 
side in policy areas with municipal competences in recent years were generally relatively di-
verse. However, while the majority of survey participants mentioned budget cuts in most pol-
icy areas, this does not comply with official government statistics in all cases. Regarding the 
mayors’ expectations about future savings and their personal preferences, similarities can be 
observed in many, but not all, policy areas. Building upon these insights into the Dutch mayors’ 
perceptions, expectations, and preferences in terms of municipal expenses, the next sub-
chapter will focus on the related cost-cutting approaches based on data from the same own 
survey. 
 
11.4. Austerity measures and cutback management strategies 
If budget cuts are intended, then there are various ways in which to achieve those cuts, as 
already discussed in chapter 2.3.4 based on theoretical considerations. To obtain an overview 
of the dissemination of different methods of savings, also referred to as cutback management 
strategies, in Dutch local government, the topic was also addressed in a question of the first 
municipal survey in 2013. By asking for the austerity methods that have been utilised in the 
mayor’s municipality since the beginning of the Financial Crisis, as well as the austerity meth-
ods that the respondent would personally choose, provided that such measures are necessary 
and decisions could be made independently, the question consisted of two parts. Ten answer-
ing options were given for both parts, and multiple choices were possible. One-hundred par-
ticipants were recorded for the first part of the question, and 94 for the second.189 At first 
glance, it can be observed that all 10 cutback methods from which to choose were recently 
implemented at the Dutch local level, but with different levels of frequency, according to the 
mayors. Among the selection of methods, savings in personnel costs were generally most pop-
ular. On closer inspection, expenditures for internal staff were cut in 87.0% of the participating 
municipalities, and expenditures for external staff were cut in 83.0% of the cases. The 
lawnmower approach, which describes equal reductions of funds in all policy areas, was also 
relatively popular: it was employed in 78.0% of the municipalities, according to the survey 
data. Furthermore, savings by reducing political ambitions (64.0%), savings by ceding or ceas-
                                                     




ing municipal responsibilities (55.0%), increasing the involvement of societal and private part-
ners in the execution of services (48.0%), and outsourcing of tasks (47.0%) are cutback meth-
ods that have been applied in many Dutch municipalities in recent years as well. 
Apart from the methods that were used since the beginning of the Financial Crisis, the second 
part of the survey question inquired about the participants’ future preferences if further cut-
backs are necessary. Savings by ceding or ceasing municipal responsibilities (71.3%) and sav-
ings by reducing political ambitions (60.6%) were stated most often. Outsourcing of tasks 
(52.1%), savings in personnel costs for external staff (50.0%), and increasing the involvement 
of societal and private partners in the execution of services (46.8%) were also among the an-
swers given fairly often. 
The comparison between both parts of the question illustrates a certain disagreement be-
tween the cutback methods recently implemented at the Dutch local level and the mayors’ 
preferences. While recent austerity measures often focused on lowering personnel costs and 
across-the-board cuts, the mayors stated higher preferences for the reduction of municipal 
tasks and political ambitions. Apart from general disagreements regarding the most appropri-
ate and promising strategies, this trade-off might also reflect experiences with cutback meth-
ods used in recent years, which fell short of expectations. 
In terms of the nature of the recently popular cutback methods, they are rather short-term 
oriented, simple to implement, and executable with little public attention, and their focus is 
often on human resources. Leaving vacancies unfilled and not prolonging expired contracts 
are practical examples, where limited resistance can also be expected. Furthermore, by cut-
ting costs equally across all departments and policy areas in line with the lawnmower ap-
proach, decisions on political priorities are not necessary, and competitive thinking, possibly 
leading to occasional resistance, is not supported. The mayors’ most preferred methods, on 
the other hand, are generally more difficult to realise, especially in the case of reducing mu-
nicipal tasks, because of provisions by central government. Similarly, lowering the political 
ambitions is also only possible to a limited extent, because of, for example, mandatory public 
services provided by the local level on behalf of central government. Overall, the relatively 
small leeway of local government in the Netherlands in terms of organising its own affairs 
becomes evident once more. 
In summary, according to the mayors, the most common cutback methods that have been 
implemented at the local level in the Netherlands in recent years involve across-the-board 
cuts at the beginning of times of austerity, followed by more targeted methods of realising 
savings at a later stage. These methods have also frequently been observed during various 
types of crises in the past. However, reflecting on the three municipal surveys, it must also be 
recognised that not all survey results appear to be completely reliable, as the comparison with 
official governmental statistics illustrated, particularly regarding the financial developments 
of some types of revenues and expenses. Since there are no signs of an unrepresentative 
group of survey participants, social desirability and limited detailed knowledge in financial af-
fairs might provide partial explanations for these circumstances. However, while the insights 




irrational crisis reactions, because of a perception of a crisis impact, which does not fully com-
ply with real events, the next part of this study will focus on variation across the local level in 
the Netherlands in terms of the impact of and responses to the recent Financial Crisis, as well 














Part 4: Variation at the local level of government in the Netherlands in 
the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007 
Part four includes the second empirical component of this study. After analysing the overall 
financial implications of the recent Financial Crisis at the Dutch local level by examining all 
municipalities combined in the previous part, this part focuses on the variation between mu-
nicipalities as well as the explanatory factors. Building upon the previous analyses, the infla-
tion-adjusted financial changes in a number of selected areas with competences of the local 
level, such as social services and land development, will be further investigated by assessing 
the situation of the approximately 400 municipalities in the Netherlands separately and dis-
cussing the relevant statistical key figures. Overall, the financial changes at the level of indi-
vidual municipalities in the selected areas of interest will be the dependent variables in the 
analyses at a later stage. 
While potential factors of influence on the financial position of local government during a fi-
nancial crisis were already identified and discussed in the theory section and operationalised 
in the methodological section of this study, the statistical distributions of the related figures 
in the context of Dutch municipalities and the Financial Crisis since 2007 will be presented in 
this part. These variables within the groups of structure-based, institution-based, and interest-
based factors will subsequently be utilised as independent variables in the analytical model. 
With linear regressions, the correlations between the factors and the financial changes at the 
Dutch local level during the recent Financial Crisis will be investigated. This also includes the 
testing of the hypotheses formulated in the theory section and the presentation of the empir-
ical findings. 
What follows is a more general discussion of the statistical results in terms of factors and 
groups of factors with a noticeable influence in relation to financial changes in the municipal 
balance sheets during the recent Financial Crisis in the Netherlands. Further reflections will 
also include the results of the own surveys as well as the findings of other studies. To assess 
the role of contextual factors, the empirical results will also be discussed in connection with 
the general trends and developments identified at the Dutch local level. Thereafter, various 
limitations of this study will be pointed out, before the research question will be answered. 
Lastly, a number of policy recommendations for the Dutch case, as well as some wider lessons 
from the recent Financial Crisis in relation to local government and local governance, will also 





12. The impact of and responses to the Crisis’ at the local level of gov-
ernment in the Netherlands from a comparative perspective 
Measuring the impact of a crisis is certainly a challenge because of complex and interacting 
mechanisms as well as the problem of taking temporal demarcations of developments with 
effects over decades or even centuries.190 While the latter circumstance can be understood as 
a claim to examine as-long-as-possible time periods, certain crisis effects might be counter-
balanced in the long run. Similar problems can be observed in the context of crisis reactions. 
Some types of countermeasures, such as labour market reforms, usually take time to have an 
effect. Furthermore, various spillover effects across all national levels of government, as well 
as measures taken in other countries or by international institutions, might be of influence 
over the course of a crisis in a certain territorial entity. 
While the first empirical component focused on aggregated data of all Dutch municipalities 
combined, where certain effects might be outbalanced on average, the second empirical com-
ponent will address the Dutch municipalities separately. In this chapter, the changes in the 
account balances of income and expenses in all the areas where effects of the recent Financial 
Crisis were identified, as well as the changes in municipal short-term debt and municipal long-
term debt, will be analysed in detail. The situation during the Crisis will be compared to the 
situation before. Since the analyses address financial developments over time, all data will 
again be adjusted to the Dutch consumer price level of the year 2007. To balance possible 
fluctuations and outliers independent of the recent Financial Crisis, the variables will also be 
calculated as three-year averages. 
As already pointed out in chapter 9, the recent Financial Crisis became notable in the Nether-
lands in late 2008, first affecting central government primarily in terms of bank rescue 
measures before attempts at fiscal stimulus and austerity measures were undertaken, both of 
which were also intended to target local government. Following this line of argumentation, 
the years 2005 to 2007 represent the financial situation before the Crisis. Because of time 
differences in terms of the effects of a crisis in various policy areas, different time periods from 
2008 onwards were chosen for the financial situation during the Crisis. In other words, the 
three-year time spans were selected based on identifiable changes in the aggregated data of 
each balance sheet item191, policy area, and financial results192 of interest. The change in the 
pairs of variables will also be utilised as dependent variables of the linear regressions in the 
following chapter.193 
Building upon the analyses of chapter 10, figure 33 and figure 34 provide an overview of ag-
gregated account balances of income and expenses of the policy area and balance sheet items 
where impacts of or reactions to the recent Financial Crisis were identified. The developments 
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nancial crisis in general and in the case of the recent Financial Crisis in particular. 
191 Balance sheet items are specific budgetary sections, for example in line with certain public tasks, within a 
policy area. 
192 Financial results are understood as overall balance sheet results in terms of surpluses or deficits. 




of municipal short-term and long-term debt are also included to illustrate the overall financial 
results. Regarding the inflation-adjusted data in the figures, it needs to be taken into account 
that positive values stand for municipal revenues or levels of municipal debt, while negative 
values indicate municipal expenses.194 
 
Figure 33: Budget balance of selected balance sheet items of all Dutch municipalities combined in million euro (adjusted for 
inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), part 1, 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (revenues and 
expenses by region and by size); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
 
                                                     


















Figure 34: Budget balance of selected balance sheet items and policy areas of all Dutch municipalities combined in million 
euro (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007), part 2, 2004–2014 (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts 
(revenues and expenses by region and by size); CBS; Municipal accounts (balance by region and by size); CBS, Annual change 
of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
As already pointed out in chapter 10.2.11, the overall consequences of the Financial Crisis at 
the Dutch local level were most notable in the case of land development; however, other areas 
with municipal competences and activities were also affected, as was the municipal admin-
istration itself. Accordingly, increases in municipal short-term and long-term debt can be ob-
served in the years after 2008, and possible variation across the local level needs to be taken 
into account. While the total effect of the Crisis on land development was relatively extensive 
in comparison with other balance sheet items, this does not necessarily imply negative devel-
opments in all municipalities. In some municipalities, revenues from land development might 
even have grown during the years of the recent Financial Crisis. On the other hand, some mu-
nicipalities might have been concerned about the financial consequences of the Crisis in cer-
tain areas of activity, such as tourist taxes, where the aggregated effect appeared to be rela-
tively low. 
In line with the different municipal activities of interest identified in chapter 10, the following 
sub-chapters are structured as follows: social services (12.1), administrative support of the 
executive board (12.2), building permits (12.3), land development (12.4), tourist taxes (12.5), 
and general payments from the municipal fund (12.6). The overall financial results in terms of 
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12.1. Social services 
In welfare states, times of crisis are usually linked to higher expenditures for social services. 
Higher unemployment and increases in short-time work are among the main reasons. Building 
upon the previous insights from chapter 10.2.7 into the changes in expenses in this area with 
responsibilities of local government in the Netherlands over time, variation between the indi-
vidual municipalities will be analysed next. 
According to a study (Allers, 2009) published during an early phase of the recent Financial 
Crisis, the increase in unemployment, as a major cause of higher expenses in social affairs, is 
not expected to be equally distributed across the Netherlands. In municipalities where many 
employees work for government, in the healthcare sector, or in the education sector, such as 
in The Hague and Groningen, the effect of the Crisis is expected to be smaller in comparison 
with regions where many persons are traditionally employed in the financial sector, transport, 
and the manufacturing industry, such as Amsterdam and Eindhoven (p. 287). Whether these 
expectations can be confirmed by changes in social expenses, according to official statistics, 
will also be addressed below. 
From a methodological perspective, the mean account balance in the policy area of social ser-
vices in pre-crisis times was calculated by building the average of the annual account balances 
of the years 2005 to 2007. For the times during the Crisis, the years 2009 to 2011 were taken 
into account. To recognise the differences regarding the size of the municipalities in terms of 
inhabitants and changes in the price levels, all values are expressed in euro per capita and are 
adjusted for inflation. 
Table 20 includes statistical key figures of the distribution of both variables as well as the 
changes between both mean values. While positive values of the three-year mean values im-
ply municipal revenues, negative values denote municipal expenses. In the case of the change 
between both variables, calculated by subtraction, positive values indicate an increase, while 
negative values indicate a decrease.195 
Table 20: Statistical key figures of the distribution of Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and expenses for 
social services in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal 
accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own 
calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2009–2011 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 410 339 
Mean -215.62 -311.93 96.61 
Std. Deviation 70.04 97.83 45.84 
Range 516.10 710.65 315.10 
Min. -569.30 -786.99 -74.06 
Max. -53.21 -76.34 241.03 
 
                                                     




According to the data, social services account for expenses in all Dutch municipalities in recent 
years considering the two groups of three-year averages. In other words, no municipality 
earned more money by providing the accompanied public services than it paid for them. While 
the Dutch local government spent 215.62 euro per citizen on average between 2005 and 2007, 
311.93 euro were spent between 2009 and 2011, which implies an increase close to 100 euro 
per capita.196 Interestingly, a range above 500 euro can be observed during the first period of 
time and above 700 euro during the second period of time. In other words, municipal expenses 
on social services vary significantly across the Dutch local level, and this variation increased 
over time. In the context of the financial changes between both time periods, variation can 
also be observed among the municipalities. While the costs increased in most municipalities, 
there are also cases where the expenses for social services decreased. 
To obtain a better insight into the variation across the local level in the Netherlands, an over-
view of the individual municipalities with the highest and lowest inflation-adjusted financial 
changes in social services is presented in table 21, building upon the calculations presented in 
the previous table.197 
Table 21: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and 
expenses for social services in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: 
CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index 
from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
cost increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 highest 
cost decreases / lowest cost in-
creases 
Euro per capita 
Heeze-Leende 241.03 Boekel -74.06 
Leeuwarden 233.91 Someren -19.11 
Vlaardingen 233.05 Aalsmeer -10.48 
Amsterdam 230.35 Vlieland -7.50 
Venlo 228.22 Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht 1.70 
Vlissingen198 222.65 Ameland 6.73 
Nijmegen 220.78 Scherpenzeel 8.99 
‘s-Gravenhage199 211.84 Ubbergen 14.38 
Tilburg 203.36 Woudrichem 15.39 
Doetinchem 200.36 Graafstroom 20.21 
 
                                                     
196 Since the number of cases used to calculate the statistical key figures of the three variables’ distributions is 
subject to some variation, relating to changes in the number of municipalities over time as a result of municipal 
amalgamations and data availability, the mean value of the distribution of the change between the two mean 
values does not exactly match the subtraction of the mean values of the distribution of the two mean values. 
On closer inspection, the first mean value (three-year average) was calculated for all municipalities where the 
necessary financial data were available for the first time span. The second mean value (three-year average) was 
calculated for all municipalities where the necessary financial data were available for the second time span. 
Calculating the change between two mean values requires a pair of variables. In other words, it was only possi-
ble to calculate the change between the two mean values for municipalities where the financial data were 
available for both time spans. The same logic also applies to the calculation in the following sub-chapters. 
197 See appendix 9 for the financial changes within this policy area of all Dutch municipalities, as well as for the 
balance sheet items and financial results presented and discussed in the following sub-chapters. 
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According to the data, the highest cost increase for the provision of social services between 
the two time periods under investigation can be observed in the case of Heeze-Leende. Some 
of the largest cities, such as Amsterdam and The Hague, are also among the group of munici-
palities where the cost for social services rose the most. In only four municipalities, the ex-
penditures for social services decreased during the time periods under investigation, and this 
development is most significant in the case of Boekel.  
Considering the expectations stated in a previous study (Allers, 2009) regarding variation in 
the growth of unemployment across the Netherlands, the overview of changes in expenses 
related to social services in table 21 does not fully comply. While Amsterdam, as a city with 
many persons traditionally employed in the financial sector, transport, and the manufacturing 
industry, is among the municipalities with the highest increases in social expenditures from a 
comparative perspective, this also applies to The Hague, where many employees traditionally 
work for government or in the healthcare and education sectors. However, it must be taken 
into account that unemployment is not the only possible cause of higher expenditures in social 
affairs. Other factors, such as the social composition of the population, might be relevant as 
well. Overall, the data indicate that higher expenses for social services in times of the recent 
Financial Crisis affected larger cities more than smaller municipalities. Financial changes in 
relation to the administrative support of the executive board will be addressed in the next 
sub-chapter. 
 
12.2. Administrative support of the executive board 
The first separate balance sheet item analysed, with a focus on variation across the local level 
in the Netherlands, is administrative support of the executive board within the policy area of 
general administration. In general, this task is mainly characterised by municipal expenses. 
However, a few municipalities have generated minor net revenues in the context of this bal-
ance sheet item in recent years.200 During a crisis, it can generally be concluded that the ne-
cessity of support of a municipal executive board and hence the costs increase. The need for 
comprehensive external advice might be an example of the origin of higher expenses from a 
more practical perspective. 
Comparable to the methodological approach introduced in the previous sub-chapter, the in-
flation-adjusted changes between two three-year averages were calculated to assess the ef-
fects of the recent Financial Crisis on the account balance of expenses and revenues in the 
administrative support of the executive board. Again, the mean for the years 2005, 2006, and 
2007 was calculated for each municipality, and it represents the pre-Crisis level. Assuming that 
local officials evaluated the developments of a crisis and discussed potential measures right 
from the start, in combination with the logic that the administrative support of the executive 
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board is needed most during the peak of a crisis, the second mean value was calculated by 
including the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. 
Statistical key figures of the distributions of the two mean values, as well as the changes be-
tween the mean values at the level of individual municipalities, are listed in table 22. With the 
exception of the number of cases, all other values are stated in euro per capita. 
Table 22: Statistical key figures of the distribution of Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and expenses for the 
administrative support of the executive board in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) 
(Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer 
price index from 1963; own calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2009–2011 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 410 339 
Mean -62.77 -66.27 4.98 
Std. Deviation 43.79 49.18 26.13 
Range 559.07 602.70 296.11 
Min. -546.96 -602.80 -108.73 
Max. 12.10 -0.10 187.38 
 
According to the calculations, on average, Dutch municipalities spent 62.77 euro per capita 
annually for the administrative support of the executive board between 2005 and 2007. Be-
tween 2009 and 2011, this average value increased to 66.27 euro per capita. In other words, 
the average costs for this balance sheet item increased by almost 5 euro per capita since the 
beginning of the recent Financial Crisis. On closer inspection, a broad dispersion of the munic-
ipalities’ expenses for the administrative support of the executive board can be observed, with 
annual expenditure per capita ranging from close to 0 to above 600 euro. 
An overview of the 10 municipalities with the highest inflation-adjusted increases in costs for 
the administrative support of the executive board and the 10 municipalities with the highest 
inflation-adjusted decreases is presented in table 23. 
Table 23: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and 
expenses for the administrative support of the executive board in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level 
of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual 
change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
cost increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 highest 
cost decreases 
Euro per capita 
Schiermonnikoog 187.38 Dongen -108.73 
Kapelle 131.00 Utrecht -85.57 
Laren (NH.) 109.39 Meppel -74.83 
Zeevang 80.11 Boekel -68.31 
Zoeterwoude 75.79 Breda -63.13 
Veenendaal 71.60 Oldebroek -54.09 
Texel 67.71 Rheden -49.53 
Tubbergen 58.53 Uithoorn -48.42 
Wieringermeer 56.57 Drechterland -47.97 





During the time period under investigation, the average costs per capita for the administrative 
support of the executive board increased the most in Schiermonnikoog. In contrast, in the 
municipality of Dongen, the costs for this task were reduced the most. Considering both ends 
of the list of municipalities, many relatively small municipalities in terms of the number of 
inhabitants are among the two groups with the highest changes in expenses for the adminis-
trative support of the executive board in recent years. However, Utrecht and Breda – two large 
cities – are also part of the group of municipalities with the highest cost decreases. Building 
permits comprise the next balance sheet item to be addressed in terms of recent changes in 
times of the Financial Crisis since 2007 and variation across Dutch municipalities. 
 
12.3. Building permits 
While the policy area and the balance sheet item analysed in the previous sub-chapters were 
characterised by average net expenses by local government, issuing building permits is an ac-
tivity whereby most municipalities in the Netherlands traditionally earn money. However, in 
the context of a financial crisis, it can be argued that private investments in construction are 
likely to decrease, implying lower revenues for local government from licensing activities in 
this field. To compare the financial changes since the beginning of the recent Financial Crisis, 
the inflation-adjusted mean values of the account balances per capita were calculated for each 
municipality for the years 2005 to 2007 and 2011 to 2013. The latter time span is justified by 
a temporal delay of crisis impacts on the activity of issuing building permits in comparison with 
effects in other policy areas, since investments by private companies and households are often 
planned in the longer run. 
Table 24 contains the statistical key figures of the distributions of both three-year averages as 
well as for the changes between the two time periods. 
Table 24: Statistical key figures of the distribution of Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and expenses for 
building permits in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal 
accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own 
calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2011–2013 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 402 324 
Mean 29.65 20.72 -8.58 
Std. Deviation 13.53 9.92 13.66 
Range 119.08 65.24 132.73 
Min. -9.44 3.66 -81.95 
Max. 109.64 68.91 50.78 
 
According to the data, issuing building permits was and still is an activity whereby most Dutch 
municipalities earn money. Between 2005 and 2007, the income amounted to 29.65 euro per 
capita on average. This value decreased by almost 10 euro per capita to 20.72 euro per capita 
between 2011 and 2013. In other words, the average revenues of Dutch municipalities in this 




observed across the local level. This applies to the two three-year averages as well as to the 
change between the pairs of variables. While the income from building permits decreased by 
more than 50 euro per capita in three municipalities, it also increased by more than 50 euro 
per capita in one municipality. 
An overview of the municipalities with the highest inflation-adjusted increases and decreases 
in this context is provided in table 25. 
Table 25: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and 
expenses for building permits in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: 
CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index 
from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
revenue increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 highest 
revenue decreases 
Euro per capita 
Mill en Sint Hubert 50.78 Aalsmeer -81.95 
Wassenaar 33.43 Eemsmond -65.97 
Haarlemmerliede en Spaarnwoude 30.75 Pijnacker-Nootdorp -63.53 
Veere 29.40 Geertruidenberg -38.13 
Oudewater 27.38 Houten -37.80 
Sluis 23.53 Gilze en Rijen -35.44 
Haren 20.56 Boarnsterhim201 -34.56 
Wormerland 19.60 Rijswijk (ZH.) -34.17 
Reimerswaal 18.95 Laren (NH.) -32.93 
Zoeterwoude 17.63 Noordwijk -31.92 
 
According to the calculations, Aalsmeer is the Dutch municipality with the highest decreases 
in revenues from building permits in recent years. In Mill en Sint Hubert, the highest increases 
were recorded, followed by Wassenaar, which is known as a municipality with many wealthy 
inhabitants and as the official residence of the Dutch royal family. Overall, relatively small 
municipalities in terms of the number of inhabitants form both groups. Changes in land devel-
opment, as a second balance sheet item within the policy areas of spatial planning and hous-
ing, will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
12.4. Land development 
Next to building permits, land development is an activity, where Dutch municipalities gained 
considerable revenues in the past. However, as the analyses in chapter 10.2.9 illustrated and 
previous studies pointed out already, the recent Financial Crisis became most apparent at the 
local level in the Netherlands in the context of this balance sheet item. Again, following the 
logic that private companies and individuals do not usually choose to expand their businesses 
or to invest in real estate respectively in times of crises, many areas that were developed by 
local government were unsellable, leading to lower revenues or even considerable losses. To 
recognise a certain temporal delay in the potential effects of a financial crisis in the context of 
this area of activity, the inflation-adjusted three-year mean values of income and/or expenses 
                                                     




per capita were calculated for the time period 2011 to 2013, representing crisis times, next to 
the time period 2005 to 2007 as the starting position directly before the Crisis. 
The statistical key figures of the distributions of these two variables as well as those of the 
changes between them are listed in table 26. 
Table 26: Statistical key figures of the distribution of Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and expenses for land 
development in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal 
accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own 
calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2011–2013 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 402 324 
Mean 29.12 -41.75 -68.37 
Std. Deviation 62.21 87.75 102.18 
Range 611.56 816.39 823.62 
Min. -127.26 -564.18 -569.29 
Max. 484.30 252.21 254.33 
 
While land development was a source of income for approximately three quarters of the 
Dutch municipalities between 2005 and 2007, it became an item of expenses for about three 
quarters of municipalities between 2011 and 2013. Correspondingly, the average income of 
29.12 euro per capita changed to average expenses of 41.75 euro per capita during the afore-
mentioned periods of time, which equals a decrease of roughly 70 euro per capita. Considering 
the average level of income before the Financial Crisis, this financial change can be described 
as highly extensive, also in comparison with other municipal balance sheet items. However, 
the ranges above 600 euro per capita before the Crisis and above 800 euro per capita during 
the Crisis, illustrate the wide variation in income and expenses for land development across 
the local level in the Netherlands in general. In addition, wide variation can be observed for 
the changes between the two time spans, also expressed by a range above 800 euro per cap-
ita. 
To gain a better insight into the differences across the local level, the municipalities with the 
10 highest inflation-adjusted increases in revenues from land development, as well as those 











Table 27: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and 
expenses for land development in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: 
CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index 
from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
revenue increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 highest 
revenue decreases 
Euro per capita 
Muiden202 254.33 Heerenveen -569.29 
Beemster 193.65 Geldermalsen -556.21 
Cuijk 149.45 Zevenaar -501.99 
Noordwijk 145.06 Laren (NH.) -473.16 
Beverwijk 122.92 Best -441.59 
Bergen op Zoom 108.70 Veghel -432.25 
Zoeterwoude 100.76 Brielle -383.25 
Edam-Volendam 92.24 Zeewolde -335.35 
Vianen 86.30 Nuenen, Gerwen en Nederwetten -332.67 
Boskoop203 69.37 Bunnik -292.09 
 
According to the calculations, the Dutch municipality of Muiden has managed to increase its 
revenues from land development the most per capita in recent years. On closer inspection, 
the municipality’s account balance in this area changed from a minor deficit to a respectable 
income. Heerenveen can be found at the other end of the list. There, a minor positive result 
changed into a relatively high deficit. Overall, many small and some mid-sized municipalities 
– in terms of the number of inhabitants – can be found at both ends of the distribution. 
Changes in tourist taxes will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
12.5. Tourist taxes 
The previous analyses of chapter 10.3.1 also indicated a minor impact of the recent Financial 
Crisis on revenues from tourist taxes at the Dutch local level, as a result of a decline in tourism. 
In times of crisis, it can be expected that less people go on holiday, while others reduce the 
lengths of their stay. This applies to Dutch citizens and holidays within the Netherlands as well 
as to foreign tourists coming to the country. By also taking into account that these effects 
occur faster than those of other crises, partially because of shorter planning periods, such as 
in the case of spontaneous holidays, as well as because of a general reduction in expenses for 
pleasure, also originating from anticipated potential future concerns with the Crisis, the time 
period 2008 to 2010 was selected for the calculation of the inflation-adjusted mean revenues 
per municipality during the Financial Crisis, next to the time period 2005 to 2007, representing 
pre-Crisis times. However, since changes in tourism are mainly caused by developments out-
side potential holiday destinations, regression analyses on own characteristics of territorial 
entities determining variation will not be conducted for this balance sheet item at a later stage 
of this study.  
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The statistical key figures of the distributions of both variables, as well as for the changes be-
tween them, are listed in table 28. 
Table 28: Statistical key figures of the distribution of Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and expenses for 
tourist taxes in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal 
accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own 
calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2008–2010 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 425 353 
Mean 14.15 14.23 1.57 
Std. Deviation 62.77 66.19 10.57 
Range 790.70 858.52 173.00 
Min. 0.00 -0.04 -11.86 
Max. 790.70 858.48 161.14 
 
Overall, approximately three quarters of all Dutch municipalities earned money from tourist 
taxes, as a type of local tax, during both time periods under investigation, which also implies 
that the number of municipalities levying the tax did not change considerably. Net losses from 
the tax were the absolute exception, occurring in one case. Between 2005 and 2007, the mu-
nicipality that was most successful in earning money from tourism had an income of 790.70 
euro per capita of the own population. As already pointed out before, not all Dutch munici-
palities raise this type of tax, which explains both the minimum revenue of 0.00 euro and the 
average value of 14.15 euro per capita when assessing the Dutch local level as a whole. Be-
tween 2008 and 2010, Dutch municipalities collected, on average, 14.23 euro per capita of the 
own population from taxing tourists, which implies a minor increase. The maximum income 
also rose, when assessing the financial developments between the two time spans. While the 
times of the recent Financial Crisis did not, on average, have a negative impact on revenues 
from tourist taxes in the Netherlands, not all municipalities experienced an increase in this 
type of revenue, as the minimum value of the change between the two mean values illus-
trates. 
An overview of the highest inflation-adjusted changes in tourist taxes at the level of individual 












Table 29: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding Dutch municipalities’ account balances of revenues and 
expenses related to tourist taxes in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: 
CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index 
from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
revenue increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 highest 
revenue decreases 
Euro per capita 
Ameland 161.14 Waterland -11.86 
Schiermonnikoog 67.79 Nijefurd -9.26 
Vlieland 56.96 Gaasterlân-Sleat -6.80 
Texel 47.60 Noordwijk -5.35 
Terschelling 46.97 Bloemendaal -5.29 
Goedereede 15.45 Graft-De Rijp -4.87 
Enkhuizen 9.77 Gulpen-Wittem -4.39 
Noord-Beveland 9.05 Haarlemmermeer -3.63 
Hilvarenbeek 9.04 Zeewolde -3.42 
Bergen (NH.) 8.80 Epe -2.88 
 
When comparing the two time periods under investigation, revenues from tourist taxes in-
creased the most per capita in the Dutch municipality of Ameland. On closer inspection, many 
West Frisian Islands are among the group of municipalities with higher revenues from tourist 
taxation in recent years. Waterland, on the other hand, is the municipality whose income from 
tourist taxes declined the most per capita when comparing the time periods 2005 to 2007 and 
2008 to 2010. Overall, many relatively small municipalities in terms of the number of inhabit-
ants can again be found at both ends of the distribution. Changes in the general payments 
from the municipal fund will be addressed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
12.6. General payments from the municipal fund 
As a result of the relatively limited fiscal autonomy, Dutch municipalities largely rely on trans-
fers from central government. While the total sum of the transfers is directly linked to the 
budget at the national level, on the one hand, and various political intentions for a reduction 
of the municipal fund were expressed in recent years, on the other hand, the inflation-ad-
justed financial developments of this balance sheet item, as the most important source of 
municipal revenues, will be more closely examined next. Alongside the average financial 
means per capita between 2005 and 2007, representing the years before the Financial Crisis, 
the payments between 2011 and 2013, representing a time period of austerity and consolida-
tion measures as a consequence of the Crisis, was selected for the comparison. However, since 
the distribution of financial means to the municipalities takes place based on various exactly 
defined factors, such as the social composition of the population and the size of the terri-
tory,204 and is both largely beyond municipal own influence and without changes as a result 
of a financial crisis, general payments from the municipal fund will not be part of the regres-
sion analyses in the following chapter. 
                                                     




The statistical key figures of the distributions of the calculations for both time spans, as well 
as those of the changes in the mean values in the context of general transfers from the mu-
nicipal fund, are listed in table 30. 
Table 30: Statistical key figures of the distribution of the account balances of revenues and expenses related to general pay-
ments from the municipal fund to Dutch municipalities in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the 
year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change of 
the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2011–2013 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 402 324 
Mean 717.15 846.15 136.84 
Std. Deviation 170.80 190.58 54.67 
Range 1,693.51 1,805.47 546.59 
Min. 470.38 602.91 3.56 
Max. 2,163.89 2,408.38 550.15 
 
As the data illustrate, all Dutch municipalities receive financial means from the municipal fund. 
However, considered per capita, the transfers from central government vary significantly. In 
recent years, some municipalities have received less than 500 euro per capita, while others 
have received more than 2,400 euro per capita, depending on a number of factors, as ex-
plained before. On average, 717.15 euro per capita were transferred to the municipalities be-
tween 2005 and 2007 and 846.15 euro per capita between 2011 and 2013. This equals an 
average increase of approximately 130 euro per capita between the two periods. On closer 
inspection, it can be observed that more money was transferred to all municipalities overall, 
but to different extents. 
Table 31 provides an overview of the 10 municipalities in which transfers from central govern-















Table 31: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding the account balances of revenues and expenses of general 
payments from the municipal fund to Dutch municipalities in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of 
the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, taxes); CBS, Annual change 
of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
revenue increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 lowest 
revenue increases 
Euro per capita 
Boarnsterhim205 550.15 Nieuwkoop206 3.56 
Rozendaal 507.51 Boskoop207 10.87 
Heerlen 366.83 Drechterland 19.44 
Leeuwarden 308.57 Neder-Betuwe208 33.69 
Vlissingen209 285.76 Houten 35.65 
Millingen aan de Rijn210 279.06 Bronckhorst 42.26 
Rotterdam 266.23 Staphorst 43.06 
Venlo 260.10 Wageningen 59.12 
Dordrecht 253.82 Urk 60.72 
Gouda 246.27 Littenseradiel 62.02 
 
The highest increases in payments from the municipal fund per capita in recent years took 
place in Boarnsterhim. In contrast, the increase was the lowest in Nieuwkoop. Overall, some 
smaller municipalities, as well as some larger cities, are among the group with the highest 
increases, while mainly smaller municipalities can be found at the lower end of the distribu-
tion.211 Representing the results of all financial activities, changes in municipal debt will be 
analysed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
12.7. Changes in municipal debt 
Since the sums of assets and liabilities are necessarily balanced in double-entry accounting, 
debt and changes in debt can serve as indicators of the financial situation and financial devel-
opments. In this context, a distinction between short-term debt (Dutch: kortlopende schuld) 
and long-term debt (Dutch: vaste schuld) is common. While short-term debt includes negative 
bank and giro balances, as well as all other liabilities with maturities of one year or less in the 
context of the Dutch local government, long-term debt mainly consists of bonds, private loans, 
money invested by third parties, and deposit guarantees, as well as all other liabilities with 
maturities longer than one year. 
Comparable to the previous analyses, the inflation-adjusted mean values for short-term debt, 
long-term debt, and total debt were calculated for the time periods 2005 to 2007 and 2009 to 
2011. In a second step, the changes between the pairs of mean values were calculated for 
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each municipality. While short-term debt and long-term debt will also be utilised as independ-
ent variables in the regression analyses in the next chapter, this does not apply to the sum of 
both types of debt, since the two former enable more detailed analyses. 
An overview of the distribution of the total debt per municipality, being composed of short- 
and long-term debt, and the financial changes in recent years is provided in table 32. Also, 
comparable to the previous analyses, debt and changes in debt are expressed in euro per cap-
ita within this sub-chapter. 
Table 32: Statistical key figures of the distribution of Dutch municipalities’ total debt in euro per capita (adjusted for inflation, 
consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (balance per municipality); CBS, Annual change 
of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2009–2011 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 410 339 
Mean 1,704.45 1,882.37 169.37 
Std. Deviation 1,257.41 1,248.96 650.17 
Range 6,961.03 7,059.07 5,150.47 
Min. 101.45 77.69 -1,599.24 
Max. 7,062.48 7,136.75 3,551.23 
 
Between 2005 and 2007, Dutch municipalities had an average total debt of 1,704.45 euro per 
capita. This value increased to 1,882.37 euro per capita between 2009 and 2011. In other 
words, the debt per person rose by about 180 euro per capita between the two time periods 
under investigation.212 In addition, a broad variation can be observed between the municipal-
ities. While the total debt amounted to roughly 100 euro per capita in some municipalities, 
others had a debt per person above 7,000 euro during the first time span. This range was also 
comparable during the second time span. However, the changes in total debt between the 
two periods were subject to broad variation across the local level as well. While an increase 
of more than 3,500 euro per capita occurred in one municipality, another one managed to 
reduce its total debt by more than 1,500 euro per capita. 
An overview of the 10 municipalities with the highest inflation-adjusted debt growths, as well 
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Table 33: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding the total debt of Dutch municipalities in euro per capita 
(adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (balance per municipal-
ity); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
debt increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 highest 
debt decreases 
Euro per capita 
Maasdonk 3,551.23 Hoorn -1,599.24 
Blaricum 3,190.04 Amersfoort -1,407.82 
Geldermalsen 3,108.17 Groningen -1,269.72 
Rijswijk (ZH.) 1,983.21 Zeewolde -1,148.12 
Gouda 1,899.39 Rijnwaarden -1,102.77 
Beverwijk 1,865.98 Valkenburg aan de Geul -1,066.36 
Nuenen, Gerwen en Nederwetten 1,835.49 IJsselstein -1,007.93 
Barneveld 1,682.88 Nederweert -961.80 
Zevenaar 1,595.14 Borne -946.27 
Lelystad213 1,580.10 Papendrecht -944.11 
 
According to the data, Maasdonk, with a debt increase of 3,551.23 euro per capita, was the 
municipality in which the total debt per person increased the most in recent years. The mu-
nicipality of Hoorn, in contrast, managed to reduce its total debt the most. In comparison with 
the time period 2005 to 2007, the total debt per person was 1,599.24 euro lower between 
2009 and 2011. With Amersfoort and Groningen, it can be noticed that two of the largest 
Dutch cities in terms of the number of inhabitants are among the group of municipalities 
whose total debt per person decreased the most in recent years. 
Next, to gain more detailed insights into the inflation-adjusted changes in the financial situa-
tion of Dutch municipalities in times of the recent Financial Crisis, short-term debt and long-
term debt are looked at separately. An overview of the statistical key figures of the distribu-
tions of municipal short-term debt in the Netherlands and the related changes between the 
time period 2005 to 2007 and the time period 2009 to 2011 is presented in table 34. 
Table 34: Statistical key figures of the distribution of Dutch municipalities’ short-term debt in euro per capita (adjusted for 
inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (balance per municipality); CBS, An-
nual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2009–2011 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 410 339 
Mean 269.14 340.88 86.37 
Std. Deviation 268.23 273.02 259.76 
Range 3,951.63 2,417.15 3,081.04 
Min. -111.35 23.32 -839.31 
Max. 3,840.28 2,440.47 2,241.73 
 
Between 2005 and 2007, the municipal short-term debt per capita amounted to 269.14 euro 
in the Netherlands on average, or about 15.8% of the total debt. A wide variation was given 
when comparing the municipalities. Some municipalities accumulated short-term debt of 
close to 4,000 euro per capita, while others even had a positive balance, which is possible 
                                                     




because the compilations include current accounts. With 340.88 euro per capita, the average 
short-term debt was higher between 2009 and 2011, representing the second time period 
under investigation. Amounting to about 70 euro per capita on average, this growth in cash 
credits over only a few years has a considerable scope. Regarding the share of short-term debt 
in relation to total debt, an increase to approximately 18.1% can be observed. However, be-
tween 2009 and 2011, it can also be noted that the range of short-term debt among Dutch 
municipalities decreased in comparison with the previous time period. The highest debt per 
capita amounted to more than 2,400 euro during this second period. In addition, the changes 
in the financial positions of the individual municipalities during the time period under investi-
gation were subject to broad variation. While the short-term debt increased by more than 
2,000 euro in one municipality, others managed to decrease it by several hundred euros. 
Table 35 provides an overview of the 10 municipalities with the highest inflation-adjusted in-
creases and decreases of short-term debt per capita by comparing the time periods 2005–
2007 with 2009–2011. 
Table 35: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding Dutch municipalities’ short-term debt in euro per capita 
(adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (balance per municipal-
ity); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
debt increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 highest 
debt decreases 
Euro per capita 
Maasdonk 2,241.73 Zeewolde -839.31 
Rijswijk (ZH.) 1,872.96 Slochteren -542.36 
Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht 1,329.81 Vlieland -352.43 
Culemborg 1,307.45 Amersfoort -327.47 
Weesp 1,224.78 Lingewaard -285.10 
Beuningen 1,109.58 Amsterdam -280.92 
Beemster 1,070.40 Leiderdorp -266.40 
Assen 696.31 Goirle -265.58 
Gilze en Rijen 595.65 Gorinchem -218.87 
Boxmeer 501.59 Haren -217.65 
 
The highest increase in short-term debt in recent years was recorded for Maasdonk, with a 
scope of 2,241.73 euro per capita. In a number of other municipalities, the short term-debt 
rose by more than 1,000 euro per capita as well. Zeewolde, at the other end of the distribu-
tion, managed to reduce its short-term debt by 839.31 euro per capita. With Amersfoort and 
Amsterdam, two of the largest Dutch cities are also among the municipalities that have low-
ered their cash credits extensively in recent years. 
The inflation-adjusted financial developments in the context of long-term debt, as the more 
common type of debt at the local level in the Netherlands in comparison with short-term debt, 
will be assessed next. Therefore, table 36 provides an overview of the statistical key figures of 
the distributions of the means values for the two time periods 2005 to 2007 and 2009 to 2011 




Table 36: Statistical key figures of the distribution of Dutch municipalities’ long-term debt in euro per capita (adjusted for 
inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (balance per municipality); CBS, An-
nual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
 Mean value 2005–2007 Mean value 2009–2011 Change between the two 
mean values 
N 369 410 339 
Mean 1,435.31 1,541.48 83.00 
Std. Deviation 1,173.43 1,147.81 586.94 
Range 6,367.53 6,647.23 4,836.64 
Min. 0.00 0.00 -1,751.15 
Max. 6,367.53 6,647.23 3,085.49 
 
Between 2005 and 2007, the average municipal long-term debt amounted to 1,435.31 euro 
per capita in the Netherlands. Within the time period 2009 to 2011, this value increased by 
about 110 euro per capita to be 1,541.48 euro per capita. During both periods of time, the 
variation across the local level was significant, ranging from a small number of municipalities 
without any long-term debt to those with long-term debt above 6,000 euro per capita. Con-
sidering the changes between the two time periods, a municipality with an increase above 
3,000 euro per capita, as well as several municipalities with decreases above 1,000 euro, can 
be observed. In other words, the financial developments in relation to long-term debt have 
also been subject to broad variation at the Dutch local level in recent years. 
Table 37 provides an overview of the 10 municipalities at both ends of the distribution of in-
flation-adjusted changes in long-term debt. 
Table 37: Highest and lowest changes in the mean values regarding Dutch municipalities’ long-term debt in euro per capita 
(adjusted for inflation, consumer price level of the year 2007) (Data sources: CBS, Municipal accounts (balance per municipal-
ity); CBS, Annual change of the consumer price index from 1963; own calculations) 
Municipalities with the 10 highest 
debt increases 
Euro per capita Municipalities with the 10 highest 
debt decreases 
Euro per capita 
Geldermalsen 3,085.49 Hoorn -1,751.15 
Blaricum 2,700.94 Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht -1,686.84 
Gouda 2,006.07 Groningen -1,384.27 
Beverwijk 1,887.16 Rijnwaarden -1,155.23 
Zevenaar 1,577.52 Borne -1,150.85 
Veghel 1,577.22 Beuningen -1,140.96 
Barneveld 1,466.98 Amersfoort -1,080.34 
Nuenen, Gerwen en Nederwetten 1,464.36 Nijmegen -1,041.34 
Maasdonk 1,309.49 IJsselstein -1,029.74 
Lelystad214 1,275.45 Valkenburg aan de Geul -967.37 
 
The highest increase in long-term debt in recent years was recorded for Geldermalsen, with a 
rise of 3,085.49 euro per capita. Hoorn, on the other hand, managed to reduce its long-term 
debt by 1,751.15 euro per inhabitant. While both municipalities represent the two maximum 
values of the distribution, they cannot be considered as outliers from a statistical perspective, 
since other municipalities experienced similar changes. There are also three major cities, 
                                                     




namely Groningen, Amersfoort, and Nijmegen, among the municipalities where the financial 
situation improved the most. Amersfoort is also the only municipality among the 10 munici-
palities with the highest decreases in short-term debt as well as among the 10 municipalities 
with the highest decreases in long-term debt. Maasdonk, on the other hand, can be found 
among both groups of municipalities with the highest increases in short- and long-term debt. 
Interestingly, Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht and Beuningen managed to reduce their long-term debt 
rather extensively in comparison with other municipalities, while their changes in short-term 
debt are among the highest increases, which indicates measures of debt restructuring. 
Taken together, a number of unfavourable financial developments at the Dutch local level can 
be observed when comparing the years of the Financial Crisis to pre-Crisis times. After adjust-
ing for inflation, the expenditures for social services increased by 96.61 euro per capita or 
44.81% on average.215 Also, the administrative support of the executive board became more 
expensive. For this balance sheet item, an average increase of 4.98 euro per capita or 7.93% 
was recorded. In addition to the expenditure side, the situation on the revenue side deterio-
rated. The income from building permits decreased by 8.58 euro per capita or 28.94% on av-
erage. The same applies to land development, where the average income reduction amounted 
to 68.37 euro per capita or 234.79%. In other words, this balance sheet item changed from 
net revenues to net expenses. Partially in consequence of these developments, both short and 
long-term debt have increased at the local level in the Netherlands in recent years. While the 
former rose by 86.37 euro per capita or 32.09% on average, the latter grew by 83.00 euro per 
capita or 5.78% on average, which also implies changes in the debt structures. All these spe-
cific changes in public finances will serve as dependent variables in the linear regressions in 
the next chapter. However, before the calculations, the statistical distributions of the factors 
potentially determining variation will be presented as independent variables. 
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13. Factors determining variation in crisis impact and crisis responses 
at the local level of government in the Netherlands 
As the results in chapter 12 illustrate, financial changes in times of the recent Financial Crisis 
did not affect all Dutch municipalities to the same extent. Some municipalities even experi-
enced positive developments in the form of higher revenues or lower expenses in the context 
of the selected balance sheet items and policy areas of interest. The question thus arises as to 
what the potential factors of influence identified previously explain the variation. That ques-
tion will be addressed in this chapter as a continuation of the second empirical component of 
this study. 
While the calculations of financial changes, presented in the previous chapter, will serve as 
dependent variables in the following analyses, the potential factors of influence, which were 
introduced in chapter 4 and operationalised in chapter 5, will be utilised as independent vari-
ables. Accordingly, the statistical characteristics of the independent variables’ distributions 
will be presented and discussed in the first sub-chapter (13.1). Linear regressions will be used 
to estimate the associations between these factors and the financial changes in the next sub-
chapter, which also includes the testing of the hypotheses formulated in chapter 4 (13.2). 
Lastly, the main empirical findings will be summarised in a final sub-chapter (13.3). 
 
13.1. Potential factors of influence 
Municipal finances can be affected by various common trends and developments as well as 
individual factors. Financial changes can concern either the revenue or the expenditure side 
of the balance sheets, or they can involve both sides at once. Although the corresponding 
dependencies are given at any time, they are even more important to understand in times of 
considerable budgetary pressure, for example caused by a financial crisis. While various fac-
tors and their potential influence in the case of such an event were already derived theoreti-
cally in chapter 4 and operationalised in chapter 5, this chapter will present the statistical key 
figures of the variables’ distributions in the case of Dutch municipalities and the Financial Crisis 
since 2007. Following the previous distinction of theoretical approaches to understand poli-
cymaking, the three sub-chapters focus on structure-based factors (13.1.1), institution-based 
factors (13.1.2), and interest-based factors (13.1.3). While structure-based models focus on 
the socio-economic structure and associated problems in society to provide explanations for 
the policy outcome, formal and informal institutional structures are of interest in institution-
based models. Furthermore, actors within the political-administrative system and their pref-
erences describe the main explanatory approach in interest-based models (Knill & Tosun, 
2012, p. 69 ff.). Since all financial data in the three sub-chapters relate to the year 2007, as 
the base year of the adjustments for inflation in the previous chapters, no adjustments for 





13.1.1. Structure-based factors 
Within the group of structure-based factors with a potential influence on financial develop-
ments at the local level in times of a financial crisis, a distinction can be made between socio-
economic factors and factors in relation to the cleavage approach. The socio-economic school 
focuses on societal and economic influences on policymaking, as well as the resulting pressure 
to address accruing problems because of societal and economic developments (Schmidt & 
Ostheim, 2007, p. 29; Obinger, 2015, p. 35 f.). The cleavage approach considers factors of long-
term socio-economic fissions and their influence to be most relevant in understanding policy-
making (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). 
The following three variables were operationalised as part of the first sub-group: the change 
in unemployment, the share of the financial sector, and the share of persons aged 65 and older. 
In addition, two variables, namely the number of inhabitants and the share of agricultural soil 
usage, were defined as part of the second sub-group. The statistical key figures of these five 
variables’ distributions in the case of the Dutch municipalities are listed in table 38. 
Table 38: Potential structure-based factors of influence on municipal finances in times of a financial crisis (Data sources: see 
table 4; own calculations) 








Share of persons 
aged 65 and 
older 2007 
Population 2007 Share of agricul-
tural soil usage 
2006 
N 403 443 443 443 458 
Mean 0.1983 0.0727 0.1506 37,032.50 0.5617 
Std. Deviation 0.2958 0.0230 0.0267 58,740.11 0.2355 
Range 2.17 0.1754 0.1965 746,142 0.9409 
Min. -1.00 0.0000 0.0689 951 0.0007 
Max. 1.17 0.1754 0.2654 747,093 0.9415 
 
On average, the unemployment rate increased by 0.1983 percentage points216 in the Nether-
lands when comparing the times of the recent Financial Crisis to pre-Crisis times. However, 
when looking at the municipalities separately, the development was not uniform. While the 
highest increase was recorded in Rijswijk (+1.17 percentage points), the highest decrease oc-
curred in Roermond (-1.00 percentage points).217 The size of the financial sector, expressed as 
the share of branches of companies with related activities of all branches of companies within 
a certain municipality, varied in 2007 as well. While 7.27% of the businesses within a munici-
pality were part of the group on average, none of the local companies performed activities in 
the area of financial services in Schiermonnikoog and Vlieland. In Bloemendaal, on the other 
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hand, 17.54% of all companies were part of the financial sector. Also, the share of persons 
aged 65 and older was not equally distributed across the Netherlands in 2007. While 15.06% 
of the population was part of this age group on national average, the variation at the local 
level ranged from 6.89% (Urk) to 26.54% (Laren). 
As a result of various factors, such as geographic conditions and historical developments, the 
size of municipalities in terms of inhabitants is subject to variation within a country. In 2007, 
an average of 37,032.50 persons lived in a Dutch municipality. While the smallest village 
(Schiermonnikoog) had 951 inhabitants, 747,093 persons resided in the largest city (Amster-
dam). Quite naturally, the usage of the soil also differs for similar reasons. In 2006, the average 
area used for agriculture amounted to 56.17% at the Dutch local level. The individual share 
ranged from 0.07% of the total surface area in Vlieland to 94.15% in Littenseradiel. Overall, 
the distributions of the independent variables in line with structure-based factors illustrate 
wide variation, which affirms their potential role as explanatory factors of variation in munic-
ipal finances. Following this overview on structure-based factors, institution-based factors will 
be considered in the next sub-chapter. 
 
13.1.2. Institution-based factors 
New institutionalism is a theoretical approach within the group of institution-based models. 
In line with the earlier developments of behaviouralism and rational choice theory since the 
1950s, new institutionalism can be considered as a movement away from the previous focus 
on formal structures of institutions towards informal processes, also including political factors 
(March & Olsen, 1984). Historical institutionalism represents one type of new institutionalism, 
focusing on path dependencies in policy decisions as a result of former choices by an institu-
tion and historical contingencies in general (Peters, 2005, pp. 19 f., 71 ff.; Hall & Taylor, 1996, 
p. 937 ff.; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, pp. 1 f., 10; Raadschelders, 1998). 
Existing municipal debt was identified as a potential parameter of influence on financial de-
velopments in times of crisis, based on historical institutionalism. More specifically, a distinc-
tion was made between short-term debt and long-term debt in the operationalisation, in line 
with the maturities of the liabilities. The statistical key figures of the distributions of both types 
of debt in Dutch municipalities in 2007 are listed in table 39. 
Table 39: Potential institution-based factors of influence on municipal finances in times of a financial crisis (Data sources: see 
table 4; own calculations) 
 Short-term debt in euro per 
capita 2007 
Long-term debt in euro per 
capita 2007 
N 425 425 
Mean 274.67 1,438.24 
Std. Deviation 288.16 1,154.36 
Range 4,091.00 5,884.00 
Min. -189.00 0.00 





As already pointed out in the context of the changes of debt in the years of the recent Financial 
Crisis, Dutch municipalities were and still are in debt to differing degrees. In 2007, the short-
term debt at the local level amounted to 274.67 euro per capita on average. Since this category 
involves current accounts, positive balances are also possible. However, with seven munici-
palities in 2007, this can be considered as an exception. On the one hand, the highest positive 
cash position was given in Zeewolde, with 189.00 euro per capita. The highest negative posi-
tion, on the other hand, was recorded in Margraten, with an indebtedness of 3,902.00 euro 
per capita. From a comparative perspective, the Dutch local government’s long-term debt is 
usually higher than its short-term debt. With an average long-term debt of 1,438.24 euro per 
capita, this applies also to the situation in 2007. However, while eight municipalities (Blaricum, 
Dantumadeel, Geldermalsen, Lopik, Ouder-Amstel, Scherpenzeel, Voorschoten, and Waalre) 
did not possess any long-term debt, the highest indebtedness was recorded in Borne, with 
5,884.00 euro per capita, again illustrating a wide variation. Taken together, the two types of 
debt are also unevenly distributed across Dutch municipalities. In line with the resulting finan-
cial leeway, the two variables might be part of the explanation for unequal developments of 
other balance sheet items. As the last group of potential factors of influence on municipal 
finances in times of crisis, interest-based factors are the focus of the next sub-chapter. 
 
13.1.3. Interest-based factors 
Institutions and their activities are characterised by elected and appointed officials, as well as 
the employees working for them. Following this line of thought, interest-based models focus 
on the role of people or groups of persons in conjunction with their views and objectives in 
policymaking (Peters, 2005, pp. 123 ff., 136). A further subdivision into party-focused and bu-
reaucracy-focused approaches is common. On the one hand, party-focused approaches see 
political parties and their officials, who are presumed to generally be aiming to increase their 
political influence, as crucial for the policy outcome (Strøm, 1990; Hibbs, 1977). Bureaucracy-
focused approaches, on the other hand, emphasise the role of the administration in the pro-
cess of policymaking, also beyond the implementation of policies (Niskanen, 1971; Dunleavy, 
1991). 
In the context of the intended analyses, the share of left parties and the political fragmenta-
tion of the municipal council were identified and operationalised as part of the former group 
of theoretical approaches. The same applies to the number of civil servants and the adminis-
trative budget as part of the latter group of approaches. The statistical key figures of the dis-
tributions of these four variables with a potential influence on municipal finances in times of 





Table 40: Potential interest-based factors of influence on municipal finances in times of a financial crisis (Data sources: see 
table 4; own calculations) 
 Share of left parties 
2006 
Fragmentation 2006 Civil servants (FTE) 
per 1,000 inhabitants 
2007 
Administrative costs 
in euro per capita 
2007 
N 418 418 373 425 
Mean 0.3084 0.7843 8.1126 -147.81 
Std. Deviation 0.1531 0.0493 3.2758 75.69 
Range 0.7692 0.3528 26.0358 974.66 
Min. 0.0000 0.5319 2.0066 -858.35 
Max. 0.7692 0.8847 28.0424 116.31 
 
According to the calculations, left parties gained an average of 30.84% of the municipal council 
seats in the 2006 municipal election. A broad variation can be observed across the local level. 
While parties on this side of the political spectrum gained no seats in 30 municipalities, the 
highest seat share of 76.92% was recorded in Reiderland. Correspondingly, the fragmentation 
of the seat shares within the municipal council – measured on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 
implies the lowest and 1 the highest possible fragmentation – varied across the Dutch local 
level and is closely related to the number of parties that participated in the 2006 municipal 
election in each municipality. An average fragmentation of 0.7843 was calculated. The lowest 
fragmentation of the municipal council was observed in Tubbergen, with a value of 0.5319, 
and the highest fragmentation occurred in Waalwijk, with a value of 0.8847. 
The number of civil servants in full-time equivalents per 1,000 inhabitants was also subject to 
variation across the local level in the Netherlands. In 2007, an average of 8.1126 civil servants 
per 1,000 inhabitants were employed by each municipality. This average share ranged from 
2.0066 civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants in Ten Boer218 to 28.0424 civil servants per 1,000 
inhabitants in Schagen. Furthermore, administrative affairs are mainly associated with costs 
at all levels of government. However, revenues can be generated, for example with fees for 
services of the public affairs secretary. Therefore, positive account balances are possible in 
this policy area. In 2007, administrative costs amounted to 147.81 euro per capita at the local 
level in the Netherlands. The highest expenses took place in Schiermonnikoog, with 858.35 
euro per capita. The only positive result, at the other end of the distribution, was recorded for 
Veenendaal, with revenues of 116.31 euro per capita. Overall, the independent variables in 
line with interest-based factors also have a sufficient variance to serve as potential explana-
tions for differences in financial developments at the municipal level. After introducing all the 
dependent and independent variables, as well as their statistical characteristics, in case of the 
Dutch local level and the Financial Crisis since 2007, the results of linear regressions will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
 
                                                     




13.2. Empirical analyses of factors potentially determining variation in 
crisis impact and crisis responses  
Following the identifications, operationalisations, and calculations of six dependent variables 
and 11 independent variables, linear regressions, which represent a statistical approach to 
model the relationship between variables, will be utilised to quantify the correlations between 
the potential factors determining variation and the financial developments at the Dutch local 
level in times of the recent Financial Crisis. Separate regressions are calculated for all depend-
ent variables, while the same set of independent variables is included.219 Since the analyses 
involve the variables of the previous chapters, all data in the following analysis are adjusted 
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the models were limited to a set of independent variables with relatively low correlations between these varia-




Table 41: Results of the linear regressions (Data sources: see table 4; own calculations) 
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N 296 296 296 296 296 296 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.302 0.080 0.027 0.030 0.003 0.088 
Note: Unstandardised coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
296 Dutch municipalities were included in each of the six linear regressions. Missing data were 
mainly caused by municipal mergers, which implied that data were not available for some or 
all variables. This circumstance primarily occurred with variables based on time spans. Also, in 
other cases, individual data were not available. All corresponding cases were excluded list-
wise. However, considering the number of municipalities – 408 – in 2013 (Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek, 2018a), representing the last year with data incorporated into this part of 
                                                     
220 The measuring scale of the variable population 2007 was divided by 1,000 inhabitants in order to increase 
the presentability of the coefficients. 
221 The measuring scale of the variable short-term debt 2007 was divided by 1,000 euro in order to increase the 
presentability of the coefficients. 
222 The measuring scale of the variable long-term debt 2007 was divided by 1,000 euro in order to increase the 




the empirical analyses, it was possible to include the financial developments in 72.55% of all 
Dutch municipalities. 
According to the adjusted R squared, between 30.2% (dependent variable: social services) and 
0.3% (dependent variable: short-term debt) of the variation is explained by the independent 
variables correlating with the dependent variables in the different models. Considering the 
explorative nature of this research and the large number of other factors potentially affecting 
municipal finances, the explanatory power of the models with the dependent variables social 
services, long-term debt (adjusted R squared: 8.8%), and administrative support of the exec-
utive board (adjusted R squared: 8.0%) is particularly satisfactory. Furthermore, multicolline-
arity, which is a potential problem in regression models with a high correlation between the 
independent variables and a reduced reliability of the coefficients, does not appear to apply 
to the six regression models above, with the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) of 2.185 
and all other values below 2.0. 
In the first regression model, with the policy area social services as the dependent variable, 
three independent variables, namely the share of the financial sector in 2007, the share of 
persons aged 65 and older in 2007, and the population in 2007, have a highly statistically sig-
nificant223 association with the dependent variable. Since higher positive values of the de-
pendent variables express higher cost increases for social services in recent years, positive 
coefficients imply reinforcing effects of the related independent variables. This is the case for 
the share of persons aged 65 and older in 2007 and the population in 2007. In other words, 
the higher the share of the elderly or the higher the number of inhabitants, the higher the cost 
increases for social services when comparing the time periods 2005–2007 with 2009–2011. In 
the case of the share of the financial sector, the relation to changing costs for social services 
is also highly significant, but negative, which means that a higher share is associated with 
lower cost increases. Some limited statistical significance is also given for the three independ-
ent variables, namely share of left parties in the 2006 municipal election, administrative costs 
in 2007, and the number of civil servants in 2007 in relation to the financial developments, 
with the provision of social services as a dependent variable. In the case of left parties, where 
higher positive values of the independent variable imply more seats in the municipal councils, 
the regression results point to a positive interrelation with higher cost increases for social ser-
vices. Higher administrative costs, expressed by higher negative values of the independent 
variable, on the other hand, are associated with lower cost increases for social services. Lastly, 
a higher number of civil servants is related to more extensive rises in social spending, accord-
ing to the results. 
In the second regression model, with the administrative support of the executive board as the 
dependent variable, the analysis identified no highly significant independent variables. Some 
limited statistical significance can be observed for the administrative costs in 2007 and the 
seat shares of left parties in the 2006 municipal election. In this regard, higher positive values 
of the dependent variable indicate higher cost increases. Accordingly, higher administrative 
                                                     
223 In this case as well as in the following, highly (statistically) significant refers to a significance level of p < 
0.001. Terms, such as (statistically) significant or limited (statistical) significance, will be used to describe signif-




expenses are related to higher rises in expenditures for the administrative support of the ex-
ecutive board. In the case of left parties, more seats are associated with lower cost increases 
of the administrative support under investigation. 
Building permits formed the dependent variable in the third regression model. Here, higher 
positive values represent increasing revenues in this area of municipal activities, while nega-
tive values imply a decrease. According to the results, no independent variable is highly signif-
icant, while the share of agricultural soil usage in 2006, the share of persons aged 65 and older 
in 2007, and the administrative costs in 2007 have a limited statistical significance. In the case 
of agricultural soil usage, a higher share of soil used for related purposes indicates a lower 
degree of urbanisation, which is associated with higher revenue increases from building per-
mits in the regression model. Also, in case of a higher share of the elderly, a higher increase 
of the dependent variable can be observed. The same connection applies to administrative 
costs, where higher expenses are related to higher revenues from building permits. 
Interestingly, hardly any of the included factors is statistically linked to the financial changes 
in land development as the dependent variable in the fourth regression model and the balance 
sheet item, where the highest impact of the recent Financial Crisis can be observed at the local 
level in the Netherlands in comparison with the other areas of municipal activities. Some lim-
ited statistical significance is only given for the share of persons aged 65 and older in 2007. In 
this regard, a higher share of the elderly relates to lower decreases in revenues from land 
development. 
In regression model number five, with short-term debt as the dependent variable, again no 
highly significant independent variables can be observed based on the calculations. However, 
some limited statistical significance is given for the change in unemployment. The independ-
ent variable positively relates to the dependent variable. In other words, a larger growth in 
unemployment is linked to higher increases in short-term debt at the local level in the Neth-
erlands. Interestingly, there is no statistical evidence regarding a relation between the existing 
short-term debt in 2007 and the increases in short-term debt in the following years. 
The sixth and last regression model of this study comprises long-term debt as the dependent 
variable. According to the results, the existing long-term debt in 2007 is the only factor that is 
statistically connected to changes in long-term debt with a high significance. The negative co-
efficient implies that a higher long-term debt in 2007 is associated with a higher decrease in 
long-term debt in the following years. In addition, the links between the existing short-term 
debt in 2007, the share of agricultural soil usage in 2006, the number of civil servants in 2007, 
and the changes in long-term debt are statistically significant to a limited degree. Higher short-
term debt in 2007 is related to higher increases in long-term debt in more recent years. Fur-
thermore, according to the regression results, a higher share of soil usage for agricultural pur-
poses and a higher number of civil servants are also associated with higher increases in long-
term debt. 
Taken together, the brief overview of the results of the six linear regression models demon-
strates that some of the 11 independent variables turned out to be highly significantly corre-




since 2007. However, as is usual in social sciences, it was not possible to identify one specific 
factor that could explain large shares of the variation in multiple regression models. In other 
words, the detected factors that influence financial changes in the separate balance sheet 
items, policy areas, and financial results differ. The detailed implications of the regression re-
sults for the hypotheses proposed in chapter 4 will be assessed in the next step. In line with 
the three groups of independent variables, also referred to as potential factors of influence 
on municipal finances, the successive sub-chapters are structured as follows: structure-based 
factors (13.2.1), institution-based factors (13.2.2), and interest-based factors (13.2.3). 
 
13.2.1. The influence of structure-based factors 
As already illustrated in table 41 and described above, none of the independent variables are 
significantly linked to all six dependent variables. This implies that none of the hypotheses 
formulated in chapter 4 can be confirmed for all balance sheet items, policy areas, and finan-
cial results of interest. Furthermore, statistical significance does not necessarily mean that the 
relation between the variables follows the direction formulated in the hypotheses. Building 
upon the statistical results presented in the previous chapter, the hypotheses in line with 
structure-based factors will be tested for the dependent variables separately in this sub-chap-
ter. 
Hypothesis 1 focuses on the relation between the increase in unemployment and financial 
changes at the local level during a financial crisis, and it was formulated as follows:224 
H1: The higher the increase in unemployment, the higher the increase in municipal net 
expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in municipal net reve-
nues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Considering a significance level of at least 5% (p < 0.05)225 and the sign of the coefficient, this 
hypothesis is confirmed for the financial changes in short-term debt.226 According to the re-
gression results, none of the other dependent variables are significantly associated with the 
changes in unemployment. The share of the financial sector is the focus of the second hypoth-
eses, which reads as follows: 
H2: The higher the share of the financial sector, the higher the increase in municipal net 
expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in municipal net reve-
nues per capita during a financial crisis. 
A high statistical significance of the size of the financial sector can be observed for financial 
changes in the policy area of social services. However, the relation is negative, which implies 
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that the hypothesis is not confirmed for any of the dependent variables. The third hypothesis 
addresses the share of the elderly population and was formulated as follows: 
H3: The higher the share of persons aged 65 and older, the lower the increase in mu-
nicipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the lower the decrease in municipal 
net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
A statistically significant link can be recorded between this independent variable and the fol-
lowing policy areas: social services, building permits, and land development. However, in the 
case of social services, the observed relation is again opposite to the hypothesis, which implies 
that it is not confirmed. For building permits and land development, on the other hand, the 
hypothesis is confirmed. The next hypothesis in line with potential structure-based factors of 
influence on municipal finances in times of crisis addresses the size of the municipalities in 
terms of the number of inhabitants. This hypothesis was formulated as follows: 
H4: The more inhabitants, the higher the increase in municipal net expenditures per 
capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in municipal net revenues per capita 
during a financial crisis. 
In this case, a statistically significant association was observed between the independent var-
iable and social services. Considering the direction of the relation, the hypothesis is confirmed 
for this dependent variable. The fifth and last hypothesis in line with potential structure-based 
factors of influence on municipal finances in times of crisis focuses on the share of soil used 
for agricultural purposes as a measure of urbanisation. Here, a larger share of agricultural soil 
usage indicates a lower degree of urbanisation. Accordingly, the following hypothesis was for-
mulated: 
H5: The higher the share of soil used for agricultural purposes, the lower the increase 
in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the lower the decrease in mu-
nicipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Statistical significance for the expected relation can be observed in the cases of building per-
mits and long-term debt. Based on the directions of statistical links, the hypothesis is con-
firmed for building permits, but not for long-term debt. The hypotheses in line with potential 
institution-based factors of influence on changes in municipal finances will be addressed in 
the next sub-chapter. 
 
13.2.2. The influence of institution-based factors 
Two hypotheses were formulated with a focus on potential institution-based factors of influ-
ence on financial developments in local government in times of a financial crisis. In both cases, 
the role of debt is assessed, and the maturities of the liabilities differ. The first hypothesis 




H6: The higher the existing municipal short-term debt per capita, the higher the in-
crease in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease 
in municipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Statistical evidence in line with this relation can only be observed regarding the changes in 
long-term debt. The direction also corresponds to the hypothesis, which is confirmed. The 
existing long-term debt is the independent variable of interest in the second hypothesis, with 
a focus on institution-based factors, and it was set up as follows: 
H7: The higher the existing municipal long-term debt per capita, the higher the increase 
in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in mu-
nicipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
According to the calculations, statistical significance can only be observed for the relation be-
tween existing long-term debt and the development of long-term debt. However, the linkage 
is not in line with the direction proposed in the hypothesis, which is consequently not con-
firmed. The influence of potential interest-based factors in the context of financial changes at 
the local level in times of crisis will be addressed in the next and last sub-chapter. 
 
13.2.3. The influence of interest-based factors 
Within the group of interest-based factors, four hypotheses were formulated. The first one 
addresses the seat share of left parties in the 2006 municipal election, representing the last 
regular election before the recent Financial Crisis, and it reads as follows:  
H8: The higher the share of left parties in the municipal council, the higher the increase 
in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease in mu-
nicipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Statistically significant results were found for the financial developments in social services and 
the administrative support of the executive board as dependent variables. In the former case, 
the direction is aligned with the expected relation. Therefore, the hypothesis is confirmed for 
the policy area of social services. In the latter case, the hypothesis is not confirmed. The polit-
ical fragmentation based on the results of the 2006 municipal election is the focus of the next 
hypothesis within the group of interest-based factors. The hypothesis was formulated as fol-
lows. 
H9: The lower the political fragmentation of the municipal council, the higher the in-
crease in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the higher the decrease 
in municipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
Since this independent variable does not have a statistically significant association with any of 
the six dependent variables, the hypothesis is rejected. The number of civil servants in relation 





H10: The higher the number of municipal staff members in relation to the inhabitants, 
the lower the increase in municipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the 
lower the decrease in municipal net revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
According to the regression results, this independent variable is statistically significantly linked 
to social services and long-term debt. However, in both cases, the hypothesis is not confirmed, 
since the direction of the relation is not in line with the formulated expectations. The last 
hypothesis addresses the role of the administrative budget, and was formulated as follows: 
H11: The higher the administrative budget per capita, the lower the increase in munic-
ipal net expenditures per capita or alternatively the lower the decrease in municipal net 
revenues per capita during a financial crisis. 
In this case, statistically significant results were found for the dependent variables administra-
tive support of the executive board, social services, and building permits. Since the direction of 
the statistical relation regarding the first dependent variable is in line with the formulated 
dependency, the hypothesis is confirmed for the administrative support of the executive 
board. In the cases of the two latter variable, namely social services and building permits, on 
the other hand, the hypothesis is not confirmed. Following the testing of the 11 hypotheses 
in combination with the six dependent variables, the main results of the statistical analyses 
will be summarised in the last sub-chapter of chapter 13. 
 
13.3. Factors of influence on municipal finances in times of the recent 
Financial Crisis 
Aiming to determine the influence of 11 factors on financial changes at the local level in the 
Netherlands during the recent Financial Crisis, six linear regressions were calculated. Consid-
ering the 11 independent variables and the 11 corresponding hypotheses, in combination with 
the six dependent variables, 66 separate sub-hypotheses can be distinguished. Only eight of 
these sub-hypotheses were confirmed in the statistical analyses, and they are listed below: 
 Hypothesis 1: (change in unemployment) for the dependent variable short-term debt (p 
< 0.01) 
 Hypothesis 3: share of persons aged 65 and older) for the dependent variable building 
permits (p < 0.05) 
 Hypothesis 3: (share of persons aged 65 and older) for the dependent variable land de-
velopment (p < 0.05) 
 Hypothesis 4: (population) for the dependent variable social services (p < 0.001) 
 Hypothesis 5: (share of agricultural soil usage) for the dependent variable building per-
mits (p < 0.01) 
 Hypothesis 6: (existing short-term debt) for the dependent variable change in long-term 
debt (p < 0.01) 




 Hypothesis 11: (administrative budget) for the dependent variable administrative sup-
port of the executive board (p < 0.01) 
Reflecting on the share of sub-hypotheses confirmed, it was not possible to identify one fac-
tor, or a set of factors, that explains a large part of the variation in financial changes across 
multiple policy areas at the local level in the Netherlands in times of the recent Financial Crisis. 
Given the very large number of potential factors affecting a research object of interest, this 
circumstance can be considered as usual in social sciences (Mill, 1843; Scharpf, 1997b, p. 22 
ff.). 
Accordingly, the detected factors of influence in certain areas of municipal activities largely 
vary. It must also be noted that the significance levels of some of those factors are relatively 
high. Apart from the statistical results, it should be taken into account that other unidentified 
factors, which were not included in the analyses, potentially influenced the financial develop-
ments. In addition, relatively unsystematic financial changes are always a possibility as well. 
Following the statistical results, the conclusion of this study, which includes a discussion of the 
implications and limitations of the insights, as well as an answer to the research question, will 





14. Changes in the financial situation of Dutch municipalities in times 
of the Financial Crisis since 2007 
The Financial Crisis since 2007 was certainly one of the most disadvantageous events in recent 
decades, and it included wide-ranging consequences for citizens across the globe. Represent-
ing a result of human action, it was also argued that this Crisis could have been prevented 
(Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). More generally, the Crisis also illustrated how 
quickly financial and economic difficulties can spread across national borders, as a result of 
the increasing complexity and highly interlinked nature of financial markets and the global 
economy. 
While the economic situation in most affected countries began to recover already a few years 
ago, as the economic growth rates indicate (World Bank, 2017a), it needs to be taken into 
account that ongoing consequences of the Financial Crisis can still be observed, especially in 
the areas of public debt and monetary policies. Given the high increases in public debt, a num-
ber of cutback initiatives might still be necessary in many countries, including the Netherlands, 
in the near future (Kickert, 2015, p. 560). Rising interest rates might also reinforce this neces-
sity. In other words, some of the long-term consequences of the Financial Crisis since 2007 
remain to be seen. 
By combining mainly quantitative analyses with qualitative additions, this study provides de-
tailed insights into the financial developments at the local level in the Netherlands in time of 
the Financial Crisis since 2007, with a focus on variation between the municipalities. This chap-
ter concludes the study. The first sub-chapter includes the main empirical findings in general 
as well as in comparison with other studies (14.1). Then, the relations between the financial 
changes identified at the Dutch local level and the contextual factors in terms of general trends 
and developments in Dutch local government and local governance are discussed (14.2). Re-
marks on the overall limitations of this study follow thereafter (14.3). The next sub-chapter 
provides an answer to the research question (14.4). This is followed by reflections on crisis 
management and policy recommendations focusing on the Dutch case (14.5) and some 
broader thoughts on the more general lessons from the recent Financial Crisis (14.6). 
 
14.1. Conclusions from the empirical results 
Even though none of the 11 hypotheses on factors potentially explaining variation – formu-
lated in line with the study’s conceptual model – were confirmed for all balance sheet items, 
policy areas, and the financial results of Dutch municipalities previously identified as affected 
by the Financial Crisis since 2007, the quantitative analyses provide various interesting in-
sights. In this regard, it should be taken into account that the absence of a statistically signifi-





The empirical results validate that municipal expenses for social services increased more in 
larger cities in comparison with smaller villages. Also, a higher seat share for left parties in the 
2006 municipal election relates to higher increases in social expenses. Accordingly, the expec-
tation formulated based on the party difference hypothesis by Hibbs (1977) is confirmed for 
this policy area. Furthermore, the relation between a lower degree of urbanisation and lower 
revenue decreases from building permits is validated, and it reflects the general importance 
of the availability of land for construction activities. 
Among the variables that are not statistically significantly related, it is interesting to observe 
that changes in unemployment, which are generally considered to be one of the most relevant 
societal consequences of the recent Financial Crisis, hardly affected any of the balance sheet 
items and the policy area of interest. This is particularly surprising for expenses for social ser-
vices; however, it might be explained by relatively low increases in unemployment on average 
as well as limited competences of the local level in this area during the time period under 
investigation. Nevertheless, higher increases in unemployment relate to higher increases in 
short-term debt. 
Another interesting observation is that the size of the financial sector does not explain varia-
tion in any of the financial areas under investigation, apart from social services, where a higher 
share of financial service companies of all businesses is associated with declining expenses. In 
other words, municipalities with many banks and other types of financial service companies, 
which represent enterprises affected by the recent Financial Crisis the most, thereby implying 
reductions in their numbers of employees, experienced decreases in social expenditure. In line 
with the previous observation that increases in unemployment are not associated with higher 
social expenses at the Dutch local level in times of the recent Financial Crisis, a general demo-
graphic structure in these municipalities with a relatively young population might provide an 
explanation for this relation. This assumption is also supported by the empirical finding that a 
higher share of the elderly is associated with cost increases for social services. 
Regarding the financial results, it is interesting to note that existing debt is not always relevant 
for the development of debt. It was revealed that short-term debt in 2007 was not linked to 
the development of short-term debt in the following years. In the case of long-term debt on 
the one hand, a higher level of debt in 2007 is related to a higher reduction in this type of debt 
in the following years, which might be interpreted as success in debt reduction. On the other 
hand, a higher level of short-term debt in 2007 is associated with higher increases in long-
term debt in more recent years, which points to measures of debt restructuring. 
In the case of land development, as a traditional source of local revenues in the Netherlands 
and as the municipal activity that previous studies (Overmans, 2017, p. 173; Weske et al., 
2014, p. 411; Bos, 2013, p. 46 f.; Allers, 2009, p. 283; Centraal Planbureau, 2016; Kattenberg 
et al., 2016; Deloitte, 2010; Deloitte, 2011; Deloitte, 2012; Deloitte, 2013; Deloitte, 2014; 
Deloitte, 2016; Deloitte, 2017; Ernst & Young, 2015) pointed out as being most affected by the 
recent Financial Crisis, the number of relevant factors identified and their statistical signifi-
cances on the financial developments in recent years is relatively low. Limited statistical evi-




companying hypothesis, namely that the higher the share of the elderly, the lower the de-
creases in municipal net revenues. Moreover, in the case of building permits, the share of the 
elderly was also revealed to be a factor of influence.  
The fact that most of the hypotheses and sub-hypotheses of this study were not confirmed is 
best explained by the overall complexity of budgetary developments in municipal finances and 
changes in the supply and demand of public services. Apart from the factors identified and 
included in the statistical analyses, certainly other factors of influence exist. However, even if 
these hidden factors would be known, it might be difficult to operationalise and measure 
them. Next to specific factors, there are many more individual reasons for certain decisions. 
In case of the decision by a private company to invest in new land within a certain region at a 
particular point in time, for example, the considerations might be based on aspects ranging 
from labour supply to the competitive situation. The multitude of reasons for certain devel-
opments apply in general as well as in times of financial crises. As a consequence, it might be 
possible to detect changes in demand within areas of interest in aggregated figures, repre-
senting the cumulated decisions by a large number of actors, such as in the case of declines in 
revenues from land development at the local level in the Netherlands during the Financial 
Crisis since 2007; however, confirming relevant factors statistically to explain the reasons for 
changes is rather difficult. On the supply side, possible factors and reasons for certain policy 
decisions are also manifold. In the area of land development, for example, municipal councils 
might be influenced in their plans to establish new industrial zones by aspects ranging from 
the suitability of certain areas within the municipal territory to predictions of future demand. 
While some financial or other types of developments might be explainable in statistical models 
by taking the interactions of a large number of factors into account, in many cases the under-
lying causes, such as policy decisions, might take place relatively unsystematically, which 
makes the detection and explanation of holistic patterns impossible by definition. In such a 
context, other quantitative research methods are also unable to identify and determine asso-
ciations between certain factors and changes in public budgets in a large number of cases. 
This is also illustrated by many single case studies or studies with a relatively small number of 
cases being published, focusing on the detection and explanation of mechanisms and relation-
ships with qualitative methods.  
Given that the potential factors of influence on municipal finances included in the empirical 
analyses of this study were mostly rejected, the validity and applicability of the political-ad-
ministrative and socio-economic theories from which the factors were derived may be ques-
tioned as well. This applies to the structure-, institution-, and interest-based models to similar 
extents. However, as the conceptual model of this study already illustrated, theory building 
and testing in the area of municipal finances is complicated because of numerous factors of 
influence and different legal frameworks. Similar experiences were also found in many other 
empirical studies. 
Against this background, it must be assumed that, on the one hand, more specific theories in 
the context of municipal finances, applicable to a larger number of jurisdictions, will certainly 




torical institutionalism with its focus on path dependencies, will further turn out to be unver-
ifiable for many subjects of research. However, it should not be forgotten that identifying and 
statistically verifying factors which are not related to one another, enhances the scientific 
knowledge on a certain topic as well. 
Overall, the lack of far-reaching explanations for financial variation both in this study and in 
other research implies a difficulty in taking appropriate measures to reduce the potential ef-
fects of future crises not only in the area of land development but also in relation to other 
items of the municipal balance sheets. However, also rather restricted insights, such as the 
empirical finding that in times of the recent Financial Crisis, municipal expenses for social ser-
vices per capita increased more in larger cities in comparison with smaller villages, can be 
helpful when aiming to address other crises in future. 
From a theoretical perspective, budgeting was described as the challenge of deciding on the 
allocation of public funds to different areas of governmental activities already several decades 
ago (Key, 1940, p. 1138). This difficulty is also reflected in the broad variation of financial de-
velopments in the different municipalities, as illustrated by the statistical distributions of the 
dependent variables included in this study on the Netherlands. In combination with the lim-
ited significance of factors possibly determining variation in the regression analyses, Wil-
davsky’s (1961, p. 184) view – that a subjective dimension is always involved when assigning 
financial resources to certain areas of responsibility, which also makes a normative theory of 
budgeting utopian – can also be agreed with. 
Regarding the already long-lasting theoretical debate on the advantageousness of counter-
cyclical and pro-cyclical policies in times of a financial crisis, the financial data of Dutch munic-
ipalities analysed in this study do not reveal a general pattern in line with one of the two ap-
proaches. Especially extensive counter-cyclical investments in infrastructure, which are often 
suggested in times of crises to stimulate the economy, cannot be identified at the Dutch mu-
nicipal level during the Financial Crisis since 2007. However, together with the relatively lim-
ited financial room for manoeuvrability at the local level of government in the Netherlands, it 
needs to be taken into account that financial changes often originate from changes on the 
demand side rather than from own policy decisions. In the case of the recent Financial Crisis, 
further budgetary decisions at the national level, which included both counter-cyclical and 
pro-cyclical policies, implied financial changes for Dutch municipalities. In this context, the 
growing challenge to design and implement countermeasures to a crisis, because of more 
complex framework conditions (Raudla et al., 2015b, p. 448 f.), can also be confirmed for the 
Dutch case. 
Considering individual municipalities, it is interesting to observe that Geldermalsen, Zen-
venaar, Veghel, and Nuenen, Gerwen en Nederwetten are part of the group of municipalities 
in which the revenues from land developments decreased the most, as well as the group with 
the highest increases in long-term debt. For Gilze en Rijen and Rijswijk, a similar situation is 
found. Both municipalities are among those whose revenues from building permits decreased 
the most, while short-term debt saw the largest increases. As the cases of these six municipal-
ities illustrate, unfavourable financial developments in relation to certain balance sheet items 




At the local level in the Netherlands, municipalities with article-12 status – in other words, 
municipalities receiving additional funds from central government as a result of financial im-
balances – are a group of particular interest in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007. 
However, while the number of article-12 municipalities was generally relatively low in recent 
decades, even a decreasing tendency can be observed of late, which does not comply with the 
predictions of other studies (cf. Deloitte, 2011; Deloitte, 2012; van der Lei, 2015). According 
to the data published by central government, financial pressure in times of the recent Finan-
cial Crisis leading to an article-12 status is an exception (Rijksoverheid, 2016f; van der Woude, 
2018, p. 255).  
Regarding the municipalities experiencing the most extensive financial changes in times of the 
recent Crisis, the numbers of article-12 municipalities within the separate groups are also rel-
atively low. Some of these municipalities are among the local authorities with the highest and 
lowest adjustments to the general payments from the municipal fund; this mainly illustrates 
changes because of their article-12 status. No article-12 municipality is part of the group with 
the highest revenue decreases in land development. In the group with the highest revenue 
decreases in relation to building permits, Boarnsterhim, which was an article-12 municipality 
between 2012 and 2014, is the only exception. In contrast, Muiden and Boskoop, which were 
article-12 municipalities in 2015 and 2000–2010 respectively, are part of the group that real-
ised the highest revenue increases in land development despite the Crisis. However, in the 
latter case, the time period of the article-12 status indicates that financial imbalances were 
already a problem for the municipality long before the beginning of the recent Financial Crisis. 
Next to Boarnsterhim, Vlissingen is another local entity with financial troubles possibly related 
to the Financial Crisis since 2007. The municipality was among those with the highest cost 
increases for social services, and it was an article-12 municipality between 2015 and 2016. 
Lastly, it is also interesting to observe that, apart from Lelystad, which has received additional 
financial contributions from central government since 1987, none of the article-12 municipal-
ities in recent years can be found among the groups of municipalities with the highest in-
creases in debt per capita. 
Another group of municipalities of particular interest are those that have recently merged, 
since municipal amalgamations are often justified by lower administrative costs in the longer 
run and a higher quality of public services, which also applies to the case of the Netherlands 
(Rutte, 2012). From a practical perspective, small municipalities that are highly in debt are 
often incorporated into larger municipalities with a better financial position. However, since 
recently merged municipalities were largely excluded from the statistical analyses, because of 
a lack of suitable data for the time span before or after the territorial changes, no statements 
on the financial success of municipal mergers are possible based on the calculations of this 
study. 
The qualitative results, which mainly describe the Dutch mayors’ subjective perceptions of 
financial implications of the Financial Crisis since 2007 within their municipalities, revealed 
interesting insights. According to the mayors’ statements in 2015, the Crisis can be considered 
as an ongoing challenge also for the near future, especially in the context of negative second-




situation. Reflecting on the survey results regarding the financial developments on both sides 
of the municipal balance sheets on average, it needs to be noted that they are not completely 
in line with official governmental statistics provided by the CBS. On the revenue side, for ex-
ample, the common perception of lower transfers from central government in recent years 
does not comply with official data. For income from local taxes and local fees, on the other 
hand, such inconsistencies cannot be observed. Certain deviations between the mayors’ per-
ceptions and official statistics can also be observed on the expenditure side, when comparing 
the data at an aggregated level. On closer inspection, the scopes of recent budget cuts were 
often overestimated. 
Regarding the discrepancies between the survey results and governmental statistics, the po-
litical discussions on austerity measures, including, for instance, cutbacks of the municipal 
fund, might provide an explanation, alongside social desirability and limited detailed 
knowledge about financial affairs. Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that, on the one 
hand, the majority of mayors’ favour higher transfers from central government, while, on the 
other hand, many of them called for more local autonomy in financial affairs. This more gen-
eral debate will be continued in the next sub-chapter. 
In the area of recently implemented cutback methods, the survey results revealed that the 
approaches chosen were generally rather short-term oriented, easy to implement, and exe-
cutable with little public attention. The common focus on human resources is illustrated by 
the practical examples of leaving vacancies unfilled for a certain time period and not prolong-
ing temporary contracts. Moreover, across-the-board cuts were relatively common, which im-
plies that decisions on political priorities were not necessary. Overall, it is recognisable that 
the cutback strategies with the least-anticipated resistance were chosen. Again, a certain 
trade-off between the implemented measures and the mayors’ preferences can be observed. 
The cutback methods they are most in favour of on average include reducing municipal tasks 
and lowering political ambitions in future, both of which certainly require the setting of prior-
ities. 
Considering the results of previous studies on financial changes at the local level in the Neth-
erlands in times of the Financial Crisis since 2007 – presented and discussed in chapter 9.2 – 
the empirical results of this study are largely comparable, even though the possibilities of di-
rect comparisons are limited because of different data sources, varying groups of municipali-
ties surveyed, and different observation periods. The main finding of other studies, namely 
that the most important impact of the Crisis can be observed in the area of land development, 
can be generally confirmed based on the data analyses of this study. Moreover, the figures of 
losses and lower revenues in this field, amounting to a total of 3.5 to 4 billion euro in recent 
years at the Dutch local level according to calculations by private consultancies were also ver-
ified. 
Overall, this study provided detailed new insights into the implications of the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 at the municipal level in the Netherlands, and it contributed to a better scientific 
understanding of public finances and budgetary changes at the local level of government in 




further discussed at a later stage. Before doing so, the following sub-chapter reflects on con-
textual factors and developments with possible confounding impacts on municipal finances 
during the time period under investigation. 
 
14.2. Financial changes in times of the recent Financial Crisis and gen-
eral trends and developments at the local level of government 
Government and governance are subject to permanent changes. At the local level, the decen-
tralisation of tasks, municipal amalgamations and municipal co-operation, management 
changes, Europeanisation, citizen participation, and the digitalisation of public services were 
previously identified as the most important trends and developments in recent decades. 
Therefore, they were included in the conceptual model, and a certain relevance of all these 
aspects is also given in the case of Dutch municipalities. However, in the context of the Neth-
erlands, it needs to be taken into account that initiatives for changes at the local level mainly 
originate from central government. 
Developments towards a smaller and more decentralised welfare state can be observed in the 
Netherlands since 1983. Decentralisations of tasks to local government took place in the form 
of multiple steps of different scales, as discussed in chapter 7.5.1. The 2015 decentralisation 
reform can be considered as the most important and extensive measure of transferring re-
sponsibilities to the local level in recent decades. While the reform was generally intended to 
lower total government spending through efficiency gains by the provision of public services 
closer to the citizens, its necessity was also justified with the additional budgetary pressure 
emerging from the Financial Crisis since 2007 (Rijksoverheid, 2015a; Sociaal en Cultureel 
Planbureau, 2016). However, considering the detailed data analyses of this study, covering 
the years 2005 to 2013 in the search for variation regarding the impact of and responses to 
the Crisis across the local level, municipal finances during this time period were not notably 
influenced by decentralisation measures. 
Municipal amalgamations and increased municipal co-operation are also ongoing develop-
ments, which have been occurring for a long time, at the local level in the Netherlands, as 
described in chapter 7.5.2. Reductions in the number of municipalities through mergers have 
been taking place since the establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the fre-
quency has increased lately. It should be taken into account that, in practice, the amalgama-
tion of two or more municipalities is a long process that extends beyond the official date of 
the merger (Backes & van der Woude, 2013, p. 234; Denters et al., 2014, p. 3; Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, p. 15 f.; Voermans & Waling, 2018, p. 207 
ff.). Municipal co-operation has gained in importance in recent decades as well. Also in the 
context of the 2015 decentralisation reform, co-operation was a common strategy of local 
authorities to fulfil the additional tasks (Niaounakis & Blank, 2017; Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 
69; Steen et al., 2017, p. 60; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2016, 
pp. 15 f., 86 f.; Voermans & Waling, 2018, p. 226 ff.). Considering the times since the beginning 




municipalities can be observed until 2018. The Crisis served as an additional reason when jus-
tifying the need for larger territorial units in order to increase the efficiency of local govern-
ment. However, since the municipalities that were part of a merger in the relevant period of 
time were largely excluded from the detailed statistical analyses of municipal finances, be-
cause of a lack of data availability, the calculations are not biased on the basis of territorial 
reforms. 
Furthermore, management changes, mainly prompted at the national level, have concerned 
municipal administrations in the Netherlands for decades, as discussed in chapter 7.5.3. How-
ever, while the reform initiatives in line with NPM were mainly implemented in the 1980s, 
followed by subsequent attempts to moderate previous changes, far-reaching reforms in this 
area were not realised in more recent years (Denters & Klok, 2005, p. 78 f.; Kickert, 2003, pp. 
378 f., 382; ter Bogt, 2008a, p. 31; Bekke, 1991). Therefore, management changes did not 
considerably affect municipal finances during the time period in the statistical analyses of this 
study. 
The same applies to Europeanisation as another ongoing development at the local level, de-
scribed in chapter 7.5.4. While an increasing influence of the EU on policy areas with tradi-
tional competences of local government in the Netherlands can be observed in general, the 
process is characterised by rather gradual steps (Denters & Klok, 2005, 73 ff.; Backes & van 
der Woude, 2013, p. 244 f.). However, major financial changes, as result of European integra-
tion, did not take place at the local level during the time period considered in the statistical 
analyses of this study. 
While citizen participation has been a long-standing tradition in the Netherlands in general, 
some new initiatives were started at the local level of government in recent years, as a reac-
tion to declining turnouts in local elections, among other factors (Michels, 2018; Michels & de 
Graaf, 2010, p. 481; Hendriks & Tops, 2003, p. 312; Kickert, 2003, p. 387 f.; Denters, 2011, p. 
319), as pointed out in chapter 7.5.5. While measures to increase citizen participation differ 
from the other trends and developments, since they usually imply additional expenses in com-
parison with the general intentions to reduce expenditures, the financial resources used for 
the initiatives are usually relatively low. Therefore, they are not relevant for the overall finan-
cial situation of Dutch municipalities. 
The digitalisation of public services in line with e-government strategies was previously iden-
tified as the last major development at the local level in the Netherlands and discussed in 
chapter 7.5.6. While related technological changes usually imply additional expenses in the 
form of conversion costs in the short term, cost reductions are the general aim in the longer 
run (Rijksoverheid, 2015c, p. 40 f.; Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016a; 
Kwaliteitsinstituut Nederlandse Gemeenten, 2016). However, reflecting on the initiatives at 
the local level in the Netherlands to date, it can be concluded that they did not have a relevant 
impact on municipal balance sheets, thereby implying that the statistical analyses of this study 
are not biased in this respect. Keeping the previous considerations in mind, the next sub-chap-





14.3. Limitations of the study 
As with any empirical research in social sciences, this study has a number of limitations. First, 
the link between financial changes and the underlying cause or causes is difficult to determine 
for each transaction of a municipality’s total budget. Especially in the policy area of social ser-
vices, many other factors of influence on financial developments, such as an ageing popula-
tion, are imaginable. If a municipal council takes a decision on a certain policy programme, 
then it can be further argued from a more practical perspective that the overall financial po-
sition of the municipality is most relevant, independent of the origin of a financial leeway or 
financial pressure. However, following the previous studies on the budgetary situation of the 
Dutch local level in times of the recent Financial Crisis – presented and discussed in chapter 
9.2 – as well as the own survey results, the Crisis can be considered as the main reason for the 
budgetary pressure of Dutch municipalities in recent years, particularly as a result of lower 
revenues from land development. 
Assessing the impact of a crisis also largely depends on the time period under review. While 
early analyses might not cover all the effects, late analyses can face the problem that certain 
developments are already counterbalanced because of a decline of the crisis. Furthermore, it 
needs to be noted that some consequences of a financial crisis, especially in terms of debt and 
debt repayments, can last for centuries, as in the case of the 1720 South Sea bubble (Castle, 
2014), which usually implies certain compromises when deciding on the time spans of empir-
ical analyses. However, in the context of this study, it was possible to identify the relevant 
time frame of the recent Financial Crisis by carefully assessing the financial developments of 
all separate balance sheet items between 2004 and 2014. 
Further limitations of this study might also originate from the reliability and validity of some 
of the data included. Apart from possible inconsistencies or mistakes in the municipalities’ 
reporting of income and expenses, as well as other key figures, the employment figures of civil 
servants within the administrations, for example, also depend on the organisation of munici-
pal co-operation and the degree of privatisation of public services. As a consequence, the 
comparability of some figures, such as personnel capacities, might be restricted to some ex-
tent. In other words, a municipality’s individual situation matters, and this is difficult to include 
in quantitative analyses. However, there is no evidence of structural distortions of the empir-
ical results in this study arising from unreliable or inaccurate data. 
Apart from all limitations, and in comparison with previous studies, this study has the follow-
ing main advantage: it was possible to include financial data of the majority of Dutch munici-
palities, which enabled the calculations of average effects and the further investigations of 
factors determining variation for all policy areas and separate balance sheet items identified 
as affected by the Financial Crisis since 2007. Following the detailed analyses and considera-





14.4. Answering the research question 
In the first chapter, the research question of this study was formulated as follows: 
How did the Financial Crisis since 2007 have an impact on Dutch municipalities and their finan-
cial situation, how did local authorities respond to the Crisis, and what factors explain varia-
tion? 
With regard to the first part of the research question, a number of negative implications of 
the recent Financial Crisis on the financial situation of local government in the Netherlands 
were observed in the empirical analyses of this study. At the level of aggregated data of all 
Dutch municipalities combined and after adjusting for inflation, adverse financial develop-
ments and burdens were identified in the policy area of social services and for the separate 
balance sheet items administrative support of the executive board, within the policy area of 
general administration, and building permits and land development, both within the policy 
area of spatial planning and housing. However, in line with the analytical focus on aggregated 
developments, these findings do not exclude the possibility that individual municipalities ex-
perienced either severe financial problems in other policy areas or no financial stress at all. 
When comparing the Dutch municipalities’ average expenses for social services between 2005 
and 2007 with those between 2009 and 2011, the costs increased by 44.8%. During the same 
time periods, the average expenditures for the administrative support of the executive board 
rose by 7.9%. In the cases of building permits and land developments, the time period 2005–
2007 was compared to the time period 2011–2013, since a certain temporal lag of the effects 
was recognised. For building permits, a decrease in the average income by 28.9% was identi-
fied, while for land development, which other studies pointed out as the area of local govern-
ment activities in the Netherlands that was most affected by the recent Financial Crisis, a de-
crease of 234.8% was calculated. In the latter case, the balance sheet item changed from av-
erage revenues to average expenses at the municipal level. 
To assess the budgetary situation of local government in the Netherlands in general and the 
wider financial consequences of the recent Financial Crisis in particular, the inflation-adjusted 
development of the financial results is of interest. When comparing the time periods 2005–
2007 and 2009–2011, the average short-term debt increased by 32.1%, while the average 
long-term debt rose by 5.8%. In other words, the financial situation of Dutch municipalities 
deteriorated significantly in times of the Crisis. 
Overall, it needs to be taken into account that variation in the financial changes at the Dutch 
local level was relatively high and that the recent Financial Crisis was not the only factor of 
influence. However, in combination with the qualitative survey results, it can be concluded 
that the Crisis was the main reason for financial changes. Table 42 summarises the inflation-
adjusted financial developments at the local level in the Netherlands in times of the Financial 




Table 42: Inflation-adjusted financial changes at the local level of government in the Netherlands in times of the Financial 
Crisis since 2007 
Area of activity / Type of debt Financial implication 
Social services Increase in average expenditures by 44.8% 
Administrative support of the executive board Increase in average expenditures by 7.9% 
Building permits Decrease in average revenues by 28.9% 
Land development Decrease in average revenues by 234.8% 
Short-term debt Increase in average debt by 32.1% 
Long-term debt Increase in average debt by 5.8% 
 
The way in which local authorities responded to the recent Financial Crisis is the focus of the 
second part of the research question. Municipalities’ reactions that imply financial changes 
are already included in the budgetary developments presented above, since changes in mu-
nicipal balance sheets can originate from impacts, especially in the area of tax revenues on 
the income side, and responses by political-administrative decision maker, mainly concerning 
the expenditure side. Regarding the methods used to address the Crisis, far-reaching austerity 
measures, with a focus on personnel costs and in the form of across-the-board cuts, were 
further identified in the qualitative part of this study. The area of human resources included 
strategies such as leaving vacancies unfilled for a certain time period and not prolonging tem-
porary contracts. Across-the-board cuts had the advantage that decisions on political priorities 
were not necessary. Overall, the approaches chosen were generally short-term oriented, easy 
to implement, and executable with little public attention. 
The focus of the third part of the research question is on the factors that determine variation 
in the impact of and responses to the recent Financial Crisis at the local level of government 
in the Netherlands. Based on the statistical analyses of this study, it was not possible to iden-
tify one factor that explains variation in the financial developments across multiple policy ar-
eas, balance sheet items, or financial results of interest. Considering the high complexity of 
financial crises and public finances, this is not unexpected. However, statistically significant 
interrelations were revealed for some separate cases. 
Increases in expenditures related to social services turned out to be linked to both the size of 
the municipality in terms of the number of inhabitants and the share of left parties in the 
municipal council. In the context of higher costs for the administrative support of the execu-
tive board, the overall administrative budget appeared to be relevant. Regarding building per-
mits, as a source of municipal revenues, the share of the elderly and the degree of urbanisa-
tion were identified as influential factors for the financial developments. In the case of land 
development, as the area of activities by Dutch local government most affected by the recent 
Financial Crisis and hence of particular interest in the analyses, the share of the elderly was 
the only factor with some limited statistical significance in terms of explaining variation. 
According to the statistical results for Dutch municipalities, higher short-term debt, as a com-
mon consequence of the recent Financial Crisis, depended on the change in unemployment. 
Lastly, for long-term debt, the existing amount of short-term debt appeared to be associated 




Overall, the empirical results illustrate that developing strategies to reduce the effects of po-
tential future financial crises at the local level of government is difficult. This is because of 
economic mechanisms of high complexity and because of a lack of general factors explaining 
large shares of the variation in financial implications from a political-administrative and eco-
nomic perspective. However, in summary, the quantitative and qualitative analyses of this 
study and the aforementioned findings contribute to a better scientific understanding of the 
implications of the Financial Crisis since 2007 at the local level of government in the Nether-
lands as well as the relations between a financial crisis and municipal finances more generally. 
Following these answers to the research question, the next sub-chapter summarises further 
insights in relation to crisis management and points out some policy recommendations in the 
Dutch context. 
 
14.5. Lessons from crisis management and policy recommendations 
Considering crisis management in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007, various rela-
tively un-co-ordinated and short-term-oriented measures by national governments and cen-
tral banks could be observed, and the lack of a clear long-term strategy was often apparent. 
In other words, what could be witnessed was a process of trial and error or muddling through 
(cf. Lindblom, 1959), which is highly risky in an environment where market participants do not 
necessarily act rationally and where unpredictable dynamics can emerge quickly. In retro-
spect, some governmental responses can also be considered as mistakes (Saliterer et al., 2017, 
p. 2). 
Against the background of the scope of the decisions that public leaders needed to take after 
2007, when the Financial Crisis threatened the financial system, such framework conditions 
for decision-making are highly unsatisfactory, and, in retrospect, the consequences of the Cri-
sis could have been even worse. Minor misinterpretations or misunderstandings during back-
room negotiations in the middle of the night could have led to the collapse of the global finan-
cial system, and the further consequences for society would have been severe. 
However, reflecting on the different approaches to explain and address financial crises in eco-
nomic and political-administrative theory – best illustrated by the ongoing debates on the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical measures – a universalistic 
approach to reacting to a certain type of crisis might not be realistic in general. In other words, 
as already pointed out before, each crisis is different. 
Diverse national and local circumstances in terms of the legal framework and administrative 
responsibilities further contribute to the difficulties in developing general strategies in crisis 
management (Saliterer et al., 2017, p. 13), since not only each crisis, but also each territorial 
entity potentially affected by it, is different. However, apart from these relatively sobering 
realisations, the recent Financial Crisis also demonstrates the importance of co-ordination in 




in supranational entities, such as the EU, from a more practical perspective (van den Noord, 
2011, p. 50). 
Taking a closer look at the implications of a financial crisis for public finances, a distinction can 
be made between two types of effects: expenses or the absence of revenues on the one hand 
and a lower valuation or an unsaleability of assets on the other. Costs for providing social 
services to individuals who have lost their jobs are an example of the first category. The related 
payments have a direct impact on municipal balance sheets, and possible compensations for 
the costs are only relevant in the longer run. In the context of social services, the latter mech-
anism could, for example, include higher revenues from local taxes and fees, if the persons 
supported are successfully reintegrated into the labour market. 
Examples of the second category are developed construction sites that are currently not in 
demand. In this context it is often forgotten that lower valuations only imply financial losses 
when they are realised. From a short-term perspective, investments for the exploration and 
development were taken, while the book values of the sites might have decreased. Overall, 
this weakens the financial position of the affected public authority. However, considering the 
economic situation of today’s industrial countries in the long run, economic growth has been 
observed for centuries. This growth was certainly disrupted by numerous crises of various 
types and scopes, but the overall expansive nature of economic developments has not 
changed. In such a context, a lower valuation or unsaleability of assets, such as land, is tem-
porary in most cases. While it is not impossible for losses in asset value to be permanent, for 
example in the context of new products based on technological progress, many assets can be 
expected to regain in value in the long term. In other words, time is of importance for the 
valuation. 
As a consequence, for many assets, lower valuations should not be realised by the sale of the 
asset; instead, waiting for better market conditions is the better choice, even though this 
might exceed typical political planning horizons. Against this background, it can also be con-
cluded that politicians as well as bankers should focus on more long-term perspectives in their 
decision-making. In the Dutch case, proceeding with lower asset valuations is most relevant 
for municipal land, which local government develops with the intention to sell it to private 
companies or households and which is exactly the area in which the recent Financial Crisis 
became most apparent for the municipalities. 
In addition, the already long-lasting debate on the necessity of more fiscal autonomy and tax-
ation power of Dutch local government gained new attention in the context of the Financial 
Crisis since 2007 (Overmans, 2017, p. 185; van der Woude, 2018, p. 250). As explained before, 
Dutch municipalities largely depend on financial transfers from central government, also in 
comparison with other industrial countries. In general, more fiscal autonomy leads to more 
possibilities for municipalities to adjustments their finances to local needs. While this would 
also enable more room to manoeuvre in the context of policy reactions in times of crises, there 
are also sound reasons to argue that local capacities and competences to find tailor-made 
solutions to highly complex economic problems will remain relatively low, even if the local 




Overall, it needs to be taken into account that more fiscal autonomy and taxation power of 
the municipalities could lead to more variation in terms of living conditions as well as the fi-
nancial position of local authorities across the local level. While the current system in the 
Netherlands is designed to minimise the differences between the municipalities, the decision 
to enable more variation or not is mainly a political one. However, the recent Financial Crisis 
can certainly be seen as an occasion to further rethink the system of Dutch municipal finance 
with the aim of strengthening financial resilience. 
In the context of municipal finances, possible improvements of the Dutch system of financial 
supervision, including the supervision of the municipalities by the provinces, are also part of 
an ongoing topic, even though the number of article-12 municipalities, which represent mu-
nicipalities with considerable financial imbalances, remained relatively low in times of the re-
cent Financial Crisis. In late 2018, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Min-
istry of Finance, the VNG, and the Association of Provinces (Dutch: Interprovinciaal Overleg, 
IPO) published a report (Rijksoverheid, 2018) with suggestions for possible changes in the sys-
tem of financial supervision. Based on the increasing complexity of administrative affairs in 
general and the higher responsibilities of the municipalities in relation to financial affairs as a 
result of the recent decentralisation measures, they propose improving financial supervision 
with a focus on experience-based learning and more constructive dialogues between the par-
ties involved. More specifically, they suggest making horizontal checks and balances possible 
by enabling municipalities to do the following: learn from one another with an improved pro-
vision of financial data and benchmarks, focus on potential risks within the budgets, perform 
the financial supervision more uniformly while allowing for more customised measures, and 
combine the various types of financial insights as much as possible. 
According to the report, it should also be taken into account that technical advances and dig-
italisation offer new possibilities in the area of financial supervision. This includes not only 
more advanced tools for data and risk analyses, but also the possibility of more transparency 
in municipal finances by providing data on the Internet. In this context, two new websites227 
were recently launched that enable citizens and local officials to obtain interactive insights 
into municipal finances and to compare the financial situation of their municipality with other 
municipalities (Rijksoverheid, 2018). 
Closely related to the debates on municipal finances, and in line with the institutional prob-
lems and challenges identified in the context of the recent Financial Crisis, ongoing debates 
on the necessity of territorial reforms and the optimal size of territorial entities in relation to 
their tasks in general (cf. Dahl & Tufte, 1973) and in the case of the local level in particular (cf. 
Denters et al., 2014) might also intensify in the coming years. This is especially likely in coun-
tries with relatively small municipalities in terms of the number of inhabitants, as well as in 
the Netherlands, where a process of municipal amalgamations, aiming to form municipalities 
with at least 100,000 inhabitants, is already on its way (Rijksoverheid, 2012a). It could be ar-
gued that the formation of larger units in sub-national government ensures a more reliable 
                                                     
227 The website https://www.financiengemeenten.nl/ is operated by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 




fulfilment of tasks in crises situations. In addition, requests might arise to transfer certain re-
sponsibilities, especially in the area of financial supervision, to higher levels of the political-
administrative subdivision with civil servants specialising in increasingly complex circum-
stances.  
However, larger is not necessarily better. With larger territorial entities at the local level, new 
challenges might emerge, for example in the context of democratic participation and repre-
sentation. From an administrative perspective, it can be argued that the functioning of each 
level of government mainly depends on sufficient personnel and financial resources, which 
could also justify more local fiscal autonomy, including further possibilities for local entities to 
generate own revenues (Ahmad et al., 2016, p. 17). Accordingly, more political-administrative 
research on the most suitable institutional design of local government, including appropriate 
room for manoeuvrability in relation to administrative decisions and financial affairs within a 
system of multi-level governance, can be considered as important. Especially comparative em-
pirical studies that include municipalities and their financial situations in different nation 
states might help to better understand the advantages and disadvantages of the different po-
litical-administrative systems in practice. These types of studies could also aim to identify the 
system with the highest level of resilience in times of financial crises. Furthermore, economic 
research on interrelations and mechanisms below national and international levels of govern-
ment would be helpful to gain better insights into the role of sub-national authorities within 
the economic system. 
Even though the political-administrative framework conditions might differ, the aforemen-
tioned lessons on crisis management and policy suggestions based on the insights from this 
study on the Netherlands are also of relevance for municipalities in other countries. This con-
cerns the situation of a lower valuation or an unsaleability of assets in particular. However, 
questions regarding the optimal level of local fiscal autonomy, the most suitable design of 
financial supervision, and the optimal size of territorial entities are also issues that are similarly 
relevant in every country with a political-administrative subdivision below the national level 
of government. 
In summary, crisis management in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007 illustrates the 
difficulty in deciding on adequate countermeasures. More universalistic strategies to react to 
financial crises unfortunately appear to be unrealistic from a theoretical perspective. In such 
an environment, building upon past experiences as much as possible can be considered as 
crucial, and this study contributed to a better scientific as well as practical understanding of 
crisis management. In addition, the recent Financial Crisis revived some long-lasting debates 
in public administration and political science. Following these reflections on crisis manage-
ment and the wider implications for the political-administrative system, primarily with a focus 






14.6. General lessons from the Financial Crisis since 2007 
Once a crisis needs to be combatted, it is already too late. Therefore, more general lessons 
from the recent Financial Crisis, potentially also contributing to crises prevention in future, are 
needed. Reflecting upon the global developments since 2007, general lessons are most obvi-
ous regarding the regulation of the financial sector, as a typical area of competence of national 
governments and international organisations. 
Even though insufficient regulation might not have directly caused the Crisis, the existing 
framework conditions were unable to prevent the adverse development from occurring. Ac-
cordingly, it can be argued that improvements in the form of more precise financial regula-
tions are required to avoid comparable incidents in the future. Functioning regulatory institu-
tions are also crucial for the confidence of market participants (Shiller, 2008, p. 171 ff.; Car-
massi et al., 2009). Apart from filling identified gaps in the regulatory framework of financial 
markets, additional areas of focus should include the enforcement of existing rules and critical 
reflections on potential new types of financial problems. 
Considering some recent market developments, public leaders should make haste with such 
measures. By the time of writing, in autumn of 2018, the share prices of many technology 
companies had declined noticeably, potentially marking the beginning of the end of the latest 
boom phases. Also, in comparison with earlier boom-and-bust cycles, the duration of the eco-
nomic growth of recent years is already taking longer than average. In addition, the latest 
developments of the yield curves of U.S. treasury bonds are not very encouraging. The spread 
between the yield on 10-year and 2-year bonds is gradually moving closer to zero percentage 
points, describing a market environment wherein long-term and short-term interest rates con-
verge. An inverted yield curve, where short-term interest rates are higher than long-term in-
terest rates, served as a simple, but meaningful predictor of recessions in the past (The Econ-
omist, 2018). In other words, the US might experience its next recession in only a few months 
or years, which would certainly imply global consequences. 
Furthermore, local governments were affected by the Financial Crisis since 2007 and at-
tempted to react within their organisational and budgetary capacities. The necessity of co-
ordination within systems of multi-level governance because of distributed responsibilities 
and competences became apparent. Considering the high complexity of global economic de-
velopments, it is also comprehensible that decision makers at the local level might lack suffi-
cient detailed information about the developments and potential implications for their level 
of government (Ahmad et al., 2016, p. 1). This further illustrates the importance of co-opera-
tion across all levels of the political-administrative subdivision. In addition, problems regarding 
the reliability of financial supervision within municipal administrations, as well as that of local 
authorities by the highest levels of government, were observed in some countries. Consider-
ations might thus be required regarding the adequacy of the responsibilities of the actors in-
volved. Also, the elimination of related legislative loopholes and ambiguities, for example in 
the context of the financial evaluation of municipal companies, appears to be helpful (Ter-




As already pointed out in the first chapter, the Financial Crisis since 2007 is fading, and ongoing 
consequences are mostly limited to public debt and monetary policies. For other aspects, such 
as average stock market valuations and unemployment, the Crisis can be considered as over. 
However, reflecting on the first warning signals and the recurring nature of financial difficul-
ties and crises, as the economic history of industrial countries has taught over the last centu-
ries, watchful eyes need to be maintained on financial as well as socio-economic develop-
ments. 
Apart from all the negative effects discussed and analysed in this study, it should finally be 
taken into account that financial crises can also include positive aspects and consequences. 
For example, they generate opportunities for necessary reforms that are long overdue, and 
they enable the expansion of co-operation between various actors that was previously con-
sidered impossible (Bailey & Chapain, 2011b, p. 21). In other words, as the economist Paul 
Romer once said in a similar context, “a crisis is a terrible thing to waste” (As cited in The New 







Appendix 1: Publications on the Financial Crisis since 2007 at the local 
level of government in the Netherlands 
Scientific publications and policy reports on the Financial Crisis since 2007 and the impact on 
and responses by public authorities at the local level of government in the Netherlands 
Author(s) and year of 
publication 
Title Focus Remarks 
Council of European 
Municipalities and 
Regions, 2009a 
The economic and financial crisis, Impact on 
local and regional authorities 
Impact Multiple country study; 
discusses potential re-
sponses 
Allers & Bolt, 2010 Financiële gevolgen van de recessie voor de 




Allers & Hoeben, 
2010 
Bezuinigingen en crisisbeheersing: Financiële 




Engelen & Musterd, 
2010  
Amsterdam in Crisis: How the (Local) State 
Buffers and Suffers 
Impact Single case study of Am-
sterdam 
Deloitte, 2010 Financiële effecten crisis bij gemeentelijke 
grondbedrijven 
Impact Focus on land develop-
ment 
Deloitte, 2011 Financiële effecten crisis bij gemeentelijke 
grondbedrijven, Update 2011 
Impact Focus on land develop-
ment 
Deloitte, 2012 Financiële effecten crisis bij gemeentelijke 
grondbedrijven, Actualisatie 2012 






Delivering Local Development, New Growth 
and Investment Strategies 
Impact and 
response 
Case study of the Amster-
dam Metropolitan Area 
Deloitte, 2013 Financiële situatie bij gemeentelijke grond-
bedrijven 2013 




Managing austerity: rhetorical and real re-
sponses to fiscal stress in local government 
Response Study of eight Dutch mu-
nicipalities 
Weske et al., 2014 Local government austerity policies in the 
Netherlands: the effectiveness of social dia-
logue in preserving public employment 
Response  
Deloitte, 2014 Monitor gemeentefinanciën 2014, Special: 
grond en vastgoed 
Impact Focus on land develop-
ment 
Ernst & Young, 2015 Financiële positie gemeentelijke grond-
bedrijven 
Impact Focus on land develop-
ment 





Managing Austerity: Comparing municipal 
austerity plans in the Netherlands and North 
Rhine-Westphalia 
Response Qualitative approach 
Centraal Planbureau, 
2016 
Hoe gaan gemeenten om met financiële mee- 
en tegenvallers 
Impact  
Kattenberg et al., 
2016 
Hoogte gemeentelijke belasting ongevoelig 
voor mee- of tegenvallers 
Impact Summary of Centraal 
Planbureau, 2016 
Deloitte, 2016 Grondposities bij gemeenten eind 2015 Impact Focus on land develop-
ment 
Overmans, 2017 Financial Resilience: How Dutch Cities have 
buffered and adapted to the Financial Crisis 
Response Study of four Dutch munic-
ipalities 





Appendix 2: Municipal functions and the composition of municipal 









 Totaal gemeentelijke functies na best. Total   
0 Totaal algemeen bestuur Total general administration   
 Bestuursorganen Administrative bodies   
 
Bestuursondersteuning college van B en 
W 
Administrative support executive board   
 Burgerzaken Citizen affairs   
 Baten secretarieleges burgerzaken Public affairs secretary fees  x 
 Bestuurlijke samenwerking Administrative cooperation   
 
Bestuursondersteuning raad en re-
kenkamer 
Administrative support municipal council 
and auditing office 
  
1 Totaal openbare orde en veiligheid Total public order and safety   
 Brandweer en rampenbestrijding Fire brigades and disaster relief   
 Openbare orde en veiligheid Public order and safety   
 Opsporing en ruiming conv. explosieven 
Detection and clearance of conventional 
explosives 
  
2 Totaal verkeer, vervoer en waterstaat 
Total traffic, transport and water man-
agement 
  
 Wegen, straten en pleinen Roads, streets and squares   
 Verkeersmaatregelen te land Traffic Measures   
 Openbaar vervoer Public transport   
 Parkeren Parking   
 Baten parkeerbelasting Parking fee x  
 Zeehavens Seaports   
 Binnenhavens en waterwegen Inland ports and waterways   
 Veerdiensten Ferry services   




Watering, drainage, land reclamation   
3 Totaal economische zaken Total economic affairs   
 Handel en ambacht Trade and craft   
 Baten marktgelden Market fees  x 
 Industrie Industry   
 Nutsbedrijven Public utilities   
 Agrarische productie en ontginning Agricultural production and mining   
 Overige agrar. zaken, jacht en visserij 
Other agricultural affairs, hunting and 
fishing 
  
4 Totaal onderwijs Total education   
 
Openb. basisonderwijs, ex. 
onderw.huisv. 
Public primary education excluding 
housing 
  
 Openb. basisonderwijs, onderw.huisv. Housing for public primary education   
 Bijz. onderwijs, excl. onderwijshuisv. 
Special primary education excluding 
housing 
  
 Bijz. onderwijs, onderwijshuisvesting Housing for special primary education   
 Openb. (vrtg.) spec. onderw., ex. huisv. 
Public (secondary) special education, ex-
cluding housing 
  
                                                     












 Openb. (vrtg.) spec. onderw., huisv. 
Housing for public (secondary) special 
education 
  
 Bijz. (vrtg.) spec. onderw., ex. huisv. 
Special (secondary) special education, 
excluding housing 
  
 Bijz. (vrtg.) spec. onderw., huisv. 
Housing for special (secondary) special 
education 
  
 Openb.voortg. onderwijs, ex. huisv. 
Public secondary education, excluding 
housing 
  
 Openb.voortg. onderwijs, huisv. Housing for public secondary education   
 Bijz. voortg. onderwijs, ex huisv. 
Special secondary education, excluding 
housing 
  
 Bijz. voortg. onderwijs, huisv. Housing for special secondary education   
 Gemeenschapp. b. en l. v.h. onderwijs 
Common revenues and expenses of edu-
cation 
  
 Volwasseneneducatie Adult education   
5 Totaal cultuur en recreatie Total culture and recreation   
 Openbaar bibliotheekwerk Public libraries   
 Vormings- en ontwikkelingswerk Training and development   
 Sport Sport   
 Groene sportvelden en -terreinen Sports fields and terrains   
 Kunst Art   
 Oudheidkunde / musea Classical studies and museums   
 Natuurbescherming Nature protection   
 Openbaar groen en openluchtrecreatie Public green and outdoor recreation   
 Overige recreatieve voorzieningen Other recreational facilities   
6 Totaal soc. voorz. en maatsch. dnstverl. Total social services   
 Bijstandsverlening en inkomensvoorz. Assistance and income provisions   
 Werkgelegenheid Employment opportunities   
 Inkomensvoorzieningen vanuit het Rijk 
Income provisions from central govern-
ment 
  
 Overige sociale zekerheidsregeling Rijk 
Other social security schemes from cen-
tral government 
  
 Gemeentelijk minimabeleid Municipal minimum policy   
 Maatschappelijke begeleiding en advies Social support and advice   
 Vreemdelingen Foreigners   
 Huishoudelijke verzorging Home care   
 Participatiebudget Participation budget   
 Sociaal-cultureel werk Social-cultural work   
 Tehuizen 
Housing for disabled people, homeless 
people, and children in care 
  
 Kinderdagopvang Daycare for children   
 Dagopvang gehandicapten Daycare for the disabled   
 Voorzieningen gehandicapten Facilities for the disabled   
7 Totaal volksgezondheid en milieu Total public health and environment   
 Ambulancevervoer Ambulance services   
 Verpleeginrichtingen Nursing facilities   
 Openbare gezondheidszorg Public health care   
 Centra jeugd gezin (jeugdgezondh.) 
Centres for youth and family (youth 
health care) 
  
 Centra voor jeugd en gezin (ond. WMO) Centres for youth and family (WMO)   
 Afvalverwijdering en -verwerking Waste disposal and processing   












 Milieubeheer Environmental management   
 Lijkbezorging Funeral services   
 Baten reinigingsrechten en afvalstofheff Cleaning fees and waste disposal  x 
 Baten rioolheffing (gecombineerd) Sewage charges (combined) x x 
 Baten rioolheffing huishoudelijk/bedrijf Sewage charges domestic and industrial x x 
 Baten rioolheffing grond- en hemelwater 
Sewage charges groundwater and rain-
water 
x x 
 Huishoudelijk/bedrijfsafvalwater Domestic and industrial waste water   
 Hemelwater Rainwater   
 Grondwater Groundwater   
 Baten begraafplaatsrechten Cemetery fees  x 
8 Totaal ruimtelijke ord. en volkshuisv. Total spatial planning and housing   
 Ruimtelijke ordening Spatial planning   
 Woningexploitatie / woningbouw Housing exploitation and construction   
 Stads- en dorpsvernieuwing Urban and village renewal   
 Overige volkshuisvesting Other public housing   
 Bouwvergunningen Building permits  x 
 Bouwgrondexploitatie Land development   
(no-
ne) 
Totaal financiering en alg. dekkingsmid. 
Total financing and means for universal 
coverage  
  
 Totaal gemeentelijke functies voor best. Total municipal functions   
 Totaal financ. en alg. dekking. na best 
Total financing and general financial 
means 
  
 Geldleningen en uitzettingen < 1 jaar Loans and liabilities < 1 year   
 Overige financiële middelen Other financial means   
 Geldleningen en uitzettingen >= 1 jaar Loans and liabilities >= 1 year   
 Algemene uitkering gemeentefonds 
General payment from the municipal 
fund 
  
 Algemene baten en lasten General revenues and expenses   
 Uitvoering wet WOZ Implementation law WOZ   
 Baten onroerende zaakbelasting gebr. 




Baten onroerende zaakbelasting eige-
naren 
Property tax on immovable property 
(owners) 
x  
 Baten roer. woon- en bedrijfsr. belast. 
Property tax on movable housing or 
business space 
x  
 Baten baatbelasting Benefit charge x  
 Baten forensenbelasting Commuter charge x  
 Baten toeristenbelasting Tourist tax x  
 Baten hondenbelasting Dog tax x  
 Baten reclamebelasting Advertising tax x  
 Baten precariobelasting Public space usage fee x  
 Lasten heffing en invorder. gem. belast. 
Costs of levying and collecting of munici-
pal revenues 
  
 Lastenverlichting Rijk Reliefs by central government   
 Saldo van kostenplaatsen Balance of costs   
 Saldo van rekening van baten en lasten 
Balance of calculation of revenues and 
expenses 
  
 Mutaties reserves ivm h-functie 0-9 
Changes in reserves related to the main 
function 0 to 9 
  
 Result. van rekening van baten en lasten 






Appendix 3: A brief overview of Dutch municipal finance, 2000–2015 
Nominal data, not adjusted for inflation. 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total income (in 
million euro) 
41074 42717 44849 47203 48805 49345 50740 51817 
Total expenses (in 
million euro) 
40866 44526 47888 48663 50556 49559 49740 52554 
Annual balance 
(in million euro) 
208 -1809 -3039 -1460 -1751 -214 1000 -737 
Annual balance as 
share of the total 
expenses 
0.5 -4.1 -6.3 -3.0 -3.5 -0.4 2.0 -1.4 
Total income per 
person (in euro) 
2569.21 2652.41 2769.65 2903.37 2993.07 3021.00 3101.85 3158.61 
Total expenses 
per person (in 
euro) 
2556.20 2764.73 2957.33 2993.17 3100.45 3034.10 3040.71 3203.54 
Total debt (in mil-
lion euro) 
38700 39300 40000 39700 41894 40167 38847 38949 
Total debt per 
person (in euro) 
2420.72 2440.24 2470.20 2441.87 2569.24 2459.10 2374.80 2374.22 
 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015229 
Total income (in 
million euro) 
53294 58550 52090 51816 50261 50536 50114 56537 
Total expenses (in 
million euro) 
55362 58040 57003 55099 53631 52796 51013 57010 
Annual balance 
(in million euro) 
-2068 510 -4913 -3283 -3370 -2260 -899 -473 
Annual balance as 
share of the total 
expenses 
-3.7 0.9 -8.6 -6.0 -6.3 -4.3 -1.8 -0.8 
Total income per 
person (in euro) 
3232.68 3532.43 3127.40 3097.19 2995.29 3002.91 2965.15 3329.82 
Total expenses 
per person (in 
euro) 
3358.12 3501.66 3422.37 3293.42 3196.13 3137.20 3018.34 3357.68 
Total debt (in mil-
lion euro) 
43953 45143 48521 50082 51740 52686 51850 51437 
Total debt per 
person (in euro) 
2666.08 2723.56 2913.12 2993.54 3083.43 3130.67 3067.87 3029.45 
 
(Data sources: CBS, Municipal finance from 1900; CBS, Population, households and popula-
tion development from 1899; own calculations) 
 
  
                                                     




Appendix 4: Balance of revenues and expenses of all Dutch munici-
palities combined, 2004–2014 
Nominal data, not adjusted for inflation; all figures in million euro 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
General administration (total) -2178 -2274 -2355 -2358 -2484 -2710 
Public order and safety (total) -964 -1053 -1136 -1253 -1390 -1508 
Traffic, transport and water manage-
ment (total) 
-2304 -2380 -2590 -2538 -2758 -3126 
Economic affairs (total) -24 212 322 485 378 5049 
Education (total) -1853 -1883 -1935 -1997 -2154 -2249 
Culture and recreation (total) -3483 -3466 -3618 -3721 -4112 -4413 
Social services (total) -3840 -3775 -4143 -5595 -5904 -6414 
Public health and environment (total) -863 -756 54 -668 -566 -799 
Spatial planning and housing (total) -377 48 237 -83 -217 -1515 
Financing and means for universal cover-
age (total) 
15886 15325 15165 17727 19209 17685 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
General administration (total) -2791 -2656 -2651 -2573 -2695  
Public order and safety (total) -1616 -1584 -1603 -1652 -1661  
Traffic, transport and water manage-
ment (total) 
-3193 -2934 -2888 -2713 -3326  
Economic affairs (total) -72 305 -35 -193 -114  
Education (total) -2454 -2348 -2329 -2333 -2288  
Culture and recreation (total) -4511 -4411 -4474 -4402 -4416  
Social services (total) -7392 -7311 -6629 -6311 -6590  
Public health and environment (total) -840 -774 -1054 -986 -1141  
Spatial planning and housing (total) -1921 -2128 -2378 -1452 -1687  
Financing and means for universal cover-
age (total) 
24790 23840 24041 22616 23917  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
General administration (total) -2178 -2274 -2355 -2358 -2484 -2710 
Administrative bodies -537 -531 -590 -566 -576 -604 
Administrative support executive board -1143 -1154 -1156 -1170 -1224 -1317 
Citizen affairs -468 -472 -525 -544 -576 -650 
Public affairs secretary fees 161 158 184 212 213 220 
Administrative cooperation -57 -116 -97 -114 -126 -142 
Administrative support municipal council 
and auditing office 
-134 -159 -171 -177 -194 -217 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
General administration (total) -2791 -2656 -2651 -2573 -2695  
Administrative bodies -662 -624 -646 -628 -630  
Administrative support executive board -1248 -1218 -1192 -1142 -1172  
Citizen affairs -726 -680 -680 -659 -708  
Public affairs secretary fees 212 206 210 181 176  
Administrative cooperation -155 -135 -147 -129 -158  
Administrative support municipal council 
and auditing office 




 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Public order and safety (total) -964 -1053 -1136 -1253 -1390 -1508 
Fire brigades and disaster relief -754 -799 -862 -943 -1017 -1094 
Public order and safety -210 -253 -274 -310 -374 -414 
Detection and clearance of conventional 
explosives 
      
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Public order and safety (total) -1616 -1584 -1603 -1652 -1661  
Fire brigades and disaster relief -1125 -1102 -1107 -1104 -1094  
Public order and safety -491 -471 -483 -525 -547  
Detection and clearance of conventional 
explosives 
  -11 -12 -23 -21  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Traffic, transport and water manage-
ment (total) 
-2304 -2380 -2590 -2538 -2758 -3126 
Roads, streets and squares -2047 -2047 -2131 -2173 -2452 -2623 
Traffic Measures -282 -330 -354 -344 -359 -441 
Public transport 60 -18 -153 -236 -84 -116 
Parking -263 -263 -281 -281 -385 -388 
Parking fee 339 392 439 494 517 537 
Seaports 18 19 25 151 147 79 
Inland ports and waterways -59 -56 -58 -73 -81 -91 
Ferry services -7 -10 -10 -7 -11 -10 
Aviation 0 0 0 0 14 1 
Watering, drainage, land reclamation -62 -66 -68 -69 -65 -72 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Traffic, transport and water manage-
ment (total) 
-3193 -2934 -2888 -2713 -3326  
Roads, streets and squares -2737 -2577 -2535 -2525 -2619  
Traffic Measures -398 -376 -309 -348 -448  
Public transport -102 -33 -95 -116 -264  
Parking -427 -487 -525 -481 -570  
Parking fee 564 598 610 621 642  
Seaports 63 100 108 292 100  
Inland ports and waterways -76 -87 -68 -72 -89  
Ferry services -11 -10 -11 -21 -19  
Aviation 0 1 2 2 3  
Watering, drainage, land reclamation -67 -65 -63 -65 -61  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Economic affairs (total) -24 212 322 485 378 5049 
Trade and craft -190 -173 -209 -236 -317 -309 
Market fees     29 31 
Industry 8 -7 -12 -16 -19 -33 
Public utilities 155 379 537 731 677 5346 
Agricultural production and mining 3 8 5 4 6 10 
Other agricultural affairs, hunting and 
fishing 





 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Economic affairs (total) -72 305 -35 -193 -114  
Trade and craft -329 -316 -373 -425 -379  
Market fees 30 29 31 28 28  
Industry -32 -5 -24 -93 -49  
Public utilities 251 591 323 283 278  
Agricultural production and mining 6 5 10 7 3  
Other agricultural affairs, hunting and 
fishing 
2 1 -3 7 5  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Education (total) -1853 -1883 -1935 -1997 -2154 -2249 
Public primary education excluding 
housing 
-85 -115 -100 -73 -78 -96 
Housing for public primary education -289 -299 -331 -345 -375 -371 
Special primary education excluding 
housing 
-58 -56 -53 -49 -74 -79 
Housing for special primary education -378 -383 -378 -397 -424 -445 
Public (secondary) special education, ex-
cluding housing 
-17 -15 7 -6 -12 -11 
Housing for public (secondary) special 
education 
-20 -25 -43 -28 -31 -34 
Special (secondary) special education, 
excluding housing 
-21 -17 -20 -19 -23 -25 
Housing for special (secondary) special 
education 
-65 -72 -75 -80 -78 -88 
Public secondary education, excluding 
housing 
-21 -28 -6 -11 -13 -10 
Housing for public secondary education -85 -80 -77 -87 -88 -91 
Special secondary education, excluding 
housing 
-6 -5 -6 -6 -5 -6 
Housing for special secondary education -150 -148 -170 -161 -195 -200 
Common revenues and expenses of edu-
cation 
-637 -622 -653 -704 -736 -767 
Adult education -22 -17 -31 -31 -22 -28 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Education (total) -2454 -2348 -2329 -2333 -2288  
Public primary education excluding 
housing 
-79 -48 -52 -30 -33  
Housing for public primary education -391 -364 -368 -368 -332  
Special primary education excluding 
housing 
-66 -72 -51 -34 -30  
Housing for special primary education -492 -501 -516 -507 -461  
Public (secondary) special education, ex-
cluding housing 
-10 -8 -6 -6 -5  
Housing for public (secondary) special 
education 
-35 -40 -42 -51 -60  
Special (secondary) special education, 
excluding housing 
-22 -23 -23 -19 -18  
Housing for special (secondary) special 
education 
-96 -98 -106 -97 -104  
Public secondary education, excluding 
housing 




 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Housing for public secondary education -110 -107 -111 -138 -148  
Special secondary education, excluding 
housing 
-6 -6 -6 -5 -4  
Housing for special secondary education -220 -227 -238 -228 -224  
Common revenues and expenses of edu-
cation 
-903 -832 -795 -835 -855  
Adult education -11 -10 -8 -9 -8  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Culture and recreation (total) -3483 -3466 -3618 -3721 -4112 -4413 
Public libraries -383 -393 -413 -405 -434 -465 
Training and development -210 -217 -215 -219 -232 -235 
Sport -674 -677 -736 -715 -800 -887 
Sports fields and terrains -145 -159 -166 -191 -202 -232 
Art -499 -435 -490 -532 -594 -655 
Classical studies and museums -319 -322 -306 -306 -359 -366 
Nature protection -41 -26 -27 -29 -35 -39 
Public green and outdoor recreation -1082 -1111 -1123 -1163 -1276 -1365 
Other recreational facilities -129 -125 -141 -161 -180 -168 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Culture and recreation (total) -4511 -4411 -4474 -4402 -4416  
Public libraries -467 -468 -459 -446 -441  
Training and development -240 -232 -224 -203 -173  
Sport -922 -919 -927 -943 -974  
Sports fields and terrains -237 -233 -242 -238 -250  
Art -673 -650 -697 -701 -713  
Classical studies and museums -374 -366 -368 -353 -361  
Nature protection -30 -35 -35 -36 -32  
Public green and outdoor recreation -1397 -1337 -1354 -1316 -1314  
Other recreational facilities -172 -170 -167 -165 -157  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Social services (total) -3840 -3775 -4143 -5595 -5904 -6414 
Assistance and income provisions -518 -683 -903 -822 -825 -938 
Employment opportunities -403 -349 -327 -389 -350 -420 
Income provisions from central govern-
ment 
-11 -8 2 -4 -18 -16 
Other social security schemes from cen-
tral government 
-6 -4 -6 -5 -6 -7 
Municipal minimum policy -417 -423 -498 -512 -609 -681 
Social support and advice -652 -605 -655 -773 -843 -897 
Foreigners -78 -59 -52 -97 -92 -77 
Home care    -1232 -1277 -1382 
Participation budget       
Social-cultural work -612 -634 -671 -709 -751 -812 
Housing for disabled people, homeless 
people, and children in care 
1 -3 -3 -3 5 0 
Daycare for children -196 -135 -154 -171 -189 -186 
Daycare for the disabled 0 -29 -2 0 0 0 





 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Social services (total) -7392 -7311 -6629 -6311 -6590  
Assistance and income provisions -1019 -1228 -770 -657 -905  
Employment opportunities -330 -287 -257 -312 -302  
Income provisions from central govern-
ment 
-58      
Other social security schemes from cen-
tral government 
-11 -17 -9 -11 -19  
Municipal minimum policy -714 -686 -701 -725 -827  
Social support and advice -1122 -1184 -1189 -1205 -1264  
Foreigners -65 -35 -24 -26 -23  
Home care -1545 -1523 -1432 -1307 -1243  
Participation budget -434 -367 -322 -271 -260  
Social-cultural work -874 -818 -831 -815 -799  
Housing for disabled people, homeless 
people, and children in care 
-2 0 -2 -5 -2  
Daycare for children -215 -215 -198 -168 -154  
Daycare for the disabled 0 0 0 0 0  
Facilities for the disabled -1002 -950 -895 -811 -790  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Public health and environment (total) -863 -756 54 -668 -566 -799 
Ambulance services -5 -4 -4 -7 -6 1 
Nursing facilities -1 0 -1 0 0 -1 
Public health care -314 -302 -291 -293 -326 -331 
Centres for youth and family (youth 
health care) 
-46 -40 -43 -55 -67 -87 
Centres for youth and family (WMO) -9 -13 -13 -28 -34 -47 
Waste disposal and processing -1404 -1517 -746 -1543 -1538 -1607 
Sewerage (combined) -893 -943 -987 -1031 -950 -1140 
Environmental management -408 -412 -464 -456 -476 -499 
Funeral services -43 -33 -37 -42 -146 -150 
Cleaning fees and waste disposal 1450 1605 1633 1694 1713 1747 
Sewage charges (combined) 810 904 1006 1094 1179 1240 
Sewage charges domestic and industrial     2 1 
Sewage charges groundwater and rain-
water 
    1 1 
Domestic and industrial waste water     -11 -18 
Rainwater     -3 -6 
Groundwater     0 -2 
Cemetery fees     97 98 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Public health and environment (total) -840 -774 -1054 -986 -1141  
Ambulance services -5 -6 4 -3 -1  
Nursing facilities -2 -4 -4 -4 -4  
Public health care -431 -446 -440 -436 -447  
Centres for youth and family (youth 
health care) 
-75 -65 -278 -303 -319  
Centres for youth and family (WMO) -55 -47 -168 -179 -187  
Waste disposal and processing -1578 -1491 -1482 -1425 -1455  
Sewerage (combined) -1135 -1202 -1221 -1232 -1316  
Environmental management -523 -547 -535 -512 -527  




 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Cleaning fees and waste disposal 1753 1755 1738 1731 1712  
Sewage charges (combined) 1274 1337 1391 1441 1481  
Sewage charges domestic and industrial 22 23 23 10 10  
Sewage charges groundwater and rain-
water 
2 3 3 3 3  
Domestic and industrial waste water -25 -24 -23 -21 -27  
Rainwater -7 -6 -9 -8 -8  
Groundwater -2 -3 -4 -3 -3  
Cemetery fees 102 103 108 109 109  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Spatial planning and housing (total) -377 48 237 -83 -217 -1515 
Spatial planning -459 -479 -464 -497 -566 -635 
Housing exploitation and construction 46 202 59 21 33 -34 
Urban and village renewal -188 -92 -152 -113 -113 -133 
Other public housing -516 -582 -633 -649 -775 -753 
Building permits 264 393 508 537 602 454 
Land development 477 605 919 618 603 -414 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Spatial planning and housing (total) -1921 -2128 -2378 -1452 -1687  
Spatial planning -618 -568 -590 -511 -548  
Housing exploitation and construction -38 -28 -84 -25 -65  
Urban and village renewal -150 -242 -201 -205 -210  
Other public housing -827 -810 -781 -817 -817  
Building permits 435 424 382 334 371  
Land development -723 -903 -1103 -229 -418  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Financing and means for universal cover-
age (total)  
15886 15325 15165 17727 19209 17685 
Total municipal functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total financing and general financial 
means 
15886 15326 15165 17727 19209 17685 
Loans and liabilities < 1 year 142 68 112 110 68 20 
Other financial means 714 488 800 767 441 251 
Loans and liabilities >= 1 year 589 802 984 1007 1045 1159 
General payment from the municipal 
fund 
11823 11865 13400 15093 16200 17731 
General revenues and expenses 66 -88 -358 1 59 -29 
Implementation law WOZ -91 -94 -98 -95 -96 -168 
Property tax on immovable property (us-
ers) 
1488 1578 514 525 538 574 
Property tax on immovable property 
(owners) 
1870 2019 2050 2153 2249 2360 
Property tax on movable housing or 
business space 
4 3 2 3 2 2 
Benefit charge 4 3 5 2 2 2 
Commuter charge 19 21 19 21 23 24 
Tourist tax 104 110 114 125 137 121 
Dog tax 47 51 53 54 55 58 




 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Public space usage fee 73 79 85 101 109 107 
Costs of levying and collecting of munici-
pal revenues 
-162 -175 -180 -197 -187 -296 
Reliefs by central government -263 -14 -4 -2 0 -1 
Balance of costs 149 -255 -60 -246 -240 66 
Balance of calculation of revenues and 
expenses 
-699 -1147 -2283 -1707 -1205 -4312 
Changes in reserves related to the main 
functions 
-114 -330 -770 -339 -157 -2881 
Account balance of revenues and ex-
penses 
-585 -816 -1513 -1369 -1048 -1431 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Financing and means for universal cover-
age (total)  
24790 23840 24041 22616 23917  
Total municipal functions 0 0 0 0 0  
Total financing and general financial 
means 
24790 23840 24041 22616 23917  
Loans and liabilities < 1 year 96 55 42 44 29  
Other financial means -89 -45 -217 93 72  
Loans and liabilities >= 1 year 1443 1402 1390 1321 1234  
General payment from the municipal 
fund 
18493 18459 18355 18034 18646  
General revenues and expenses -184 -78 -108 6 338  
Implementation law WOZ -163 -155 -150 -150 -139  
Property tax on immovable property (us-
ers) 
595 619 657 673 691  
Property tax on immovable property 
(owners) 
2447 2550 2679 2772 2851  
Property tax on movable housing or 
business space 
2 2 2 2 1  
Benefit charge -4 2 1 1 2  
Commuter charge 25 26 28 30 29  
Tourist tax 131 148 159 167 180  
Dog tax 59 61 64 65 65  
Advertising tax 20 19 20 21 24  
Public space usage fee 103 106 119 135 156  
Costs of levying and collecting of munici-
pal revenues 
-192 -167 -150 -178 -171  
Reliefs by central government 0 0 0 0 0  
Balance of costs -59 -92 -79 -283 -163  
Balance of calculation of revenues and 
expenses 
2067 929 1230 -137 74  
Changes in reserves related to the main 
functions 
2233 1005 1893 940 950  
Account balance of revenues and ex-
penses 
-166 -76 -663 -1077 -876  
 






Appendix 5: Own income of all Dutch municipalities combined, 2004–
2015 
Nominal data, not adjusted for inflation; all figures in million euro 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Own income (total) 6893 7506 6735 7142 7578 7692 
Local taxes 3994 4295 3297 3497 3652 3802 
Local fees 2898 3211 3438 3645 3926 3890 
       
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015230 
Own income (total) 7869 8112 8320 8417 8662 9013 
Local taxes 3942 4132 4339 4488 4643 4888 
Local fees 3926 3981 3981 3929 4019 4124 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Local taxes (total) 3994 4295 3297 3497 3652 3802 
Property tax on immovable property (to-
tal) 
3377 3613 2565 2681 2797 2934 
Property tax on immovable property for 
users 
1491 1583 514 527 539 574 
Property tax on immovable property for 
owners 
1886 2030 2051 2154 2258 2360 
Dog tax 47 51 53 54 55 58 
Tourist tax 105 110 114 126 137 121 
Advertising tax 10 12 10 11 11 16 
Benefit charge 4 3 6 4 2 2 
Commuter charge 19 21 19 21 23 24 
Parking fee 355 399 440 495 517 538 
Public space usage fee 73 83 88 101 109 107 
Property tax on movable housing or 
business space 
4 3 2 3 2 2 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015231 
Local taxes (total) 3942 4132 4339 4488 4643 4888 
Property tax on immovable property (to-
tal) 
3043 3170 3336 3445 3542 3690 
Property tax on immovable property for 
users 
596 620 657 673 691 717 
Property tax on immovable property for 
owners 
2447 2550 2679 2772 2851 2973 
Dog tax 59 61 64 65 65 65 
Tourist tax 131 148 159 167 180 206 
Advertising tax 20 19 20 21 24 23 
Benefit charge -4 2 1 1 2 1 
Commuter charge 25 26 28 30 29 29 
Parking fee 564 598 610 621 642 680 
Public space usage fee 103 106 119 137 159 193 
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 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015232 
Property tax on movable housing or 
business space 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Local fees (total) 2898 3211 3438 3645 3926 3890 
Sewage charges (total) 854 920 1014 1099 1184 1247 
Sewage charges domestic/industrial     2 1 
Sewage charges groundwater and rain-
water 
    1 1 
Cleaning fees and waste disposal 1507 1620 1642 1701 1714 1748 
Cemetery fees     98 98 
Building permits 338 453 543 553 603 455 
Public affairs secretary fees 200 218 240 292 296 309 
Market fees     29 31 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015233 
Local fees (total) 3926 3981 3981 3929 4019 4124 
Sewage charges (total) 1281 1342 1393 1443 1482 1530 
Sewage charges domestic/industrial 22 23 23 10 10  
Sewage charges groundwater and rain-
water 
2 3 3 3 3  
Cleaning fees and waste disposal 1753 1758 1738 1731 1712 1725 
Cemetery fees 102 103 108 109 109 117 
Building permits 435 424 382 334 371 411 
Public affairs secretary fees 303 299 304 270 304 312 
Market fees 30 29 31 28 28 29 
 
(Data source: CBS, Municipal accounts (charges by region and by size)) 
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Appendix 6: Questions and results of the first municipal survey 
1. How many inhabitants does your municipality have? 












32 (28.3%) 19 (16.8%) 43 (38.1%) 11 (9.7%) 8 (7.1%) 0 (0.0%) 113 
 
2. What is your position within the municipality?234 
Mayor Deputy mayor City manager Deputy city man-
ager 
Other Total 
113 53 141 47 70 429 
 
3. Which political party is the largest in the municipal council of your municipality? 




































































Spatial planning 27 (25.2%) 17 (15.9%) 26 (24.3%) 26 (24.3%) 7 (6.5%) 2 (1.9%) 2 (1.9%) 107 
Traffic 28 (26.2%) 12 (11.2%) 28 (26.2%) 33 (30.8%) 3 (2.8%) 1 (0.9%) 2 (1.9%) 107 
Environment 15 (14.2%) 31 (29.2%) 34 (32.1%) 19 (17.9%) 2 (1.9%) 0 (0%) 5 (4.7%) 106 
Education 32 (29.9%) 30 (28%) 28 (26.2%) 14 (13.1%) 1 (0.9%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.9%) 107 
Welfare 7 (6.5%) 15 (14%) 26 (24.3%) 41 (38.3%) 17 (15.9%) 1 (0.9%) 0 (0%) 107 
Culture 6 (5.6%) 11 (10.3%) 21 (19.6%) 43 (40.2%) 23 (21.5%) 2 (1.9%) 1 (0.9%) 107 
Sport 15 (14%) 15 (14%) 28 (26.2%) 36 (33.6%) 11 (10.3%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.9%) 107 
Youth 15 (14%) 39 (36.4%) 27 (25.2%) 20 (18.7%) 5 (4.7%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.9%) 107 
Integration 1 (0.9%) 46 (43%) 23 (21.5%) 13 (12.1%) 8 (7.5%) 1 (0.9%) 15 (14%) 107 
Social policies 17 (15.9%) 25 (23.4%) 36 (33.6%) 15 (14%) 11 (10.3%) 1 (0.9%) 2 (1.9%) 107 
Development 
cooperation 
1 (0.9%) 21 (19.6%) 16 (15%) 9 (8.4%) 13 (12.1%) 4 (3.7%) 43 (40.2%) 107 
Safety 35 (32.7%) 36 (33.6%) 22 (20.6%) 9 (8.4%) 4 (3.7%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.9%) 107 
Managing public 
space 







                                                     
234 While the results for the second survey question illustrate the distribution of all participants, the results pre-




5. In which of the policy areas do you expect the highest and the lowest cuts in the coming years in 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































6. Which are the three policy areas where you have the least reservations with cuts in the coming 
years, and which are the three policy areas where you have the most reservations with cuts in the 
coming years? 
 Least reservations with fu-
ture savings 
Most reservations with fu-
ture savings 
Total 
Spatial planning 44 (89.8%) 5 (10.2%) 49 
Traffic 37 (77.1%) 11 (22.9%) 48 
Environment 24 (75%) 8 (25%) 32 
Education 5 (12.8%) 34 (87.2%) 39 
Welfare 25 (53.2%) 22 (46.8%) 47 
Culture 17 (42.5%) 23 (57.5%) 40 
Sport 21 (84%) 4 (16%) 25 
Youth 2 (3.4%) 56 (96.6%) 58 
Integration 27 (81.8%) 6 (18.2%) 33 
Social policies 9 (17.3%) 43 (82.7%) 52 
Development cooperation 49 (94.2%) 3 (5.8%) 52 
Safety 2 (2.8%) 70 (97.2%) 72 





7. Saving methods and preferred measures. 
 Austerity measures im-
plemented since the be-




Lawnmower approach 78 (78%) 21 (22.3%) 
Elimination of redundancies in administrative pro-
cesses 
26 (26%) 27 (28.7%) 
Redistribution of financial resources across the policy 
area 
15 (15%) 21 (22.3%) 
Outsourcing of tasks (including private-public partner-
ships) 
47 (47%) 49 (52.1%) 
Savings by ceding or ceasing municipal responsibilities 55 (55%) 67 (71.3%) 
Savings in personnel costs (internal staff) 87 (87%) 32 (34%) 
Savings in personnel costs (external staff) 83 (83%) 47 (50%) 
Limiting the involvement of societal and private part-
ners in decision making 
9 (9%) 16 (17%) 
Increasing the involvement of societal and private 
partners in the execution of services 
48 (48%) 44 (46.8%) 






Appendix 7: Questions and results of the second municipal survey 
1. What is your position within the municipality?235 
Mayor Deputy mayor City manager Deputy city man-
ager 
Other Total 
92 40 68 46 104 350 
 
2. How many inhabitants does your municipality have? 












28 (30.4%) 18 (19.6%) 36 (39.1%) 4 (4.3%) 6 (6.5%) 0 (0.0%) 92 
 
3a. Which political party is the largest in the municipal council of your municipality? (one answer pos-
sible) 











































3b. Which political parties form the coalition within the executive board? (multiple answers possible) 













57 41 0 50 2 24 16 14 10 1 51 6 1 92 
 













































































































































































                                                     
235 While the results for the first survey question illustrate the distribution of all participants, the results pre-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. What types of income do you personally like to see changing in the coming years? 
 Increase Decrease No preference Not applicable Total 
General grants 65 (84.4%) 5 (6.5%) 7 (9.1%) --- 77 
Specific grants 41 (54.7%) 16 (21.3%) 18 (24%) --- 75 
Property tax on immovable 
property 
29 (38.7%) 25 (33.3%) 21 (28%) 0 (0%) 75 
Parking fee 7 (9.2%) 7 (9.2%) 14 (18.4%) 48 (63.2%) 76 
Public space usage fee 11 (14.9%) 7 (9.5%) 28 (37.8%) 28 (37.8%) 74 
Advertising tax 9 (12.2%) 7 (9.5%) 22 (29.7%) 36 (48.6%) 74 
Cleaning fees 10 (13.3%) 34 (45.3%) 27 (36%) 4 (5.3%) 75 
Other fees (passports etc.) 12 (16%) 14 (18.7%) 48 (64%) 1 (1.3%) 75 
Sewage charge 14 (18.7%) 25 (33.3%) 35 (46.7%) 1 (1.3%) 75 
Tourist tax 19 (25.7%) 14 (18.9%) 30 (40.5%) 11 (14.9%) 74 
Dog tax 8 (10.7%) 9 (12%) 30 (40%) 28 (37.3%) 75 
Other 0 (0%) 2 (5.3%) 5 (13.2%) 31 (81.6%) 38 
Income from investments 
(e.g. interests and dividends) 
45 (60%) 2 (2.7%) 24 (32%) 4 (5.3%) 75 
Income from own 
land/buildings 
45 (60%) 4 (5.3%) 19 (25.3%) 7 (9.3%) 75 
Rates (museums etc.) 4 (5.4%) 4 (5.4%) 23 (31.1%) 43 (58.1%) 74 
Remaining 0 (0%) 1 (2.5%) 4 (10%) 35 (87.5%) 40 
 
7. What other options to increasing municipal income do you see? (multiple answers possible) 
Introduction of additional taxes or fees 27 
Selling municipal waste 23 
Generating revenues from renewable energy sources 22 
Establishing business clusters in a certain sector 6 
 







Appendix 8: Questions and results of the third municipal survey 
1. What is your gender? 
Female Male Missing Total 
47 (21.6%) 171 (78.4%) 0 (0.0%) 218 
 
2. What is your year of birth? 













































































3. How long have you been active as mayor of your municipality? 
Up to 1 year Between 1 
and 2 years 
Between 2 
and 5 years 
Between 5 
and 10 years 




34 (15.6%) 19 (8.7%) 70 (32.1%) 61 (28.0%) 34 (15.6%) 0 (0.0%) 218 
 
4. How long have you been active as mayor if you add up all your positions as mayor? 
Up to 1 year Between 1 
and 2 years 
Between 2 
and 5 years 
Between 5 
and 10 years 




22 (10.1%) 12 (5.5%) 55 (25.2%) 45 (20.6%) 83 (38.1%) 1 (0.5%) 218 
 
5. Which political party are you a member of? 













































6. Which political party(s) form the coalition within the executive board? (multiple answers possible) 




SGP A local 
party 
Other Missing Total 
150 112 73 76 19 36 42 32 146 21 0 218 
 
7. How many inhabitants does your municipality have? 












48 (22.0%) 53 (24.3%) 82 (37.6%) 20 (9.2%) 14 (6.4%) 1 (0.5%) 218 
 
8. To what extent are the following issues challenges for your municipality at the moment? 
 
Not at all 
Rather 
small 




Unemployment 9 (4.1%) 55 (25.3%) 94 (43.3%) 45 (20.7%) 14 (6.5%) 0 (0%) 217 





Not at all 
Rather 
small 




Immigration 18 (8.3%) 66 (30.6%) 72 (33.3%) 44 (20.4%) 16 (7.4%) 0 (0%) 216 
Health and social 
security 
2 (0.9%) 49 (22.7%) 110 (50.9%) 45 (20.8%) 10 (4.6%) 0 (0%) 216 
Government debt 37 (17.1%) 69 (31.8%) 59 (27.2%) 42 (19.4%) 10 (4.6%) 0 (0%) 217 
Taxation 27 (12.5%) 81 (37.5%) 88 (40.7%) 17 (7.9%) 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.5%) 216 
Crime 7 (3.3%) 112 (52.1%) 62 (28.8%) 28 (13%) 6 (2.8%) 0 (0%) 215 
Education 16 (7.4%) 83 (38.4%) 93 (43.1%) 23 (10.6%) 1 (0.5%) 0 (0%) 216 
Environment, cli-
mate and energy 
6 (2.8%) 46 (21.5%) 111 (51.9%) 49 (22.9%) 2 (0.9%) 0 (0%) 214 
Housing 3 (1.4%) 32 (14.9%) 93 (43.3%) 74 (34.4%) 13 (6%) 0 (0%) 215 
Terrorism 84 (39.3%) 96 (44.9%) 26 (12.1%) 4 (1.9%) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.4%) 214 
 
9. To what extent do you expect the following issues to be challenges for your municipality over the 
next five years? 
 
Not at all 
Rather 
small 




Unemployment 6 (2.8%) 63 (29.3%) 91 (42.3%) 44 (20.5%) 10 (4.7%) 1 (0.5%) 215 
Economic situation 4 (1.9%) 47 (22.2%) 91 (42.9%) 57 (26.9%) 12 (5.7%) 1 (0.5%) 212 
Immigration 6 (2.8%) 37 (17.5%) 81 (38.2%) 76 (35.8%) 9 (4.2%) 3 (1.4%) 212 
Health and social 
security 
2 (0.9%) 40 (18.9%) 112 (52.8%) 51 (24.1%) 6 (2.8%) 1 (0.5%) 212 
Government debt 18 (8.4%) 55 (25.6%) 89 (41.4%) 48 (22.3%) 3 (1.4%) 2 (0.9%) 215 
Taxation 19 (8.9%) 63 (29.6%) 107 (50.2%) 20 (9.4%) 3 (1.4%) 1 (0.5%) 213 
Crime 10 (4.7%) 84 (39.1%) 80 (37.2%) 34 (15.8%) 4 (1.9%) 3 (1.4%) 215 
Education 16 (7.5%) 72 (33.6%) 103 (48.1%) 21 (9.8%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%) 214 
Environment, cli-
mate and energy 
5 (2.3%) 35 (16.4%) 101 (47.4%) 62 (29.1%) 9 (4.2%) 1 (0.5%) 213 
Housing 3 (1.4%) 35 (16.4%) 92 (43%) 75 (35%) 8 (3.7%) 1 (0.5%) 214 
Terrorism 52 (24.3%) 86 (40.2%) 60 (28%) 6 (2.8%) 0 (0%) 10 (4.7%) 214 
 










Unemployment 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 41 (19.3%) 152 (71.7%) 17 (8%) 2 (0.9%) 212 
Economic situation 0 (0%) 3 (1.4%) 43 (20.4%) 150 (71.1%) 14 (6.6%) 1 (0.5%) 211 
Immigration 3 (1.4%) 4 (1.9%) 137 (64.6%) 52 (24.5%) 10 (4.7%) 6 (2.8%) 212 
Health and social 
security 
1 (0.5%) 4 (1.9%) 140 (66.7%) 61 (29%) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.4%) 210 
Government debt 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.4%) 69 (32.7%) 113 (53.6%) 24 (11.4%) 1 (0.5%) 211 
Taxation 2 (0.9%) 4 (1.9%) 130 (61.3%) 71 (33.5%) 4 (1.9%) 1 (0.5%) 212 
Crime 2 (0.9%) 6 (2.8%) 168 (79.2%) 33 (15.6%) 1 (0.5%) 2 (0.9%) 212 
Education 2 (1%) 5 (2.4%) 197 (93.8%) 5 (2.4%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.5%) 210 
Environment, cli-
mate and energy 
2 (0.9%) 11 (5.2%) 158 (74.5%) 40 (18.9%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.5%) 212 
Housing 1 (0.5%) 5 (2.4%) 118 (56.5%) 74 (35.4%) 10 (4.8%) 1 (0.5%) 209 






Appendix 9: Changes in the account balances of selected balance 
sheet items per municipality (dependent variables) 
Inflation-adjusted changes in the mean values of net income/expenses and types of debt in 
euro per capita between the following two time periods: 
- (1) Total social services: 2005–2007 and 2009–2011 
- (2) Administrative support executive board: 2005–2007 and 2009–2011 
- (3) Building permits: 2005–2007 and 2011–2013 
- (4) Land development: 2005–2007 and 2011–2013 
- (5) Tourist taxes: 2005–2007 and 2008–2010 
- (6) General payment from the municipal fund: 2005–2007 and 2011–2013 
- (7) Total debt: 2005–2007 and 2009–2011 
- (8) Short-term debt: 2005–2007 and 2009–2011 
- (9) Long-term debt: 2005–2007 and 2009–2011 































Aa en Hunze 96.92 6.28 -20.22 -30.19 8.65 111.57 -154.04 24.08 -178.12 
Aalburg 44.80 14.14 0.05 0.39 0.00 119.31 311.14 240.77 70.37 
Aalsmeer -10.48 -32.30 -81.95 -177.90 -0.05 140.55 393.18 332.43 60.75 
Aalten 108.64 40.00 -9.51 -78.19 0.75 85.14 -559.67 31.89 -591.56 
Ter Aar          
Abcoude          
Achtkarspelen 96.80 -15.93 -8.98 -13.08 0.00 135.88 -367.39 74.97 -442.35 
Alblasserdam          
Albrandswaard          
Alkemade          
Alkmaar 188.69 10.23 -5.19 -31.65 0.00 186.93 -50.56 142.32 -192.89 
Almelo 145.40 39.76 -14.75 -251.38 0.00 178.70 1029.88 280.91 748.97 
Almere 138.35 10.40 -24.92 -2.19 0.00 166.44 -0.85 -40.28 39.43 
Alphen aan den Rijn 104.61 8.43 -16.66 -147.27 0.02 148.15 634.37 78.04 556.33 
Alphen-Chaam 71.63 -17.26 6.18 -36.72 -0.38 117.11 569.88 105.52 464.36 
Ambt Montfort          
Ameland 6.73 46.08 0.82 -3.44 161.14 103.83 -504.12 190.03 -694.14 
Amerongen          
Amersfoort 121.09 9.66 -17.07 -96.68 -0.46 124.78 -1407.82 -327.47 -1080.34 
Amstelveen 107.26 -3.43 -16.20 6.34 -0.41 130.50 135.91 -51.17 187.08 
Amsterdam 230.35 1.61 3.51 -216.14 -0.19 194.68 -327.92 -280.92 -46.99 
Andijk     3.40     
Anna Paulowna 58.72 53.46   0.00  798.51 122.18 676.33 
Apeldoorn 176.04 2.55 -11.26 -260.74 0.73 168.17 862.09 -5.42 867.51 
Appingedam 158.28 29.67 -8.84 -70.23 0.00 202.26 39.58 152.25 -112.67 
Arcen en Velden          
Arnhem 123.15 -5.17 -14.78 -105.85 -0.02 184.32 -701.47 185.84 -887.31 
Assen 163.40 -38.25 -22.72 -243.54 -0.01 215.88 1178.01 696.31 481.70 
Asten 54.08 10.91 -4.89 -127.41 6.15 140.98 -75.45 37.40 -112.85 


































Baarn 106.51 -4.44 11.55 -22.76 -0.25 146.74 -680.97 32.18 -713.15 
Barendrecht          
Barneveld 84.55 12.61 0.02 -234.54 1.18 117.02 1682.88 215.89 1466.98 
Bedum 118.55 9.21 -7.88 -43.62 0.00 125.90 -127.87 25.14 -153.01 
Beek (L.) 138.44 3.33 -11.25 -18.41 0.09 164.02 -167.83 -48.33 -119.50 
Beemster 50.51 44.50 6.69 193.65 0.16 101.78 1132.99 1070.40 62.59 
Beesel 148.64 39.60 -26.61 -18.03 -2.00 159.76 -462.34 84.64 -546.98 
Bellingwedde 168.60 14.10 -0.60 0.00 0.95 130.10 59.67 301.80 -242.14 
Bennebroek          
Bergambacht 89.47 11.22 -17.95 1.10 -1.35 143.49 -23.54 -22.70 -0.84 
Bergeijk 64.99 -11.85 -25.07 -34.50 3.15 107.89 251.65 -122.37 374.02 
Bergen (L.) 187.44 11.16 -13.44 -46.31 1.52 157.34 241.08 253.94 -12.86 
Bergen (NH.) 69.44 9.39 -8.63 0.88 8.80 128.80 -48.90 -100.54 51.64 
Bergen op Zoom 158.79 0.77 -16.03 108.70 2.79 188.60 813.74 120.14 693.60 
Bergschenhoek          
Berkel en Rodenrijs          
Berkelland 103.56 14.70 -9.46 6.50 1.33 103.60 -484.92 -19.34 -465.58 
Bernheze          
Bernisse 66.16 14.90 3.05 -66.92 0.00 109.15 -361.25 78.75 -440.01 
Best 53.92 3.50 7.40 -441.59 0.00 132.43 -134.01 90.49 -224.50 
Beuningen 84.09 3.36 5.33 -84.79 -0.05 110.54 -31.38 1109.58 -1140.96 
Beverwijk 96.13 -2.09 -21.81 122.92 0.31 161.07 1865.98 -21.19 1887.16 
het Bildt 91.49 4.65 -11.49 41.36 0.00 113.82 -143.46 54.02 -197.48 
De Bilt 61.77 31.67 -9.96 -51.99 0.00 138.69 94.18 -111.51 205.69 
Binnenmaas          
Bladel 100.91 20.94 -15.95 -46.43 1.05 147.28 451.74 197.11 254.63 
Blaricum 38.90 46.17 0.15 26.88 0.48 132.52 3190.04 489.10 2700.94 
Bleiswijk          
Bloemendaal 103.08 7.17 3.03 -19.59 -5.29 159.10 162.52 -67.49 230.00 
Boarnsterhim 84.77 -28.90 -34.56 -47.16 0.28 550.15 -512.61 -189.11 -323.50 
Bodegraven          
Bodegraven-Reeuwijk          
Boekel -74.06 -68.31 -17.24 -169.54 -0.65 84.97 1050.64 -94.38 1145.01 
Ten Boer          
Bolsward     0.00     
Borger-Odoorn 119.95 30.41 -13.32 -41.87 7.23 123.34 -272.52 205.79 -478.31 
Borne 82.80 -10.85 -10.09 -63.96 0.00 121.59 -946.27 204.58 -1150.85 
Borsele 98.31 -7.87 -9.69 36.01 0.00 97.71 502.10 124.04 378.07 
Boskoop 64.99 3.01 -2.92 69.37 0.00 10.87 -499.10 -167.12 -331.98 
Boxmeer 74.25 0.82 5.00 -50.08 1.10 142.42 1163.32 501.59 661.72 
Boxtel 129.10 12.56 -6.90 -62.90 -0.05 112.12 150.08 -16.06 166.14 
Breda 163.86 -63.13 -17.77 -37.21 0.00 120.05 -440.98 148.86 -589.84 
Breukelen     -0.33     
Brielle 48.38 9.14 -22.44 -383.25 0.33 101.72 40.62 228.96 -188.35 
Bronckhorst 97.67 4.07 -4.53 -88.74 -1.12 42.26 187.63 77.16 110.47 
Brummen 124.19 37.64 -16.48 -250.86 3.13 139.35 4.54 17.84 -13.30 
Brunssum          
Bunnik 37.34 5.21 14.92 -292.09 0.21 115.99 72.42 125.68 -53.26 
Bunschoten 63.09 6.23 -14.86 -125.15 -0.02 83.62 896.29 -19.27 915.56 
Buren 52.58 6.54 15.04 -41.21 0.02 68.70 -30.38 94.63 -125.01 
Bussum          
Capelle aan den IJssel 150.00 24.84 -11.02 9.23 -0.20 183.19 -209.44 -12.09 -197.35 
Castricum 69.77 5.29 5.42 9.32 0.93 134.83 209.63 -69.35 278.98 


































Cranendonck 108.41 -17.19 3.87 7.93 -0.17 127.64 -220.45 -33.11 -187.34 
Cromstrijen 78.86 -1.90 4.41 -74.77 -0.20 90.77 -212.91 28.31 -241.21 
Cuijk 121.01 15.29 4.89 149.45 0.62 156.01 -217.95 4.97 -222.92 
Culemborg 118.38 0.00 -11.70 24.30 0.15 162.18 921.76 1307.45 -385.70 
Dalfsen 95.85 11.56 -19.78 -155.67 -0.70 114.41 -242.90 -12.99 -229.91 
Dantumadeel          
Dantumadiel          
Delft 169.94 6.06 -20.94 -112.22 0.01 180.46 808.68 478.09 330.58 
Delfzijl 164.66 -29.00 -10.42 -2.38 1.40 225.97 1024.75 134.08 890.67 
Deurne          
Deventer 106.31 17.64 -1.20 -178.18 -0.06 159.00 313.93 169.03 144.90 
Diemen          
Dinkelland 102.00 3.66 -28.43 -44.97 0.01 91.12 -618.15 -35.40 -582.75 
Dirksland 100.64 16.19   -0.42  -105.74 19.52 -125.26 
Doesburg 134.51 -4.52 -17.06 -32.95 2.89 162.39 -728.22 58.78 -787.00 
Doetinchem 200.36 -35.37 -4.51 -175.59 -0.09 186.18 1226.66 104.84 1121.82 
Dongen 132.00 -108.73 -6.93 -102.91 0.00 134.24 415.68 98.98 316.70 
Dongeradeel 68.04 6.25 -15.31 -13.20 5.07 136.63 147.43 137.10 10.33 
Doorn          
Dordrecht 124.57 -2.96 -12.45 -195.85 0.00 253.82 1394.38 314.19 1080.19 
Drechterland 71.58 -47.97 -6.93 -187.49 -0.12 19.44 -214.55 -1.22 -213.33 
Driebergen-Rijsen-
burg 
         
Drimmelen 43.59 -2.54 -0.25 33.88 2.08 124.31 72.55 46.40 26.15 
Dronten          
Druten 117.21 5.68 -12.82 -10.76 0.00 136.55 398.83 0.78 398.05 
Duiven 105.37 4.49 -10.14 -161.99 0.00 102.87 -637.68 73.44 -711.12 
Echt-Susteren 132.61 -4.57 -18.36 8.03 1.18 130.47 511.76 106.42 405.34 
Edam-Volendam 31.25 13.99 -7.34 92.24 8.25 115.75 -95.10 200.90 -295.99 
Ede 88.71 1.13 -2.85 -37.30 1.26 142.42 -129.78 30.17 -159.95 
Eemnes          
Eemsmond 176.07 21.98 -65.97 -86.24 0.00 87.82 -854.17 -96.48 -757.68 
Eersel 67.88 4.69 -3.70 -48.63 1.55 105.46 45.67 34.81 10.86 
Eijsden     0.14     
Eijsden-Margraten          
Eindhoven          
Elburg 99.87 20.66 -6.87 -112.90 0.07 115.02 177.36 -38.36 215.72 
Emmen          
Enkhuizen 104.70 -2.34 -15.47 -20.31 9.77 97.28 -774.48 21.71 -796.18 
Enschede          
Epe 111.80 -6.16 -11.65 -58.56 -2.88 123.14 7.25 137.56 -130.31 
Ermelo 121.18 -14.31 -8.81 27.52 0.35 138.13 -412.67 -24.79 -387.88 
Etten-Leur 89.80 18.27 -18.02 -61.87 0.00 134.17 -159.19 -51.64 -107.55 
Ferwerderadiel 51.25 5.12 5.01 3.79 0.17 117.25 245.24 4.30 240.94 
Franekeradeel 99.62 11.54 -11.32 -172.80 0.00 123.23 37.02 34.82 2.20 
De Friese Meren          
Gaasterlân-Sleat 117.26 -7.54   -6.80  -264.36 13.26 -277.62 
Geertruidenberg 50.24 -8.01 -38.13 -3.89 0.00 149.20 -641.73 -88.48 -553.25 
Geldermalsen 91.68 12.74 -9.38 -556.21 -0.03 96.35 3108.17 22.68 3085.49 
Geldrop-Mierlo 137.19 0.33 -7.82 -240.07 3.38 141.77 437.52 23.21 414.31 
Gemert-Bakel 145.36 -0.90 -15.75 -142.45 0.63 109.50 1042.30 -217.62 1259.92 
Gennep 176.34 -0.54 -13.42 -145.60 2.12 118.80 328.12 49.17 278.95 
Giessenlanden          


































Goedereede 59.59 31.69   15.45  -138.08 -57.62 -80.47 
Goeree-Overflakkee          
Goes 120.48 -1.59 -7.71 34.98 -0.41 137.78 363.13 32.73 330.40 
Goirle 93.67 0.61 -18.11 -20.22 0.00 139.65 11.91 -265.58 277.49 
Gorinchem 141.35 24.85 -5.80 -271.44 0.00 158.79 -387.30 -218.87 -168.43 
Gouda 73.82 -9.49 -11.48 5.64 -0.07 246.27 1899.39 -106.67 2006.07 
Graafstroom 20.21 -32.59   0.73  749.87 102.66 647.21 
Graft-De Rijp 46.59 18.56 13.96 -11.25 -4.87 73.85 -277.54 -63.49 -214.05 
Grave 136.73 19.32 -4.04 -39.59 0.00 140.47 -7.64 75.56 -83.20 
's-Gravendeel          
's-Gravenhage 211.84 29.46 9.95 -48.80 -1.34 188.10 -269.76 -185.79 -83.97 
Groenlo          
Groesbeek 137.31 -3.57 14.35 45.23 0.82 153.66 347.17 64.20 282.97 
Groningen 120.89 8.59 -25.70 -99.17 1.56 153.80 -1269.72 114.55 -1384.27 
Grootegast 75.82 -10.62 -10.59 -48.05 0.06 81.24 283.29 -28.95 312.24 
Gulpen-Wittem 132.25 31.11 -7.92 12.67 -4.39 161.08 -272.45 31.94 -304.39 
Haaksbergen 92.21 2.78 -4.01 -49.87 0.75 129.55 519.19 47.58 471.62 
Haaren          
Haarlem          
Haarlemmerliede en 
Spaarnwoude 
50.90 10.17 30.75 -25.62 -1.82 131.55 91.12 34.35 56.77 
Haarlemmermeer 79.19 3.45 10.74 -18.97 -3.63 112.26 855.63 215.85 639.78 
Haelen          
Halderberge 103.97 18.64 -30.75 -170.77 -0.09 118.59 360.14 -118.33 478.47 
Hardenberg 85.58 0.19 -20.12 -94.17 -0.67 114.42 902.21 73.67 828.54 
Harderwijk 104.15 7.98 -11.73 -113.61 -2.61 134.03 60.27 -96.73 157.00 
Hardinxveld-Giessen-
dam 
97.67 3.60 -17.08 -22.61 0.00 96.00 381.67 95.79 285.88 
Haren 82.60 18.68 20.56 -15.59 0.35 197.42 -22.64 -217.65 195.01 
Harenkarspel          
Harlingen 80.97 15.53 -14.61 -216.30 -0.20 126.40 264.94 147.67 117.26 
Hattem 63.42 5.78 8.16 7.32 0.65 113.94 699.62 -3.51 703.13 
Heel          
Heemskerk 94.83 -0.91 -21.10 10.75 0.14 172.46 518.84 92.08 426.77 
Heemstede          
Heerde 65.18 7.11 -12.06 -116.90 0.74 110.61 569.76 53.86 515.90 
Heerenveen 101.74 5.41 -5.90 -569.29 0.02 143.25 586.73 149.88 436.85 
Heerhugowaard 92.19 0.88 6.18 -211.76 0.00 89.47 812.01 59.42 752.60 
Heerlen 189.92 -39.05 -1.78 1.49 -0.05 366.83 174.52 0.59 173.93 
Heeze-Leende 241.03 0.52 -5.61 -48.65 2.74 146.17 35.81 134.52 -98.70 
Heiloo 83.77 3.69 -8.09 -115.60 -0.39 123.61 630.15 -106.23 736.38 
Helden          
Den Helder 66.63 0.95 -8.58 -30.04 2.11 190.57 -397.61 -79.43 -318.18 
Hellendoorn 79.54 -8.79 -1.16 -64.10 3.63 112.85 1079.17 110.46 968.71 
Hellevoetsluis 51.82 5.21 -14.28 -129.59 2.00 114.10 590.85 76.59 514.26 
Helmond 124.32 30.62 -12.51 -186.26 0.00 183.39 -597.96 -63.17 -534.79 
Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht 1.70 -9.05 -26.89 -114.09 0.00 85.80 -357.04 1329.81 -1686.84 
Hengelo (O.) 158.68 -41.62 -4.91 -5.64 0.03 168.88 1491.53 248.17 1243.36 
's-Hertogenbosch 155.88 14.72 -11.57 -29.13 0.00 197.12 -205.66 351.06 -556.72 
Heumen 102.14 23.15 14.62 -72.36 0.00 114.39 759.73 110.98 648.74 
Heusden          
Heythuysen          
Hillegom 85.45 5.43 -5.28 38.98 0.00 124.39 8.03 8.15 -0.12 


































Hilversum 158.46 -7.19 5.40 -25.13 0.00 208.59 427.79 -216.36 644.16 
Hof van Twente 124.78 -3.66 -15.77 -63.50 0.33 115.44 -77.16 169.01 -246.17 
Hollands Kroon          
Hoogeveen 122.15 -0.22 -15.14 -27.85 0.43 130.82 724.52 -31.65 756.17 
Hoogezand-Sappe-
meer 
182.87 -4.32 -13.62 -68.98 0.06 144.77 444.95 74.48 370.47 
Hoorn 99.53 9.56 -15.99 -77.21 0.04 137.61 -1599.24 151.90 -1751.15 
Horst aan de Maas 42.74 -15.43 -21.13 -37.63 4.45 108.72 -564.38 79.00 -643.38 
Houten 54.06 -7.36 -37.80 -9.14 0.00 35.65 561.85 32.23 529.62 
Huizen 94.32 -3.01 -13.10 -65.62 0.55 146.30 -25.38 -24.48 -0.90 
Hulst 89.57 -9.05 -4.51 -5.34 0.14 106.97 56.57 131.54 -74.97 
Hunsel          
IJsselstein 84.81 -4.31 -12.47 8.29 0.00 102.59 -1007.93 21.81 -1029.74 
Jacobswoude          
Kaag en Braassem          
Kampen          
Kapelle 60.57 131.00 -16.10 -156.72 -1.45 91.57 -96.74 100.74 -197.48 
Katwijk          
Kerkrade          
Kessel          
Koggenland          
Kollumerland en 
Nieuwkruisland 
65.44 -0.79 -8.89 -102.84 0.00 127.37 230.95 198.68 32.26 
Korendijk 95.40 5.29 -8.70 -62.76 0.00 110.89 -339.13 -4.43 -334.70 
Krimpen aan den IJs-
sel 
         
Laarbeek 47.21 0.53 -3.69 -81.50 0.00 112.86 -92.07 1.59 -93.66 
Landerd 46.91 34.91 -19.12 -196.06 2.40 86.53 298.85 191.59 107.25 
Landgraaf 133.83 7.65 -9.87 -51.50 0.70 182.06 -176.69 77.19 -253.88 
Landsmeer 72.54 6.30 -11.63 -53.86 -0.02 125.84 378.57 309.05 69.52 
Langedijk 78.31 -2.22 10.43 -204.10 -0.06 102.10 806.67 174.62 632.06 
Lansingerland          
Laren (NH.) 115.21 109.39 -32.93 -473.16 0.00 180.25 382.16 153.65 228.51 
Leek 93.68 -1.18 -6.36 -124.52 0.00 115.49 1014.42 92.02 922.40 
Leerdam 111.97 3.34 -7.51 -41.84 -0.05 145.85 446.50 206.00 240.50 
Leersum          
Leeuwarden 233.91 -0.79 -9.87 18.60 -0.55 308.57 600.43 -197.31 797.74 
Leeuwarderadeel 114.04 -31.21 -6.62 -73.18 0.00 135.92 -463.93 -58.19 -405.74 
Leiden 110.50 -16.46 -15.31 -202.43 -2.37 77.54 -843.75 -16.16 -827.59 
Leiderdorp 62.87 26.26 -8.48 21.91 1.19 125.36 -528.31 -266.40 -261.91 
Leidschendam-Voor-
burg 
116.80 10.19 -3.20 -4.00 -0.14 174.73 126.86 71.84 55.02 
Lelystad 131.36 13.90 -30.11 -200.53 0.00 125.64 1580.10 304.65 1275.45 
Lemsterland 94.88 13.87   6.19  -151.06 -42.10 -108.96 
Leudal          
Leusden 58.37 11.14 -16.33 -67.44 0.06 98.94 -470.36 -173.68 -296.67 
Liemeer          
Liesveld 32.87 -11.20   0.00  130.26 88.06 42.20 
Lingewaal 62.65 45.42 4.13 43.76 0.15 98.47 466.19 74.02 392.16 
Lingewaard 70.18 0.00 -16.70 17.41 0.26 118.11 331.29 -285.10 616.38 
Lisse          
Lith     -1.19     
Littenseradiel 67.62 16.70 -3.54 -4.51 0.00 62.02 304.23 -92.58 396.80 


































Loenen     0.14     
Loon op Zand          
Lopik 80.14 -17.66 -17.05 0.02 -0.14 67.28 65.83 64.74 1.09 
Loppersum 72.65 21.21 4.73 -52.48 0.00 232.51 -217.49 45.45 -262.94 
Losser 91.80 4.43 -4.00 -97.47 0.83 146.10 -310.46 -119.99 -190.47 
Maarn          
Maarssen     0.13     
Maasbracht          
Maasbree          
Maasdonk 79.47 18.61 1.81 -93.61 0.48 106.41 3551.23 2241.73 1309.49 
Maasdriel 78.32 3.99 -18.34 -54.09 0.40 104.88 599.42 154.77 444.66 
Maasgouw          
Maassluis 95.14 14.14 -5.70 24.05 0.00 151.47 183.33 -168.66 351.99 
Maastricht          
Margraten     -0.10     
De Marne 62.20 -34.21 3.05 -38.74 3.42 200.27 -32.90 -46.64 13.74 
Marum 78.94 -1.66 -20.58 -52.11 0.00 86.31 55.05 161.40 -106.35 
Medemblik          
Meerlo-Wanssum          
Meerssen 95.85 2.49 2.16 -7.00 -0.10 134.67 -273.36 -153.38 -119.99 
Meijel          
Menaldumadeel     0.00     
Menameradiel          
Menterwolde 109.32 18.77 2.50 -27.72 0.20 128.52 287.78 97.99 189.79 
Meppel 72.99 -74.83 -11.11 -115.45 0.00 99.00 -147.23 54.18 -201.41 
Middelburg (Z.) 100.22 27.19 -19.82 -114.99 0.44 125.48 217.89 -32.18 250.07 
Middelharnis 95.29 7.92   0.26  73.34 143.59 -70.25 
Midden-Delfland 47.07 30.59 -7.77 -123.88 0.00 95.85 -560.82 -37.02 -523.81 
Midden-Drenthe 128.83 -1.61 -7.70 -35.44 5.07 85.42 -90.23 204.37 -294.60 
Mill en Sint Hubert 79.00 12.77 50.78 -9.41 0.00 123.00 188.86 231.12 -42.26 
Millingen aan de Rijn 158.01 47.98 -8.55 55.06 0.71 279.06 396.55 333.64 62.92 
Moerdijk 124.94 18.43 -7.84 -96.60 0.27 102.85 101.55 48.09 53.45 
Molenwaard          
Montferland 143.06 12.55 1.15 -17.70 -0.23 107.45 260.76 327.50 -66.74 
Montfoort 62.84 3.62 -12.49 -144.32 0.00 99.95 458.58 254.87 203.71 
Mook en Middelaar 133.77 -20.45 10.25 64.49 -0.17 145.84 -262.82 52.49 -315.31 
Moordrecht          
Muiden 65.33 -17.60 -15.39 254.33 0.90 188.92 69.57 69.59 -0.02 
Naarden          
Neder-Betuwe 85.37 -35.87 -4.35 -61.66 0.29 33.69 681.92 1.51 680.41 
Nederlek 86.67 12.42 -16.68 -5.28 0.00 134.40 634.16 236.39 397.77 
Nederweert 76.39 6.08 -28.20 -42.68 0.08 124.99 -961.80 -63.21 -898.59 
Neerijnen 48.41 28.91 -2.42 -44.64 0.02 98.02 282.42 -137.54 419.96 
Niedorp 46.18 20.14   0.00  -227.52 28.75 -256.27 
Nieuwegein 47.82 -7.98 -0.78 -27.63 0.00 127.29 1269.60 107.74 1161.87 
Nieuwerkerk aan den 
IJssel 
         
Nieuwkoop 76.03 4.13 7.55 -235.56 0.00 3.56 653.00 30.95 622.05 
Nieuw-Lekkerland 67.61 -29.05   0.00  831.43 -6.55 837.97 
Nijefurd     -9.26     
Nijkerk 95.28 -1.30 -2.41 -71.19 0.62 130.35 -663.08 -4.33 -658.75 
Nijmegen 220.78 -31.49 1.98 -186.81 1.44 166.49 -855.24 186.10 -1041.34 
Noord-Beveland 124.92 7.94 -21.13 -46.15 9.05 152.68 -236.44 -113.95 -122.49 


































Noorder-Koggenland          
Noordoostpolder 117.94 16.90 -3.11 -127.09 1.08 116.45 -32.08 -0.40 -31.68 
Noordwijk 56.52 24.16 -31.92 145.06 -5.35 111.46 131.56 -68.81 200.38 
Noordwijkerhout 97.64 23.18 -7.34 5.04 3.03 141.42 96.22 121.85 -25.63 
Nuenen, Gerwen en 
Nederwetten 
61.37 18.14 -10.60 -332.67 0.06 122.53 1835.49 371.13 1464.36 
Nunspeet 68.57 20.79 -10.98 -97.83 0.59 137.96 279.95 164.00 115.95 
Nuth 94.85 0.04 -9.71 -71.78 0.05 156.85 -437.80 -113.23 -324.57 
Obdam          
Oegstgeest          
Oirschot 40.70 3.94 -28.91 -155.59 0.71 90.45 114.97 -1.80 116.78 
Oisterwijk          
Oldambt          
Oldebroek 52.52 -54.09 -20.60 -4.44 3.00 88.58 -499.26 -153.81 -345.45 
Oldenzaal 117.43 -5.03 -30.17 -109.56 -0.05 127.36 -252.38 1.11 -253.49 
Olst-Wijhe 93.27 5.79 2.75 -80.07 1.01 100.89 891.58 407.61 483.97 
Ommen 104.89 39.00 -19.07 -270.49 -2.56 150.63 466.24 172.46 293.78 
Onderbanken 198.19 21.00 -3.67 -41.43 0.06 191.93 -38.52 84.37 -122.89 
Oost Gelre          
Oosterhout 52.09 14.80 -2.11 -143.53 -0.29 130.21 122.44 115.95 6.49 
Oostflakkee 70.18 9.46   0.07  -215.18 -15.28 -199.90 
Ooststellingwerf          
Oostzaan          
Opmeer 84.36 25.41 -13.87 -139.27 0.12 107.30 -489.67 -57.78 -431.89 
Opsterland          
Oss 65.99 -0.02 5.01 -180.65 0.71 176.22 45.19 132.43 -87.25 
Oud-Beijerland          
Oude IJsselstreek          
Ouder-Amstel 74.41 5.80 16.16 -49.07 4.94 144.17 -61.37 -61.37 0.00 
Ouderkerk 113.39 -4.88 8.56 24.31 0.00 130.53 332.17 -64.58 396.75 
Oudewater 57.30 2.86 27.38 -4.74 0.00 111.07 80.99 21.24 59.75 
Overbetuwe 98.03 14.49 -26.35 -152.32 0.00 125.75 -242.50 -191.51 -50.99 
Papendrecht 37.50 11.88 -14.74 -96.51 0.00 154.31 -944.11 -94.72 -849.39 
Peel en Maas          
Pekela 123.20 -11.39 -1.60 -8.08 0.00 163.79 58.72 7.95 50.77 
Pijnacker-Nootdorp 45.75 -16.08 -63.53 -184.99 1.41 71.31 -154.44 -103.84 -50.60 
Purmerend          
Putten 77.68 0.20 -14.79 11.82 1.58 98.82 -459.97 130.91 -590.88 
Raalte 105.36 -31.50 -6.24 -116.19 -0.20 132.03 201.20 -74.82 276.02 
Reeuwijk          
Reiderland          
Reimerswaal 63.65 0.39 18.95 51.50 -0.09 100.40 -145.95 -14.11 -131.85 
Renkum 114.83 4.40 -14.90 -15.24 1.98 158.80 -262.12 63.35 -325.47 
Renswoude          
Reusel-De Mierden          
Rheden 129.61 -49.53 -5.73 -64.86 0.08 178.36 311.81 224.33 87.48 
Rhenen 49.03 9.26 -3.73 35.29 0.23 103.50 -467.42 39.02 -506.44 
Ridderkerk          
Rijnsburg          
Rijnwaarden 88.21 12.77 -20.09 -37.86 0.77 163.21 -1102.77 52.45 -1155.23 
Rijnwoude 60.75 5.54 -16.54 -140.63 0.00 119.30 618.84 334.48 284.36 
Rijssen-Holten          
Rijswijk (ZH.) 118.49 8.97 -34.17 -93.67 -0.54 214.94 1983.21 1872.96 110.25 


































Roermond          
Roggel en Neer          
De Ronde Venen 75.09 6.97 -19.91 -181.37 0.54 160.37 834.33 56.47 777.87 
Roosendaal 180.50 11.90 -10.43 5.07 0.22 148.81 22.33 164.09 -141.76 
Rotterdam 133.00 -11.18 -10.91 -63.03 -0.61 266.23 629.88 212.28 417.60 
Rozenburg          
Rozendaal 52.46 -23.17 -20.52 -28.62 0.00 507.51 -14.94 -11.71 -3.23 
Rucphen 188.78 22.29 -12.31 -41.72 -1.70 108.85 21.44 41.41 -19.98 
Sassenheim          
Schagen 88.08 2.69 7.34 -26.80 0.11 137.88 487.11 123.54 363.57 
Scheemda          
Schermer 33.41 21.18 -11.13 -24.53 0.68 86.84 -295.61 -30.16 -265.45 
Scherpenzeel 8.99 37.73 -2.74 -72.00 2.83 113.69 584.49 -6.49 590.98 
Schiedam 180.97 -39.14 -13.98 -130.93 0.00 190.63 -150.59 384.01 -534.60 
Schiermonnikoog 172.11 187.38 -22.34 8.78 67.79 244.49 -166.09 199.05 -365.15 
Schijndel 53.51 3.78 -5.72 -7.13 -0.04 163.18 450.68 242.13 208.55 
Schinnen 105.01 33.76 -16.55 0.00 0.22 133.96 -201.32 108.50 -309.82 
Schoonhoven 99.51 22.90 16.90 -8.45 -0.05 198.23 598.22 64.09 534.13 
Schouwen-Duiveland          
Sevenum          
Simpelveld 108.66 -19.83 -5.00 1.34 -0.54 73.64 -587.82 162.88 -750.71 
Sint Anthonis 65.41 1.71 -1.02 -114.57 -2.79 93.05 114.60 10.00 104.60 
Sint-Michielsgestel 81.91 46.28 -9.40 -31.09 1.05 105.95 87.36 19.10 68.26 
Sint-Oedenrode 93.65 4.34 -11.08 -1.47 0.16 104.31 124.33 9.21 115.12 
Sittard-Geleen 100.60 -1.64 -11.41 -20.94 0.29 175.63 -225.51 -48.38 -177.13 
Skarsterlân 113.07 -1.29   0.10  187.45 -108.01 295.46 
Sliedrecht 63.00 14.61 -7.91 -42.30 0.00 139.23 -202.74 4.54 -207.29 
Slochteren 48.00 9.95 -19.90 -16.28 -1.53 102.38 31.19 -542.36 573.56 
Sluis 85.92 -7.42 23.53 -11.62 -0.03 173.37 521.34 71.56 449.78 
Smallingerland 100.96 0.07 -2.35 -47.91 0.00 131.76 -869.81 -33.15 -836.66 
Sneek     0.67     
Soest          
Someren -19.11 -38.97 -1.28 39.53 0.69 128.32 55.50 76.10 -20.61 
Son en Breugel          
Spijkenisse          
Stadskanaal 197.79 3.42 -5.43 -24.89 1.29 178.04 -72.72 225.39 -298.11 
Staphorst 59.14 14.69 -4.04 -56.13 -0.02 43.06 -246.52 104.79 -351.31 
Stede Broec 61.86 -10.18 4.07 9.71 0.00 81.34 -288.09 45.26 -333.35 
Steenbergen          
Steenwijkerland 125.35 4.42 8.68 -74.31 0.96 125.47 -683.53 -109.53 -574.00 
Stein (L.) 112.32 -29.93 -1.32 -0.17 -0.07 148.33 -225.60 -66.65 -158.95 
Stichtse Vecht          
Strijen 99.83 -2.93 -8.09 -9.68 0.29 127.24 57.31 95.01 -37.69 
Súdwest-Fryslân          
Swalmen          
Terneuzen 79.89 4.27 1.57 -23.75 0.17 106.06 919.15 -7.02 926.17 
Terschelling 57.57 55.83 -12.14 3.68 46.97 104.40 257.58 -185.86 443.44 
Texel 71.29 67.71 -7.61 -26.02 47.60 129.32 395.73 7.40 388.34 
Teylingen          
Tholen 108.27 12.40 -21.20 -84.48 -0.79 109.87 1296.82 60.96 1235.86 
Thorn          
Tiel 80.63 7.24 -6.94 -32.81 0.04 155.53 -755.98 132.48 -888.46 
Tilburg 203.36 -0.91 -7.41 -241.61 0.00 221.46 -266.15 120.35 -386.51 


































Twenterand          
Tynaarlo          
Tytsjerksteradiel 119.98 -7.41 -5.26 -94.35 0.89 134.77 568.17 50.40 517.77 
Ubbergen 14.38 -4.91 -17.49 -80.89 -0.55 176.36 -90.80 -16.01 -74.79 
Uden          
Uitgeest 134.64 45.64 -3.92 -166.86 -0.19 75.39 -62.76 96.81 -159.57 
Uithoorn 63.41 -48.42 -23.79 -221.67 0.00 160.85 935.93 453.75 482.18 
Urk 41.29 10.57 -12.78 -41.62 -0.04 60.72 -366.34 29.88 -396.22 
Utrecht 112.18 -85.57 -0.99 -5.91 -0.49 124.78 461.17 401.56 59.61 
Utrechtse Heuvelrug          
Vaals 120.24 5.82 -15.79 0.00 6.34 192.24 870.25 86.15 784.10 
Valkenburg (ZH.)          
Valkenburg aan de 
Geul 
119.37 15.11 -7.23 -48.32 7.61 197.75 -1066.36 -98.99 -967.37 
Valkenswaard 107.70 1.97 -16.60 -86.61 -0.05 157.76 -185.89 175.48 -361.37 
Veendam          
Veenendaal 94.28 71.60 -8.25 -33.21 0.00 141.69 298.60 153.20 145.41 
Veere 34.41 19.59 29.40 -44.26 5.76 97.19 294.05 54.28 239.77 
Veghel 71.73 1.55 -9.79 -432.25 0.00 109.01 1548.03 -29.19 1577.22 
Veldhoven          
Velsen 90.00 1.69 -4.21 -93.59 0.47 153.40 -629.95 94.87 -724.82 
Venhuizen          
Venlo 228.22 -2.57 -4.43 -50.65 3.08 260.10 798.54 165.82 632.72 
Venray 95.05 3.41 -28.65 -67.85 2.13 169.11 131.34 -52.42 183.76 
Vianen 124.64 -10.37 12.97 86.30 3.29 123.03 747.16 183.86 563.30 
Vlaardingen 233.05 -45.52 0.71 -158.50 0.00 218.54 1370.09 446.63 923.46 
Vlagtwedde 185.70 8.53 -2.91 -73.93 -1.34 168.55 136.42 148.64 -12.22 
Vlieland -7.50 -8.22 5.11 0.00 56.96 234.58 -554.08 -352.43 -201.64 
Vlissingen 222.65 -32.76 -12.22 -59.22 1.09 285.76 322.99 423.36 -100.37 
Vlist          
Voerendaal 103.28 18.08 -2.19 29.26 0.75 153.48 388.15 56.53 331.62 
Voorhout          
Voorschoten          
Voorst          
Vught 115.44 11.42 -18.51 12.89 2.19 106.46 -178.94 149.88 -328.83 
Waalre 57.76 -11.71 -28.86 -81.88 0.00 130.54 -34.07 -34.06 -0.01 
Waalwijk 83.97 3.11 3.43 11.75 1.39 172.29 57.99 111.93 -53.94 
Waddinxveen 37.54 -9.29 -18.56 -99.15 -0.01 122.50 1264.61 440.13 824.48 
Wageningen 47.98 -0.53 -26.09 36.01 1.27 59.12 -369.15 17.36 -386.51 
Warmond          
Wassenaar 35.77 0.06 33.43 -154.10 -2.36 181.86 338.67 192.50 146.16 
Waterland 33.25 -13.24 -20.80 -13.91 -11.86 94.57 -173.31 8.93 -182.24 
Weert 126.60 7.04 -10.44 -59.25 1.64 144.86 458.24 -22.63 480.88 
Weesp 140.61 -1.08 -9.80 -38.96 0.00 176.36 1380.78 1224.78 156.00 
Werkendam 45.46 2.13 -0.04 -36.03 0.20 137.97 -90.49 44.32 -134.81 
Wervershoof     -0.36     
West Maas en Waal 63.82 14.29 -4.13 -21.14 0.25 117.17 591.14 100.85 490.28 
Wester-Koggenland          
Westerveld 108.41 17.17 8.27 -30.01 -0.37 124.74 -250.81 -26.91 -223.90 
Westervoort 149.55 -29.96 -2.71 -51.74 0.00 130.22 -199.84 -57.73 -142.10 
Westland 93.09 -34.01 -21.07 -116.66 2.47 88.93 474.06 116.24 357.82 
Weststellingwerf 127.10 5.51 -8.00 -32.53 0.00 112.54 122.50 144.78 -22.27 
Westvoorne          


































Wieringen 99.22 3.76   0.37  -477.19 -63.80 -413.38 
Wieringermeer 23.95 56.57   0.47  51.83 199.63 -147.80 
Wijchen          
Wijdemeren 67.47 -0.62 -19.97 -122.03 -0.54 100.07 358.51 142.04 216.46 
Wijk bij Duurstede 36.39 3.87 8.39 -34.07 0.00 90.34 694.87 309.45 385.42 
Winschoten          
Winsum 85.08 5.61 -7.24 -16.26 0.00 114.35 -416.22 52.99 -469.21 
Winterswijk 183.87 -3.63 -13.53 -41.69 3.13 153.50 850.94 -115.81 966.75 
Woensdrecht 125.41 19.44 -12.94 24.83 -0.32 113.76 37.10 141.53 -104.44 
Woerden 59.02 4.28 -12.70 -91.90 0.00 137.67 153.43 -39.76 193.19 
Wognum          
De Wolden 114.04 1.48 8.55 -49.16 1.84 86.45 -153.62 12.07 -165.69 
Wormerland 102.38 16.16 19.60 16.65 0.00 177.81 183.76 113.72 70.04 
Woudenberg 63.77 8.63 -7.67 -146.18 0.23 85.53 114.91 2.86 112.05 
Woudrichem 15.39 -13.00 -4.70 -130.03 0.01 109.73 545.24 -2.30 547.54 
Wûnseradiel     -2.74     
Wymbritseradiel     -0.52     
Zaanstad 99.24 2.10 -25.84 -41.66 -0.31 220.91 -10.27 101.06 -111.33 
Zaltbommel          
Zandvoort 126.47 -9.12 11.29 7.33 3.19 200.25 1368.38 156.78 1211.60 
Zederik 109.09 7.92 -13.21 -36.31 -0.53 93.17 227.12 132.66 94.46 
Zeevang 64.18 80.11 -12.61 51.38 -0.15 97.99 -581.76 -28.78 -552.97 
Zeewolde 60.24 -23.10 9.91 -335.35 -3.42 93.38 -1148.12 -839.31 -308.82 
Zeist 74.53 -3.65 -14.29 -4.66 1.43 124.96 -469.71 -66.90 -402.82 
Zevenaar 85.76 -3.77 -8.61 -501.99 0.39 114.64 1595.14 17.62 1577.52 
Zevenhuizen-
Moerkapelle 
         
Zijpe 70.39 14.48   4.41  445.72 9.58 436.14 
Zoetermeer 141.69 -14.93 -22.57 -96.37 -0.25 137.48 0.24 17.70 -17.46 
Zoeterwoude 81.78 75.79 17.63 100.76 0.00 72.49 451.80 120.50 331.31 
Zuidhorn 98.56 -36.44 -9.12 -70.73 0.00 106.03 1166.19 76.13 1090.06 
Zuidplas          
Zundert          
Zutphen          
Zwartewaterland 102.12 -16.49 -5.50 -192.11 -0.07 85.74 877.94 52.84 825.10 
Zwijndrecht 39.48 -7.05 -10.73 -12.14 0.00 190.11 318.05 267.94 50.12 
Zwolle 194.56 3.14 -12.96 -177.16 0.31 210.32 370.15 146.84 223.32 
 
(Data sources: (1)-(6): CBS, Municipal accounts (per municipality; revenues and expenses, 
taxes); (7)-(9): CBS, Municipal accounts (balance per municipality); CBS, Annual change of 






Appendix 10: Potential factors of influence on municipal finances per 
municipality (independent variables) 
The variables below are expressed in the following units of measurement: 
- (1) Change in unemployment: percentage points 
- (2) Share of financial sector: share (ranging from 0 to 1) 
- (3) Share of persons aged 65 and older: share (ranging from 0 to 1) 
- (4) Population: absolute value 
- (5) Share of agricultural soil usage: share (ranging from 0 to 1) 
- (6) Short-term debt: euro per capita 
- (7) Long-term debt: euro per capita 
- (8) Share of left parties: share (ranging from 0 to 1) 
- (9) Political fragmentation: coefficient (ranging from 0 to 1) 
- (10) Civil servants: full-time equivalents per 1,000 inhabitants 
- (11) Administrative costs: euro per capita 


































































Aa en Hunze 0.00 0.0564 0.1769 25598 0.6919 54.00 435.00 0.5238 0.7120 6.6138 -107.54 
Aalburg 0.10 0.0448 0.1244 12386 0.8255 176.00 366.00 0.1333 0.8178 5.6112 -136.58 
Aalsmeer 0.57 0.0935 0.1545 26386 0.3142 193.00 289.00 0.0000 0.7424 4.8890 -126.94 
Aalten 0.23 0.0650 0.1599 27568 0.8340 108.00 1742.00   5.6442 -106.09 
Ter Aar     0.7665       
Abcoude  0.1208 0.1563 8688 0.8032   0.2308 0.8047   
Achtkarspelen 0.40 0.0449 0.1393 28088 0.8470 288.00 1795.00 0.4762 0.7800 7.2130 -154.78 
Alblasserdam 0.03 0.0657 0.1653 18718 0.3032   0.3529 0.7612 5.8019  
Albrandswaard 0.40 0.1161 0.1292 22453 0.4661 393.00 2149.00 0.2105 0.8033 5.6251 -158.20 
Alkemade  0.0901 0.1360 14481 0.7079 215.00 2133.00 0.2667 0.7467  -184.03 
Alkmaar 0.33 0.0710 0.1342 93876 0.1791 178.00 2118.00 0.5135 0.8400 14.4638 -122.57 
Almelo -0.17 0.0786 0.1468 72287 0.5300 587.00 2493.00 0.5143 0.7820 11.3810 -141.13 
Almere 0.50 0.0564 0.0718 183270 0.1444 348.00 2358.00 0.4872 0.8337 7.9620 -142.44 
Alphen aan den Rijn 0.40 0.0808 0.1180 71658 0.6217 612.00 285.00 0.3714 0.8490 11.4139 -173.18 
Alphen-Chaam 0.30 0.0523 0.1509 9455 0.7127 141.00 420.00 0.0000 0.7929 6.7583 -178.31 
Ambt Montfort     0.6942       
Ameland 0.30 0.0385 0.1497 3456 0.0748 1142.00 4903.00 0.1818 0.7603 21.7882 -442.77 
Amerongen            
Amersfoort 0.17 0.0743 0.1171 141211 0.3412 109.00 4676.00 0.4359 0.8494 7.0455 -69.66 
Amstelveen 0.53 0.1104 0.1853 78980 0.4064 86.00 1.00 0.3714 0.8229 8.9174 -100.91 
Amsterdam 0.07 0.0602 0.1125 747093 0.1279 2140.00 3336.00 0.7333 0.7249 19.9559 -220.91 
Andijk  0.0702 0.1254 6581 0.3521 410.00 875.00 0.3846 0.7692  -172.91 
Anna Paulowna  0.0437 0.1207 14123 0.8529 121.00 1049.00 0.3333 0.7022  -218.50 
Apeldoorn 0.53 0.0810 0.1580 155108 0.2542 321.00 3079.00 0.3846 0.8402 11.0400 -117.75 
Appingedam -0.67 0.0652 0.1941 12131 0.7266 261.00 1455.00 0.4667 0.6933 11.5737 -168.05 





































































Arnhem 0.10 0.0610 0.1267 143582 0.1615 631.00 4410.00 0.5897 0.8179 15.7575 -115.10 
Assen -0.37 0.0617 0.1419 65487 0.4820 192.00 933.00 0.4848 0.8173 14.6365 -144.00 
Asten 0.13 0.0798 0.1380 16392 0.6540 138.00 548.00 0.0000 0.7820 8.0527 -105.78 
Baarle-Nassau 0.50 0.0403 0.1879 6664 0.8355 233.00 384.00 0.0000 0.7456 7.2179 -179.35 
Baarn 0.07 0.0960 0.1825 24406 0.2343 68.00 1475.00 0.3158 0.8033 6.0846 -126.77 
Barendrecht 0.57 0.1137 0.1170 44962 0.2053 248.00 1339.00 0.3333 0.7984 5.4802 -133.31 
Barneveld 0.13 0.0731 0.1256 51486 0.5580 61.00 2895.00 0.1613 0.8241 8.0371 -112.50 
Bedum 0.20 0.0510 0.1365 10550 0.8701 104.00 2197.00 0.2667 0.7733 6.8152 -84.24 
Beek (L.) -0.07 0.0633 0.1737 16696 0.6343 162.00 248.00 0.0000 0.7197 5.2108 -157.80 
Beemster 0.37 0.0759 0.1546 8474 0.9051 142.00 2377.00 0.2308 0.7219 9.1220 -204.58 
Beesel 0.27 0.0992 0.1433 13643 0.6518 155.00 1042.00 0.2000 0.8089 6.1570 -189.21 
Bellingwedde -0.03 0.0354 0.1867 9497 0.8444 177.00 1741.00 0.5385 0.7456 6.0440 -196.34 
Bennebroek  0.1607 0.2576 5094 0.0391 249.00 42.00 0.2727 0.6612  -330.29 
Bergambacht 0.37 0.1168 0.1537 9517 0.8276 127.00 1.00 0.2308 0.7337  -139.21 
Bergeijk 0.17 0.0801 0.1486 18099 0.6162 833.00 804.00 0.1765 0.6782 5.8512 -132.70 
Bergen (L.) 0.30 0.0584 0.1499 13499 0.5359 105.00 267.00 0.4000 0.6844 7.8450 -124.84 
Bergen (NH.) 0.20 0.1116 0.2094 31220 0.3557 34.00 2686.00 0.3043 0.8166 7.5496 -157.67 
Bergen op Zoom 0.40 0.0659 0.1541 65242 0.3815 541.00 1297.00 0.3030 0.8558 8.5390 -134.86 
Bergschenhoek     0.4298       
Berkel en Rodenrijs     0.6446       
Berkelland 0.27 0.0660 0.1653 45150 0.8302 185.00 2498.00   6.6047 -149.80 
Bernheze 0.37 0.0786 0.1357 29663 0.7459 264.00 745.00 0.0952 0.8435 5.6434 -139.18 
Bernisse -0.13 0.0915 0.1467 12540 0.7344 172.00 4030.00 0.2000 0.7733  -142.79 
Best 0.27 0.0861 0.1266 29089 0.4499 209.00 329.00 0.2381 0.8163 7.9549 -159.48 
Beuningen 0.53 0.0735 0.1190 25321 0.6648 -38.00 4173.00 0.3810 0.7982 5.8292 -123.82 
Beverwijk 0.30 0.0547 0.1666 37347 0.1909 337.00 915.00 0.5200 0.7520 10.6247 -102.78 
het Bildt 0.13 0.0310 0.1452 10933 0.7102 110.00 609.00 0.3333 0.7289 6.2197 -152.42 
De Bilt 0.33 0.1102 0.2025 41998 0.5215 380.00 1041.00 0.3704 0.8230 5.4550 -124.24 
Binnenmaas 0.30 0.0941 0.1474 28797 0.7232 81.00 608.00   6.4729 -143.04 
Bladel 0.37 0.0799 0.1391 19114 0.5789 291.00 704.00 0.2353 0.8443 7.2617 -163.29 
Blaricum 0.20 0.1358 0.1769 9036 0.2561 205.00 0.00 0.1538 0.7929  -345.59 
Bleiswijk     0.6658       
Bloemendaal 0.20 0.1754 0.2133 16873 0.1003 608.00 624.00 0.2941 0.7820 9.3226 -183.93 
Boarnsterhim  0.0396 0.1346 19270 0.7935 369.00 2475.00 0.5882 0.7405  -181.01 
Bodegraven  0.0896 0.1273 19423 0.8094 411.00 1145.00 0.2353 0.8235  -153.83 
Bodegraven-Reeuwijk 0.23           
Boekel 0.43 0.0398 0.1266 9646 0.8569 455.00 1959.00 0.0000 0.7337 6.0129 -250.97 
Ten Boer -0.03 0.0390 0.1205 7276 0.8994 179.00 4217.00 0.3846 0.7456 2.0066 -184.79 
Bolsward  0.0598 0.1745 9730 0.5637 84.00 1708.00 0.3846 0.7219  -197.94 
Borger-Odoorn -0.20 0.0581 0.1647 26201 0.7761 82.00 1456.00 0.4762 0.7483 7.8241 -123.13 
Borne 0.17 0.0939 0.1496 20764 0.6673 702.00 5884.00 0.3158 0.7258 7.4648 -162.86 
Borsele 0.20 0.0690 0.1438 22531 0.6094 234.00 535.00 0.3158 0.7424 7.7582 -119.22 
Boskoop  0.0616 0.1316 15217 0.7146 634.00 1765.00 0.2941 0.8028  -157.59 
Boxmeer 0.03 0.0585 0.1435 28635 0.7216 294.00 1122.00 0.2857 0.8435 5.7727 -100.05 
Boxtel 0.17 0.0827 0.1384 30241 0.5626 206.00 1687.00 0.2857 0.8617 11.8713 -91.80 
Breda 0.60 0.0827 0.1511 170960 0.4664 118.00 3040.00 0.4615 0.8205 12.3105 -96.09 
Breukelen  0.0844 0.1520 14674 0.7605 229.00 1076.00 0.2000 0.8444  -151.40 
Brielle 0.13 0.0833 0.1456 15762 0.6237 294.00 942.00 0.4118 0.7889 9.2184 -114.65 
Bronckhorst 0.33 0.0640 0.1783 37833 0.8003 100.00 840.00   7.1604 -78.38 
Brummen 0.33 0.0789 0.1744 21200 0.6996 246.00 2296.00 0.4211 0.7036 6.1462 -194.12 





































































Bunnik 0.07 0.0864 0.1758 14258 0.7698 59.00 399.00 0.0000 0.6844 6.4385 -162.29 
Bunschoten 0.20 0.0669 0.1082 19611 0.7176 117.00 1064.00 0.0000 0.7128 5.3133 -138.69 
Buren 0.10 0.0611 0.1253 25727 0.8175 166.00 292.00 0.2857 0.8073 6.0326 -124.34 
Bussum 0.43 0.0944 0.1982 31704 0.0493 80.00 724.00 0.3913 0.7902 16.4869 -115.18 
Capelle aan den IJssel 0.47 0.1029 0.1410 65022 0.0473 216.00 1426.00 0.3333 0.8320 7.3837 -163.03 
Castricum 0.40 0.1047 0.1758 34705 0.3929 125.00 1941.00 0.2800 0.8352 6.5639 -89.24 
Coevorden -0.40 0.0558 0.1720 35993 0.7822 111.00 3010.00 0.3600 0.7584 6.3623 -132.08 
Cranendonck 0.37 0.0814 0.1548 20263 0.4832 228.00 500.00 0.2632 0.8033 6.3021 -96.54 
Cromstrijen 0.17 0.1036 0.1435 12853 0.6719 63.00 566.00 0.2667 0.8267 9.8498 -131.12 
Cuijk 0.23 0.0574 0.1344 24226 0.6447 159.00 906.00 0.3158 0.8366 9.9315 -143.63 
Culemborg 0.33 0.0710 0.1193 27298 0.6078 498.00 2643.00 0.5714 0.7982 7.6013 -123.63 
Dalfsen 0.13 0.0551 0.1472 26735 0.8148 182.00 347.00 0.1905 0.7664 6.3063 -126.94 
Dantumadeel  0.0435 0.1534 19399 0.8342 163.00 0.00 0.3529 0.8028  -160.47 
Dantumadiel 0.50           
Delft 0.73 0.0489 0.1325 96168 0.1175 809.00 2362.00 0.4865 0.8444 14.7086 -94.41 
Delfzijl -0.07 0.0476 0.1842 27314 0.4536 247.00 1948.00 0.4286 0.7392 13.6670 -182.22 
Deurne 0.20 0.0657 0.1466 31643 0.6454   0.1304 0.8015 6.9526  
Deventer 0.10 0.0758 0.1411 97342 0.6519 30.00 1227.00   8.4609 -133.81 
Diemen 0.83 0.0789 0.1352 24046 0.1532 306.00 3014.00 0.5263 0.8255 7.3651 -156.48 
Dinkelland 0.37 0.0763 0.1608 26116 0.8128 236.00 1425.00 0.1429 0.6757 7.3212 -85.45 
Dirksland  0.0532 0.1387 8324 0.5287 135.00 717.00 0.2308 0.7929  -131.23 
Doesburg -0.10 0.0734 0.1431 11567 0.5853 162.00 1191.00 0.6000 0.7556 7.3571 -168.46 
Doetinchem 0.20 0.0852 0.1506 56253 0.6400 222.00 2187.00   9.6048 -202.05 
Dongen 0.10 0.0634 0.1450 25442 0.6898 198.00 1099.00 0.3810 0.8163 7.5702 -224.77 
Dongeradeel 0.40 0.0358 0.1581 24694 0.5272 274.00 2465.00 0.4286 0.7755 8.9576 -95.67 
Doorn            
Dordrecht 0.23 0.0701 0.1449 118182 0.3063 473.00 319.00 0.3846 0.8297 18.4241 -132.21 
Drechterland 0.07 0.0623 0.1267 18818 0.6457 160.00 355.00   5.2822 -121.26 
Driebergen-Rijsen-
burg 
           
Drimmelen 0.13 0.0526 0.1415 26623 0.5902 144.00 229.00 0.2381 0.7937 5.2811 -130.35 
Dronten 0.40 0.0626 0.1204 38528 0.6303 -109.00 1927.00 0.3600 0.8192 7.0209 -87.03 
Druten 0.17 0.0679 0.1208 18082 0.6634 500.00 1856.00 0.0000 0.8720 5.8677 -124.60 
Duiven 0.43 0.0787 0.1204 25560 0.6671 327.00 3571.00 0.3333 0.8027 6.5493 -122.98 
Echt-Susteren -0.50 0.0623 0.1664 32172 0.6918 97.00 1623.00 0.1739 0.8129 6.6704 -75.44 
Edam-Volendam 0.33 0.0837 0.1181 28448 0.4015 128.00 1253.00 0.1905 0.8118 6.2430 -190.57 
Ede 0.30 0.0752 0.1408 107686 0.3554 328.00 2585.00 0.2308 0.8534 7.9193 -179.28 
Eemnes 0.30 0.0750 0.1140 8964 0.7654 370.00 84.00 0.3077 0.7811 22.3896 -211.34 
Eemsmond -0.83 0.0314 0.1559 16542 0.2833 182.00 2299.00 0.4706 0.7820 9.6361 -125.43 
Eersel 0.13 0.0800 0.1605 18072 0.6200 237.00 138.00 0.1765 0.7405 5.8931 -197.88 
Eijsden  0.0635 0.1612 11495 0.6975 24.00 2809.00 0.2000 0.7111  -160.30 
Eijsden-Margraten -0.03           
Eindhoven 0.43 0.0755 0.1551 210333 0.1466 137.00 881.00 0.5111 0.8306 11.5612 -283.06 
Elburg 0.13 0.0648 0.1323 22231 0.4575 358.00 1221.00 0.1579 0.8421 7.3681 -100.51 
Emmen 0.03 0.0635 0.1648 109151 0.6912   0.5385 0.7219 9.8900  
Enkhuizen -0.03 0.0649 0.1395 17804 0.0593 51.00 1803.00 0.4118 0.8304 7.4815 -161.90 
Enschede 0.17 0.0818 0.1399 154753 0.4909 840.00 1911.00 0.5385 0.7837 12.4456 -161.56 
Epe 0.27 0.0993 0.1831 32970 0.4459 132.00 211.00 0.3043 0.8431 6.4331 -93.73 
Ermelo 0.13 0.0833 0.1683 26270 0.2376 178.00 796.00 0.0000 0.7982 7.1222 -138.15 
Etten-Leur 0.43 0.0737 0.1331 40435 0.7035 266.00 877.00 0.2593 0.8148 7.1151 -89.60 





































































Franekeradeel 0.33 0.0407 0.1512 20542 0.8382 133.00 823.00 0.4737 0.8033 10.0915 -114.14 
De Friese Meren 0.27           
Gaasterlân-Sleat  0.0366 0.1880 10215 0.3636 233.00 667.00 0.4000 0.7822  -192.98 
Geertruidenberg 0.47 0.0601 0.1397 20742 0.5358 228.00 1663.00 0.3684 0.8255 6.3639 -94.58 
Geldermalsen 0.20 0.0682 0.1261 26285 0.7644 279.00 0.00 0.2381 0.8118 12.6003 -186.44 
Geldrop-Mierlo 0.33 0.0829 0.1569 37982 0.3488 293.00 1474.00 0.2000 0.8288 6.0976 -111.20 
Gemert-Bakel 0.07 0.0619 0.1329 28103 0.6582 1180.00 4374.00 0.1905 0.7800 6.9743 -130.12 
Gennep 0.20 0.0741 0.1498 16890 0.6446 116.00 1615.00 0.2353 0.7682 6.3173 -171.97 
Giessenlanden 0.20 0.0742 0.1309 14422 0.8811 413.00 917.00 0.2667 0.8000 7.0795 -120.71 
Gilze en Rijen 0.13 0.0570 0.1370 25644 0.5718 148.00 1576.00 0.2857 0.8118 7.0660 -161.53 
Goedereede  0.0859 0.1562 11589 0.2242 225.00 423.00 0.1333 0.7911  -180.75 
Goeree-Overflakkee 0.00           
Goes 0.03 0.0956 0.1796 36706 0.6919 123.00 3409.00 0.4000 0.7968 13.7035 -108.25 
Goirle 0.27 0.0726 0.1451 22319 0.5762 495.00 767.00 0.2105 0.8089 4.8793 -100.30 
Gorinchem 0.57 0.0686 0.1477 34472 0.3688 391.00 4689.00 0.5652 0.7977 11.5833 -155.19 
Gouda 0.70 0.0831 0.1372 70857 0.1939 460.00 1885.00 0.4286 0.8522 10.8049 -177.85 
Graafstroom  0.0634 0.1226 9796 0.8987 125.00 890.00 0.1538 0.7811  -177.04 
Graft-De Rijp 0.37 0.0860 0.1426 6539 0.7853 252.00 548.00 0.3846 0.6982  -206.19 
Grave 0.53 0.0588 0.1300 12717 0.7293 247.00 557.00 0.2667 0.8267 7.1872 -42.36 
's-Gravendeel     0.7255       
's-Gravenhage 0.77 0.0599 0.1343 475681 0.0266 651.00 1475.00 0.4889 0.8099 15.4896 -148.26 
Groenlo     0.8268       
Groesbeek 0.50 0.0854 0.1877 18976 0.5009 220.00 368.00 0.2941 0.8166 10.6714 -170.52 
Groningen -0.50 0.0576 0.1139 182484 0.3451 414.00 4335.00 0.6154 0.8258 15.7729 -141.80 
Grootegast -0.17 0.0352 0.1341 12208 0.8982 157.00 1474.00 0.2000 0.7644 7.2248 -148.58 
Gulpen-Wittem -0.30 0.0535 0.1738 14712 0.8009 132.00 1503.00 0.2353 0.7612 8.9315 -181.93 
Haaksbergen 0.27 0.0753 0.1632 24378 0.6886 148.00 2908.00 0.2632 0.7535 7.1417 -166.71 
Haaren 0.33 0.0888 0.1457 13769 0.7227   0.0000 0.7378 6.2459  
Haarlem 0.17 0.0567 0.1525 147640 0.1370   0.5641 0.8297 13.1631  
Haarlemmerliede en 
Spaarnwoude 
0.50 0.1053 0.1418 5429 0.5555 258.00 321.00 0.2727 0.7107  -194.89 
Haarlemmermeer 0.63 0.0907 0.1063 140648 0.6186 377.00 1152.00 0.3846 0.8297 7.8949 -142.32 
Haelen     0.4624       
Halderberge 0.33 0.0825 0.1567 29488 0.7888 524.00 881.00 0.1905 0.8390 6.4942 -104.94 
Hardenberg 0.10 0.0495 0.1401 58207 0.8118 155.00 1306.00 0.2903 0.7575 7.5094 -60.13 
Harderwijk 0.17 0.0915 0.1328 42333 0.2030 140.00 609.00 0.1481 0.8477 9.6473 -148.48 
Hardinxveld-Giessen-
dam 
0.37 0.0944 0.1399 17604 0.5716 269.00 1562.00 0.2353 0.8166 6.8905 -120.84 
Haren -0.10 0.1280 0.2324 18706 0.6349 300.00 2319.00 0.4706 0.7958 8.0669 -136.96 
Harenkarspel  0.0744 0.1176 15932 0.8470 137.00 13.00 0.2353 0.7336  -148.33 
Harlingen 0.43 0.0613 0.1635 15567 0.0439 173.00 59.00 0.4706 0.7612 8.2611 -151.24 
Hattem 0.23 0.0866 0.1679 11657 0.5326 264.00 883.00 0.4000 0.7111 7.0430 -145.83 
Heel     0.3186       
Heemskerk 0.23 0.0786 0.1678 38381 0.2127 103.00 218.00 0.4400 0.7776 6.6752 -62.81 
Heemstede 0.20 0.1201 0.2224 25626 0.1629 310.00 1250.00 0.3333 0.8118 6.8407 -108.82 
Heerde -0.03 0.0718 0.1675 18212 0.4970 380.00 329.00 0.2941 0.7682 6.8087 -131.46 
Heerenveen 0.17 0.0649 0.1751 43027 0.7176 292.00 3425.00 0.5556 0.7407 7.9694 -111.72 
Heerhugowaard 0.57 0.0769 0.1044 50390 0.5614 163.00 1084.00 0.3103 0.8181 7.7099 -77.89 
Heerlen -0.67 0.0513 0.1821 89671 0.1864 550.00 833.00 0.5405 0.8181 12.3451 -179.77 
Heeze-Leende 0.33 0.0909 0.1744 15133 0.4200 116.00 767.00 0.1765 0.7889 6.5949 -114.89 
Heiloo 0.30 0.1089 0.2036 22024 0.5292 130.00 1628.00 0.3158 0.7978 6.9697 -88.36 





































































Den Helder -0.10 0.0718 0.1497 57795 0.0985 395.00 3403.00 0.4194 0.8470 9.0406 -110.82 
Hellendoorn 0.33 0.0831 0.1575 36059 0.5940 373.00 2737.00 0.2000 0.7584 8.5776 -120.54 
Hellevoetsluis -0.10 0.0877 0.1205 39620 0.4085 297.00 675.00 0.4074 0.7764 4.4573 -91.79 
Helmond -0.03 0.0809 0.1249 86767 0.2962 656.00 1873.00 0.3784 0.8503 9.9243 -176.83 
Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht 0.37 0.0973 0.1312 24854 0.2619 457.00 5005.00 0.2632 0.7867 4.7638 -147.83 
Hengelo (O.) -0.13 0.0796 0.1549 81088 0.4257 210.00 5475.00 0.5135 0.8181 11.0103 -108.19 
's-Hertogenbosch 0.23 0.0780 0.1339 136481 0.3932 697.00 1263.00 0.4615 0.8679 13.8459 -153.89 
Heumen 0.20 0.0918 0.1507 16628 0.5709 167.00 839.00 0.4118 0.7405 5.6291 -199.12 
Heusden 0.23 0.0839 0.1343 42942 0.5836 134.00 1382.00 0.1852 0.8258 6.1758 -108.48 
Heythuysen     0.7710       
Hillegom 0.33 0.0714 0.1585 20348 0.5772 108.00 1.00 0.2632 0.8033 6.3004 -180.78 
Hilvarenbeek 0.17 0.0625 0.1405 15107 0.6077 171.00 1764.00 0.1333 0.7644 7.0630 -106.84 
Hilversum 0.43 0.0675 0.1786 83815 0.1259 617.00 1257.00 0.4324 0.8488 7.8530 -122.18 
Hof van Twente 0.03 0.0755 0.1829 35181 0.7363 -35.00 1237.00 0.2800 0.7456 6.7480 -120.67 
Hollands Kroon 0.20           
Hoogeveen -0.17 0.0623 0.1604 54468 0.6980 752.00 799.00 0.3548 0.7763 8.1608 -81.64 
Hoogezand-Sappe-
meer 
-0.93 0.0753 0.1672 34417 0.6293 723.00 1274.00 0.6087 0.7259 10.2914 -96.42 
Hoorn 0.27 0.0685 0.1215 68696 0.0465 181.00 4087.00 0.4545 0.8062 10.3310 -86.72 
Horst aan de Maas 0.17 0.0684 0.1463 28975 0.6954 317.00 1768.00 0.4762 0.6939 10.5470 -139.12 
Houten 0.37 0.0843 0.0879 46475 0.7048 184.00 1200.00 0.3704 0.8450 7.6428 -102.57 
Huizen 0.33 0.1070 0.1397 41880 0.0485 102.00 8.00 0.2963 0.8505 6.1414 -71.41 
Hulst 0.43 0.0567 0.1790 27944 0.6164 145.00 1573.00 0.2857 0.8435 7.1572 -114.23 
Hunsel     0.8364       
IJsselstein 0.40 0.0944 0.1010 34059 0.6438 110.00 2962.00 0.5217 0.7788 7.4254 -81.40 
Jacobswoude  0.0848 0.1378 10771 0.7936 86.00 1230.00 0.0000 0.6400  -151.00 
Kaag en Braassem 0.43           
Kampen -0.03 0.0655 0.1319 49385 0.7249 305.00 528.00 0.2414 0.8419 8.0531 -64.87 
Kapelle -0.07 0.0735 0.1446 12047 0.5660 264.00 594.00 0.2000 0.8089 5.9849 -142.40 
Katwijk 0.20 0.0802 0.1310 61180 0.2415 329.00 1407.00   6.8813 -166.35 
Kerkrade -0.70 0.0424 0.1886 48334 0.1926 246.00 1481.00 0.3793 0.8133 7.5227 -139.74 
Kessel  0.0714 0.1441 4266 0.7155 97.00 3045.00 0.0000 0.6281  -247.25 
Koggenland 0.40 0.0613 0.1215 21495  189.00 186.00   5.7083 -163.19 
Kollumerland en 
Nieuwkruisland 
0.57 0.0347 0.1415 13085 0.7415 772.00 1941.00 0.4000 0.7733 9.0409 -87.81 
Korendijk -0.07 0.0791 0.1385 10934 0.6555 84.00 1215.00 0.2000 0.7911 5.1857 -121.11 
Krimpen aan den IJs-
sel 
0.17 0.1141 0.1750 28807 0.0470   0.3333 0.8027 7.3940  
Laarbeek 0.13 0.0772 0.1442 21783 0.7029 169.00 282.00 0.1579 0.7922 5.6374 -119.37 
Landerd 0.27 0.1013 0.1350 14796 0.6551 137.00 63.00 0.0000 0.8178 5.3393 -140.36 
Landgraaf -0.73 0.0436 0.1677 38748 0.3240 102.00 490.00 0.3600 0.8352 6.1758 -147.64 
Landsmeer 0.13 0.1020 0.1645 10173 0.5670 128.00 1319.00 0.4000 0.7822 6.0356 -125.88 
Langedijk 0.37 0.0939 0.1156 26047 0.4728 171.00 1529.00 0.2857 0.8299 5.6936 -116.95 
Lansingerland 0.20 0.0962 0.1122 49411  1552.00 3906.00   5.7234 -109.77 
Laren (NH.) 0.53 0.1542 0.2654 10958 0.0412 183.00 16.00 0.1333 0.7556  -204.94 
Leek -0.23 0.0814 0.1509 19289 0.8211 133.00 3609.00 0.4706 0.7612 8.5800 -147.26 
Leerdam 0.23 0.0664 0.1466 20624 0.7984 29.00 899.00 0.3158 0.8033 6.1288 -137.37 
Leersum            
Leeuwarden 0.23 0.0583 0.1451 92864 0.5251 439.00 2266.00 0.6486 0.7757 14.4243 -109.67 
Leeuwarderadeel 0.33 0.0575 0.1320 10383 0.8690 108.00 1688.00 0.4000 0.7556 7.4160 -151.94 
Leiden 0.33 0.0541 0.1176 116878 0.1187 699.00 1881.00 0.5385 0.8429 18.3807 -204.43 







































































0.87 0.0925 0.1959 72862 0.4871 127.00 243.00 0.3429 0.8163 8.5957 -170.97 
Lelystad 0.47 0.0562 0.0955 73063 0.1509 254.00 500.00 0.4857 0.8327 13.4911 -185.75 
Lemsterland  0.0561 0.1390 13430 0.5353 263.00 1389.00 0.4000 0.8178  -138.53 
Leudal -0.03 0.0632 0.1532 36744  177.00 1629.00   6.6977 -130.29 
Leusden 0.27 0.0987 0.1381 28540 0.4978 275.00 148.00 0.3333 0.8073 5.9075 -162.81 
Liemeer     0.8928       
Liesveld  0.0667 0.1209 9771 0.8123 1424.00 2196.00 0.1538 0.7692  -129.50 
Lingewaal 0.10 0.0780 0.1296 10916 0.7227 320.00 799.00 0.3333 0.7556 5.6523 -238.52 
Lingewaard 0.47 0.0814 0.1302 44617 0.6649 840.00 1383.00 0.2593 0.8340 5.6548 -120.26 
Lisse 0.40 0.0824 0.1533 22131 0.5264   0.2105 0.8255 8.0746  
Lith  0.0667 0.1179 6716 0.8285 369.00 1096.00 0.0000 0.6982  -161.11 
Littenseradiel 0.33 0.0255 0.1211 10885 0.9415 393.00 956.00 0.5333 0.7378 6.3482 -156.31 
Lochem 0.07 0.0761 0.2097 33045 0.7406 140.00 783.00   6.1764 -106.24 
Loenen  0.1192 0.1711 8280 0.7478 204.00 593.00 0.2308 0.7929  -148.68 
Loon op Zand 0.30 0.0842 0.1543 22885 0.4619   0.2632 0.7590 4.6668  
Lopik 0.17 0.0541 0.1098 14047 0.8777 116.00 0.00 0.2667 0.7644 6.9054 -135.58 
Loppersum 0.03 0.0333 0.1439 10702 0.9160 368.00 1634.00 0.4000 0.8000 6.3166 -166.48 
Losser 0.30 0.0690 0.1594 22492 0.7212 265.00 1464.00 0.2632 0.7701 7.2737 -159.62 
Maarn            
Maarssen  0.0778 0.1176 39361 0.4744 180.00 470.00 0.4400 0.7552  -116.70 
Maasbracht     0.4469       
Maasbree  0.0629 0.1236 12939 0.7034 136.00 1500.00 0.2667 0.7467  -170.87 
Maasdonk 0.37 0.0718 0.1389 11260 0.8119 143.00 510.00 0.0000 0.7556  -152.14 
Maasdriel 0.30 0.0574 0.1325 23631 0.7108 136.00 937.00 0.2632 0.7479 4.6718 -91.99 
Maasgouw -0.37 0.0706 0.1753 24545  228.00 401.00   6.9627 -188.55 
Maassluis 0.53 0.0890 0.1532 31394 0.2542 481.00 1423.00 0.4348 0.7977 9.9605 -165.84 
Maastricht 0.23 0.0564 0.1738 118004 0.3523   0.5385 0.8126 12.2140  
Margraten  0.0549 0.1717 13531 0.8205 3902.00 1101.00 0.0000 0.6844  -143.78 
De Marne -0.43 0.0395 0.1672 10696 0.5039 468.00 2769.00 0.4667 0.7733 9.3212 -188.12 
Marum -0.07 0.0547 0.1328 10218 0.8789 230.00 1294.00 0.4000 0.6933 5.0108 -116.43 
Medemblik 0.23 0.0574 0.1271 26682 0.0424 127.00 1688.00   8.9461 -57.51 
Meerlo-Wanssum  0.0566 0.1283 7672 0.6769 150.00 4.00 0.1538 0.7101  -96.74 
Meerssen 0.27 0.0566 0.1791 19744 0.6236 37.00 4656.00 0.1176 0.7197 4.8673 -119.31 
Meijel  0.0706 0.1455 5956 0.7665   0.4545 0.6777   
Menaldumadeel  0.0327 0.1335 13710 0.8739 126.00 1552.00 0.6000 0.8089  -189.88 
Menameradiel 0.33           
Menterwolde -0.30 0.0661 0.1289 12498 0.8235 205.00 1145.00 0.6667 0.7733 6.7531 -116.93 
Meppel 0.10 0.0574 0.1471 31536 0.7152 199.00 3566.00 0.3478 0.7713 9.8681 -144.56 
Middelburg (Z.) -0.20 0.0839 0.1634 47325 0.5861 80.00 5289.00 0.4138 0.8585 13.4960 -175.96 
Middelharnis  0.0722 0.1611 17689 0.5883 292.00 1709.00 0.1765 0.8512  -129.16 
Midden-Delfland 0.43 0.0868 0.1284 17451 0.7837 212.00 1182.00 0.3462 0.7515 7.1801 -147.87 
Midden-Drenthe -0.33 0.0452 0.1592 33587 0.7422 157.00 1314.00 0.1429 0.7653 6.9342 -117.57 
Mill en Sint Hubert 0.37 0.0556 0.1466 10996 0.7293 122.00 63.00 0.1333 0.7822 6.8752 -93.58 
Millingen aan de Rijn 0.53 0.0385 0.1389 5876 0.5339 96.00 765.00 0.4545 0.6942  -197.41 
Moerdijk 0.30 0.0623 0.1455 36724 0.6353 118.00 227.00 0.3200 0.8032 7.5618 -132.81 
Molenwaard 0.23           
Montferland 0.37 0.0931 0.1590 34995 0.7022 141.00 1689.00   6.4581 -112.23 
Montfoort 0.30 0.1015 0.1084 13493 0.8731 181.00 231.00 0.0000 0.8089 5.7660 -159.12 
Mook en Middelaar 0.30 0.1290 0.1663 8084 0.3774 93.00 1245.00   7.1994 -194.30 





































































Muiden 0.60 0.0965 0.1550 6608 0.2618 234.00 1.00 0.3077 0.7692 5.7809 -283.01 
Naarden 0.33 0.1070 0.1904 17140 0.2098 134.00 1232.00 0.4118 0.7543 7.3221 -133.04 
Neder-Betuwe 0.17 0.0579 0.1156 22424 0.7185 171.00 729.00 0.3158 0.7645 5.1864 -96.64 
Nederlek 0.47 0.0760 0.1563 14308 0.6648 220.00 88.00 0.3333 0.7733  -88.15 
Nederweert 0.23 0.0659 0.1490 16665 0.7400 379.00 409.00 0.1765 0.7266 7.1827 -124.43 
Neerijnen 0.33 0.0543 0.1266 11851 0.7747 802.00 781.00 0.2667 0.7911 5.9236 -106.58 
Niedorp  0.0550 0.1204 12046 0.8778 124.00 382.00 0.3333 0.7378  -166.86 
Nieuwegein 0.23 0.0725 0.1131 61087 0.1752 280.00 339.00 0.4848 0.8356 8.0639 -147.69 
Nieuwerkerk aan den 
IJssel 
 0.1287 0.1101 21741 0.5604 118.00 1414.00 0.2105 0.7812  -126.16 
Nieuwkoop 0.37 0.0721 0.1245 26777 0.5140 372.00 844.00   6.2068 -128.99 
Nieuw-Lekkerland  0.0617 0.1104 9503 0.5262 249.00 799.00 0.3077 0.7692  -213.15 
Nijefurd  0.0263 0.1808 11040 0.2873 177.00 844.00 0.4667 0.7911  -179.04 
Nijkerk 0.07 0.0836 0.1288 38982 0.7112 361.00 1545.00 0.1200 0.8384 6.0643 -82.51 
Nijmegen 0.30 0.0621 0.1300 161251 0.1912 208.00 4072.00 0.6154 0.8323 14.5612 -169.40 
Noord-Beveland 0.03 0.0547 0.1913 7289 0.5894 345.00 1326.00 0.2308 0.7929 7.7102 -211.64 
Noordenveld 0.17 0.0732 0.1890 31253 0.7158 212.00 1246.00 0.3913 0.7524 8.3640 -147.59 
Noorder-Koggenland     0.8941       
Noordoostpolder 0.17 0.0489 0.1314 45716 0.6871 209.00 72.00 0.2069 0.8109 6.9122 -91.73 
Noordwijk 0.30 0.1014 0.1468 24906 0.1617 211.00 1206.00 0.2105 0.8476 8.5040 -209.19 
Noordwijkerhout 0.10 0.0593 0.1573 15399 0.6427 390.00 1502.00 0.2941 0.7405 4.6951 -139.27 
Nuenen, Gerwen en 
Nederwetten 
0.37 0.1003 0.1473 22598 0.5831 115.00 1437.00 0.2105 0.8255 5.9297 -123.04 
Nunspeet 0.23 0.0738 0.1530 26567 0.2378 98.00 829.00 0.0952 0.7846 6.4064 -111.54 
Nuth -0.23 0.0625 0.1911 15851 0.7814 155.00 1760.00 0.2941 0.7682 5.9744 -63.05 
Obdam     0.8442       
Oegstgeest 0.30 0.1100 0.1636 22367 0.2155 418.00 3330.00 0.3158 0.7368 6.5498 -138.18 
Oirschot 0.10 0.0799 0.1457 17855 0.5791 398.00 3218.00 0.2353 0.7889 6.8664 -129.79 
Oisterwijk 0.23 0.0841 0.1687 25743 0.5683 137.00 805.00 0.3333 0.7755 7.2719 -99.29 
Oldambt 0.23           
Oldebroek 0.03 0.0563 0.1319 22771 0.5914 293.00 864.00 0.2632 0.7590 6.6839 -135.48 
Oldenzaal 0.40 0.1047 0.1559 31584 0.3312 262.00 1441.00 0.2609 0.7410 8.9476 -104.06 
Olst-Wijhe 0.03 0.0615 0.1497 17334 0.8234 276.00 1005.00 0.3529 0.7059 6.7901 -180.70 
Ommen 0.30 0.0569 0.1577 17419 0.6306 202.00 1034.00 0.1176 0.7820 8.0028 -172.78 
Onderbanken -0.67 0.0317 0.1649 8240 0.6601 50.00 537.00 0.0000 0.7101 5.9709 -252.17 
Oost Gelre 0.50 0.0746 0.1503 29873  97.00 1962.00   9.3998 -151.24 
Oosterhout 0.60 0.0912 0.1523 53785 0.4645 172.00 653.00 0.4194 0.8408 7.5411 -110.50 
Oostflakkee  0.0465 0.1481 10178 0.5550 227.00 796.00 0.3333 0.7911  -213.81 
Ooststellingwerf 0.13 0.0433 0.1676 26398 0.7370   0.4286 0.7574 7.5119  
Oostzaan 0.73 0.0833 0.1530 9205 0.3329 522.00 3137.00 0.4615 0.7929 4.9321 -170.96 
Opmeer 0.33 0.0592 0.1324 11244 0.8809 447.00 1040.00 0.2000 0.7556 7.4262 -131.82 
Opsterland 0.77 0.0334 0.1472 29703 0.7886   0.3810 0.7710 5.6930  
Oss 0.87 0.0804 0.1439 76732 0.6246 150.00 1495.00 0.4857 0.7967 9.2856 -64.04 
Oud-Beijerland 0.33 0.1060 0.1339 23824 0.6242 221.00 313.00 0.3158 0.8476 8.3739 -52.79 
Oude IJsselstreek 0.53 0.0830 0.1638 39905 0.8257 175.00 2170.00   6.8262 -120.25 
Ouder-Amstel 0.37 0.0970 0.1608 13046 0.6253 262.00 0.00 0.3333 0.7289 6.5231 -138.29 
Ouderkerk 0.23 0.0708 0.1430 8156 0.8615 176.00 992.00 0.3077 0.7692  -256.99 
Oudewater 0.37 0.0872 0.1457 9917 0.9099 136.00 1.00 0.1538 0.7811 6.2216 -176.33 
Overbetuwe 0.40 0.0766 0.1289 44226 0.7592 322.00 908.00 0.2963 0.8176 6.0598 -120.29 
Papendrecht 0.30 0.0882 0.1506 31573 0.1300 158.00 1679.00 0.3478 0.8280 6.3124 -143.84 
Peel en Maas -0.07           





































































Pijnacker-Nootdorp 0.80 0.0626 0.1087 43762 0.6023 342.00 2652.00 0.3333 0.7984 6.8256 -90.21 
Purmerend 0.40 0.0645 0.1370 78434 0.1584   0.4286 0.8490 9.0547  
Putten 0.23 0.0815 0.1509 23183 0.5496 119.00 565.00 0.1053 0.8089 5.8750 -109.46 
Raalte 0.17 0.0578 0.1467 37030 0.8178 326.00 640.00 0.2800 0.7840 6.6406 -167.83 
Reeuwijk  0.1032 0.1567 12803 0.6623 790.00 1919.00 0.2000 0.8000  -180.38 
Reiderland  0.0149 0.1702 7014 0.5110 658.00 3608.00 0.7692 0.7219  -157.22 
Reimerswaal 0.00 0.0943 0.1477 21296 0.3117 178.00 1492.00 0.2105 0.7645 6.1608 -107.82 
Renkum -0.07 0.1066 0.2237 31719 0.3330 265.00 599.00 0.4348 0.7977 7.4876 -85.37 
Renswoude 0.03 0.0595 0.0968 4482 0.8440 217.00 4288.00 0.0000 0.7107 6.2026 -182.84 
Reusel-De Mierden 0.27 0.0490 0.1281 12384 0.6278   0.2667 0.7289 7.1786  
Rheden 0.23 0.0807 0.2244 43763 0.3029 291.00 256.00 0.4444 0.8203 7.6754 -156.68 
Rhenen 0.30 0.1061 0.1627 18779 0.5078 146.00 1940.00 0.4118 0.8166 6.6138 -100.51 
Ridderkerk 0.27 0.0981 0.1908 44689 0.3741 167.00 717.00 0.3103 0.8276 6.7377 -73.84 
Rijnsburg            
Rijnwaarden -0.03 0.0796 0.1346 11008 0.6383 87.00 3793.00 0.2000 0.8000 6.7133 -138.10 
Rijnwoude  0.0644 0.1370 18704 0.8570 319.00 92.00 0.2353 0.7958  -118.27 
Rijssen-Holten 0.30 0.1058 0.1466 36667 0.5833 283.00 1499.00 0.2000 0.8160 7.1727 -93.95 
Rijswijk (ZH.) 1.17 0.0852 0.2191 46833 0.1243 1015.00 1070.00 0.2759 0.8181 7.5225 -152.40 
Roerdalen -0.57 0.0667 0.1661 21142 0.4230 123.00 856.00   6.4469 -157.79 
Roermond -1.00 0.0761 0.1572 54446 0.3313 351.00 980.00   12.1552 -95.56 
Roggel en Neer     0.6691       
De Ronde Venen 0.43 0.0982 0.1312 34569 0.6842 185.00 444.00 0.1739 0.8355 8.2531 -98.77 
Roosendaal 0.53 0.0804 0.1561 77277 0.6697 318.00 899.00 0.3714 0.8147 11.1171 -103.37 
Rotterdam 0.37 0.0669 0.1451 582951 0.0652 516.00 1832.00 0.5111 0.7269 24.3684 -330.73 
Rozenburg  0.0500 0.1478 12553 0.1923 321.00 92.00 0.2000 0.7911  -168.53 
Rozendaal 0.10 0.1739 0.2502 1511 0.0161 344.00 5.00 0.0000 0.6420  -472.17 
Rucphen 0.00 0.0494 0.1513 22473 0.6646 217.00 253.00 0.1579 0.7701 6.3943 -99.52 
Sassenheim            
Schagen 0.23 0.0720 0.1595 19064 0.6382 375.00 806.00 0.4118 0.7682 28.0424 -88.93 
Scheemda  0.0588 0.1491 14234 0.8010 326.00 1336.00 0.5333 0.7644  -110.72 
Schermer 0.40 0.0549 0.1241 5307 0.8818 234.00 522.00 0.2727 0.7438  -197.12 
Scherpenzeel 0.30 0.1066 0.1365 9037 0.6850 151.00 0.00 0.2308 0.7811 6.0972 -176.00 
Schiedam 0.57 0.0643 0.1525 74947 0.1704 -116.00 2806.00 0.5714 0.7951 14.0820 -153.87 
Schiermonnikoog -0.07 0.0000 0.1945 951 0.0162 691.00 4896.00 0.0000 0.6667 22.8181 -858.35 
Schijndel 0.50 0.0745 0.1391 22878 0.6797 503.00 769.00 0.3684 0.8476 6.6221 -102.00 
Schinnen 0.00 0.0519 0.1730 13418 0.7078 121.00 1608.00 0.2000 0.7556 5.8280 -183.45 
Schoonhoven 0.70 0.0974 0.1371 12132 0.5489 233.00 8.00 0.3333 0.8178  -180.74 
Schouwen-Duiveland 0.13 0.0796 0.1932 33994 0.3250 154.00 1738.00 0.2609 0.8507 10.4842 -100.05 
Sevenum  0.0686 0.1486 7652 0.7008 224.00 2274.00 0.0000 0.6746  -165.77 
Simpelveld -0.27 0.0625 0.1826 11206 0.7486 155.00 1866.00 0.1333 0.7822 5.2561 -102.04 
Sint Anthonis 0.13 0.0542 0.1592 11789 0.7829 216.00 652.00 0.0000 0.6844 6.9980 -108.28 
Sint-Michielsgestel 0.13 0.0909 0.1594 28100 0.7571 67.00 201.00 0.1905 0.8481 5.1673 -172.74 
Sint-Oedenrode 0.43 0.0669 0.1483 17220 0.7891 111.00 1015.00 0.0000 0.8166 7.1080 -70.53 
Sittard-Geleen -0.83 0.0571 0.1729 95691 0.4059 305.00 3245.00 0.3514 0.8473 11.5842 -163.66 
Skarsterlân  0.0501 0.1528 27097 0.7259 190.00 1039.00 0.5714 0.7392  -140.51 
Sliedrecht 0.07 0.0803 0.1641 23765 0.4721 339.00 909.00 0.3158 0.7313 6.4969 -192.61 
Slochteren -0.53 0.0437 0.1377 15564 0.8082 198.00 1574.00 0.4000 0.7911 7.7808 -101.28 
Sluis -0.23 0.0583 0.2130 24238 0.8117 449.00 1984.00 0.2105 0.8199 9.1220 -192.35 
Smallingerland 0.77 0.0489 0.1582 54962 0.7077 0.00 2170.00 0.5161 0.7888 9.8577 -63.51 
Sneek  0.0602 0.1621 33216 0.4932 432.00 2011.00 0.6087 0.7864  -196.28 





































































Someren 0.10 0.0805 0.1451 18211 0.6851 172.00 21.00 0.0000 0.8304 6.6004 -117.84 
Son en Breugel 0.20 0.0898 0.1872 15448 0.4734 132.00 399.00 0.1765 0.7889 6.6675 -125.77 
Spijkenisse 0.00 0.0720 0.1227 73107 0.3037 72.00 4773.00 0.2857 0.6824  -133.18 
Stadskanaal -0.50 0.0627 0.1842 33817 0.7748 335.00 872.00 0.4348 0.7183 10.1872 -99.46 
Staphorst 0.30 0.0386 0.1123 15973 0.8049 111.00 595.00 0.1176 0.7612 6.8115 -129.88 
Stede Broec 0.13 0.0634 0.1219 21372 0.4756 299.00 4365.00 0.2632 0.8255 5.6990 -87.98 
Steenbergen -0.03 0.0607 0.1530 23211 0.8019 128.00 19.00 0.2105 0.8255 5.5706 -138.45 
Steenwijkerland 0.13 0.0437 0.1653 43282 0.6016 270.00 1745.00 0.3704 0.8313 7.2848 -98.11 
Stein (L.) -0.30 0.0420 0.1675 26091 0.4284 277.00 2194.00 0.1429 0.8073 6.1094 -147.73 
Stichtse Vecht 0.27           
Strijen 0.47 0.0752 0.1363 9055 0.7609 89.00 2226.00 0.3077 0.7692 5.8421 -160.26 
Súdwest-Fryslân 0.73           
Swalmen     0.5329       
Terneuzen -0.17 0.0578 0.1823 55155 0.6226 177.00 1976.00 0.3548 0.7992 10.6627 -105.03 
Terschelling -0.20 0.0400 0.1678 4705 0.0220 626.00 1734.00 0.2727 0.7438 16.5143 -768.01 
Texel -0.03 0.0651 0.1554 13547 0.2200 333.00 3024.00 0.2667 0.8089 12.7113 -275.37 
Teylingen 0.43 0.0900 0.1427 35308 0.5453 155.00 1025.00   5.7522 -141.57 
Tholen 0.30 0.0513 0.1398 25264 0.4730 99.00 410.00 0.3158 0.7867 7.3543 -123.67 
Thorn     0.5614       
Tiel 0.20 0.0625 0.1179 41132 0.4989 267.00 1907.00 0.4444 0.7654 12.3456 -149.38 
Tilburg 1.03 0.0565 0.1314 202091 0.3516 278.00 728.00 0.4872 0.8363 9.9025 -61.92 
Tubbergen 0.33 0.0689 0.1360 20797 0.8617 59.00 1849.00 0.1579 0.5319 6.0441 -142.40 
Twenterand -0.20 0.0676 0.1293 33461 0.7490 93.00 988.00 0.2174 0.7637 6.0937 -133.26 
Tynaarlo -0.03 0.0789 0.1946 31974 0.7613 177.00 1992.00 0.3913 0.8393 6.7023 -106.33 
Tytsjerksteradiel 0.40 0.0478 0.1630 32243 0.7747 78.00 879.00 0.5217 0.7788 7.4280 -102.53 
Ubbergen 0.33 0.0762 0.1947 9325 0.6211 202.00 258.00 0.3077 0.7574  -186.89 
Uden 0.30 0.0890 0.1422 40126 0.6255 461.00 2068.00 0.3333 0.8422 9.2359 -71.44 
Uitgeest 0.37 0.0876 0.1270 12205 0.6683 -56.00 429.00 0.2000 0.8089 5.1372 -41.46 
Uithoorn 0.53 0.0916 0.1562 27501 0.5572 296.00 7.00 0.3333 0.7800 6.0652 -119.44 
Urk 0.13 0.0974 0.0689 17825 0.0399 317.00 3779.00 0.0000 0.7197 6.5189 -106.85 
Utrecht 0.07 0.0583 0.1037 294737 0.2728 188.00 364.00 0.6000 0.8277 14.8627 -215.35 
Utrechtse Heuvelrug 0.20 0.0899 0.1963 48979 0.3698 205.00 1374.00   5.9046 -170.56 
Vaals -0.40 0.0396 0.1949 9838 0.6100 475.00 1986.00 0.2000 0.7556 8.4875 -195.20 
Valkenburg (ZH.)            
Valkenburg aan de 
Geul 
-0.10 0.0598 0.2064 17099 0.6754 338.00 2091.00 0.2941 0.8235 6.8074 -147.45 
Valkenswaard 0.10 0.1038 0.1737 30867 0.4500 164.00 1277.00 0.2609 0.8393 7.1695 -91.46 
Veendam -0.20 0.0681 0.1655 28058 0.7369 441.00 767.00 0.5238 0.6939 12.5811 -141.27 
Veenendaal 0.17 0.0919 0.1271 61769 0.2408 45.00 1358.00 0.2727 0.8485 7.2172 116.31 
Veere 0.03 0.0669 0.1847 21998 0.4807 157.00 1472.00 0.2632 0.7645 8.0462 -130.11 
Veghel 0.27 0.0841 0.1354 36913 0.7108 390.00 401.00 0.1200 0.8064 7.4581 -114.53 
Veldhoven 0.17 0.0887 0.1506 43056 0.4038 148.00 1974.00 0.2222 0.7846 6.0990 -103.73 
Velsen 0.27 0.0792 0.1669 67556 0.0681 -6.00 2812.00 0.4242 0.8613 7.1245 -76.72 
Venhuizen            
Venlo -0.03 0.0700 0.1607 91872 0.3697 411.00 1603.00 0.3784 0.8430 12.7449 -126.90 
Venray 0.40 0.0647 0.1387 39100 0.6816 299.00 1977.00 0.3200 0.8032 7.3274 -125.73 
Vianen 0.23 0.0769 0.1272 19637 0.6519 254.00 458.00 0.2353 0.8235 7.7914 -100.16 
Vlaardingen 0.33 0.0812 0.1815 70860 0.1936 285.00 1475.00 0.5429 0.8163 9.5597 -169.60 
Vlagtwedde -0.07 0.0493 0.1925 16325 0.8336 227.00 63.00 0.4118 0.7682 7.7366 -187.35 
Vlieland -0.23 0.0000 0.1390 1124 0.0007 1583.00 5658.00 0.3333 0.6667 25.2669 -785.40 





































































Vlist 0.37 0.1090 0.1539 9853 0.9020   0.1538 0.7811   
Voerendaal -0.13 0.0667 0.1848 12757 0.8174 223.00 1387.00 0.2000 0.8267 4.6406 -139.48 
Voorhout            
Voorschoten 0.40 0.0921 0.1863 22861 0.3969 142.00 0.00 0.3684 0.7590 7.5675 -166.60 
Voorst 0.23 0.0772 0.1720 23660 0.7990   0.3158 0.7756 7.9374  
Vught 0.17 0.1101 0.1677 25337 0.4808 167.00 2137.00 0.4286 0.7937 6.9582 -72.31 
Waalre 0.37 0.1307 0.1899 16695 0.3844 239.00 0.00 0.2941 0.8235 6.4331 -212.64 
Waalwijk 0.03 0.0754 0.1496 45641 0.6480 98.00 3292.00 0.2759 0.8847 9.4958 -92.12 
Waddinxveen 0.27 0.1065 0.1450 25638 0.6628 190.00 1017.00 0.2381 0.8027 6.5918 -123.34 
Wageningen 0.03 0.0646 0.1300 36215 0.4733 130.00 2066.00 0.5600 0.8384 7.6073 -112.05 
Warmond            
Wassenaar 0.50 0.1412 0.2170 25763 0.1963 139.00 173.00 0.1429 0.7664 7.7941 -228.05 
Waterland 0.10 0.0815 0.1579 17026 0.3885 102.00 265.00 0.3529 0.8097 5.8029 -136.53 
Weert 0.10 0.0825 0.1647 48305 0.5582 560.00 1394.00 0.3448 0.7990 8.6678 -89.89 
Weesp 0.37 0.0714 0.1549 17575 0.7107 174.00 920.00 0.2941 0.8166 7.2831 -125.94 
Werkendam 0.50 0.0407 0.1352 26415 0.6528 160.00 1014.00 0.1905 0.7483 6.1972 -96.01 
Wervershoof  0.0872 0.1313 8600 0.5759 116.00 429.00 0.1538 0.8284  -179.55 
West Maas en Waal 0.17 0.0607 0.1487 18320 0.7663 173.00 1571.00 0.1176 0.8720 5.5677 -128.09 
Wester-Koggenland     0.8426       
Westerveld 0.07 0.0536 0.2052 19333 0.5664 340.00 573.00 0.4706 0.7889 7.1484 -157.05 
Westervoort 0.10 0.0714 0.1055 15478 0.3890 236.00 1625.00 0.5882 0.6920 5.9504 -214.69 
Westland 0.20 0.0777 0.1392 99299 0.5444 395.00 2382.00 0.1081 0.7772 8.5600 -66.21 
Weststellingwerf 0.20 0.0302 0.1801 25674 0.8110 215.00 2640.00 0.4762 0.7528 7.1200 -206.35 
Westvoorne 0.10 0.1173 0.1901 14084 0.3025 352.00 3205.00 0.2667 0.7644 8.6481 -140.08 
Wierden 0.20 0.0866 0.1444 23365 0.7720 231.00 414.00 0.0000 0.6814 7.1218 -132.47 
Wieringen  0.0672 0.1680 8636 0.0980 180.00 1161.00 0.3077 0.7692  -174.46 
Wieringermeer  0.0415 0.1424 12614 0.5712 0.00 424.00 0.2000 0.8267  -129.85 
Wijchen 0.13 0.0773 0.1281 39660 0.6498 255.00 1062.00 0.2800 0.7744 6.1397 -104.33 
Wijdemeren 0.30 0.0903 0.1739 23432 0.3586 256.00 623.00 0.2632 0.8144 6.2863 -125.49 
Wijk bij Duurstede 0.17 0.0790 0.1000 23306 0.7376 255.00 339.00 0.5263 0.8421 6.7279 -138.02 
Winschoten  0.0637 0.2054 18358 0.4366 292.00 3152.00 0.7059 0.6574  -203.83 
Winsum 0.00 0.0559 0.1323 13925 0.9175 101.00 1191.00 0.4000 0.8178 6.2478 -117.19 
Winterswijk 0.33 0.0615 0.1727 29182 0.7616 165.00 2511.00 0.2857 0.7347 8.1557 -106.53 
Woensdrecht -0.03 0.0750 0.1634 21637 0.4626 194.00 505.00 0.2632 0.7812 5.3381 -152.53 
Woerden 0.33 0.0832 0.1253 48383 0.7928 375.00 1111.00 0.2414 0.8109 7.1492 -121.71 
Wognum     0.8478       
De Wolden 0.03 0.0475 0.1741 23554 0.8295 155.00 615.00 0.2632 0.7922 7.2684 -95.12 
Wormerland 0.73 0.0691 0.1579 15901 0.7273 85.00 890.00 0.4706 0.7958 5.0563 -156.28 
Woudenberg 0.20 0.0892 0.1413 11592 0.6304 354.00 1355.00 0.1333 0.7733 5.8920 -148.21 
Woudrichem 0.23 0.0597 0.1345 14421 0.7930 143.00 1401.00 0.2000 0.7733 5.5960 -175.74 
Wûnseradiel  0.0244 0.1305 11855 0.4465 161.00 1186.00 0.5333 0.7644  -130.71 
Wymbritseradiel  0.0429 0.1288 16078 0.7808 167.00 553.00 0.4118 0.7958  -172.25 
Zaanstad 0.70 0.0715 0.1447 142863 0.4155 275.00 2680.00 0.5128 0.8389 9.0331 -151.11 
Zaltbommel 0.30 0.0635 0.1290 26185 0.7181 675.00 1161.00 0.2857 0.8481 6.7711 -117.93 
Zandvoort 0.10 0.0870 0.1932 16665 0.0025 303.00 1312.00 0.2941 0.8028 9.5530 -242.85 
Zederik 0.23 0.0548 0.1371 13389 0.8517 148.00 1853.00 0.2000 0.8178 5.7585 -140.34 
Zeevang 0.40 0.0947 0.1255 6306 0.6263 107.00 889.00 0.2308 0.6982 5.2965 -221.43 
Zeewolde 0.27 0.0625 0.0800 20286 0.6438 -189.00 2326.00 0.1765 0.7958 8.0795 -159.31 
Zeist 0.33 0.1139 0.1744 60488 0.1248 172.00 889.00 0.3939 0.8522 12.9315 -80.96 







































































 0.0934 0.1460 10314 0.8350 311.00 1087.00 0.2000 0.8267  -170.80 
Zijpe  0.0503 0.1406 11512 0.6607 194.00 586.00 0.2667 0.7822  -205.05 
Zoetermeer 0.57 0.0708 0.1158 119504 0.2032 258.00 62.00 0.4103 0.8442 10.6105 -171.84 
Zoeterwoude 0.57 0.0694 0.1364 8303 0.8079 330.00 2248.00 0.0000 0.6154 8.2139 -248.10 
Zuidhorn 0.03 0.0490 0.1291 18374 0.8907 459.00 531.00 0.4118 0.7889 6.6017 -138.86 
Zuidplas 0.57           
Zundert 0.57 0.0526 0.1598 20947 0.8112   0.1053 0.8421 5.3516  
Zutphen -0.43 0.0614 0.1398 46762 0.4708 246.00 3285.00   9.9974 -124.63 
Zwartewaterland 0.40 0.0874 0.1091 21930 0.7856 275.00 2224.00 0.2105 0.7922 6.5527 -167.34 
Zwijndrecht 0.23 0.0915 0.1752 44472 0.2670 302.00 2369.00 0.3793 0.8062 6.1050 -93.85 
Zwolle 0.23 0.0578 0.1268 116365 0.5723 499.00 2653.00 0.4615 0.8560 11.2654 -162.92 
 
(Data sources: (1): CBS, Arbeidsdeelname; regionale indeling 2014, 2003-2014; (2): CBS, Ves-
tigingen van bedrijven; bedrijfstak, gemeente; (3): CBS, Regionale kerncijfers Nederland; 
(4)+(10): CBS, Bevolkingsontwikkeling; regio per maand; (5): CBS, Bodemgebruik; uitgebreide 
gebruiksvorm, per gemeente; (6)-(7): CBS, Gemeenterekeningen; balans per gemeente 2005-
2014; (8)-(9): Kiesraad, Verkiezingsuitslagen 2006; (10): Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 
en Koninkrijksrelaties, Werknemers Overheid en Onderwijs-Personen en FTE (instellingen 
openbaar bestuur en veiligheid); (11): CBS, Gemeenterekeningen; per gemeente, baten en 
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Local Government in Times of Global Challenges. The Implications of the Financial Crisis since 
2007 on Public Finances at the Municipal Level in the Netherlands 
 
The Financial Crisis since 2007 is one of the most important challenges in recent decades. 
Starting with financing problems in the United States’ real estate market, the financial diffi-
culties developed into a major crisis affecting nearly all economic sectors in industrial coun-
tries. Next to citizens who have lost their jobs and companies that went bankrupt, the public 
sector was – and partially still is – affected by lower tax revenues and higher expenses. These 
rather unfavourable developments of public budgets are caused by a variety of direct and 
indirect implications of the Crisis, ranging from lower income and corporate taxes to higher 
social expenditures and bailout packages. 
On closer inspection, the impact of and responses to the recent Financial Crisis involved all 
levels of government, depending on the division of tasks and responsibilities within systems 
of multi-level governance. While the roles of the national, supranational, and international 
levels during the Crisis were widely reported in news coverage and academic research, the 
implications for sub-national government received far less attention. Taking into account that 
local government is the main provider of public services in many countries, the importance of 
the financial position of this level of government should not be underestimated. Furthermore, 
the usual division into a large number of territorial units with identical tasks enables broad 
variation regarding the consequences of external events, such as a financial crisis. To under-
stand why certain municipalities were more affected than others can also be considered as 
crucial when aiming to take measures to lessen the negative consequences of similar devel-
opments in the future. 
Analysing how the financial situation of local government was affected by the Financial Crisis 
since 2007 and what factors determined variation was the main intention of this study. The 
Netherlands, along with its roughly 400 municipalities, was chosen as the object of research. 
By following a multidisciplinary approach, the study combined theoretical considerations from 
the academic disciplines of public administration, political science, economics, law, psychol-
ogy, and sociology. From a methodological perspective, mainly quantitative analyses were 
supplemented by qualitative additions. 
Based on official governmental statistics of municipal revenues and expenses, the negative 
implications of the recent Financial Crisis on the financial positions of Dutch municipalities 
were identified in the first step of the empirical analyses. At an aggregated level and after 
adjusting for inflation, adverse financial developments and burdens became evident in the 
policy area of social services. These adverse consequences were also found for the separate 
balance sheet items administrative support of the executive board, within the policy area of 
general administration, as well as building permits and land development, the latter two of 




land development, mainly originating from municipal investments in exploiting industrial ar-
eas, which turned out to be unsaleable during the Financial Crisis, also represent the most 
relevant impact of the Crisis in the case of Dutch municipalities according to previous research. 
When comparing the average expenses for social services between 2005 and 2007 with those 
between 2009 and 2011 for all Dutch municipalities, the costs increased by 44.8%. During the 
same time periods, the average expenditures for the administrative support of the executive 
board rose by 7.9%. In the cases of building permits and land developments, the time period 
from 2005 to 2007 was compared to the time period from 2011 to 2013, since a certain tem-
poral lag of the effects was recognised. For building permits, a 28.9% decrease in the average 
income was identified, while for land development, a decrease of 234.8% was calculated. In 
the latter case, the balance sheet item changed from average revenues to average expenses 
at an aggregated level. 
To assess the wider financial consequences of the recent Financial Crisis at the Dutch local 
level, the inflation-adjusted development of the budgetary situation in terms of the financial 
results was also of interest. When comparing the time periods 2005–2007 with 2009–2011, 
the average short-term debt increased by 32.1%, while the average long-term debt rose by 
5.8%. In other words, the financial situation of Dutch municipalities has deteriorated signifi-
cantly in recent years. 
Overall, it can be observed that the variation in financial changes was relatively high across 
the Dutch local level. This also implies that individual municipalities experienced no financial 
problems in the policy area and balance sheet items under closer inspection, had financial 
difficulties in other areas, or even improved their financial position in general. Furthermore, 
it needs to be taken into account that the recent Financial Crisis was not the only factor of 
influence on municipal finances in recent years. Particularly in the policy area of social ser-
vices, other factors of influence are plausible. However, by assessing various trends and de-
velopments in local government and governance in general, as well as in the case of the Neth-
erlands in particular, it was concluded that they did not substantially influence the financial 
changes identified in the context of the Financial Crisis since 2007. 
In addition, the results of three consecutive surveys among Dutch mayors provided further 
evidence regarding the recent Financial Crisis as the main reason for financial changes at the 
local level in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the survey data revealed that austerity measures 
focused primarily on personnel costs and across-the-board cuts. On the other hand, the 
mayors’ statements regarding financial changes on both sides of the budget illustrated that 
their perceptions did not always comply with official governmental statistics. This is particu-
larly interesting considering their role in crisis management. 
The factors that determine variation at an individual level were the focus of the second step 
of the empirical analyses of public finances at the Dutch local level in times of crisis. Therefore, 
financial data on areas of municipal activities previously identified as affected by the Financial 
Crisis since 2007 were combined with data on 11 structure-, institution-, and interest-based 
factors with a potential influence on municipal finances during a financial crisis derived based 




variation in the financial developments across multiple policy areas, balance sheet items, or 
financial results of interest. This is not unexpected considering the high complexity of financial 
crises and public finances. However, statistically significant interrelations were revealed in 
some separate areas. 
Increases in expenditures related to social services turned out to be influenced by both the 
size of the municipality in terms of the number of inhabitants and the share of left parties in 
the municipal council. In the context of higher costs for the administrative support of the ex-
ecutive board, the overall administrative budget appeared to be relevant. With respect to 
building permits, as a source of municipal revenues, the share of the elderly and the degree 
of urbanisation were identified as influential factors for the financial developments. In the 
case of land development, which is the area of activities by Dutch local government that was 
most affected by the recent Financial Crisis and therefore of particular interest in the analyses, 
the share of the elderly was the only factor with some limited statistical significance in terms 
of explaining variation. 
Higher short-term debt, as a common consequence of the recent Financial Crisis, depended 
on the change in unemployment, according to the statistical results for Dutch municipalities. 
Lastly, for long-term debt, the existing amount of short-term debt appeared to have an influ-
ence on the increases. 
Most of the potential relationships between financial developments and possible factors of 
influence analysed in the empirical part of this study were not confirmed statistically. This is 
best explained by the overall complexity of budgetary developments in municipal finances and 
policy decisions, which take place rather unsystematically, thereby making the detection and 
explanation of holistic patterns impossible by definition. Given that many factors of potential 
influence on public finances were rejected in this study as well as in other research, the validity 
and applicability of the political-administrative and socio-economic theories from which the 
factors were derived may be questioned as well. 
In summary, this study provided detailed new insights into the implications of the Financial 
Crisis since 2007 at the municipal level in the Netherlands and contributed to a better scientific 
understanding of public finances and budgetary changes at the local level of government in 





Summary in Dutch 
De lokale overheid in tijden van mondiale uitdagingen. De gevolgen van de Financiële Crisis 
sinds 2007 op publieke financiën op het gemeentelijk niveau in Nederland 
 
De Financiële Crisis die begon in 2007 is één van de grootste uitdagingen in afgelopen decen-
nia. De financiële moeilijkheden, die begonnen met de financieringsproblemen in de huizen-
markt van de Verenigde Staten, ontwikkelden zich tot een grote crisis, die bijna alle economi-
sche sectoren in industriële landen raakte. Naast dat burgers hun baan verloren en bedrijven 
bankroet gingen, werd – en deels wordt – de publieke sector aangetast door lagere belasting-
inkomsten en hogere uitgaven. Deze enigszins ongunstige ontwikkelingen van de publieke be-
grotingen werden veroorzaakt door een diversiteit van directe en indirecte gevolgen van de 
Crisis, variërend van lagere inkomsten- en bedrijfsbelastingen tot hogere sociale uitgaven en 
bailout-pakketten. 
Uit nader onderzoek blijkt dat de impact van, en reacties op, de Financiële Crisis alle over-
heidsniveaus betroffen, afhankelijk van de verdeling van taken en verantwoordelijkheden bin-
nen systemen van multi-level governance. Terwijl de rollen van het nationale, het supranati-
onale en het internationale niveau tijdens de Crisis uitgebreid in het nieuws en academisch 
onderzoek besproken werden, kregen de gevolgen voor het sub-nationale niveau minder aan-
dacht. Er mee rekening houdende dat lokale overheden in veel landen de hoofdleverancier 
zijn van publieke diensten, mag het belang van de financiële positie van dit overheidsniveau 
niet onderschat worden. De gangbare verdeling in een groot aantal territoriale eenheden met 
identieke taken, maakt een grote variëteit op het gebied van externe gebeurtenissen, zoals de 
financiële crisis, mogelijk. Om beleid dat negatieve gevolgen van gelijkaardige ontwikkelingen 
in de toekomst beperkt, te kunnen ontwikkelen, is het van cruciaal belang te begrijpen 
waarom sommige gemeenten meer getroffen zijn dan anderen. 
Het belangrijkste doel van deze studie was het analyseren van hoe de financiële positie van 
lokale overheden werd beïnvloed door de Financiële Crisis en welke factoren deze variatie 
verklaren. Nederland met haar ongeveer 400 gemeenten, is gekozen als object van deze stu-
die. Door in deze studie een multidisciplinaire aanpak te gebruiken, was het mogelijk om in-
zichten van zowel bestuurskunde, politieke wetenschappen, economie, rechten, psychologie, 
en sociologie te combineren. Vanuit een methodologisch perspectief werden hoofdzakelijk 
kwantitatieve analyses gebruikt, aangevuld met kwalitatieve inzichten. 
In een eerste fase van de empirische analyse werden de negatieve gevolgen van de recente 
Financiële Crisis op de financiële positie van lokale overheden in kaart gebracht, gebaseerd op 
officiële overheidsstatistieken. Nadat correctie op inflatie, werd het op een geaggregeerd ni-
veau duidelijk dat er negatieve financiële lasten en ontwikkelingen konden geïdentificeerd 
worden in de volgende gebieden: het beleidsdomein ‘sociale voorzieningen en maatschappe-
lijke dienstverlening’ in het algemeen; binnen het beleidsdomein ‘algemeen bestuur’ het sub-




domeinen ‘bouwvergunningen’ en ‘bouwgrondexploitatie’ binnen het beleidsdomein ‘ruimte-
lijke ordening en volkshuisvesting’. Eerder onderzoek had reeds aangetoond dat financiële 
moeilijkheden rond ‘bouwgrondexploitatie’, voornamelijk te herleiden tot gemeentelijke in-
vesteringen in industriële gebieden die door de Financiële Crisis niet verkoopbaar waren, de 
belangrijkste impact van de Crisis op Nederlandse gemeenten genereerde. 
Indien de gemiddelde kosten voor ‘sociale voorzieningen en maatschappelijke dienstverle-
ning’ tussen 2005 en 2007 voor alle Nederlandse gemeenten worden vergeleken met de ge-
middelde kosten tussen 2009 en 2011, kan een kostenverhoging worden geobserveerd van 
44.8%. Gedurende deze zelfde perioden gingen de gemiddelde kosten voor ‘bestuursonder-
steuning van het college van burgemeester en wethouders’ omhoog met 7.9%. Voor de sub-
domeinen ‘bouwvergunningen’ en ‘bouwgrondexploitatie’, werd een vergelijking gemaakt 
tussen de perioden 2005 en 2007, en 2011 en 2013, gezien er hier sprake van een temporele 
vertraging van de effecten (i.e.: de effecten van de Financiële Crisis zijn pas trager merkbaar). 
Wat betreft ‘bouwvergunningen’ werd een vermindering van de gemiddelde inkomsten geob-
serveerd van 28.9%, terwijl het wat betreft ‘bouwgrondexploitatie’ ging het om een vermin-
dering van 234.8%. Bij laatstgenoemde betekende dit dat op geaggregeerd niveau het sub-
domein niet langer op de jaarbalans bij gemiddelde inkomsten werd geplaatst, maar bij ge-
middelde uitgaven. 
Het is ook relevant om de algemene ontwikkeling van de budgettaire situatie te bekijken, na 
inflatiecorrectie, dit om de bredere financiële gevolgen van de recente Financiële Crisis op het 
Nederlandse lokale niveau te kunnen beoordelen. Wanneer de perioden tussen 2005 en 2007, 
en tussen 2009 en 2011 worden vergeleken, kan een verhoging van de gemiddelde kortlo-
pende schuld met 32.1% en de vaste schuld met 5.8% worden waargenomen. Met andere 
woorden verslechterde de financiële toestand van Nederlandse gemeenten in significante 
mate gedurende deze periode. 
Over het algemeen was er een behoorlijk grote variatie ten aanzien van financiële wijzigingen 
op het Nederlandse lokale niveau. Dit betekent ook dat een aantal gemeenten geen financiële 
moeilijkheden hebben ondervonden in de hierboven aangeduide domeinen en sub-domei-
nen, dat sommige gemeenten moeilijkheden ondervonden in andere gebieden en andere ge-
meenten zelfs hun algemene financiële positie verbeterd hebben. Tevens moet er rekening 
worden gehouden met het feit dat de Financiële Crisis niet de enige factor is geweest die in 
de afgelopen jaren invloed heeft gehad op de gemeentelijke financiën. In het bijzonder in het 
beleidsdomein ‘sociale voorzieningen en maatschappelijke dienstverlening’ is het plausibel 
dat ook andere factoren invloed hadden. Desalniettemin kan op basis van een analyse van 
verscheidene trends en ontwikkelingen in lokale overheden en bestuur in het algemeen, en 
specifiek in de Nederlandse context, geconcludeerd worden dat deze factoren geen substan-
tiële invloed hebben gehad op de conclusies die getrokken zijn omtrent de financiële wijzigin-
gen geïdentificeerd in de context van de Financiële Crisis. 
Daarnaast gaven de resultaten van drie opeenvolgende enquêtes verdere fundering voor het 
idee dat de Financiële Crisis de voornaamste reden was voor financiële veranderingen op het 




maatregelen voornamelijk toegespitst waren op personeelskosten en besparingen over de ge-
hele linie. Tegelijkertijd illustreerden de antwoorden van de burgemeesters rond de wijzigin-
gen in de jaarbalans dat hun percepties niet steeds overeenkwamen met de officiële over-
heidscijfers. Dit is in het bijzonder relevant gezien hun rol in crisismanagement. 
Het tweede gedeelte van de empirische analyse van publieke financiën op het Nederlandse 
lokale niveau in tijden van crisis richtte zich op de factoren die de variatie op een individueel 
niveau verklaren. Om dit te bewerkstelligen, werden, gebaseerd op theoretische overwegin-
gen, elf op structuur, institutie, en belangen gebaseerde factoren met een potentiële invloed 
op gemeentelijke financiën tijdens een financiële crisis geïdentificeerd. Deze werden vergele-
ken met de financiële data op het gebied van gemeentelijke activiteiten waarvoor in de vorige 
fase werden vastgesteld dat er een invloed was van de Financiële Crisis. Het was echter niet 
mogelijk om een enkele factor te identificeren die de variatie in de financiële ontwikkelingen 
verklaard tussen de verscheidene van belang zijnde beleidsterreinen, balansposten, of finan-
ciële resultaten. Dit is niet onverwacht gezien de hoge complexiteit van financiële crises en 
publieke financiën. Echter, zijn in sommige gescheiden gebieden wel statistisch significante 
onderlinge relaties te onderscheiden. 
Verhogingen van uitgaven met betrekking op ‘sociale voorzieningen en maatschappelijke 
dienstverlening’ bleken te worden beïnvloed door de grootte van de gemeente op het gebied 
van inwoners en door het aandeel linkse partijen in de gemeenteraad. In de context van ho-
gere kosten voor de ‘bestuursondersteuning van het college van burgemeester en wethou-
ders’ bleek het totale budget voor het algemeen bestuur van belang. Op het gebied van ‘bouw-
vergunningen’ als bron van gemeentelijke inkomsten, werden het aandeel ouderen en de 
mate van verstedelijking gevonden als invloedrijke factoren voor de financiële ontwikkelingen. 
Ten aanzien van ‘bouwgrondexploitatie’ – het activiteitengebied van de Nederlandse lokale 
overheid die het meest geraakt is door de recente Financiële Crisis, en dus van specifiek belang 
in de analyses – bleek het aandeel ouderen de enige factor met enige, doch beperkte, statis-
tische significantie voor het verklaren van variatie. 
Hogere kortlopende schuld – een veelvoorkomend gevolg van de recente Financiële Crisis – 
was op basis van de statistische resultaten voor Nederlandse gemeenten afhankelijk van de 
verandering in werkloosheid. Als laatste, bleek de bestaande hoeveelheid kortlopende schuld 
van invloed op de toename van vaste schuld. 
De meeste potentiële relaties tussen de financiële ontwikkelingen en mogelijke factoren die 
van invloed zijn - zoals geanalyseerd in het empirische gedeelte van deze studie – werden niet 
statistisch bevestigd. Dit kan het best worden verklaard door de algehele complexiteit van 
budgettaire ontwikkelingen in gemeentelijke financiën en besluiten voor beleid, die nogal on-
systematisch plaatsvinden, en het onderscheiden en verklaren van holistische patronen 
daarom per definitie onmogelijk maken. Dit betekent ook dat de validiteit en toepasbaarheid 
van de politiek-administratieve en sociaaleconomische theorieën die gebruikt werden om de 
vele factoren met een potentiële invloed op publieke financiën te identificeren, in vraag kun-




Alles bij elkaar genomen heeft deze studie gedetailleerde nieuwe inzichten gegenereerd in de 
implicaties van de Financiële Crisis sinds 2007 voor het gemeentelijke niveau in Nederland, en 
heeft het bijgedragen aan een beter wetenschappelijk begrip van publieke financiën en bud-
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